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ABSTRACT 
In the first few years of the twentieth century, there 
was a flurry of excitement in the British press over the 
alleged American economic 11 invasion" of England. British 
writers of that time and historians since have made it clear 
that by 1901-2 the scope of American activity in England was 
already impressiye. This study attempts to trace the response 
of British opinion to the emergence of this American chal-
lenge to British economic supremacy, in the United States and 
around the world as well as in England, in the period 1873-
1903. It is a study not of the real dimensions of this 
American challenge but of the growing British awareness of 
it and is based upon an examination of representative organs 
of the British press. 
During the years 1873-89, which are treated in Chapters 
I and II, discussion of the American challenge was general 
and wide-ranging. The most consistent theme was that, while 
the "Great Depression" kept British economic activity at a 
relatively low level, industrial America was growing rapidly. 
Alarming predictions of future American economic strength 
were coupled with the recognition that the Americans were 
becoming increasingly self-sufficient in products formerly 
supplied by the British and that the Americans were beginning 
to compete with the British in exporting manufactured goods 
to world markets, especially to Canada. 
The years 1890-97 saw the continuation of these themes 
but concern over ".McKinleyism" dominated the pages of the 
British press. Chapters III-V deal with the domestic aspect 
-of "I1cKinleyism": the losses--real and anticipated--resulting 
from the prohibitive levels of the McKinley and Dingley 
tariffs; the transfer of British capital and labor across the 
Atlantic; and the rapid growth of American basic industries 
such as textiles, coal, iron and steel behind the high wall 
of protection. The next four chapters deal with the external 
aspects of the period 1890-97. Chapter VI deals with the 
increase of American manufactured exports; schemes to revive 
American shipping; and the global expansion of American influ-
ence. Chapters VII and VIII examine reciprocity and compe-
tition in Canada and Latin America. Chapter IX deals with 
American competition in Europe, Africa, Asia, the British 
Empire and in Britain itself. The chapter concludes with an 
examination of 1897, for the beginnings of the excited public 
discussions of the American challenge which marked the first 
years of the new century may be traced to this year, which 
witnessed both the passage of the Dingley Tariff and sizeable 
shipments of American iron and steel to British and other 
foreign markets. The climax of this British concern over 
American competition in the years 1898-1903 is treated in a 
brief epilogue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By the late nineteenth century, America-watching was 
already a British tradition of long standing. ~ong the 
welter of conflicting opinion and testimony offered by Bri-
tish commentators there was a fairly common and consistent 
observation; this was the general and rather complacent 
prediction that at some time in the future the American 
nation must become the most prosperous in the world. For 
centuries prominent Englishmen kept returning to this theme. 
William Paterson, who had been instrumental in founding the 
Bank of England in the seventeenth century, had presented 
this prescient vision of the American future: 
Ir neither Britain singly, nor the maritime 
Powers of Europe, will treat for Darien, the per-
iod is not very far distant when, instead of 
waiting for the slow returns of trade, America 
will seize the pass of Darien. Their ~ext move 
will be to hold the Sandwich Islands. Stationed 
thus in the middle, on the east and on the west 
sides of the New World, English-Americans will 
form the most potent and singular empire that has 
appeared, because it will consist, not in the 
dominion of a part of the land of the globe, but 
in the dominion of the whole ocean. They can make 
the tour of the Indian and Southern Seas, collect-
ing wealth by trade wherever they pass. During 
European wars they may have the carrying trade of 
all. If blessed with letters and arts they will 
spread civilization over the universe. Then Eng-
land, with all her liberties and glory, may be 
known as Egypt is now.l 
1Quoted in Benjamin Taylor, "The Coming Struggle in the 
Pacific," Nineteenth Century, XLIV (October, 1898) 1 661. 
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In the late eighteenth century Edmund Burke had stated 
it this way: 
Young man, there is America--which at this day 
serves for little more than to amuse you with 
stories of savage man and uncouth manners; yet 
shall, before you taste of death, show itself 
equal to the whole of that commerce which now 
attracts the envy 01· the world.2 
Some of Burke's contemporaries were more specific. Thomas 
Malthus had warned his countrymen that, if England were ever 
to lose her position of manufacturing leadership, the danger 
would come from America, with her superior resources: 
According to general principles, it will fin-
ally answer to most landed nations both to manufac-
ture for themselves, and to conduct their own com-
merce. That raw cotton should be shipped in America, 
carried some thousands of miles to another country, 
there to be manufactured and shipped again for the 
American market, is a state of things that cannot 
be permanent. A purely commercial State must always 
be undersold and driven out of the 3market by those who possess the advantage of land. 
The generation of Englishmen which saw the repeal of the 
Corn Laws and the booming prosperity which characterized the 
mid-Victorian years was no less impressed with the American 
future. As early as 1835 Richard Cobden had urged his coun-
try to adopt many of the American economic innovations if 
they hoped to keep pace.4 By mid-century The Economist had 
2Quoted in "England and Her Second Colonial Empire," 
Quarterly Review, CLVlII (July, 1884), 135. 
3Quoted in "Ritortus," "The Imperialism of British Trade: 
Part I," Contemporary Review, LXXVI (July, 1899), 140. 
4
see H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: 
A Rister of An lo-American Relations · ~ew York: 
St. Martin s Press, 1 5 , 74. 
!orecast: 
From the relative progress of the two countries 
within the last sixty years, it may be inferred 
that the superiority of the United States to 
England is ultimately as certain as the next 
eclipse.5 
3 
).nd the British economist Robert Torrens, less confident than 
Cobden and The Economist of the wisdom of unilateral Free 
Trade, wrote at about the same time: 
In the United States the rewards of industry 
are more than commensurate with its efficacy; the 
attraction of higher profits and higher wages turns 
upon their shores, from all the other quarters of 
the globe, a never-ebbing tide of capital and la-
bour; their progress is the most rapid that the 
world ever saw. 
The United Kingdom presents a different pic-
ture. Here the rewards of industry are not commen-
surate with its efficacy. The tide of capital and 
labour recedes from the British shores.6 
In the late 1870s and early 1880s, such observations 
were still being made. In 18?9, in an article destined to 
be widely and sometimes angrily quoted by his contemporaries, 
William Gladstone wrote 
of the menace which in the prospective development 
of her resources America offers to the commercial 
supremacy of England. On this subject I will only 
say that it is she alone who, at a coming time, 
can and probably will wrest from us our commercial 
supremacy •••• We have no more title against her 
than Venice or Genoa or Holland has had against us. • • • 
5March 8, 1851; quoted in J. H. Clapham, An Economic Ris-
to~ of Modern Britain, Vol. II, Free Trade and S~eel, 1850-
1[__ (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), 10. 
6Quoted in "Ritortus," "The Imperialism of British Trade: 
Part I," 141. 
?"Kin Beyond the Sea," North American Review (1879); 
quoted in Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 82. 
Allusions to, and paraphrases of, this remark were frequent 
in the Bri~ish press in the late nineteenth century; see 
below, passim. 
7 
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By 1879, however, it was no longer possible to make such 
statements without being controversial. The Great Depression, 
which had begun in 1873, had produced a wave of introspective 
analyses and foreign comparisons. Free Trade was coming 
under heavy attack and its antithesis, Fair Trade,8 was be-
ginning to win considerable support. As a competent and 
cautious analyst of Britain's economic situation wrote: "a 
not inconsiderable section of the community both hope and 
expect" that Britain would re-adopt a system of protective 
tariffs. 
The most loyal and patient free-traders are not 
without serious cause for discontent with the 
existing condition of things •••• Free trade is 
now more than at any previous period on its trial. 
The crisis is pregnant with important issues •••• 9 
One of those issues was the alleged American challenge 
to British economic superiority. 10 While, in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century and later, numerous predictions of 
American economic greatness continued to be made in the 
characteristic future mode, a new sense of imminent danger 
began to appear in many observations on America. There were 
8For the sake of consistency I will capitalize both the 
phrase "Fair Trade" (which was always capitalized) and the 
phrase "Free Trade" (which appeared in a variety of ways) ex-
cept when the latter term appears in some other fashion in 
a direct quotation. 
9James Stephen Jeans, England's Supremacy: Its Sources, 
Economics$ and Dangers (London: Lon3mans, Green, and Co., 
1885) t ll -116. 
10
rt is not without significan:e that most of the earlier 
statements above were quoted by British writers of the late 
nineteenth century. 
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not a few who argued that the often-predicted American assump-
tion of economic supremacy was at hand. They were angered 
by the apparent complacency of Gladstone's statement and 
others like it. The vigorously-debated issue of the Ameri-
can challenge, and the broader debate over Britidh fiscal 
policy of which it was a part, were indications that by the 
end of the 1870s the British were becoming aware of, and 
very sensitive to, important changes in the nineteenth-
century economy. British discussion of the American chal-
lenge occurred against the background, first, of the Great 
Depression, and secondly, of Britain's loss of the industrial-
commercial monopoly she had long enjoyed. 
In 1873 the great mid-Victorian economic boom came to 
an end. 11 For the next two decades and more, the economic 
11The literature on the Great Depression is extensive 
and increasing. As Derek H. Aldcroft has written: "In the 
last few years the period 1870-1914 has become as popular as 
t.he classical industrial revolution as a field for scholarly 
study." The book which Aldcroft edited, The Develo ment of 
British Industry and Forei n Com etition London: 
eorge Allen & Unwin Ltd., , is t e best introduction 
to the role of foreign competition during the Great Depression. 
It provides case studies of ten major British industries. 
Its use for this dissertation is limited, however, by the 
fact that the contributors are primarily concerned with the 
entrepreneurial response to foreign competition. Important 
also, but with similar limitations, are two articles by David 
E. Novak and Matthew Simon, "Some Dimensions of the American 
Commercial Invasion of Europe, 1871-1914: An Introductory 
Essay," Journal of Economic History, XXIV (1964), 591-605; 
and "Commercial Responses to the American Export Invasion, 
1871-1914: An Easay in Attitudinal History, 11 Explorations in 
Entrepreneurial History, Second Series, III (Winter, 1966), 
121-4(. A recen~ ganeral treatment of the period can be found 
in the first ten chapters of William Ashworth, An Economic 
History of England, 1870-1939 (London: Methuen~ Co., Ltd., 
!9E'>O); it is more concerned with questions of long-term growth 
and response, as is much of the recent work, than with the 
pi 
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indices by which the British were accustomed to measure their 
economic performance all declined. Reliable statistics on 
the home market and on invisible exports (profits from ship-
ping, banking, insurance, foreign investments, and so forth)--
indicators which would have helped to maintain confidence--
were not available at the time. The British public had there-
fore grown accustomed to gauging its economic well-being 
almost exclusively by means of foreign trade figures and the 
profit-loss statements of such key concerns as the textile, 
metals, and s~ipping industries. Gladstone typified this 
attitude when he wrote that, though he recognized the impor-
tance of the home market, "foreign trade is none the less the 
main instigator of progressive industry and enterprise in 
every domestic department ••••• 1112 These accepted indicators 
declined throughout the 1870s, reaching bottom in 1879, and 
this led to the extensive public interest in and debate of 
economic questions which characterized the last Victorian 
generation. 
particular features of the Great Depression. A summary of 
the current debate over the Great Depression can be found in 
Charles Wilson, "Economy and Society in Late Victorian Bri-
taint" Economic History Review, Second Series, XVIII (August, 
1965;, 183-98. For a more descriptive approach to the Great 
Depression, consult J. H. Clapham, An Economic Histor. of 
Modern Britain, Vol. II, Free Trade and Steel -1 , and 
Vol. III, Macfiines and Nationa ... iva ries with an 
ilo ue l - ~·€w e acmi lan ~ompany, 
; and the excellent collection of material in W.H.B. 
Court, British Economic Histor 1870-1914: Commentar and 
Documents Cam ridge: T e niversity 
12william E. Gladstone, "Free Trade, Railways, and the 
Growth of Commerce," Nineteenth Century, VII (February, 1880), 
375. 
a 
? 
Coinciding with the Great Depression was the appearance 
of commercial and industrial rivals. It had become obvious 
to nearly everyone in Britain that the British commercial-
industrial monopoly was a thing of the past. Even before 
1873 Britain had had to face new rivals in certain industrial 
products, chiefly textiles. The United States, France, Bel-
gium, and other countries had found it relatively easy to 
establish the unsophisticated factories required for the pro-
duction of the cruder sorts of textiles; soon they were sell-
ing these in competition with British goods both in their home 
and in foreign markets. In certain other manufactures also, 
especially in those which involved new inventions, Britain 
had found that other nations could successfully compete with 
her (the Anerican sewing machine, for example, was highly suc-
cessful throughout the world by the time of the Civil War). 
But it was particularly the events which marked the decades 
following the Civil War--the unification of Germany, American 
continental expansion, the rise of economic nationalism, the 
economic dislocations which periodically affected the world 
economy during the late nineteenth century--which made inter-
national economic competition intense for the first time. 
German unification had proved to be a very effective 
stimulus to industrialization and the search for foreign 
markets. The British first became concerned about the German 
threat in the mid-1880s. Their alarm declined during the 
comparatively prosperous years in Britain between 1886 and 
1891 and then increased again in the renewed depression of 
the early 1890s. It reached a crescendo in 1896, marked by 
p 
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the publication of E. E. Williams' Made in Germany. 13 
Recognition of the American danger had come even earlier. 
The conclusion of the Civil War was followed by a wave of 
railroad building which brought the far-flung regions of the 
~ontinent into a fruitful economic union. This was accom-
panied by a rapid growth of population, the result in part 
of a tremendous influx of immigrants; the rapid growth of 
manufacturing industries; an enormous expansion of agricul-
tural exports, followed by impressive increases in the export 
of manufactured goods. Small wonder then that some British 
observers began to reassess the traditional forecasts about 
the United States and to bring them up to date. Concern 
about the American challenge made its appearance in the 1870s. 
It ebbed and flowed during the 1880s and 1890s and then reached 
its peak in the so-called "American invasion" of about 1897-
1903. 
The British, then, had clearly become aware by the last 
decades of the nineteenth century that they faced two serious 
competitors, two rivals for economic pre-eminence. They re-
sponded to these rivalries, however, in significantly differ-
ent ways. The debates about these two challenges were dis-
tinct and marked by decidedly different characteristics. 
The German rivalry was considered by the British to be 
something sinister. In his autobiography the poet Robert 
13For the British reaction to 3-erman competition, see 
Ross J.S. Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalr , 
187~-1914 (Pb.iladelp ia: niversity o ennsy vania ress, !93 ). 
9 
Graves discusses his prep school days at Charterhouse a few 
years before World War I and comments that the German impli-
cations of his middle name, von Ranke, presented certain dif-
ficulties, for 
Businessmen's sons, at this time, used to di~cuss 
hotly the threat, and even the necessity, of a trade 
war with the Reich. "German 11 meant "dirty German." 
It meant: "cheap, shoddy goods competing with our 
sterling industries." It also meant military men-
ace, Prussianism, useless philosophy, tedious schol-
arship, music-loving and sabre-rattling.14 
German rivalry stimulated British self-examination in such 
areas as technical education and up-to-date business methods, 
but it also stirred up hostile national feelings. This hos-
tility grew all the more intense after the mid-1890s as Anglo-
German diplomatic tensions increased. 
The American rivalry, though it prompted occasional 
vitriolic commentaries, was debated in a very different atmos-
phere. British views of the American challenge could not be 
limited to a jealous and narrow observance of increased 
sales in this or that market; the Anglo-American relationship 
was much too complex for such a possibility. In the first 
place, though it was probably truer of the British than of 
the Americans, neither felt that the other was foreign in the 
full sense of the term. 15 One part of the English mind had 
14Good-bye to All That (rev. ed.; Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), 39. 
l5For example, the prominent British economist, Robert 
Giffen, wrote of "the United States--and our leading foreign 
competitors •••• " "The Dream of a British Zollverein," 
Nineteenth Century, LI (May, 1902), 700. 
ji 
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always been both possessive and patronizing with regard to 
America. If the United States were destined for future great-
ness, was this not, most Englishmen would have asked, the 
result of the combination of unlimited resources and British 
traits? Were not these .Americans, these future economic 
leaders, also Anglo-Saxons, cousins to the British, even 
"Brother Jonathon"? Secondly, by the mid-1890s at the latest, 
many in England had come to believe that the United States 
had reached maturity and was now a fit partner for Britain 
in the task of civilizing the world. The older nation might 
look upon the deeds of her offspring with a mixture of awe 
and pleasure, horror and chagrin, but she did not doubt that 
it was ready to take its place in the world alongside its 
parent. 16 
The British, of course, could not fail to recognize the 
ever-increasing industrial capacity of the United States: i·ts 
ability not only to satisfy the domestic demand for manufac-
tures but also to export--for the first time on a significant 
scale--man~factured goods to the neutral markets of the world, 
to Britain's colonial possessions, and even to Great Britain 
16The Times frequently referred to Americans as "our 
kinsmen 11 and a quotation from the New York Herald which appeared 
in The Times illustrates what was also the prevalent English 
view: "If the younger brother sometimes makes himself disagree-
able, he none the less respects his elder brother, and the 
elder brother is now showing himself respectful of the younger 
and quite willing to let him have his own way •••• " The 
Times, July 2, 189?, 5. Many other examples of such feelings 
can be found in Bradford Perkins, The Great Ra nrochement: 
En land and the United States. 189 - New York: Athenellill, 
he United States. 
11 
herself. These were the pivotal points for British discussions 
of the American challenge. But the close relationship of 
the two nations made it impossible to avoid raising also a 
host of related questions about American resources, character, 
the fiscal system, and s0 forth. More concretely, the special 
nature of the Anglo-American relationship meant that few 
Englishmen could confront such issues as the American tariff, 
American textiles in Latin America, American hammers in Aus-
tralia, or American coal in London without attempting to 
analyze the curiously successful (or outrageous) American 
system of protection; the high (or low) quality of life of 
the American workingman; the real (or only apparent) prosper-
ity of the American people. Beyond these there were also 
more general comparisons of the British with the American 
economic system and attempts, explicit or implicit, to compare 
the overall economic strength of the two nations. 
What had been only prophecy before the 1870s was--as 
British observers measured American economic strength during 
subsequent decades--coming ever closer to reality. The 
United States seemed to be bidding to take Britain's place 
as the leading economic power of the world. This inevitably 
raised new questions for the British. In their raising of 
these new questions, and in the answers they attempted to 
supply, can be seen the American challenge of the late-nine-
teenth and early-twentieth centuries. My intention in this 
dissertation is to explore, by examining representative 
organs of the British press, the response of British public 
12 
opinion to this emerging American challenge to British econ-
omic supremacy in the period from 1873 to 1903. 
Public opinion can be defined and dealt with in a num-
ber of ways. Attention in this dissertation will be focused 
upon a very narrow segment of the British population for 
several reasons. The late Victorians themselves had an 
elitist view as to the formation and dissemination of public 
opinion. Furthermore, it was only this recognized elite 
which concerned itself in a comprehensive way with the impli-
cations of' the American challenge. 
A satisfactory description of this opinion-making elite 
was furnished by the astute political observer, James Bryce. 
In both The American Commonwealth, in which he compared pub-
lic opinion in Britain and the United States, and again in 
Modern Democracies, Bryce devoted considerable attention to 
this important aspect of modern politics. In the latter 
work he defined public opinion as 
the aggregate of the views men hold regarding mat-
ters that affect or interest the community. Thus 
understood, it is a congeries of all sorts of dis-
crepant notions, beliefs, fancies, prejudices, 
aspirations. It is confused, incoherent, amorphous, 
varying from day to day and week to week. But in 
the midst of this diversity and confusion every 
question as it rises into importance is subjected 
to a process of consolidation and clarification 
until there emerge and take definite shape certain 
views, or sets of interconnected views, each held 
and advocated in common by bodies of citizens.17 
Bryce believed that "those who make public opinion" were the 
l?James Bryce, Modern Democracies (2 vols.; New York: 
The !'!3.cmillan Company, 1921), I, 153'=54. 
13 
"journalists and other public writers, and a small fringe of 
other persons, chiefly professional men, who think and talk 
constantly about public affairs."18 It was "an exceedingly 
small percentage" of the citizenry "who practically make 
opinion. They know the facts, they think out anJ marshall 
and set forth,- by word or pen, the arguments meant to influ-
ence the public."19 
The outlet for this opinion-making elite in late nine-
teenth-century England was what R.C.K. Ensor has called the 
"dignified phase of English journalism." This included the 
monthly and quarterly journals of opinion "which everybody 
in the government read, and to which the best writers of the 
day contributed"20 as well as the better newspapers. It is 
these organs of the British press which constitute the prin-
cipal sources for this study. Specifically, they are (1) 
newspapers: The Times and The EconQmist; (2) some of the lead-
ing journals of opinion: The Contemporary Review, The Edin-
burgh Review, The Fortnightly Review, The National Review, 
The Nineteenth Century, 21 and The Quarterly Review; and (3) 
certain books and pamphlets which were addressed directly to 
the American challenge. 
18James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (new rev. ed.; 
2 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913), II, 321-22. 
l9Bryce, Modern Democracies, I, 156-57. 
20 R.C.K. Ensor, "England: 18?0~1914 (Oxford: The Claren-
don Press, i936), 144-45. 
21r will cite it by this title throughout the disserta-
tion, though beginning January, 1901, the title became The 
Nineteenth Century and After. 
14 
Other sources, Hansard for example, might well have been 
consulted. No doubt they would have yielded additional exam-
ples and illustrations. It seems reasonable to suspect, 
however, that their use would not add important new dimensions 
to what is already an overcrowded study. In sho~t, the sources 
which have been consulted seem sufficiently representative 
of that British public opinion which is the focus of this 
dissertation. 
Certain topics which were part of, or related to, the 
American challenge will either be ignored or will receive 
only occasional attention. Some of them, such as the Ameri-
can agricultural invasion, were of major importance and their 
exclusion has been dictated by limitations of space. Others 
are ignored or slighted for the same reason, or because they 
are of only indirect importance, or because they were too 
technical to have been widely discussed among the public. 
Such topics include: general emigration from the British 
Isles and Colonies to the United States; American securities 
on the London Stock Exchange; bimetallism; the money market 
and the flow of gold; and American fiscal policy other than 
the tariff. 
The basic organization of this study is chronological. 
The period 1873-1903 falls into three fairly distinct groups 
of years, each of which has its own dominant characteristics. 
During the years 1873-1889 discussion of the American chal-
lenge tended to be general and wide-ranging. The most con-
sistent theme was not that the United States was already 
15 
successful in direct competition with Britain but that indus-
trial America was growing rapidly while Britain stagnated. 
The years 1890-189? witnessed some continuation of these 
same themes, but the period was dominated by two American 
developments, ultra-protectionism and dramatically increased 
industrial production, especially in iron and steel. The 
former threatened British producers with the loss of the 
American market through allegedly prohibitive duties and 
with the loss of at least some neutrai markets through Ameri-
can reciprocity treaties with other nations. The latter en-
dangered not only the .<\.merican and neutral markets but British 
markets as well. The beginnings of the excited public dis-
cussions of the American challenge which marked the first 
years of the new century may be traced to 189?, which wit-
nessed both the passage of the Dingley Tariff and sizeable 
shipments of American iron and steel to British and other 
foreign buyers. 
A new dimension was added to the American challenge 
when, as a result of the Spanish-American War, the United 
States took on the trappings of a world power and expressed 
new ambitions for American commerce, industry, and shipping. 
This coincided with sufficiently large-scale American exports 
to Britain of goods and capital to touch off the controversy 
over the alleged "American invasion" of England. It coin-
cided also with those economic problems which were caused 
by the Boer War and with the crisis of morale which accom-
panied it. British concern over the American challenge 
16 
reached its peak in the years 1901-1902. However, the years 
1898-1903, important and dramatic though they were, are trea-
ted briefly in this study in the form of an epilogue, since 
an account of those years is already available. 22 
British alarm over the "American invasion" receded 
rapidly after 1903. Joseph Chamberlain and his followers 
kept discussion of the American and other challenges alive 
for a time, for the bogey of foreign competition was the core 
of the fiscal reformers' tactics. But the decisive victory 
of Free Trade in the election of 1906 effectively put an end 
to public concern over the American challenge. The pre-war 
decade was an exceedingly prosperous one for Britain, as it 
was also for the United States. American economic growth 
and competition did not disappear between 1906 and 1914; it 
simply ceased to disturb the British. Above all, a much more 
ominous threat began to monopolize British attention. The 
international situation forced them to focus their attention 
closely on the German danger, which was a military as well 
as an economic threat to Great Britain. 
22see, for the fullest treatment, Richard H. Heindel, 
The American D:nnact on Great Britain, 1898-1914 (Philadel-
pnia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), Chs. VII-IX. 
There is also useful information in John H. Dunning, American 
Investment in British Nanufacturing Industry_(London: George 
I11en & Unwin, Ltd., 1958). 
PART I. 1873-1889 
CHAPTER I 
THE CONDITIONS FOR DEBATE EMERGE 
The Quiet Years, 1873-77 
The Great Depression stimulated British concern about 
American economic competion, but was not the cause of it. 
Such competition had been brought to the attention of the 
British well before the economic debacle of late 18?3. As 
early as 1840 testimony had been given before a Select Com-
mittee of the House of Coiilmons which made it clear that the 
United States had sold cotton goods in the East and West 
Indies, in Brazil, and in other South American markets "at 
a lower price than the same kind of goods made in England 
could be sold for."1 As a result of pre-Civil War tariffs, 
the Americans had become more and more self-sufficient in 
the production of leather and wooden articles, of iron ware, 
and of toolsa:ild implements. After capturing a large part of 
the domestic market from European suppliers, American manu-
£acturers had turned their attention to foreign markets. 
American-made boots and shoes, carriages, and numer-
ous other articles of manufacture now [1873] compete 
in the world's markets with the cheapest product of 
.British workshops, while in the case of mining and 
agricultural tools and implements, the American pro-
ducts have driven the British out of the field all 
1David Syme, "Restrictions on Trade from a Colonial 
Point or View, " Fortnightl;r, XIII n. s. (April, 1873), 449. 
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over the world. 2 
The British hardware industry was particularly alarmed at 
.American competition, according to Ryland's Iron Trades Jour-
nal (1871): 
-
The edge-tool trade is well sustained, and we have 
less of the effects of American competition. That 
competition is severe, however, is a fact that can-
not be ignored, and it applies to many other branches 
than that of edge-tools. Every Canadian season 
affords unmistakable evidence that some additional 
article in English hardware is being supplanted by 
the produce of Ncrthern States, and it is notorious 
how largely American wares are rivalling those of 
the mother country in other of our colonial posses-
sions, as well as upon the Continent •••• The whole 
subject is one demanding the serious attention of 
our manufacturers.3 
Outside of the specific British trades already experienc-
ing American competition, however, the subject does not seem 
to have led to any important public discussion during the 
early years of the Great Depression. By 1874 there were 
businessmen who worried that the depressed state of trade 
might last for some time and that this might be an indication 
of previously unsuspected weaknesses in the British economy. 
But the experts ridiculed them as alarmists, insisting that 
there was no cause for concern and that Britain was accumulat-
ing unparalleled riches. In particular, Britain's leading 
economists and statisticians insisted throughout the seven-
ties that English trade was not suffering from foreign com-
t . +.. 4 pe 1 .... 1on. The Times scoffed at "the excessive excitement 
2Ibid., 449-50. 
3Quoted ibid., 450-51 and note. 
4L.J. Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 
guarterl~, CLII (July, 1881), 271-74. 
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which seems to exist in some quarters about the depression 
of trade" (December 27, 1878) and insisted that there was 
"no evidence that the amount of the permanent foreign demand 
is changed" (January 11, 1879)0 When, in 1879, Gladstone 
envisioned.the future greatness of the United St~tes, he was 
sufficiently confident that Britain would retain her marvel-
ous prosperity that he professed he was not inclined "to 
murmur at the prospect" of American supremacy.5 While, on 
the one hand, the experts denied that American competition 
played any part in Britain's economic distress, they also 
took pains to make clear to the British public that the United 
States was suffering as much as or even more than Britain from 
the unhappy trade conditions which followed the panics of 
1873. 6 With the exception of a few random remarks,7 allega-
tions of American competition or superiority played no part 
in the very limited and mild-tempered public discussions of 
the Great Depression during the years 1873-1877• 
The most widely accepted explanations of trade depression 
5All quoted ibid. 
6see Horace White, "The Financial Crisis in America," 
Fortnightly, XIX n.s.(June, 1876), 810-29; and Robert Giffen, 
11 The Liquidations of 1873-6," Fortnightly, XXII n.s.(October, 
18??), 510-25. The question whether Britain or the United 
States suffered longer or more intensely from depressions was 
constantly debated during the late nineteenth century; see 
below passim. 
?Britain's technical and industrial libraries and museums, 
it was charged, were inferior to those of the United States and 
France. Lyon Playfair, "On Patents and the New Patent Bill," 
Nineteenth Century, I (April, 1877), 324-25. And it was pointed 
out that the United States had a greater attraction for British 
emigrants than did the British colcnies. Sir Julius Vogel, 
"Greater or Lesser Britain," Nineteenth Century, I (July, 187?), 
825. 
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during the 1870s and 1880s had little or nothing to do with 
foreign competition or British incapacity. Commercial crises 
were believed to be naturally recurrent; they were held to 
be periodic adjustments that affected all commercial nations. 8 
They were explained as nothing more than a serious fall in 
prices, which resulted from the curtailment of the purchasing 
power of Britain's customers and which had little real effect 
on the productive powers of the nation.9 Or they were held 
to be the result of overproduction and perhaps of foreign 
tariffs, but in any case foreign competition as a cause of 
. . . . d 10 depression was minimize • 
The Reaction against Complacency 
Beginning in 1878, more than four years after the panics 
which had launched the Great Depression, a reaction set in 
against the relatively complacent analyses of the experts. 
Prices, profits, and foreign trade had continued to plummet 
since 1873. They reached their nadir in 1879. Despite a 
general economic revival between 1879 and 1882, there were 
many in Britain who by now were thoroughly alarmed. The 
British experienced a crisis of confidence in the late 1870s 
8Giffen, "The Liquidations of 1873-6,"(1877), 510-25; 
and James Steph~n Jeans, England's Supremacy, 116. 
9Giffen, "The Liquidations of 1873-6,"(1877) and "Trade 
Depression and Low Prices," Contemporary, XLVII (June, 1885), 
800-22; Thomas Brassey, "The Depression of Trade," Nineteenth 
Century, V (May, 1879), 788-90. 
10Archibald R. Colquhoun, "An Anglo-Chinese Commerical 
Alliance," National, VI ( Octob~r, 1885), 162. 
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and early 1880s. They were exposed in the press to a noisy 
debate over what one writer called the "conditions and pros-
pects of England. 1111 
By 1878 there were some who were concerned that, as Gold-
.,in Smith put it, nEnglish commerce ••• may have passed 
12 its acme." One of the causes behind such concern was for-
eign rivalry; according to another analyst, 
There is probably no question in which greater 
interest is felt at the present time in the several 
centres of manufacturing industry than that of 
foreign competition.13 
Even Gladstone, who in 1879 had looked forward to American 
supremacy with equanimity, in 1881 allegedly "no longer exults 
over a prosperity which advances by 'leaps and bounds,' but 
warns the nation that its progress appears to have been 
arrested."l4-
It was this crisis of confidence in the proper and sue-
cessful operation of the British economy which produced the 
Fair Trade movement, which sought the re-establishment of 
protective duties in order that Britain could negotiate favor-
able commercial treaties with the high-tariff nations of the 
world. 1 5 One of the first targets of the Fair Traders was 
11Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 271-74. 
12Goldwin Smith, "The Greatness of England," Contemporary, 
XXXIV (December, 18?8),_8. 
- -- - ·
13james Henderson, "England and America as Manufacturing 
Competitors," Contemporar;y, ·xxxrrr (O?tober, 1878), 458. 
14JenniD.gs, "English Trade.and-Foreign·Competition," 271-74. 
15 -See B. H. Brown, The Tariff Reform Movement in Great 
Britain, 1881-1895 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943). 
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those who denied the existence of a depression or the dangers 
of foreign tariffs and competition. L. J. Jennings complained 
that British manufacturers failed to recognize their need 
ror state aid to enable them to compete with foreign goods 
in the English market. "They are," he wrote, "if anything, 
disposed to underrate the extent of competition to which they 
are now exposed at home. The newspape~s, as a rule, make 
very light of it, and speak of the importations of manufac-
tured goods as utterly insignificant. 1116 
The special object of Jennings wrath was The Times. 
Since 1874 it "has systematically denied that any depression 
whatever has existed in trade, just as it does at the moment 
• • 
•• It is only by an occasional accident that the truth 
has leaked out," as in the following example from The Times 
(March 30, 1881): 
Although the special falling off in our exports 
to foreign countries may be partly explained by the 
foreign loan collapse of the last few years and in 
other ways, which do not imply a diminished taste 
!or our manufactures abroad, the decline seems so 
general and so large that there can oe little doubt 
of its being produced to some extent by the hostile 
tariffs of foreign countries and the advances the~ 
have themselves made in manufacturing. It is becom-
ing important, therefore, to have attention directed 
to new markets. 
He also criticized The Economist for its remark that only 
slightly more than one-tenth of British imports in 1880 had 
consisted of manufactures. How trifling this sounds, 
16Jennings,"English Trade and Foreign Competition," 271-?4. 
l?L. J. Jennings, "Fair Trade and British Labour," Quar-
terlz, CLII (October, 1881), 564-65. 
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Jennings remarked, u..~til one realized that it amounted to 
at least .;f40,000,000 and possibly as much as;K70,ooo,ooo. 18 
The Fair Traders claimed that the disregard expressed 
by leading papers and politicians amounted to a conspiracy 
of silence. According t.::> Jennings, "it is, in fact, by a 
policy of suppression and misrepresentation that politicians 
of the Chamberlain school are now seeking to mislead the 
nation in regard to its position and prospects. 1119 W. Far-
rer Ecroyd, whose 1879 pamphlet "Self-Help" is usually taken 
to mark the beginning of the Fair Trade movement, was even 
more explicit in accusing politicians of intentionally ignor-
ing a dangerous situation. He charged that the Liberal Party 
habitually admired foreigners and deprecated the English, 
and hence it was marked by "its readiness to accept the rela-
tive decline of this country and future greatness of America 
•••• " For this reason the Liberals refused to countenance 
any talk of an American threat. 20 Sir Edward Suliivan argued 
that those who deliberately ignored the American and other 
perils had selfish reasons for opposing an honest discussion 
of the issues. Such opposition, he claimed, came from the 
large import houses which made greater profits from foreign 
than from English goods; it came from the stock-brokers, the 
18Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 271-74. 
l9Jennings, "Fair Trade and British Labour, 11 564. Ironi-
cally, identical accusations were aimed at Chamberlain when 
he launched his own campaign for tariff reform in 1903. 
20w. Farrer Ecroyd, "Fair Trade," Nineteenth Century, X 
(October, 1881), 604-05. 
London bankers, and the promoters of foreign enterprises who 
had never before been so prosperous; but "above all" it came 
from the politicians who believed that Free Trade had brought 
them prosperity and political popularity. 21 
The acrimonious campaign of the Fair Traders focused 
public attention on such issues as foreign competition, the 
loss of foreign markets due to protective tariffs, and the 
alleged superior growth rate of protected industrial econo-
mies. The atmosphere of the mid-1880s was vividly expressed 
by James Stephen Jeans, though he himself did not doubt Bri-
tain's ability to weather the storm. "There is abroad a very 
uneasy and restless spirit," he wrote, a fear of impending 
trouble which was turning people away from the economic prin-
ciples which had contented them in the past. "From many dif-
ferent quarters it is proclaimed that England's sun is setting, 
or about to set," simply because England had been experiencing 
an undeniable but "relative depression of trade." Yet Jeans 
had to admit that foreign rivalry was real, and he saw it as 
a natural result of British achievement. England had estab-
lished the techniques of industrial production; her ships 
carried abroad machinery to be utilized and products to be 
imitated. Without such English assistance "our former custom-
ers would not have become so largely our competitors as they 
are today." He acknowledged that in textiles, in iron and 
steel, "in the mechanical arts, and in a hundred minor 
21sir Edward Sullivan, "Isolated Free Trade: Part I," 
Nineteenth Century, X (August, 1881), 179. 
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industries, her pre-eminence has been threatened, and in some 
cases with unmistakable success."22 
A Royal Commission had been appointed in 1885 to "inquire 
into the extent, nature, and probable causes of the depres-
sion now or recently existing in various brancha3 of trade 
and industry." Jeans recognized that the Fair Traders hoped 
that the Commission would recommend protection and that even 
"the most loyal and patient free-traders are not without seri-
ous cause for discontent with the existing condition of 
things." "Free trade," he concluded, "is now more than at 
any previous period on its trial. The crisis is pregnant 
with important issues, and it needs that we should ••• exam-
ine their character, scope, and tendencies."23 Among the 
issues which were examined by Jeans and by many other English-
men during the 1870s and 1880s were the implications of the 
new economic world which had only ~ecently come into being, 
and the American challenge which was one of the results of 
the new economic conditions. 
Recognition of a New Economic World 
That England had been rudely awakened to the fact that 
she was no longer the only industrial nation in the world was 
a common theme in the 1870s and 1880s, possibly because the 
argument could be put to use by both Fair and Free Traders. 
22Jeans, England's Supremacy, vi, 159, 233-34. 
23ibid., 115-16. 
-
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It was frequently pointed out that England had enjoyed a 
considerable head start over other nations, industrializing 
under relatively secure circumstances while Continental Europe 
vas in nearly constant upheaval and the United States had 
ecarcely begun to develop itself. But during the more 
tranquil years since the American Civil War and the unifi-
cation of Germany 
the free intercommunication of the people of Europe 
and America, the growth of capital abroad, the adop-
tion everywhere of our improved machinery and indus-
trial organization, the spread of technical knowledge 
in other countries in a greater degree than in 
England, have all combined to sap the pre-eminent 
position we have held as the best and chapest 
producers of those manufactures w~!ch enter most 
largely into general consumption. 
The advantages which England had enjoyed at mid-century 
were advantages which we could not enjoy forever, 
and it would be folly to suppose that they can 
return. The trade of the world will henceforth 
be divided among different nations, and the most 
enterprising and the most s~ilful will get the 
lion's share of it, provided that a fair field 
and no favour is afforded to a11.25 
Others recognized that "England has little or no superiority 
24
"The Lancashire Cotton-Strike," Quarterly, CXLVI (July, 
1878), 501; Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 
306; Jeans, England's Supremacy, 160-61; Lord Penzance, "Col-
lapse of the Free Trade Argument," Nineteenth Century, XX 
(September, 1886), 338; Prince P. Kropotkin, "The Breakdown 
of Our Industrial System," Nineteenth Centur;y:, XXIII (April, 
1888)' 512-13. 
25Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 306. 
Those who opposed facto~y legislation also found the debate 
timely: "It is shallow conceit on our part to continue pooh-
poohing foreign competition, and to imagine that we can safely 
continue to work shorter hours than any country j,.n the world." 
Archibald 'W. Finlayson, "Falling Trade and Factory Legisla-
tion," Nineteenth Century, XIII (June, 1883);, 973. 
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in processes or machinery that may not be--if they have not 
already been--borrowed or stolen by our neighbours." The 
time had passed when each industry was exclusively centered 
in one place and had its exclusive secrets. 26 
Many of the more moderate observers insisted that the 
industrial states of the world could co-exist in prosperity. 
And the close economic ties between Britain and the United 
States were clearly recognized; the depressed conditions 
taught many Englishmen that British and American prosperity 
were complementary rather than competitive. 27 But the new 
awareness of the proliferation of industry could produce 
more somber conclusions as well: 
we no longer monopolize the markets of the world as 
we formerly did •••• commercial supremacy ••• has 
gone from us forever. We have played the noble part 
of teachers and leaders to the race, and now our 
pupils have grown to manhood and set up in business 
on their own accounts, as indeed they might have been 
expected to do. Did we think to hold the world's 
trade for ever, with the crowded continental nations, 
our brethren in race at peace,--with America develop-
ing into a mighty nation, and Greater Britain beyond 
the seas? Preposterous. The actual result was inevi-
table; and our foreign trade must be shared with 
these, our competitors and whilom pupilso28 
26Jeans, England's Supremacy, 160-61. See generally 
Leonard H. Courtney, "Migration of Industrial Centres," Fort-
nightl;r, XXIV n.s.(December, 1878), 801-20, which echoed-
Berkeley's "Westward the Course of Empire" and anticipated 
the writings of George Bettany and Brooks Adams, both of 
which are discussed below. 
27Jeans, En~land's Supremacy, 160-61. In the Introduc-
tion to this wor Jeans insisted that "no apology is needed--
certainly none is offered--fcr the prominence assigned to the 
great American Republic in the course of the present work." 
He believed America's agricultural and industrial development 
were likely to be controlling factors in the future of England 
and Europe; xvi-xvii. 
28Joseph G. Horner, "Technical Education and Foreign 
Competition," Quarterly, CLXVII (October, 1888), 470. 
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Another aspect of the new economic world of the late 
nineteenth century was the transportation revolution, without 
which the United States would not have loomed so large as it 
did on the British economic horizon. It was called to British 
~ttention chiefly by the writings of the American economist, 
Edward Atkinson, though subsequently his ideas were put to 
considerable use by English writers also. Atkinson's central 
theme was that the railroad had greatly extended the agricul-
tural area of the United States and had tied together the 
agricultural and industrial areas into a single economic unit. 
The creation of this large market fostered the mechanization 
of agriculture and the growth of manufacturing and led to a 
more rapid exploitation of America's rich mineral resources. 29 
This American transportation system, described by an English-
man as being "as perfect and complete as it is possible to 
imagine, being, in fact, unsurpassed ••• ,"30 had not only 
led to the mechanization of continental America but had also 
made available the markets of the world.3l Particularly 
important from the British point of view was the fact that 
rail connections had brought American textile mills closer 
to the cotton fields. Even the cotton destined for Liverpool 
29Edward Atkinson, "The Railroads of the United States: 
Their Effects on Farming and Production in That Country and 
in Great Britain," Fortnightly, :XXVIII n.s. (July, 1880), 93-
100. 
30James Keii;h, "Our Great Competitor," Nineteenth Cen-
tury, :XXI (June, 1887), 793. 
31Atkinson, "The Railroads of the United States," 93-100. 
29 
now frequently went first by rail to New York. This gave 
New England manufacturers a price advantage over their Eng-
lish competitors equal to the cost of transatlantic shipment 
and related charges. Such advantage enabled American manu-
facturers to pay higher wages and still meet the ~rice of 
foreign competitors in neutral markets.32 
In Atkinson's view, the transportation revolution was 
the most significant development of the recent past. 
When the time shall come for the history of 
the last half of the nineteenth century to be writ-
ten, it will be no tr~e record if it omits from 
among the chief factors more potent than almost 
all beside, the American railroad and the English 
steam-ship; and, from among the greatest names, the 
names of those who organized and developed them.33 
The easy accessibility of world markets, made possible by 
American railroads and English steamships, was to play a 
major role in the growth of British concern about the Ameri-
can economic challenge. 
In the 1880s British journals were crowded with articles 
celebrating what a bountiful nature had accomplished across 
the Atlantic. That America's natural resources were immense, 
as Atkinson had pointed out, no intelligent person could deny. 
They were so much greater than the resources of Britain that, 
if only the United States could produce as cheaply as Britain, 
she was bound to be a successful competitor.34 Atkinson had 
32Edward Atkinson, ''An American View of American Compe-
tition," Fortnightly, XXV n.s. (.March, 1879), 391. 
33Atkinson, "Railroads of the United States," 104. 
34F. Bulkeley Johnson, "English Supremacy in the East," 
Nineteenth Century, XVI (September, 1884), 493-94 
30 
pointed to the vastness of agricultural America: Texas had 
as much farm land as Britain and Germany combined.35 Others 
noted the rapid growth of the American population.36 
It was, however, especially the abundant and accessible 
industrial resources of America which attracted most atten-
ti on. 
The prosperity of a nation depends largely, 
if not entirely, or. its natural advantages and the 
extent to which its people avail themselves of them. 
Until recently our insular position, our supplies of 
coal and iron, and our climate have been advantages 
which have been unrivalled, and our people availed 
themselves of them with energy, ingenuity, and judg-
ment enough to place them at the head of the commer-
cial world. Now the United States are demonstrating 
that in some respects their natural advantages are 
equal to our own, and in others superior, and they 
are developing them with a determination to make the 
most of them •••• Under such conditions it is not 
surprising that competition is keen and the struggle 
for supremacy severe.3'1 
At least as early as the mid-1860s, during the debate whether 
Britain might some day exhaust her coal supplies, there had 
been men who 
pointed out that foreign countries were rivalling 
us in this or that branch of industry hitherto our 
own, and that the United States were beginning to 
realize the value of their extensive and apparently 
illimitable coal and iron fields, which, as soon 
as the growth of population should render them prac-
tically available, must give our most formidable 
rivals an irresistible and constantly increasing 
advantage.38 
35Atkinson, "Railroads of the United States," 93-100. 
36see, among many examples, Robert Giffen, "The Foreign 
Trade of the United States" (1881) in Robert Giffen, Essays in 
Finance (Second Series; New York: G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1886), 
130-31. 
3?Thomas Whitaker, "The Proposals of the Fair Trade 
League," filneteenth Century, X (October, 1881), 62?. 
38Percy Greg, 11 Fina..11cial Prospects," Quarterly, CLVII 
(January, 1884), 61. 
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Vivian Hussey, a member of the Royal Commission appointed 
to inquire into the future of Britain's coal supply, had visi-
ted the United States in 1877• He was greatly impressed by 
the magnitude of the coal fields, the quality of the coal, 
and the cheapness of mining it. Since these were among the 
major controlling factors of nearly every manufacturing in-
dustry, Hussey predicted that the United States would become 
"not only entirely self-supporting in all branches of manu-
facture, but also a largely exporting country ...... 39 
The chapter devoted to coal in Jeans' book on English 
supremacy opened with this quotation: 
Other countries--notably, our most formidable rival, 
the United States--have supplies of coal incomparably 
larger than our own and can raise that coal at a 
decidedly lower cost; and coal is at once so indis-
pensable, so primary, and so bulky an article that 
it transfers the industrial sceptre of the world to 
the land where it is found in the greatest abundance 
and at the lowest price. 
Jeans was in full agreement; he remarked that the nation with 
the most and the cheapest coal "is undoubtedly the best 
equipped for the industrial race, and is the most likely to 
excel therein."40 Blessed with so rich a supply of the 
primary ingredient of industry, blessed with the complemen-
tary resource of iron ore in sufficient quantities as to make 
the United States independent of Britain for iron and steel,41 
and blessed more than any other area of the world with facili-
39Quoted .in Leonard H. Courtney, "Migration o:f Indus-
trial Centres," 817-18. 
40Quoting W.R.Greg; Jeans, England's Supremacy, 358-59. 
41vi vian Hussey, quoted in Le.onard H. Courtney, "Migra-
tion of Industrial Centres," 817-18. 
32 
ties for producing the third major ingredient of the nine-
teenth century industrial economy, cotton,42 the United States 
presented an awe-inspiring sight to British observers. 
The resources of America represented her potential, 
~hich all agreed was enormous. But the discussions which 
took place in England during the Great Depression quite 
properly focused primarily on performance. In this case, 
too, the American record was impressive, though the implica-
tions proved to be ambiguous enough to support a vigorous 
debate which lasted for more than two decades. Given Ameri-
ca's resour~es and her growing population, it was nearly 
universally admitted that some day the scale of American 
foreign trade would surpass that of Britain. Robert Giffen, 
one of the most respected economists in England and a staunch 
defender of the soundness of the British economy in the late 
nineteenth century, could see clearly that 
at a point, it is plain, the United States can 
hardly fail to overtake us and export more, aggre-
gate for aggregate. • •• In the international trade 
of the world it is becoming a larger factor •••• 
The next few years at the recent rate of progress 
must witness in this way a great change in the 
international position of the United States.4~ 
The rate of American progress to which Giffen referred 
was nowhere better illustrated than in Jeans' study of 
42F. Bulkeley Johnson, "English Supremacy in the East," 
493-94. 
>A.,..'. 
43Giff en, "The Foreign Trade of the United States," 130-
31. Giffen, however, consistently denied that the United 
States would ever surpass Great Britain on a per capita 
trade basis. · 
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English supremacy. Examining the period 1850-1880, and basing 
his study on United States census figures, Jeans calculated 
that the numbe~ of American manufacturing establishments had 
doubled; the capital invested in these establishments had 
increased by more than 423%; the number of hands employed 
had increased by more than 185%; and the gross value of 
American manufactures had increased by more than 426%0 44 
To his book on English progress, written in honor of Victor-
ia's 1887 Jubilee, Michael G. Mulhall appended a brief "Con-
clusion" in which he wrote that "the growth of the United 
Kingdom in the last 50 years is unprecedented in Eu.rope, but 
much less than that of the United States." In support of 
his statement he offered the following figures: 
1850 
Population •••• l?,0?0,000 
Wealth (millionso<) 1,686 
Trade (millions ~) 64 
Steam, horse-power 2,020,000 
Banking (millions ~) 212 
1880 Increase (%) 
50,156,000 195 
9,495 458 
309 383 
10,600,000 425 
530 150 
Even when Mulhall compared these figures with their British 
counterparts on a per capita basis, as Giffen and other con-
fident Englishmen always did, he found that the United States 
surpassed Britain in the accumulation of wealth and in the 
production of energy. The United States produced 77,7''*"0,000 
foot-tons daily (1,430 per capita) while the United Kingdom 
44Jeans, England's Supremacy, 411, 436, Appendix III. 
\.f'l\s Tow€' 
... t ~'5' ~ LOYOLA 
UNIVERSITY 
r---,, . 
' 34 
produced 49,870,000 (l,380 per capita).4 5 
Jeans and others studied those American industries which 
might compete with the basic industries of Britain, textiles 
and iron, and they found the record no less impressive. 
World consumption of cotton had risen very subst~ntially 
since 1860. "The lion's share" of that increase was taken 
by the United States and Continental Europe. The European 
rate of increase was three times, and that of the United 
States was four times, as great as that of Britain. In 
1870-71, Britain had consumed 48.8% of the world's cotton 
while the United States had consumed only 18.1%. By 1882-
83, British consumption had declined to 37.7% and American 
consumption had risen to 23.6%0 46 In the woolen industry, 
the number of hands employed in the United States had risen 
~rom 21,342 in 1840 to 161,557 in 1880. Invested capital had 
increased £rom sixteen to thirty-t~o millions sterling, and 
the value of the products £rom twenty to fifty-three millions 
sterling.47 Finally, Jeans noted that while the silk indus-
try had increased the number of factories by more than 460% 
and the number of hands by more than 1700%, "a rate of prog-
ress rare even in the industrial annals of America," he 
4 5Michael G. Mulhall, Fifty Years of National Pro~ress, 
18~-1887 (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1887), 6 , 65, 
12 26. 
46Thomas Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain 
(London: Effingham Wilson, 1886), 102-04. 
4?Jeans, England's Supremacy, 213. 
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dolefully concluded that "it is by no means cheering to con-
sider the remarkable progress of the United States in the 
light of our own unquestionable loss of ground."48 
The comparative growth pattern in the iron and steel 
industry was, if anything, even more alarming. Lowthian 
Bell, a leading British ironmaster and frequent spokesman for 
the industry, became alarmed when American imports of British 
iron declined from 1,224,144 tons in 1872 to only 608,923 
tons in 18?3. In 1874 he travelled to the United States to 
inspect the coal fields, the ore mines, and the- manufactur-
ing establishments. He obtained further first-hand evidence 
in 1876 when he was in the United States as a British repre-
sentative to the Philadelphia International Exhibition. 
Since he had first become concerned about American produc-
tion, Bell had seen the relative positions of Britain and 
the United States change drastically. In 1870 Britain had 
produced 51.6% of the world's pig-iron and the United States 
14.4%. By 1884 the United States was producing 20.2% and 
Britain 38.4%. Put in terms of relative growth (as Bell did 
put them), these figures represented an American increase of 
more than 40% and a British decline of more than 25%. In 
absolute figures, Britain produced 5,963,000 tons of pig-iron 
48Ibid., 225-31. It should be pointed out, however, that 
in none~these branches of the textile industry did the 
British note much serious competition from the United States 
except in the American market itself (see below); the point 
was that British industry seemed stagnant when compared with 
the American during the seventies and eighties. 
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in 1870 and the United States 1,665,000 tons. In 1884 Bri-
tain produced 7,812,000 tons and the United States 4,097,000 
tons. 49 If more recent figures had been available to Bell, 
the results would have been considerably more startling; in 
1889 American production of pig-iron surpassed the British 
output. The case of steel was similar. In 1840 the produc-
tion of the United Kingdom and of the United States were 
respectively 245,000 tons and 64,000 tons. In 1884 the re-
50 spective figures were 1,780,000 tons and 1,540,000 tons. 
By 1889 it could be said that "we do not monopolize the 
steel trade of the world. The annual production of Bessemer 
steel in the United States already exceeds our own. n51 • • • 
Even before Atkinson had pointed out ·to his English 
readers the role of the railroads in the creation of a single, 
enormous American economic unit, there was some recognition 
in England that the scale of the new industrial economy of 
the United States was of considerable significance. One 
writer noted "the extent to which manufacturing of every 
kind is monopolized by huge companies or corporations" in 
the United States. He speculated that there might be a 
49Lowthian Bell, "The Iron and Steel Trade," Fortnightl;y:, 
XLI, n.s.(January, 1887), 88 and 90-91. Comparable figures 
appeared in Mulhall, Fifty Years of National Progress, 56, 
though here the comparison was taken back to 1840 and hence 
was even more dramatic. Mulhall was a prolific celebrator 
of the material accomplishments of the United Kingdom; the 
title of the work above is typical and indicative of his style. 
50ibid. 
51Joseph G. Horner, "The Age of Steel," Quarterly, CLXIX 
(July, 1889), 161. The United States produced 2,936,033 tens 
to 2,012,794 for Britain. 
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connection between American business organization and Ameri-
can competition. "It would be interesting," he thought, "to 
know how far the isolated efforts which are now being made, 
both in our own and foreign markets, to obtain a foothold by 
the manufacturers of America, are to be traced to the same 
systematic determination to beat down opposition at whatever 
cost" which marked the operation of the large corpo!'ations 
in their own home market.52 
By the mid-1880s several other English writers were also 
expressing concern over the respective scales of the British 
and the American economies. Jeans called attention to the 
advantages of large-scale production and noted that the 
largest watch and textile factories in the world were in 
Massachusetts. His study demonstrated generally that Ameri-
can manufacturing establishments were growing both larger 
and more profitable, and he concluded that "manufacturing on 
a large scale has a great deal to do with economy of working."53 
If manufacturing on a large scale served to reduce the 
cost of production, distribution on a large scale was the 
necessary corollary. Therefore, "the cardinal aim and condi-
tion of success in modern commerce is the acquisition of an 
extended market." Germany, and above all, the United States 
already possessed extended markets at home which, furthermore, 
52Henderson,"England and America as Economic Competi-
tors," 468-69. 
53Jeans, England's Supremacy, 133 and 230; see also 
generally Chs. IX and XXV. 
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were protected by high tariffs. With such assurance, manu-
facturers there could produce on a very large and efficient 
scale and, should there be any product left over after home 
demand had been satisfied, they could "dump" their excess at 
or below cost price without suffering. English ~anufacturers, 
on the other hand, were unable to adopt the new and more 
efficient techniques of large-scale production, for their 
home market was small and even that small market was unpro-
tected against foreign dumping.54 Two abortive movements 
resulted from observations such as these: the attempt to form 
industrial trusts and the attempt to secure an extended and 
protected market for British manufacturers through the forma-
tion of an imperial customs union. Both attracted consider-
able attention in the nineties and later, but in the early 
years of the Great Depression the question of scale was a 
rather fresh revelation. 
That a new economic world had come into being since 
mid-century was, then, an inescapable fact for the British. 
As the American, Edward Atkinson, wrote: 
The time has gone by for anyone to dream of rele-
gating the people of this country to the single pur-
suit of agriculture ••• or even to the crude forms 
of manufacture. Foreign nations can never again 
supply us with any large proportion of the staple 
goods or wares that constitute the principal part 
of our use of manufactured articles •••• 
It is beginning to be perceived that not only 
the g~eat moral curse of slavery has been removed, 
but that in that removal perhaps the greatest 
54Roper Lethbridge, "Is an Imperial Fiscal Policy Pos-
sible?" National, V (March, 1885), 34-37· 
industrial revolution ever accomplished has 
happened.55 
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Though the British perspective regarding the prodigious 
growth of industrial America might have been different, the 
conclusions that were drawn could be quite similar, as the 
following remarks show: 
We do not attach importance to the mere circumstance 
that America is sending to this country a small 
quantity of cotton goods. It is not the displacement 
of a certain proportion of our manufactures in the 
home market, that is the serious feature in this 
fact. But it is the indication conveyed by it, that 
the United States market is no longer wide enough 
for the United States manufacturer; that he is com-
pelled to seek an outlet in neutral markets for his 
surplus production, and that he understands, but 
does not quail before, all the consequences of the 
new position in which he finds himself placed.56 
Far from quailing, the American demonstrated an audacious 
expansiveness. Nowhere was it better illustrated than in 
the exhibition of American manufactures which was staged 
in London in the Jubilee Year, 188?. This was the first 
such exhibition ever put on in a foreign country without 
any government ass:i:tance, but financed solely by private 
individuals. As an Englishman admiringly commented: 
The mere fact that such an exhibition, solely com-
posed of our great competitor's wares, should take 
place in the capital of the commercial world, and 
in the heart of our empire, shows the pluck of the 
Americans and their determination to cut us ultimate-
ly out of the running, even in our own country, if 
they possibly can.57 
55Atkinson, "An American View of American Competition," 
395. 
5611The Lancashire Cotton-Strike," 501-03. 
5?Keith, "Our Great Competitor," 798-99· 
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British Supremacy Reasserted 
-
However impressive the American record might have been, 
few in Britain were prepared to despair for the future. On 
the contrary, the dominant view was that Britain was still 
far ahead of the United States. A combination of industrial 
growth and high tariffs was costing the British the loss of 
part of the rich American market, but as for competition 
anywhere else, most people in Britain would have sneered. 
The optimistic view of British trade which had angered 
the Fair Traders in the late 1870s continued to find frequent 
expression in the 1880s. British trade statistics proved 
that "an immense market is still open to our productions and 
that British energy has hitherto surmounted opposition."58 
Giffen never tired of asserting that the decline of export 
statistics since 1873 reflected a reduction of prices but 
not of the volume of goods sold abroad.59 In 1881 Mulhall 
claimed that "this little island of ours is the most produc-
tive spot on the globe; it is a vast workshop," and his sta-
tistical compilations were sufficient to prove it "foolish, 
if not criminal, for people to go about with lamentations 
for the decline of British industry •••• 1160 Jeans, after 
58T.E. Cliffe Leslie, "The History and Future of Interest 
and Profit," Fortnightly, XXX n.s.(November, 1881), 650. 
59see, for example, the portion of his report to the 
Board of Trade quoted in Brassey, "Depression of Trade," 788-90. 
60Michael G. Mulhall, "Two De<!ades of Industry," Contem-
~orary, XL (November, 1881), 823-4. 
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his detailed survey of the British economy in 1885, believed 
that "the present condition of England, although not perhaps 
relatively so pre-eminent as it has been, is positively as 
good as, if not better than, at any former period." Britain 
was making "real progress. 1161 
As the 1887 Jubilee drew closer, such views were ex-
pressed with some frequency. Mulhall's Jubilee book demon-
strated that Britain surpassed the United States on a per 
capita basis in most categories. 62 Many others were written 
in the same vein. According to one of these, it was true, 
as the Fair Traders were insisting, "that we stand alone in 
the wide world of commerce, but where? Why, at the very 
head of the nations. In the international race there is not 
even a good second to us. 1163 
America might have splendid resources but Britain pos-
sessed certain advantages also. Following a tour of American 
manufacturing centers, James Henderson cited six advantages 
which British manufacturers possessed over their rivals: 
61Jeans, England's Supremacy, XIX, XXII. 
62Mulhall, Fifty Years of National Progress,. 125-26. 
6 3George W. Medley, "The Lion's Share of the World's. 
Trade," Nineteenth Centurz, XIX (June, 1886), 8080 See also 
Leone Levi, "The Material Growth o.f the United Kingdom from 
1836 to 1886," Fortnight!~, XLI n.s.(June, 1887), 913-27; and 
the shallow article by Si ney c. Buxton, "Fair Trade and Free 
Trade: A Dialogue," Contemtorar:v, XL (December,1881) in which 
"Faithful" lectures "P!iab e 11 with such statements as: "I 
have some official figures at home which show that during 
the last twenty years England has experienced a greater pro-
gressive increase than America in imports and exportso ••• " 
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(1) lower rates of interest; (2) lower costs of buildings and 
machinery; (3) lower wages; (4) a sounder system or national 
finance and taxation; (5) lower cost of fuel and light; and 
(6) readier access to markets. With such advantages, British 
manufacturers "have no need to sit down in despair, under 
the idea that it is hopeless to strive against American com-
petition, and that the industrial strength of the old country 
is played out. 1164 
In the late 18?0s, Henderson went on, England had been 
rife with rumors that ''our markets were to be swamped with 
American iron and steel" and reports "that the American cotton 
manufacturers are far outstripping their Lancashire competi-
tors, not only in foreign markets, but also in Manchester 
herselfo" But it was foolish to assume that because a few 
shipments of American calicoes may have sold to advantage in 
this country, therefore we must assume ourselves beaten. 1165 
The amount of manufactures shipped by the United States to 
Britain was insignificant compared with what she accepted in 
return. Thomas Whitaker demonstrated that in 1880 Britain 
exported to the United States~25,ooo,ooo worth, and received 
64Henderson, "England and America as Manufacturing Com-
petitors," 460. That American producers faced higher costs 
or all kinds--usually attributed to the tariff--was a con-
stant theme in the British press. But, though American 
governmental methods of getting and spending often appalled 
the British, it was probably more frequently asserted that 
the tax burden in the United States was lighter than in Bri-
tain; see below, passim. 
G5Ibid., 458-61. 
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in return less than.t3,ooo,ooo worth. Britain sent America 
~l0,980,360 worth of iron and steel goods and~3,653,237 
worth of cotton goods. American exports to Britain were 
respectively~403,234 and ~04,291. 'When the total exports 
of the two nations were compared, it was clear just how far 
behind Britain the United States was. In 1878 United States 
exports amounted to 5377,837,040; those of Britain Sl,08?, 
358,000. And, whereas the British total included a large 
percentage of manufactured goods, the American exports con-
sisted chiefly of food and raw materials; 66 only 15% of the 
American tctal represented manufactured goods and only 2% 
of the total manufactured product of the United States was 
exported. 67 Whitaker seemed justified when he remarked that 
American exports "are but a drop in the bucket of the 
world's trade when compared with ours. 1168 
Jeans compared the exports of 1880 on a per capita 
basis and found that the United Kingdom figure (in pounds, 
shillings, and pence) was 6 9 5 while the figure for the 
United States was only 3 8 O. "American trade, as tested 
by exports," he wrote, "has not been so flourishing as that 
of England. 1169 Mulhall claimed that on a per capita basis 
66Whitaker, "Proposals of the Fair Trade League," 61~, 
625-26. 
67Jeans, .England's Supremacy, 960 
68Wb.itaker, "Proposals of the Fair Trade League," 626. 
69Jeans, England's Supremacy, 117. 
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American foreign trade increased by 50% between 1850 and 1880, 
but that of the United Kingdom increased by 200%.?0 Like 
Jeans and Mulhall, Giffen could recognize the amazing growth 
of the United States and. still remain confident that "a 
proper comparison shows ~he progress of the [United Kingdom] 
to be by far the most remarkable." Citing the same per capita 
export figures, he concluded that "by far the most striking 
illustration of increase is still represented by the United 
Kingdom, the great free-trade country, and the United States 
are really nowhereo"?l 
Furthermore, the English expressed some doubts about the 
soundness of American economic growth. Jeans suggested that 
it was to some extent artificially fostered and therefore 
unhealthy.72 Giffen went so far as to make the growing 
American exports a symptom of weakness. While Britain's 
wealth was augmented by "invisible exports" and especially 
by shipping, the increase of American exports was required 
to pay foreigner carriers who transported both the exports 
and the imports of the United States.73 
If the American lack of shipping was looked upon as a 
disadvantage by some English observers, still more so was the 
American tariff. It was that which really kept the United 
?OMulhall, Fifty Years of National Progress, 125-26. 
71Giffen, "The Foreign Trade of the United States," 122, 
12?. 
72Jeans, England's Supremacy, 412. 
?3Giffen, "The Foreign Trade of the United States," 
125-29. 
.. 
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states from competing with Britain for the trade of the world. 
For all their adoption of labor-saving machinery and up-to-
date methods, under a tariff the Americans could not produce 
as cheaply as their British counterparts. "They may revel 
in the monopoly of their home market, but they cannot compete 
in neutral markets with a country which adopted a free-trade 
policy. 1174 
The Americans might be prospering, so went a widely-held 
British view, but they could hardly be considered serious 
rivals. Thomas Whitaker presented the view quite vividly: 
We can send 3,000 miles across the sea for her raw 
cotton for our artisans to work up, and for her corn, 
beef, and bacon to feed them on while they are doing 
it; and when it is manufactured into piece goods we 
can send it back again 3,000 or 4,000 miles, and 
sell it to every country surrounding the nation from 
which we got the raw material and the food. It is 
only by imposing heavy duties that they can keep us 
out of their own territory, and even then they cannot 
prevent us from selling some of our goods to the very 
people who grew the material from which we made them. 
Outside their own boundaries, where they cease to be 
pro2~ed up by duties, they are not in the race with 
us. '1.? 
A surprising denial of American competition or even the 
possibility of such competition came from Andrew Carnegie. 
Carnegie, who frequently visited Britain and had begun to 
contribute to the leading British journals, insisted that it 
was unnecessary "for England to trouble herself about any 
serious competition from America in the markets of the world 
74Brassey, "The Depression of Trade," 788-90; Jeans, 
f1gland's Supremacy, 96, 203-04, 214; Ellison, The Cotton 
rade of Great Britain, 105, 111-15, 3170 
75Whitaker, "Proposals of the Fair Trade League," 
624-250 
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for many generations to come, tariff or no tariff." Carne:.. 
gie's argument was that only very high wages could keep 
American workers from moving to the fertile and unsettled 
prairies. Until the land was gone and the United States 
was as densely populated as Britain, there could be no cheap 
labour and thus no American competition.76 
In the 1870s and 1880s, during the depths of the Great 
Depression, the British became aware that they were living 
in a new economic world, a world that was considerably l~ss 
idyllic than the one which had passed away. It was no 
longer a world inhabited solely by customers; formidable 
rivals had appeared, none more awesome than the United 
States. And, while there was a substantial confident reac-
tion to the unsettling onset of the Great Depression, there 
also appeared an excited awareness of the American challenge, 
which now will be discussed more fully. 
76Andrew Carnegie, "As Others See Us," Fortnightly, X:XI 
n.s.(February, 1882), 162-63. Carnegie, of course, was instru-
mental not too many years later in making the United States 
an occasionally serious competitor; see below, passim. 
CHAPTER II 
THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE IDENTIFIED 
The American Challenge 
In 1879, at the nadir of the Great Depression, Edward 
Atkinson offered British readers this thought-provoking 
statement: 
The competition between the United States and 
the manufacturing nations of Europe, and especially 
Great Britain, for the leading places in supplying 
with machine-made fabrics those nations that do not 
as yet use modern machinery is a subject that now 
excites great interest. It is not important in 
reference to the particular circumstances of the 
present time, but much more important when we con-
sider the momentous consequences that might follow 
the establishment on the part of the United States 
of a permanent manufacturing supremacy.l 
British interest in such questions as the relative 
wealth and prosperity of Great Britain and the United States 
might have been little more than tea-time chatter had it not 
been for this fear of American manufacturing -supremacy. An 
America prospering amidst its abundant natural resources was 
a perfect complement to industrial Britain; the pattern of 
exchanging American food and raw materials had long been a 
fundamental part of the British economy. But an industrial 
United States beginning to look beyond its borders, and the 
slightest hint that America might establish permanent 
1Atkinson, "An American View of American Competition," 
383. 
4? 
48 
manufacturing supremacy, were sufficient to cause the Bri-
tish to look at American wealth and resources and even occa-
sional forays into the world market in a totally different 
light. Considered in its broadest form, the American chal-
lenge comprised all these questions and more. British alarm, 
some of which has already been noted in the above sections 
of this study, appeared in two distinct waves between 1873 
and 1889. The first of these coincided with the low point 
of the Great Depression. Atkinson's statement was among the 
earliest expressions of the American challenge, but was far 
from being the only one. 
Yorkshire and Lancashire were called the "Brain of Eng-
land" but if an Englishman "were to look for an a~tivity of 
industrial intelligence rivalling that of our older northern 
counties," wrote Mark Pattison, "I suspect we all think of 
one ••• and that is the United States. 112 "I think," he 
continued, 
there is evidence of an inventive genius at work 
in the new world more alive and more keen than in 
the old country •••• Time was when all the new 
discoveries in practical science, and improvements 
in machinery and engineering, were first made in 
this country. This is not so now. It is from 
America that all the new inventions, as all the 
new jokes, come to us.3 
The sewing machine and the washing machine, now indispensable 
in English households, came from the United States. A 
2Mark Pattison, "Industrial Shortcomings," Fortnightly, 
XXVIII n.s. (December, 1880), 739. 
. . . 
3ill2:,. t. ?43. 
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Scotsman invented the reaping machine but it required the 
.American McCormick to show the English how to make it work. 
What a length of time we went on quite content 
with the old smooth-bore muzzle-loading musket! 
The American took the matter in hand, and in a few 
years the weapon was totally transformed. From 
American brains issued the revolver and the Winches-
ter repeating-rifle while Birmingham workshops were 
vying with each other as to which could turn out 
the greatest number of guns exactly to pattern. 
The English may make more machines and better finished ones, 
but the Americans invent new ones while the English are 
quite content to copy the old models. 4 
Thirty years earlier Britain nearly monopolized the 
industrial world, but by this time Belgium, France and the 
United States had British machinery, and workmen, and capi-
tal "and they are sending us a yearly increasing surplus 
that is driving our own goods out of our own markets •••• "5 
But some saw that it was "not France, or Belgium, or even 
Germany, whose competition is likeiy to urge us close, but 
America. 116 When there was talk of foreign industrial threats 
in the late 1870s, it was most frequently the United States 
".from which the most serious and dangerous rivalry is to be 
.anticipated."7 By 18?9, according to the Quarterly Review, 
4Ibid., 743-44. 
5sullivan, "Isolated Free Trade," 162. 
6Pattison, "Industrial Shortcomings," ?42. 
?Henderson, "England and America as Manufacturing Com-
petitors," 458. 
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"the model Republic of America, having successfully fostered 
her industries against our competition, has become our rival 
in foreign markets, and is even unde,rselling us in our own."8 
The allegations were frequently general, but there were 
specific concerns behind them. Atkinson's comment above had 
been sparked by Anglo-American textile competition. When the 
~arterly Review insisted that foreign competion was the real 
cause of depression, it offered as proof declining British 
textile sales not only in protected markets but in neutral 
ones, while "the United States are already engaged in active 
rivalry with us for the supply of neutral markets, after 
having virtually driven us out of their own •••• " Just 
at the time when the markets of industrial nations were 
being closed to Britain by tariffs, the United States "threa-
ten us with a keen struggle for those portions of our cotton 
trade [neutral markets] which alone show signs of future ex-
pansion." Since American goods were being purchased even 
in England, it was apparent that American textile manufac-
turers could produce as well and as cheaply as the British.9 
It was also during these early years of the Great Depres-
sion that several other issues emerged which later were to 
become quite controversial. The first was the question 
whether America's "favorable" balance of trade and Britain's 
"unfavorable" balance proved American superiority. L. J. 
811Princlples at Stake," Quarterly, CXLVIII (October, 
1879) ' .. 591. 
9"Lancashire Cotton-Strike," 510. 
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Jennings answered in the affirmative. In 1880 the United 
Kingdom purchasedo{'90,000,000 worth of American goods of all 
kinds while selling to the United States less than~23,ooo,ooo 
worth. This obviously established an indebtedness. How was 
it paid? "We have about 2000 millions invested in American 
and other foreign bonds, and with this we are paying for a 
large part of the difference between our imports and our 
exports." The remainder was paid for by the export of Bri-
tish gold. English capital was thus being drained away to 
the United States. 10 
There was also a different kind of drain on British 
resources, however; one that could not be denied. British 
manufacturers and workers were migrating to the United States, 
the former so as to be able to sell inside the protected mar-
ket and the latter to find employment. The textile town of 
Bradford was perhaps more seriously affected by the Great 
Depression than any other major British manufacturing center. 
Bradford is nearly ruined, and both manufac-
turers and operatives are emigrating to America; 
and, as far as our political economists are con-
cerned, Bradford, say they, "must be patient and 
watchful, and must look out for new markets and new 
produce for her looms." But •••• whilst our manu-
facturers are patiently looking out for new markets 
our starving operatives are emigrating to America.ll 
The English were shocked and dismayed at such news as the 
important dress-goods manufacturers, Messrso Priestly and 
10Jennings, ".English Trade and Foreign Competition," 
290-910 
11
sullivan, "Isolated Free Trade," 170. 
12Jennings, "Fair Trade and British Labour," 552. 
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Sons, establishing mills in Philadelphia in 1881. When the 
firm crossed the Atlantic it took with it its equipment and 
12 its workmen. 
There was a very considerable decline of alarmist arti-
eles in the British press after 1881, the result perhaps of 
the upward movement of the British economy after 1879. Even 
the return of bad times from 1883 to 1886 and the appoint-
ment in 1885 of the Royal Commission on the causes of the 
depression of trade elicited no substantial debate about the 
American challenge. In 1885 only Jeans' book, England's 
Supremacy, brought important information about A.!Jerican 
industrial growth before the British public. 13 
Jeans believed that America deserved considerable atten-
tion in any study of the British economy. "In the whole 
range of politico-economic inquiry, there is perhaps no more 
interesting subject of study than that of the competition 
for manufacturing and industrial supremacy between England 
and the United States. 1114 Though he took some pains to make 
clear the heavy preponderance of food and raw materials 
among the United States exports, 15 he also pointed out that 
America's rapidly growing industry already considerably 
12Jennings, "Fair Trade and British Labour," 552. 
13r am basing this remark, of course, only on my exami-
nation of the journals of opinion used for the dissertation 
and those books published during the period that I was able 
to consult. 
14Jeans, England's Supremacy, xvi-xvii. 
l5Ibid., 85. 
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exceeded the value of American agriculture. England's manu-
facturing interests may have outstripped the growth of every 
other modern country, but not that of the United States.16 
By way of illustration he offered the following figures 
(expressed in millions sterling): 
England United States 
1870 1880 1870 1880 
Commerce 547 692 172 301 
Manufactures 642 758 677 1074 
Mining 46 65 38 72 
Agriculture 260 240 415 525 
Carrying Trade 78 121 115 141 
Banking 80 108 40 52 
Sundries 34 40 17 25 
Totals 1687 2024 1474 2190 
Thus, during the decade 1870-1880, the increase in the annual 
value of the various economic activities.of the United States 
was i716,000,000; that of the United Kingdom was ~337,000,000. 17 
We have already seen that Jeans was quite confident con-
cerning Britain's ability to hold its own under the new econ-
omic conditions. Nevertheless he was able to write that 
America, for example, has recently proved that she 
can produce certain leading articles, and has actu-
ally produced and sold them as cheaply as they can 
be made in England, notwithstanding that those same 
articles continue to be burdened, as regards their 
import, with duties varying from 40 to 70 per cent. 
of' their value. Nay more, America has been able to 
sell in Canada, in competition with English manu-
facturers, commodities that are excluded from her 
16Ibid., 377. 
l?Ibid., 340 and n.2, 341. 
own shores by the prohibitory tariff already re-
ferred to •••• If the nations that we have been 
the means very largely of educating up to their 
present proficiency in manufactures once pre-
eminently our own, succeed in beating us in neu-
tral markets, our position will indeed be beset 
with great peril.18 
The controversy over the American challenge remained 
alive during 1886. Ellison mentioned the "great deal of 
fuss" that was being made over the competition of the United 
States. 19 And Lord Penzance, contemplating Mulhall's statis-
tics of industrial growth, commented that Britain was about 
to be overtaken and by none other than "our own keen-witted 
cousins the Americans."20 It was, however, in the follow-
ing two yea.rs that the American challenge was most strongly 
presented. 
In 1887 there was information that the pattern of direct 
Anglo-American trade continued to shift in favor of the United 
States, 21 and further warnings that America and Germany were 
"the growing competitors of England." Lowthian Bell, the 
iron and steel magnate, announced that "the recent progress 
of industry in the United States of America excels that of 
any other nation in the world."23 An 1887 article was devoted 
18Ibid., 160-61. 
l9Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, 114. 
20Penzance, "The Free-Trade Idolatry: Parts I and II," 
Nineteenth Century, XIX (March, 1886), 380-81, and (April, 
1886), 593. . .. 
21 George Howell, "The State of Our Trade," Fortnightly, 
XL! n.s.(February, 188?), 202. 
22c. ·A. Cripps, "Competition and Free Trade," National, 
X (November, 1887), 342. 
23Bell, "The Iron and Steel Trade," 88. 
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to the American challenge. "Our Great Competitor" was dedi-
cated to the proposition that, with all the advantages enjoyed 
by the United States, it was a tribute to Great Britain that 
she was still in the running. Still, the author's words were 
somber enough, as seen from the English point of view: 
It need not surprise us to find that a country pos-
sessing such advantages, and under such conditions, 
should at the present time be at least twenty years 
ahead of Great Britain in invention, and in commer-
cial and political advancement. 
It will, I think, be at once seen where we have 
to look for our rival, in commerce and in arts and 
sciences, in the present as well as in the future; 
and that, if we can by any possibility keep ahead 
of or even abreast with the people of the United 
States, we can quite well afford to ignore all the 
other older and slower nationalities of the world, 
and still hold our own in progress and prosperity. 
On our present lines, however, it is utterly 
impossible for us to keep pace with our great com-
petitor, and it behoves our people, and especially 
our statesman, to be stirring. 
For him, Britain was too encumbered by tradition, too prone 
to look to the past instead of to the future. Such lethargy 
could prove fatal to Great Britain. 
Our great competitor--being the greatest agri-
cultural manufacturing, and mining nation in the 
world, with unlimited credit, and being besides 
"essentially British," and having eight thousand 
daily newspapers--is no unworthy foeman; we must 
therefore be up and doing while there is yet time 24 to clear the decks of all unnecessary dead-weight. 
However, Prince Peter Kropot~in, who was at this time 
living in England and a regular contributor on scientific 
matters to the Nineteenth Century, suggested in the strongest 
possible terms that the American challenge was unavoidable 
and irresistible, British efforts notwithstanding: 
24James Keith, "Our Great Competitor," Nineteenth Cen-
turl, XX! (June, 1887), 792-93, 798-99. 
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a terrible competitor to all European manufacturing 
countries has grown up of late in the United States. 
In proportion as their immense territory is more and 
more appropriated by the few, and free land of any 
value becomes as difficult to get as it is in Europe, 
manufactures must grow in the States; and they are 
growing at su'C'h""a speed--an American speed--that in 
a very few years the neutral markets will be invaded 
by American goods. The monopoly of the first-comers 
in the industrial field has ceased to exist. And it 
will exist no more, whatever may be the spasmodic 
efforts made to return to a state of things already 
belonging to the domain of history. New ways, new 
issues, must be searched: the past has lived, and 
it will live no more.25 ~ 
British Loss of the American Market 
The most tangible aspect of the American challenge was 
the loss of substantial portions of the American market by 
British producers. When the establishment of the Fair Trade 
movement led to a renewal of fiscal controversy in England, 
this was one of the few things upon which both sides could 
agree. According to Thomas Brassey, an ardent advocate of 
Free Trade: 
As the United States had long been the most impor-
tant consumer of British goods, our exclusion from 
that market, by the combined operation of the pro-
hibitory tariff and the diminished purchasing power 
of the American people, was a grave, and it has thus 
proved a permanent, disaster.26 
W. Farrer Ecroyd, the father of the Fair Trade movement, 
25Prince Peter Kropotkin, "The Breakdown of Our Indus-
trial System," Nineteenth Century, XXIII (April, 1888), 503. 
26Brassey, "The Depression of Trade," 790. Brassey 
pointed to the 52% growth of American manufacturing since 
1860 as evidence, not of America's ability to match England 
industrially, but of reckless overproduction which led to 
the reaction which caused a worldwide depression of prices 
and purchasing power; 788-90. 
57 
wrote that 
The nations from whom we chiefly purchase our 
supply of food [that was, overwhelmingly, the United 
States], and who, until the past five or six years, 
took large quantities of our manufactures in payment, 
will now take them from us no longer. They have 
shut out our goods by heavy duties, and, by thus 
excluding us from competition, have encouraged the 
extension of their own manufactures till they can 
supply themselves.27 
Though the British fiscal debate naturally led to the 
emphasis of the American tariff as a cause of bad British 
trade, the British also recognized that American manufactur-
ing competition was an equally important factor behind re-
duced British sales in the American market. 28 Some were pre-
pared to write off the American market as already lost, con-
soling themselves with the thought that colonial demand was 
growing so strong that, by itself, it could keep British 
trade in a prosperous condition for a century or more. 29 
27Quoted in Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Compe-
tition," 302-03. Ecroyd believed the situation far worse than 
most people realized. Recent bad weather and harvests in 
Europe had led to greatly swollen imports of American food. 
But, since the American tariff prevented Britain from paying 
for the additional food by exporting manufactures to the 
United States, Britain had to give up capital by transfer-
ing securities to the United States. Thus, to the initial 
loss of .;{-30.million--his estimate of the cost of British tar-
iffs to Britain--must be added a second-*30 million--the 
amount of British manufacturing which, except for the Ameri-
can tariff, would have been engendered by the increased food 
purchases. Everybody lost, British manufacturers, British 
farmers, and the British nation through the transfer of capi-
tal. Ecroyd, "Fair Trade," 589-91. Jennings also emphasized 
the American tariff as the cause of the "crippled trade" of 
G:eat Britain. Jennings, English Trade and Foreign Competi-
~' 303-05. 
28stephen Williamson, "Bad Trade and Its Causes," Con-
temporarz, XXXV_(April, 1879), 121. . ~ 
29George Baden-Powell·, "New Markets for British Products," 
Nineteenth Centurz, X (July, 1881), 43-55. 
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British exports to the United States were in fact declin-
ing substantially. The most recent figures available when 
the Fair Trade controversy began showed that British exports 
to the United States had dropped from ~25,170,000 in 1865 
to o("19,9a5,ooo in 1877. 30 In the period 1870-74! which inclu-
ded both the peak years of British trade and the first year 
of the Great Depression, the United States took 14.1% of Bri-
tain's total exports. In the period 1880-84, when the total 
value of British exports itself had declined considerably 
from the previous decade, the United States took only 12.2%.31 
"The hard fact that stares us in the face," in the mid-1880s 
even more so than in the late 1870s, an Englishman concluded, 
"is that we cannot expect any very large expansion of our 
export trade to those [the protectionist] countries, for 
they are now able to manufacture goods for their own con-
sumption, and even to cultivate an export trade. 11 32 
Britain's basic industries, textiles and iron and steel, 
were both badly hurt by the loss of the American market. 
The textile industry had once found its American trade amply 
satisfying.33 In 1870 the British had sold to the United 
States J2,674,697 worth of cotton manufactures. In 1876 the 
amount was only .;("1,275,788. Though the economists of Britain 
talked of a revival in 1880, cotton exports to the United 
30Albert J. Leffingwell, "Free Trade, From an American 
Standpoint," Contemporary, XXXYIII (July, 1880), 60. 
3lHoweil~ "The State of Our Trade," 202-03. 
32~.' 265. 
33However, the textile industr~ was among the first to 
confront American tariffs and competition in the American mar-
ket; the situation could be tracea back to pre-Civil War days. 
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states in that year still amounted only to ctl,748,645. The 
woolen industry was even harder hit. In 1872 Bradford, the 
center of the trade, had shipped to the United States woolen 
and worsted goods valued at ct'5,627,575. In 1880 the ship-
ments were only ~2,210,231. The British Trade Journal dis-
patched a man to the United States to discover why the de-
mand for British textiles was falling off so badly. He 
attributed it not so much to the tariff as to the increased 
production of American mills and the fa.ilure of British manu-
facturers to consider the wants of their customers: "the 
English will not change their old ways and methods to suit 
h h . f h" d t 1 11 34 t e c anges in as ions an s y es. • •• 
Ellison, in his study of the British cotton industry, 
lamented the American situation. "We have lost not only 
two-thirds of the business we did with them twenty-two years 
ago, but the vast amount of trade [that is, the natural in-
crease] we should have done with them if they had been satis-
fied to keep on the old lines •• 1135 Though the improve-• • 
ment in trade conditions between 1879 and 1883 had been accom-
panied by much larger American purchases of cotton goods, 
Ellison dreamed of what might have been. In 1853, when the 
American population had been only twenty-three million, Bri-
tain had sold them t4,273,000 worth of cotton goods. By 
1883 that population had nearly doubled, but British exports 
34Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 
274-81. ; - . 
35Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, 105. 
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amounted only to ~3,474,000. There was no doubt, Ellison 
wrote, that if the United States were to return to a pre-
Civil War type tariff, there would occur a very large in-
crease in British cotton exports to America. But he noted 
that the increase would come almost ex~lusively in the 
finer types of goods and that 
in all probability this gain to English cotton manu-
facturers would be in a great measure counterbalanced 
by a large increase in the imports of the lower med-
ium and coarser descriptions of American cotton pro-
ducts into Great Britain. Lancashire can beat Lowell 
in the production of the finer makes of goods; but 
Lowell, if permitted to purchase her machinery in 
the cheapest market, would be able to beat Lancashire 
in many of the lower medium and coarser sorts.36 
In the woolen industry, the plight of Bradford has al-
ready been mentioned. Bradford producers were leaving to 
establish factories in the United States. The plight of the 
other centers of the industry was no better. From Liverpool, 
from Hull, and from other woolen towns came reports that ex-
ports had fallen by fifty percent. The drop was particularly 
disastrous because, stimulated by the boom which ended in 
1872, such textile areas as Sheffield and South Yorkshire 
had invested enormous amounts of capital in preparation for 
increasing trade. Instead of increasing, trade had nearly 
disappeared "owing to various causes, particularly the Ameri-
can tariff," and the prospects of the British woolen towns 
was "gloomy: 11 37 
36Ibid.: 157-58. 
3?jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 
274-81; Jennings,_ "Fair Trade and British Labour," 575. 
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All branches of the trade were suffering, none more so 
than the carpet trade. Not too many years earlier, America 
had depended almost entirely on imported carpets. But in 
1879, while the United States was importing less than~OO 
worth of ingrain carpets, the city of Philadelphia alone 
manufactured more than twenty million yards of carpeting, 
mostly of this type. "Some idea of the growth of American 
competition may be had," it was said, "from the statement 
that the entire production of Great Britain was less than 
fourteen million yardso" In other grades of carpeting the 
advance had been equally rapid. In 1873 the United States 
had imported nearly three million square yards of tapestry 
carpet. But that market had steadily dwindled until the 
1873 • • • 2,958,000 square yards 
1874 2,099,000 II II • • • 
1875 1,454,000 " II • • • 1876 546,000 " II • • • 
1877 279,000 " II • • • 1878 94,000 II II . • • 
1879 23,000 " II • 0 • 
foreign trade in these carpets had been nearly destroyed. 
American production had increased correspondingly. Present 
production was about 8,500,000 square yards annually, but 
enough additional looms were in the process of construction 
and installation that the United States would soon be pro-
ducing thirteen million yards.38 
The British silk and ribbon industry had faced serious 
38Le1'fingwell, "Free Trade, from an American Standpoint," 
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competition before, chiefly from Continental manufacturers, 
but by 1879 the American nemesis was the focus of attention. 
Jeans' comments on the growth of the American silk industry 
have already been noted.39 The impact of that growth on the 
British industry was widely discussed. Towns such as Coven-
try, Macclesfield, Bethnal Green, and many others had derived 
their prosperity chiefly from this tradeo Now they were suf-
fering terribly. In 1861 there had been eighty-four ribbon 
manufacturers in Coventry. And in the past "its silk goods 
were annually exported to the United States to the value of 
tens of thousands of pounds; now little or nothing is sent 
there. 1140 As one manufacturer told Jennings: 
Hostile tariffs o •• have driven us out of the 
field. We have sold the Americans our machinery; 
our goods we cannot sell them. I have never ex-
ported anything to the States since hostile tar-
iffs came into operation. 
In 1881 there were fewer than a dozen of the former eighty-
four ribbon manufacturers left in Coventry. Coventry had 
been fortunate enough to acquire a new major industry, bicy-
cle-making (which experienced its own "American invasion" in 
the nineties), but most of the other silk towns were slowly 
d . 41 ecaying. 
An 1875 American governmental report showed that the 
American silk trade had quadrupled since the passage of the 
39see above, 34r35. 
40J . enrungs, 
41Ibid. 
"Fair Trade and British Labour," 566-67. 
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new tariff in 1864. In 1875 the United States produced silk 
goods to the value of more than $20,ooo,ooo. The growth since 
18?5, said Jennings in 1880, had been even more rapid. In 
the silk, just as in the other trades, lamented Jennings, 
the story was the same: "progress under Protection in the 
United States; decline under so-called 'Free Trade' in Eng-
land." The silk-weavers of Coventry, who had had their 
wages cut by from thirty to fifty percent, "are at a ,loss to 
understand how it happens that their fellow workmen across 
the Atlantic earn more money than they do, live in more com-
fortable homes, and are altogether better fed and cared for, 
and yet have never known the blessings of Free Trade. 1142 
In 1872 the United States imported 1,224,144 tons of 
iron and steel and their products, most of it from Great 
Britain. By 1875 these imports had declined to 141,079 tons. 43 
In 1872 the United States had imported nearly 600,000 tons 
of iron and steel rails; in 1877 a mere twelve tons.44 This 
reduced importation was partially the result of slackening 
demand; the importation of rails, particularly, fluctuated 
wildly in correspondence to the periodic railroad "booms." 
But another major factor was the amazingly rapid growth of 
the American iron and steel industry. 45 Vivian Hussey, after 
42Ibid., 567-68. 
43Bell, nThe Iron and Ste.el Trade," 89. 
60. 
44Leffingwell, "Free Trade, from an American .Standpoint," 
45see above, 35-36.. 
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touring the United States in 1877, reported that it was im-
possible that America should ever again rely on English iron 
or stee1. 46 The iron-producing centers of England had, 
according to the trade journal which spoke for the industry, 
"lost foreign markets so effectually that our manufacturing 
supremacy has well-nigh become a thing of the past." Compe-
titors, European as well as American, were at work everywhere. 
The British "see our legitimate markets in British colonies 
encroached upon, and foreign works supplying railways, &c. 
abroad, in competition with us, at far lower rates than they 
supply their home railways, where our competition is non-
existent." 
The United States was forcing out of its home market 
not only British iron and steel in its basic state but also 
the iron and steel products of certain skilled trades. The 
cutlery and hardware trades had brQught fame and prosperity 
to Sheffield. The Great Depression brought steadily rising 
unemployment. One of the causes: "Formerly, not a knife or 
a pair of scissors could be found in the United States with-
out the Sheffield stamp upon them. Now such articles may 
bear the Sheffield mark, but they are not made in Sheffield. 
They are turned out of American workshopso"4? 
The great ironmaster, Lowthian Bell, was led by the 
rapidly altering relation between the British and American 
industries to raise the question: 
4?Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 
274-810 
•\ t 
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If these rich and powerful States have placed them-
selves in a position to dispense from time to time, 
in a great measure, with our assistance in supplying 
the iron they consume, may we not fear that the day 
may come when they will meet us in all the neutral 
markets of the world, or even extinguish the fur-
naces of Cleveland and Cumberland, of Scotland and 
of Yales? 
Bell was consciously exaggerating; he believed that no such 
thing was likely to happen so long as Britain was able to 
obtain the raw materials of the industry at their present 
cost. But he did expect that in the future the United States 
would command the markets of Canada and South America. 48 
The English pottery industry, though less important 
than textiles or iron and steel, was suffering a no less 
serious depression caused by the loss of foreign markets. 
At the same time, Jennings wrote, 
In the United States, the manufacture of pottery 
and porcelain is making rapid strides, and English 
workmen will no doubt take an interest in learning 
that the average remuneration of American pottery 
operatives is fully one hundred per cent. in ex-
cess of the wages paid in Europe for the same class 
of labour. 
Even the young children employed in the American industry 
earned wages that would seem attractive to Englishmen. 
Protection was the national policy of the United States be-
cause, among other reasons, "the working men find that under 
it they are much better off than English workmen are under 
single-handed Free Trade. 1149 
48Bell, "The Iron and Steel Trade," 88. 
49Jennings, "Fair Trade and British Labour," 574. 
66 
The American policy of protection, according to Ecroyd, 
affected Britain beyond reducing her exports and thus her 
prosperity. In effect, it allotted only the meaner labor 
tasks to the British workman while his American counterpart 
got the pleasanter and more artistic and higher-paid branches 
of trade, since finished goods were charged a heavier duty 
than semi-finished or unfinished ones.50 
Even more important was the fact that the American pol-
icy led to harmful fluctuations in the British economy. 
American iron duties were high enough to guarantee the growth 
of American ironworks sufficient to meet ordinary American 
demand. When, however, American demand outstripped domestic 
production as it frequently did during prosperous times, 
large quantities of British iron could be sold in America 
despite the heavy duties. These exports stimulated British 
capital investment, plant expansion, and wages not only in 
the iron industry but in another basic British industry, 
coal, as well. But excess American demand was frequently 
short-lived. When demand fell again to the level of Ameri-
can production and British exports declined or disappeared 
entirely, a very injurious reaction occurred throughout the 
entire British economy.51 American protection, then, was a 
major concern to the British even before the days of the 
McKinley and Dingley tariffs. 
50Ecroyd, "Fair Trade," 598-99. 
51~.' 59?. 
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Canada and the American Challenge 
-
Canada played an important role in the British discussion 
of the American challenge. Ties between Canada and Great 
Britain were close. Canadian nationalism had a fairly long 
history but the Act of Confederation of 1867 whic:1 set the 
seal upon that nationalism was still a very recent event 
when the Great Depression began. Certain major events of 
1879 served to make Canada a significant topic in the British 
press. That year brought the low point of the depression, 
the emergence of the heated debate over British fiscal policy 
which gave birth to the Fair Trade movement, and the passage 
by Canada of a protective tariff which was ai~ed chiefly at 
the United States but which affected Great Britain as well.52 
Anthony Trollope had written that when one traveled from 
the United States to Canada he passed "from a richer country 
into one that is poorer, from a great country into one that 
is less." And, he continued (in Goldwin Smith's paraphrase 
of his words), "You pass from a country embracing in itself 
the resources of a continent, into one which is a narrow sec-
tion of that continent cut off commercially from the rest; 
you pass from a country which is a nation into a country 
which is not a nation."53 Here, in this brief passage, was 
52For details of the interaction of the three countries, 
see John Bartlet Brebner, North Atlantic Trian le: The Inter-
Elay of Canada, the United ta es and ew ork: 
Columbia University Press, 1945). 
53Goldwin Smith, "The Political Destiny of Canada," 
Fortnightly, XXI n.s. (April, 1877), 454. 
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the epitome of Canada's plight as it was seen by Goldwin 
Smith. In frequent articles in British and American (and 
presumably Canadian also) periodicals, Smith carried on a 
campaign for the union of Canada and the United States. In 
a Britain desparately concerned with the loss of external 
outlets for its products, such talk was anathema. 
Canada, Smith argued, could never become a nation in 
the fullest sense. As a political dependency of Great Bri-
tain, Canada was excluded from that which she most needed: 
"free access to the markets of her own continent •••• " 
Since Canada was thus economically retarded, and since there 
was no mea.~ingful outlet for Canadian nationalism and patri-
otism, most British emigrants went to the United States. 
Even those who went to Canada often migrated eventually to 
the United States, as did many native-born Canadians. But 
Smith professed to see that all this was changing and that 
the ultimate union of Canada with the United States 
appears now to be morally certain •••• The filaments 
of union are spreading daily •••• Intercourse is 
being increased by the extension of railways; the own-
ership and management of the railways themselves is 
forming an American interest in Canada; New York is 
becoming the pleasure, and, to some extent, even the 
business, capital of Canadians; American watering-
places are becoming their SUillliler resort; the perio-
dical literature of the States, which is conducted 
with extraordinary spirit and ability, is extending 
its circulation on the northern side of the line; 
and the Canadians who settle in the States are mul-
tiplying the links of family connection between the 
two countries. 
Smith justified the unification of the two countries on two 
grounds: first, that it would be a great economic advantage 
for Canada; and, secondly, it would be a great diplomatic 
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advantage for Britain by introducing into American councils 
an element quite friendly to Britain and thus offering the 
greatest guarantee against Anglo-American waro54 However 
much the British might have favored the rather intangible 
benefits of the latter ground, they were only too well aware 
that any economic advantage conferred upon Canada by the 
unification of North America would be also a boon to the 
United States and a disaster for Britain. 
Canada's reciprocity agreement with the United States 
had terminated in 1866. Subsequently Canada was deluged 
with the output oT America's burgeoning industrial system 
while the United States closed its doors to certain of the 
foods and raw material which made up the bulk of Canadian 
exports. The system of protective tariffs which Canada adop-
ted in 1879 was thus aimed chiefly at the United States. But 
the British were concerned that it would impede the flow of 
British goods into Canada at a time when Britain needed all 
the outlets she could find. And British Free Traders were 
greatly disturbed that Canada was setting so bad an example 
at a time when the British Government was working diligently 
to promote Free Trade throughout the world. 
Canadians felt that, given the American economic inva-
sion which they were facing, they had no choice but to adopt 
protection. ~ney found some support among those in England 
who did not believe that protection was an economic heresy. 
~ Ibid., 458-59. 
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As one of these Englishmen explained, industry grew and Can-
ada prospered as never before during the American Civil War 
when inf lated war-time prices served to keep Canadians from 
buying American goods. When the price deflation came, fol-
lowing the panics of 1873, the Americans attempted to main-
tain domestic prices while still disposing of the increasing 
volume of products by one or both of the following devices. 
They offered their wares in Canada at or below cost, at 
prices as much as thirty percent below the prices charged 
in the United States. Some American manufacturers simply 
demanded an outright payment, determined as a percentage of 
Canadian sales, as the condition for their remaining out of 
the Canadian market. Canadian producers were helpless since 
the American tariff kept them from entering the United 
States on similar terms.55 
Between the beginning of depr~ssion in 18?3 and 1878, 
total Canadian foreign trade declined from $217,304,516 to 
5170,523,244. But imports from the United States did not 
decline. Notwithstanding the reduced purchasing power of 
the Canadians and the lower prices of American goods, both 
of which were the result of the depression, the value of 
Canadian imports from the United States actually increased. 
But since the Canadians were forced to reduce their purchase 
of foreign goods by some means, the situation resulted in a 
serious loss for British manufacturers. The process can be 
55n. :McCulloch, "Canadian Protection Vindicated," !2!:!-
nightly, XX.V n.s. (May, 1879), 756-57· 
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seen clearly in the following set of figures: 
Canadian Imports from 
Great Britain ($) 
1873 ••• 68,522,?76 
1874 ••• 63,076,437 
1875 ••• 60,347,067 
1876 ••• 40,734,260 
1877 ••• 39,572,239 
1878 ••• 37,431,180 
Canadian Imports from 
the United States ($) 
47,735,678 
54,283,073 
50,805,820 
46,0?0,033 
51,312,669 
48,631,739 
The British did not need to worry that a Canadian tariff 
?l 
might check British business. The Americans were already 
"cleaning it out." In 1873 Britain contributed 54.52% of 
all Canadian imports; by 1878 her share had fallen to 41.04%. 
The American share of the Canadian trade meanwhile had risen 
from 37.43% to 53.32%. "If free trade England can no longer 
compete with protected America in the Canadian market," 
asked one Englishmen, "why should anybody feel angry if 
Canadians take measures to do it themselves? 11 56 
It was not only the magnitude of American-Canadian trade 
relations which worried the British but also the manifesta-
tions they saw, or professed to see, of the truth of Goldwin 
Smith's assertions that the Americans were insinuating them-
selves into the structure of the Canadian economy. In 1880 
the Canadian Government was searching for a foreign loan 
amounting toci{20,ooo,ooo in order to complete the Canadian 
Pacific Railway. According to George Anderson, London 
56Ibid., 757-58. 
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financiers were hesitant since Canada's national debt was 
already too large in their estimation. But there was fear 
that the Americans, who had "a keen appreciation of possible 
contingencies in the future," might be willing to advance 
the money. Among Americans, the "Monroe doctrine is not by 
any means dead, and their hankering after the possession of 
Canada is a desire that only waits for its opportunity. 11 5? 
Anderson was greatly distressed by what he believed the 
Garfield administration might undertake with respect to Can-
ada. He believed that "American statesmen of no mean influ-
ence" were preparing to persuade Canada by appropriate means--
such as a loan of twenty millions--"to join in a Zollverein 
with the United States, the effect of which, if indeed not 
the chief object, would be still further to shut out British 
trade from British territories." 
Anderson cited letters, subsequently published as pam-
phlets, written to Garfield and others by Wharton Barker, 
prominent Philadelphia banker and a major Garfield supporter. 
Barker had written to Garfield that 
we surely have a right to expect, in entering upon 
closer commercial relations with [Canada], a sub-
stantial guarantee that she feeJ..s herself a part 
of the great American continent, and is not ready 
to lend herself to such glittering imperial schemes 
as recently found favour in the Ministerial coun-
cils of the United Kingdom. 
To Senator Brown of Canada Barker had suggested that "if the 
two countries had a common tariff of duties, with the sea-
5?George Anderson, "The Future of the Canadian Dominion," 
Contemporary, XXXVIII (September, 1880), 401. 
,-
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board line as the only customs frontier. • •• it would make 
us one people in the great work of developing the resources 
of a new continent, and building up free, prosperous, and 
happy communities in a new world." "All far-seeing and 
practical men on both sides of the border must see that 
Canada cannot long remain in a state of commercial dependency 
upon England, and that all her interests draw her to close 
relations with the continent of which she is a part." If 
such quotes were not sufficient to alarm his readers, Ander-
son recalled for them the history of the German Zollverein 
and charged that Barker had in mind that "Uncle Sam should 
play the role of Prussia, and the Canadian provinces that 
of the lesser German States. 11 58 
Though a Canadian responded to these charges, branding 
them exaggerated and dangerously misleading,59 Goldwin Smith 
immediately re-entered the fray to insist that nothing should 
please Great Britain more than a strong and prosperous Can-
ada. Such a condition could only be accomplished by the pur-
suit of natural economic operations. Canada's natural com-
mercial relations were, and could only be, with the United 
States. 1160 
When, seven years after his observations of 187?, Smith 
58ill£., 402-04. 
59F. Hincks, "Commercial Union from a Canadian Point of 
View," Fortnightly, XXIX n.s. (May, 1881), 618-33. 
60Goldwin Smith, "The Expansion of England," Contem-
~orarz, XL (September, 1881), 378-?9, 389-98. 
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once again surveyed the Canadian situation for British readers, 
he believed that tendencies toward the unification of Canada 
and the United States had grown even stronger. The two 
North American branches of the English-speaking race "are 
actually fusing before one's eyes." There were :i.ow more than 
?00,000 Canadians in the United States. They went there 
to push their fortunes with just as little compunc-
tion as a Scotchman goes to England. When Canada 
sets up a military college for the training of offi-
cers to command her troops against the Americans, 
the first cadet who passes takes himself off to 
practice as an engineer at Chicago. 
Montreal, Canada's greatest commercial city, was closely 
linked with the United States. New York was becoming Canada's 
money market, replacing London. .American bank notes passed 
so freely in Canadian commerce that "in fact, there is almost 
a monetary uni on. 1161 
It was sufficiently clear from such articles in the 
British press, even if one makes allowances for rhetorical 
exaggeration, that the economic expansion of the United 
States militated against Britain's finding in Canada any 
solution to her economic difficulties. 
American Competition outside of North America 
Speaking at Sheffield in 1878, Arthur Mundella told his 
audience that "America is not only supplying her own country 
with goods, but exporting her manufactures to such an extent 
61Goldwin Smith, "The Expansion of .England," Contempor-
!..~, XLV (April, 1884), 538. 
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that she had become a power.ful rival to England. 1162 In a 
letter to The Times in 1879, a Colonel Wrottisley warned that 
"the Americans have obtained the start of us • • • and unless 
our manu.facturers stir themselves, the Americans will com-
pletely command the markets of Europe. 1163 In 1885, in a lec-
ture at Southwark, Professor Thorold Rogers admitted that 
American manufacturers could undersell the British in Africa 
and the Germans in Belgium. And to his charge that this was 
accomplished through tariffs that meant higher prices for 
American consumers came this reply from still another Bri-
tish observer of America: 
The American tariff has almost killed the English 
export trade to that country. Yet, Minnesota blan-
kets are cheaper than the same quality of blankets 
in England; steel rails are at this moment selling 
there at 50s. a ton less than the Americans, a year 
ago, paid for English rails; a few months ago the 
great contract for steel rails for the Canadian 
Pacific Railway was taken by an American firm (the 
Scranton Company), over the heads of every English 
competitor; and Colonel Wheatley writes, a .few 
weeks ago, to the Pall Mall Gazette, that the 
American farmer can buy a self-binding reaping 
machine for ~33, while the English farmer has to 
give .for the same thing (possibly a su~erior arti-
cle, but he cannot get it more cheaply) no less 
than .t60. 64 
By the late 1870s the Americans were competing with British 
manufacturers not only in the American and Canadian markets 
but in the rest of the world as well, including Great Britain 
62Quoted in Leffingwell, "Free Trade, from an American 
Viewpoint," 59. 
63Ibid. 
64Roper Lethbridge, "Is an Imperial Fiscal Policy Pos-
sible?" 35-36. 
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itself. 
As noted earlier, Americans and others had found it easy 
to establish the unsophisticated mills required to turn out 
the cheaper grades of textiles. But the Americans now were 
~1so competing, often successfully, with the British in the 
more skilled manufacturing lines. In 1877 the British Govern-
ment issued a Blue Book which contained the reports of the 
British commissioners at the Philadelphia International Exhi-
bition of 1876. John Anderson, chairman of the judges of 
machinery and tools, reported that 
even among ourselves, at Philadelphia, it was impos-
sible to resist the conclusion that a great change 
is going on in the relative positions of different 
countries at these machine gatherings •••• One col-
lection of (American) machine tools was without a 
parallel in the history of exhibitions, either for 
extent, money value, or for originality and mechan-
ical perfection. The impression left upon the minds 
of European visitors is that American competition in 
machine tools will soon be upon us •••• There is no 
time to be lost if we mean to hold our own in the 
hardware trade of the world.65 
David McHardy, in his report on edge tools, said that 
for years Sheffield supplied not only our own coun-
try but nearly all the world [with saws]. This mono-
poly remains with us no longer. • • .The American axe 
has for many years displaced the axes imported from 
Britain. They are now imported into this country. 
It must be allowed that in table cutlery, tools, and 
safes, America was before Great Britain. It would be 
foolish not to recognize the fact that at Philadel-
phia, Great Britain was in face of her most powerful 
rival in manufactures. A strenuous effort will be 
required from Sheffield to hold its own in the race 
of progress.66 
65Quoted in Leffingwell, "Free Trade, from an American 
Viewpoint," 59. 
66Ibid. 
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American manufacturers continued to amaze the British 
at the Paris Exhibition of 1878. In a paper read before the 
Royal Colonial Institute on the Paris Exhibition, Frederick 
Young said that 
in what they saw at Paris, British manufact11rers 
must have acquired a keener appreciation of the 
difficulties they have to encounter in main~ain­
ing their former control of the markets of the 
world. A leading manufacturer expressed himself 
startled and alarmed by what he saw of the proofs 
of successful rivalry on the part of the Ameri-
cans, in the branches of his own trade.67 
In 1887 the Americans boldly opened their industrial exhibi-
tion in London. 68 And Edward Atkinson reported that the 
Americans were importing steel from Britain and exporting 
the finished product to Sheffield.69 However, Atkinson 
warned his British readers that "the greatest danger to the 
manufacturers of England will not be in our competition in 
the sales of goods" but in the competition for skilled wor-
kers. He believed the rapidly increasing American economic 
demand would serve constantly to widen the gap between Bri-
tish and American wages and standards of living.70 
The longer established American competition in textiles 
continued to be a concern for the British. American textile 
exports increased from only £480,000 in 1872 to ~2,132,000 
in 1877. .America had become a significant factor in the 
G7Ibid. 
68For a British comment on this, see above, 39. 
69 Atkinson, "An American View of American Competition," 
395. 70 -Ibid., 3860 
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international textile trade and was even selling goods in 
Britain.71 "The competition of the United States is cer-
tainly, then, real. It has not only virtually deprived us 
of its 40,000,000 of people as customers, but it threatens 
us with permanent active rivalry in outside markets." A 
concrete illustration is contained in a letter from a New 
Orleans merchant who formerly had acted as a middleman in 
the British trade with Mexico: "The manufacturers of cotton 
goods in the United States have established for themselves 
a monopoly of supplying the Mexican markets with their manu-
factures, to the exclusion of those made in Great Britain, 
whezxethe supply had heretofore been derived. 1172 
The American Atkinson also had much to say to the Bri-
tish concerning textile competitiono He offered as evidence 
of the American industry's parity with the British the abil-
ity of the Americans to sell their wares in the markets of 
Asia, Africa, and South America. He denied British allega-
tions that this American competition was the result of lower 
American wages in the industry73 or of American dumping. 
The exported goods were made for the most part by strong and 
prosperous corporations which paid regular dividends. They 
were produced by workers who received, at least in most 
departments of the trade, wages equal to or above those paid 
7l"The Lancashire Cotton-Strike," 501-03. 
72Ibid., 509. 
73The author of "The Lancashire Cotton-Strike" had made 
the charge; 509. 
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in England. The goods were sold in China, Africa, and South 
America in payment for tea, silk, ivory, sugar, guns, hides, 
and wool. "This competition had been fairly begun before 
the late war in this country, but it is now continued under 
better conditions. 1174 
One obstacle to the global expansion of American com-
merce and industry was the woeful state of American shipping. 
The Civil War had put an end to the American merchant marine 
which had been one of the glories of the United States. In 
the post-war period, little or nothing had been done to re-
vive it. The situation is clearly expressed in the follow-
ing figures:?5 
Percentage of World Maritime Carrying Power 
Great Britain 
United States 
1850 
41 
15 
1870 
44 
8 
. 1880 
49 
6 
However, there was constant discussion in American poli-
tical circles of various schemes for the revitalization of 
the American merchant marine. The British realized that if 
74Atkinson, "An American View of American Competition," 
390-91. 
75Michael G. Mulhall, "The Carrying-Trade of the World," 
Contemporary, XL (October, 1881), 611. For the rapid decline 
of American shipping in Chinese ports between 1872 and 1879, 
see Herbert Gil es, 11 The Present State of China," Fortnightly, 
XXVI n.s. (September, 1879), 364-65; and Rutherford Alcock, 
"China and Its Foreign Relations," Contemporary, XXXVIII 
(December, 1880), 1018-19. . · 
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this should occur American competition would become a still 
greater challenge. Moreton Frewen, a frequent visitor to 
and sometime resident of the United States and a promoter of 
grandiose but unprofitable American schemes, presented an 
alarming report on the prospects and significance of an Amer-
ican shipping revival. Reminding his readers that the British 
sugar trade had been virtually destroyed as a result of 
French and German governmental bounties to their native beet 
sugar industries, Frewen predicted that the United States 
would use its enormous and embarrassing surplus to subsidize 
American industries which would compete directly with those 
of Great Britain. According to Frewen, Samuel J. Tilden had 
recently suggested to his Democratic colleagues 
that the surplus revenue could be most profitably 
expended in bonusing the construction of a mercan-
tile marine. Ten millions sterling thus invested 
would transfer all the skilled labour of the Clyde 
and the Tyne to the Hudson, and would destroy all 
the fixed capital invested in British ship-yards; 
and when this branch of native industry has suc-
cumbed, the next departure will be a heavy export 
duty levied on American raw cotton, and a handsome 
export bonus on all manufactured cotton goods.76 
In the context of American industrial expansion and the 
possibilities of the revival of American shipping, the com-
pletion of a Central American canal was a matter of some 
importance for the British. De Lesseps declared that 
he had been struck with the immense advantages which 
would accrue to the United States by the opening of 
76Moreton Frewen, "Displacement of Nations," quoted in 
Penzance, "Collapse of the Free Trade Argument," 338-39. 
Frewen did_not appear to believe that the constitutional 
prohibition of export duties would stand in the way of his 
predictiono 
an inter-oceanic canal. The first and most indis-
putable would .be the restoration, in a very short 
time, of the supremacy to the American mercantile 
marine which it possessed before the waro •• 77 
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Jeans, in his book on English supremacy, considered the 
piercing of the Isthmus to be perhaps one of the great deter-
r..inants of the American future. "No other equally limited 
section of the world's surface," he said of the Isthmus, 
"has held, or is likely to continue to hold, so great an 
influence over the destinies of nations and the commerce of 
mankind." The completion of a canal would be of considerable 
benefit to Europe which sent a "colossal and portentous" 
amount of trade by way of Cape Horn, despite the fact that 
the Suez Canal was open. But it was to the United States 
"that the opening of a water-way across the Isthmus of Panama 
is likely to be of the greatest advantage and importance. 1178 
The length of the Cape route had retarded American trade 
with Australasia, India, China, and Asia generally. Yet, 
despite such a disadvantage, American trade with those areas 
had been advancing "with remarkable strides." He noted that 
the canal would link the United States and Australia, which 
were "the countries of the future" because they possessed 
unlimited resources and were populated by Anglo-Saxons with 
energy and enterprise. He noted the "rapid expansion of the 
77Quoted in Edward Whymper, "The Panama Canal," Contem-
porarl, LV (March, 1889), 336. It should be noted that these 
words were spoken when de Lesseps was in the United States 
attempting to raise funds for his project. 
78Jeans, England's Supremacy, 189, 198. 
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J.merican trade with the whole o:f the Paci:fic" and with those 
Central American nations adjacent to the canal. He concluded 
that there was no "measurable limit to the possible growth 
of trade in these regions."79 
The completion of the canal, he predicted, would lead 
to "the quicker and more substantial development of both the 
continents of America and Asia, by abridging the distance 
that now divides them." 
At the present time England has the lion's share 
of the world's trade •••• It is, however, impos-
sible, in the course of nature, that this suprem-
acy can endure for all time •••• The past was for 
Greece and Rome, the present is for England, Ger-
many, and France; the future is undoubtedly for 
those countries that offer facilities for the devel-
opment of commerce and industry, with which the 
limited areas of Europe and the redundant popula-
tion of these islands cannot successfully compete • 
• • • The battle of the future must be to the strong, 
and the time is not likely to be far off when the 
sceptre of empire, of commerce, of wealth, and of 
industry, will be largely, if not wholly joined 
together by one or the other of the water-ways 
that are 8ow being projected across the American 
isthmus.8 
The United States was already paramount in one of the 
stepping-stones to the far Pacific. According to one Bri-
tish observer, the Hawaiian Islands were "practically Amer-
icanised, and the dollar is the standard coin." Hawaii was 
of some importance since Honolulu was the only coaling sta-
tion on the mail route between Auckland and San Francisco 
and it was on a direct line between Vancouver and Fiji. 81 
79ill£., 199. 
80Ibid., 204, 206. C:f. the section below on the American 
future,.especially the preaiction of George Thomas Bettany. 
Blc. Kinloch Cooke, "Europe in the Pacific," Nineteenth 
Century, XX (November, 1886), 742, 745. 
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According to another, Britain's Pacific possessions had sud-
denly found "themselves face to face with the Great Powers 
of the world. The United States in Samoa, France at the 
New Hebrides, and Germany in New Britain, have, in a few 
months, come to physical touch of our Australian Colonies.a82 
Year by year Australia did less business with England 
and more with America, because American manufacturers were 
careful to accomodate the needs of their customers and the 
British were not. 83 In 1884 New South Wales had experienced 
a considerable increase in foreign trade. But, whereas 
imports from Great Britain increased by 117%, those from the 
United States increased by 389%. 84 A resident of the Empire 
wrote that British 
manufacturing supremacy has been shaken. She is 
now suffering from foreign competitors. Even in 
those "lines" that were considered pre-eminently 
her own--iron manufactures--rival nations are en-
croaching on her. An American contractor can ob-
tain the erecting of the largest bridge south of 
the Line--the Hawkesbury bridge in New South Wales 
--at something like 37,000i below the English ten-
ders. He can take some of the steel from Scotland 
to the United States, manufacture it there, erect 85 it at the Antipodes cheaper than English engineers. 
The same kind of competition was occurring in New Zealand. 
82George Baden-Powell, "Our National Future," National, 
IV (February, 1885), 767. 
83Robert J. Griffiths, "New Markets for British Indus-
try," Quarterl;z, CLXIII (July, 1886), 170-71. 
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84Quoted in Leth.bridge, "Is an Imperial Fiscal Policy 
Possible?" 34. 
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85Robert Stout, "A Colonial View of Im:perial Federa-
tion," Nineteenth Century, XXI (March, 1887), 357. 
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The United States Consul at Auckland reported that "American 
implements and American machinery are everywhere superseding 
English. "86 
Such reports,"and scores more might be collected within 
a few months" it was said, all seemed to indicate "a contrac-
tion, more or less serious and permanent, of our trade" with 
the neutral markets of the world where the United States and 
Great Britain competed on an equal basis. 87 The British 
were facing the American challenge not only in the United 
States, where American manufacturers enjoyed a protected 
market, and not only in Canada, where the Americans had the 
advantage of proximity, but all over the globe. 
The American Future 
The discussion of already existing American competition 
in the British press between 1873 and 1889 provided a basis 
for even stronger predictions of the American challenge of 
the future. Many of the viewpoints already considered con-
tained strong implications, explicit or implicit, that the 
American challenge could only become more severe. Serious 
doubts about the future of American competition were rare 
and these came chiefly from Americans. We have already en-
countered Carnegie's assertion that En.gland need not fear 
real competition for many generations, not until the United 
35. 
86Lethbridge, "Is an Imperial Fiscal Policy Possible?" 
87Ibid. 
-
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states was as densely populated as Europe and wages declined.88 
But Jeans thought it likely that there would be a labor glut 
in the United States in the not-too-distant future. If 
that should occur and if, as a result, wages did decline, 
he wrote, "then it is more than probable that we shall have 
to accomodate ourselves to a very much keener rivalry in 
neutral markets, on the part of our American competitors." 
Such intense rivalry would be a most serious thing for Bri-
tain because the United States was "the most important indus-
trial nation after England herself. 1189 But the American 
Atkinson wondered, as Carnegie did, whether Britain really 
needed to be alarmed: 
May it not perhaps be in the order of things 
that our competition with England in supplying neu-
tral markets with manufactured goods, will be warded 
off by the home demand on our mills and workshops to 
supply the needs of one of the great tidal waves of 
population that seems about to b~ directed upon our 
shores from foreign lands •• ~ .~o 
The typical British view of things, however, did not 
minimize the extent of future competition. There were those 
who insisted "that it would indeed be rash to place a limit 
upon her capabilities in the remote future •••• [But] so 
long as the United States adhere to a strictly protective 
commercial policy we are safe."9l Such a view was quite 
88
see above, 45-46. 
89Jeans, England's Supremacy, 187-88, 213. 
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90A.tkinson, 11An American View of American Competition," 
91 Henderson,"England and America as Manufacturing Com-
petitors," 460-61. 
86 
common during the fiscal debate initiated by the Fair Trade 
movement. Even in the middle and latter part of the 1880s, 
by which time substantial evidence of competition had been 
publicized, the view continued to be expressed, by Jeans and 
others, that England had to fear a really dangerous competi-
tion only when the United States abolished protection.92 As 
late as 1888 Lyon Playfair felt able to write: "If the United 
states alter its Protection policy, and become a Free Trade 
nation, it will be our great competitor in the world, though 
the time is not close at hand. " Though he pointed "to • • • 
the United States as the great industrial nation of the fu-
ture •••• Luckily, her Protection policy is an incubus upon 
her industry, and gives us breathing time to prepare for the 
coming struggle. 1193 
But others, prominent Free and Fair Traders alike, were 
not so complacent. The Cobdenite Brassey insisted that 
It is not from the cheap labour of Belgium, as the 
writers of the manifestoes from time to time issued 
by the associations of employers would have us be-
lieve, but from the dear, yet skilful and energetic 
labour of the United States, that the most formidable 
competition will hereafter arise. 
Gladstone had been correct when he had predicted that commer-
cial supremacy would pass from the United Kingdom to the 
United States. "That the United States must hereafter command 
a dominant position is certain," Brassey concluded.94 
92Jeans, England's Su~remacy, 97-98; F. Bulkeley Johnson, 
"English Supremacy in the .t;ast, 11 493-94. 
· · 93Lyon Playfair, "The Progress of Applied Science in Its 
Effect upon Trade," Contemporary, LIII (March, 1888), 371. 
94Brassey, "Depression of Trade," 801-02. 
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The Fair Trader Ecroyd wrote of the United States exult-
ing in "its future industrial and commercial greatness,"95 
while his ideological colleague, Jennings, was more specific: 
Foreign competition will not become less keen as 
years go by, nor will the world be disposed to leave 
a monopoly of its markets to English manufacturers. 
Trades which we once controlled will fall into 
other hands, and t~ere will again be that "shifting 
of industries" which the philosophers assure us is 
all that is going on.96 But it is to other lands 
that the industries will be shifted. Cotton manu-
factures will be cultivated asiduously by Germany 
and the United States, and the day will certainly 
come when the only transport of cotton required 
will be from the fields where it is grown across 
the road to the mills where it is worked up. Already 
the Americans have erected cotton-mills at Chicago, 
and nothing but the temporary want of capital prevents 
the extension of the industry to the south and south-
west. Manchester and Oldham will find out, as Brad-
ford has done, that there is a form of foreign compe-
tition against which, with open ports here and clQsed 
ports everywhere else, it is impossible to fight.~? 
Jeans, despite his belief that America's protective sys-
tem hampered its ability to compete, could not forget "the 
infinitely greater resources of America," in terms of agri-
culture, mineral wealth, and population. "The American Repub-
lic has, taking the capacity of her land into view, as well 
as its mere measurement, a natural base for the greatest con-
tinuous empire ever established by man. • • .The development 
which the Republic has effected has been unexampled in its 
rapidity and force." 
tres 
95Ecroyd, "Fair Trade," 604. 
96The reference is to Courtney, "The Migration of Cen-
of. Industrial Energy." 
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America has increased her wealth fully tenfold within 
the forty years under review. England has little 
more than doubled her wealth in the same interval. 
Basing our expectations for the future on the anal-
ogy of the past, it is evident that, as regards 
wealth, England will soon cease to be in the run-
ning with her precocious offspring. And not Eng-
land alon~~ but the whole of Europe must be so over-
shadowed. "'J 
More strongly worded, and perhaps the most alarmist 
analysis of the American challenge to appear in the British 
press between 1873 and 1889, was George Thomas Bettany's 
article, ttEurope versus the United States: A Darwinian Fore-
cast." Its thesis was that Bettany's generation was witness-
ing two great struggles, one for supremacy, and in fact for 
separate political existence, on the continent of Europe; 
the other between Europe and the United States for world 
supremacy." w"hile the dramatic aspects of the armaments 
competition kept attention focused on the Continental struggle, 
we forget, or do not believe in, the future proba-
ble transfer of supremacy to the United States. We 
do not imagine that any open struggle can ever take 
place between the Old and the New World Powers •••• 
The struggle may be slow, silent, unseen in its lar-
ger aspects, but it is inevitable; and one day it 
is very possible that Europe--nay, even Great Bri-
tain--may awake to realize that the destinies of 
the world no longer depend on this quarter of the 
globe, but on the younger, stronger, more vigorous 
United States.99 
He made it clear that he did not necessarily mean military 
conflict, but he was convinced that some kind of struggle 
98Jeans, .England's Supremacy, 408-09, 418. 
99George Thomas Bettany, "Europe versus the United States: 
A Darwinian Forecast," Contemporary, LIII (March, 1888), 395-
96. Cf. the much more benign view of The Americanisation of 
the W'Orld which Stead wrote in 1901, below, 353-3~. 
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~ was bound to occur. And it made no difference whether Europe 
grew moderately or declined in numbers, wealth, and skill. 
In any case "a keen struggle of some kind in the f'uture must 
result from the extraordinarily rapid growth of the United 
states in population and wealth, with every sign of long 
continuance. In less than a century it appears probable 
that the United States will number as many inhabitants as 
non-Russian Europe. Its future wealth we can hardly guess 
at; but in a century it may not improbably exceed that of 
the whole of Europe." 
Courtney's "The Migration of Centres of Industrial 
Energy" had demonstrated clearly, contended Bettany, that 
as the appearance of new sources of energy, new ideas, and 
new techniques had given the advantage in the past first to 
one people and then to another, so it would be in the future. 
At the present point in time it was the United States which 
'· was expanding its capabilities at the greatest rate. "The 
whelp of former days has become a lion. It will certainly 
claim to be treated as a lion •••• " Europeans are compla-
cent, believing that the vastness of the United States will 
absorb American energies. 
I believe that when the popula.tion of the United 
States has increased for another century, there 
will have arisen a struggle for existence which will 
put past struggles into the shade. The Americans 
will be swarming everywhere, not merely on their 
own continent, but all over the world, seeking to 
establish themselves, demanding rights and privi-
leges, and in the end perhaps gaining the mastery 
over portions of the Old World. 
Should his readers think that he exaggerated, let them look 
90 
at what the Americans were already doing. The American de-
mand for the annexation of Canada was heard again and again. 
Look at the influence of American protective tar-
iffs on British and European manufactures. Look 
at the spreading influence of the United States in 
the Pacific Islands. Look at the exclusion of 
pauper immigrants, which is in itself a remarkable 
evidence of strength, and may easily be changed 
into a regulation that every immigrant shall possess 
a certain amount of property; thus establishing a 
most disastrous influence to make the European 
States poorer, and to extract from them the richer 
and more vigorous people.100 
Was there any remedy? At this point his readers rea-
lized that Bettany was making a plea for imperial federatio~. 
If there were any remedy, it lay in the establishment of 
some new countervailing power. A European federation he 
placed even farther into the future than American supremacy, 
though he recognized that in time common danger might produce 
European union. 101 "But the most valuable and influential 
answer to the whole question would to my mind be the develop-
ment of a British confederation •••• Thus, and thus only, 
can a second Power arise capable of balancing the United 
States."102 
"The old giants are becoming worn out, and the young 
giant is growing yet more gigantic •••• " But, "while 
Europe may go to decay, and may even become almost the vassal 
f lOOibid., 396-402. 
[ lOlThis interesting forecast was nearly realized; at the 
turn of the century there were discussions by continental 
states of a pan-European economic union against.the United 
States. 
102~.' 404. 
{ 
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of the United States," a confederated British Empire could, 
by wise legislation, establish the necessary conditions for 
prosperity and grow as rapidly as the United States in popu-
lation and wealth. Yet Bettany held out little hope that 
such a confederatio~ could be established in the near future. 
Reading history aright, we see how the cent1·e of 
gravity of human affairs has again and again shifted 
.from the East westwards .from Assyria, Phoenicia, 
and Egypt, to Greece and Rome, .from Rome to Paris, 
.from Paris to London; and it may be destined to 
shift yet farther west to Washington, unless some 
more remarkable change than we &t present foresee 
should keep it on this side of the Atlantic.103 
This note of struggle which Bettany sounded so strongly 
was to find many echoes in Britain in the years from 1890 
to 1906. The years 1890-1897 were associated in the minds 
of those who kept careful watch of American activities with 
the names of McKinley and Dingley, and there were frequent 
references to the tariff "war" which the United States was 
waging against its competitors. And from 189? to 1906, 
during which time American global influence spread more 
rapidly than ever, there were many in Great Britain who be-
lieved they were experiencing on their own soil an "American 
invasion." 
405. 
PART II 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE AMERICAN MARKET, 1890-189? 
CHAP.rER III 
THE CHALLENGE OF "MCKINLEYISM" 
Introduction 
The depths of the Great Depression had been reached in 
1879· Then, after some years of improvement, another low 
point was reached in 1885. From 1886, however, the British 
economy seemed to be making progress once again. The barom-
eter of that progress continued to be the movements in for-
eign trade. As Gladstone had maintained in 1880, so The 
Times professed in 1893: nFor English trade the best measure, 
after all, is the table of annual exports and imports."1 
British exports in particular had shown very satisfactory 
growth, increasing from .t213,600,ooo in 1886 to nearly 
t264,000,000 in 1890. This 1890 figure was a record for 
Great Britain, exceeding by some ~6 millions the previous 
record which had been set in the last pre-Depression year, 
18?2. 2 
1The Times, leading article, January 25, 1893, 9. 
2
sources for such readily available figures as total ex-
ports will not generally be given. Along with much other 
useful information, these data were published each year in 
1he Economist's "Conunercial History & Review" (hereafter cited 
as Com. History [yearJ), published annually as a supplement 
to The Economist in mid-February. The Times published a com-
prehensive but much briefer account during the first week 
of the new year. Such important data as total export figures 
were also, of course, widely referred to in the British press 
throughout the year. 
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A significant factor in this improvement of British for-
eign trade was the increased purchase of British manufactured 
goods by Americans.3 Both The Times and The Economist acknow-
ledged and frequently reminded their readers of the interde-
pendence of the British and the American economies. The Times 
pointed out previous economic recoveries which had been caused 
by increased American demand for British products4 and ~ 
Economist, in commenting on the improved export situation, 
noted that "we find the United States again figuring conspi-
cuously. "5 The United States was, in fact, Britain's best 
customer. 6 British exports to the United States were growing 
faster than total British exports in the late 1880s; in 1890 
they exceeded ~32,000,000. 
Into this Great Britain of 1890, hopeful that the Great 
Depression was finally over and keenly aware of the important 
role which the United States played in maintaining British 
prosperity, came the threat posed by the McKinley Tariff Act • 
. 
This piece of legislat~on was more than simply another Amer-
ican tariff. It not only raised many duties which the Bri-
tish already considered quite high still higher, but it 
3The Times, January 24, 1890, 13. 
4Ibid. 
5The Economist, "Monthly Trade Supplement" (hereafter 
cited as MTS), February 1, 1891, 1. The MTS was published 
the second Saturday of each month. 
6This was frequently commented upon; see, for example, 
The Times, June 7, 1890, 8; and April 20, 1891, 5; J. Stephen 
Jeans, 11 The American Tariff--Its Past and Future," Fortnightlz, 
LIII n.s. (December, 1892), ?55; and the Com. History annua~ly. 
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contained provisions for establishing reciprocity treaties 
with foreign nations and it gave the American President 
broad discretionary powers of retaliation against countries 
whose economic policies he considered inimical to the inter-
ests of the United States. 
A new word, "McKinleyism," entered the English language. 
As it was used by many in the British press, "McKinleyism" 
connoted a new American posture, one of supreme economic con-
fidence, of independence, and. perhaps of defiance toward 
England. It continued in use long after the McKinley Act 
itself had been replaced in 1894. McKinley himself stated 
the challenge clearly enough in his American speeches which 
.. 
were widely reported, frequently verbatim, in the British 
press following the passage of the Act. "Thirty years of 
protection have brought us," claimed McKinley in 1891, "from 
the lowest to the highest rank of industrial progress." Pro-
tectionist America had the lowest per capita debt in the 
world, having reduced it from $76 to $20 in twenty years. 
The taxation of the American people had declined by nearly 
10% between 1870 and 1880 while that of the British, under 
Free Trade, had increased by more than 24%. Opponents of 
protection charged that it enriched the few and impoverished 
the many, yet wealth in England was far more concentrated in 
the hands of the few than in the United States. The purpose 
of· the new tariff was, according to McKinley, to foster still 
greater industrial expansiono American "free trade builds 
factories in Europe, protection builds factories in the United 
,,..--
. 
' 
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states." Under a protective system which encouraged Ameri-
cans to manufacture what they had previously imported, 
McKinley believed the United States was destined to lead the 
world.? 
There were Englishmen who found the McKinley Act admir-
able and worthy of emulation. 8 Most Englishmen thought it 
unwise and some considered it dangerous as well. But no one 
could ignore it. As one interested observer of "McKinleyism" 
wrote: 
The passage of the McKinley Tariff Act by the 
United States Congress, the efforts which are being 
made by [Secretary of State] Blaine to bring the 
South American States and Canada into a commercial 
federation with the Republic, the "Retaliation Act," 
and a variety of other circumstances, have all com-
bined to summon the English people once more to 
consider the conditions under which the trade of 
their country is being carried on.9 
Passage of the McKinley Act set off a great wave of dis-
cussion in England similar to that which had taken place at 
the end of the 1870s, when the Fair Traders had first begun 
to measure Britain's progress against that of protectionist 
America. This chapter will examine several different aspects 
?The Times, February 14, 1891, ?; August 24, 1891, 3; 
November 2, 1892, 5; and leading article, June 22, 1891, 9. 
8see the letter praising the results of American protec-
tion written by the prominent protectionist C. E. Howard Vin-
c~nt, to The Times, October 15, 1890, 7. Many of the authors 
cited below also noted low American taxation, high wages and 
standard of living, etc. This was an important aspect of 
British protectionist comment on the United States both be-
fore and after 1890 but space does not permit any detailed 
examination. ··· 
9L. J. Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 
!_ineteenth Century, XXVIII (December, 1890), 901. 
96 
of the more immediate British response to the McKinley Act. 
But long after the initial wave of debate diminished after 
1892, "McKinleyism" continued to occupy a central role in 
British discussions of the American challenge. 
It is the thesis of Part II that the aspect of the Amer-
ican challenge which most alarned the British between the 
McKinley Tariff of 1890 and the Dingley Tariff of 189? was 
the actual or threatened loss of substantial portions of the 
lucrative American market. This loss, which will be exam-
ined in Chapter IV, the British attributed primarily to"McKin-
leyism" in the form of protective tariffs, constant disrup-
tive talk of tariff revision, and tariff-aggravated depres-
sions. By the latter 1890s, however, the British could no 
longer ignore the fact that another significant cause of 
British losses in the American market was the increasing 
ability of the Unit~d States to satisfy its own industrial 
needs, and this will be examined in Chapter V. The influence 
of "McKinleyism" will be apparent in these chapters and fur-
ther ramifications will be seen in Part III, which deals 
with the emergence of American global competition. 
Grim Expectations 
In the latter part of the 1880s, the theme of international 
struggle and competition had received prominent attention 
in the British press. At that time the notion may or may 
not have been taken as seriously as analysts such as Kropot-
kin and Bettany may have wished. It is quite possible that 
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many readers dismissed such notions as pessimistic fantasies 
or as at least exaggerations. How.ever, when the McKinley 
Act was passed, many in England were in fact quick to inter-
pret the American action as one of aggression, as the launch-
ing of an international struggle in the form of commercial 
~arfare. Those who in the past had predicted a coming strug-
gle might well have felt justified as they turned the pages 
of the British press between mid-1890 and mid-1892. 
English Cobdenites were accustomed to emphasizing the 
capacity of international trade for bringing about coopera-
tion and peace. Hence, Lyon Playfair and others blamed Amer-
icans for re-introducing the reactionary notion that inter-
national trade was in fact a form of competition or even of 
belligerency. They publicly deplored speeches given in 
defense of the McKinley Bill such as that of William Evarts 
which contained the following passage: "Sir, let us under-
stand that with us, in our system and age of civilization, 
trade between nations stands for war in a sense never to be 
overlooked, and never to be misunderstood. 1110 
The Americans, however, had no monopoly of such notions. 
Fair Traders had long been trying to convince fellow English-
men that trade and fiscal policy were elements of the inter-
national competition for supremacy. Outside the ranks of the 
Fair Traders similar views could be found. Lord Salisbury, 
lOPlayfair's speech which contained the Evarts quote 
was reported in The Times, November 14, 1890, 3-4. 
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speaking before the Manchester Chamber of Commerce at the 
low point of the Great Depression, had referred to foreign 
commercial treaties which acted as impediments to British 
trade as acts of "fiscal war." "War is a bad thing;• he had 
said, "but it is our only way of defending ourselves against 
this wrong. \.1hy is it wrong to do it in dealing with your 
fiscal matters, as well as in any other international rela-
tion?"ll Again after the passage of the McKinley Act, this 
time speaking at the Guildhall, Salisbury identified trade 
with war and charged that the protectionist nations of the 
world used tariffs as weapons. 12 The Free Traders in Eng-
land, too, were quick to accept pronouncements such as that 
of Evarts at face value and to believe that America had de-
clared economic war. According to The Times, for example, 
there was no doubt that the new American legislation was an 
act of hostility: 
The new tariff is a war measure •••• Nor is its 
character in this respect disguised by its promo-
ters. It is within the power of the American gov-
ernment to carry out such a measure, just as it is 
within its power to declare war on a friendly 
State, but let there be no mistake about the nature 13 of the former policy any more than about the latter. 
This intensity of the British reaction was attributed 
by A. N. Cumming, one of the controversialists in the debate 
which the McKinley Act provoked, to the fact that Britain 
llQuoted in A. Williamson, British Industries and 
ei~n Competition (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, 
l o., Ltd., 1894), 215. 
12The Economist, November 15, 1890, 1439. 
l3The Times, leading article, October 3, 1890, ?. 
For-
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had "again been rudely awakened~:f'rom her dogmatic slumbers" 
following a brief period of prosperity and complacency. 
Since the very depressed year 1885, Britain's foreign trade 
had increased appreciably and, he claimed, "the average man 
has been content to let sleeping dogs lie. To that is really 
due the seeming indifference of the press and public" to the 
new policy that had taken shape in the United States.14 
It was simply not true that the British press had ignored 
the McKinley Bill until it was passed and that the British 
people had been presented with a fait accompli, as Cummings 
charged. The Economist had kept its readers regularly and 
thoroughly informed from the time the House Ways and Means 
Committee had begun to hold hearings on tariff revision. 
Its United States correspondent had provided a weekly com-
mentary on the Bill as it passed through Congress and The 
Economist had devoted a substantial portion of its April 
"Monthly Trade Supplement" to summarizing the alterations 
thus far proposed in the most important tariff scheduleso 15 
Neither had The Times ignored the impending tariff 
changes. In leading articles, in reports from its corres-
pondents in the United States, and in a multitude of news 
reports, it had warned its readers of the harm the proposed 
14A. N. Cumming, "America and Protection," National, XVI 
(October, 1890), 370. 
15see The Economist, MTS, January, 1890, 9; MTS, April, 
?-11; and the reports filed each week (with only occasional 
exceptions,) by the American correspondent between January and 
October. The Economist printed, in parallel columns, the full 
text of thP- McKinley ~ariff alongside the old rates in the 
MTS, October, 1-13. 
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tariff was capable of causing. The following extracts from 
leading articles published prior to the passage of the Mc 
Kinley Bill illustrate The Times' concern: 
British industry will have small reason to be 
thankful for the new tariff if it is passed. It 
will press with special heaviness upon some local-
ities, such as Shiffield. That is the intention 
of its authors.16 
In 1889 manufactured goods were imported into the 
United States to a total value of $52,681,482, and 
paying a duty of $35,373,627. The new rate is cal-
culated to yield revenue of more than fifty-eight 
million dollars, the average rise being 67.15 per 
cent. to upwards of 91 per cent. Yorkshire will 
suffer [from the increased duties on woolens] by 
the curtailment of American demand.17 
It is clear, then, that the British had no reason to 
be taken by surprise by the McKinley Tariff. Nevertheless, 
as Cumming more correctly alleged, Great Britain had been 
"rudely awakened." To the typical Englishman, Cumming wrote, 
protection in the guise of Fair Trade had in the late 1880s 
seemed a "mere foible, the fad of a few directly interested 
or sorely hit." Then suddenly, with the enactment of the 
McKinley Tariff, it dawned on him that protectionist America 
"is now established as the most prosperous of nations," the 
American workingman is blessed with a higher standard of 
living than his British counterpart, and America is "competing 
with England for the industrial supremacy of the world ••• 
[and] in many departments they are already ahead of us." 
That Free Trader, he concluded, "has little grasped the facts 
16The Times, leading article, August 19, 1890, 7. 
17The Times, leading article, September 29, 1890, 9. 
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of the situation who does not see that a wholly new set of 
problems, undreamt of by Bright and Cobden, are now presented 
to his view. "18 
The new problems mentioned by Cum.ming and the re-exami-
nation of the conditions under which British trade was car-
ried on requested by Jennings filled the British press with 
controversial writings for nearly two years. The early evi-
dence of the effects the new tariff was having on British 
trade was anything but conclusive19 and much of the litera-
ture was stroigly opinionated and rhetorical. The strongest 
and most dramatic theme to appear was the notion, alluded to 
above, that the McKinley Tariff was an act of hostility, the 
opening gambit of a commercial war. In addition to the unam-
biguous statements of Lord Salisbury and of The Times already 
mentioned and the similar statements which continued to 
appear in that newspaper, British periodicals published ar-
ticles bearing titles such as "The American Tariff \Jar" and 
"The Trade League against England." Even essays with the 
soberest of titles said of the McKinley Act that "its opera-
tion must be equivalent to a commercial war. 1120 
There was no doubt in most British minds that the McKin-
ley Act had been aimed directly at them. As The Times edi-
torialized: 
18cumm.ing, "America and Protection," 370-71, 373-740 
19see the following chapter. 
20w. H. Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of the United States," 
F.dinburgh, CLXXIII (January, 1891), 292. 
' l 
Ye are entitled to say, then, that the blow aimed 
at British industry by the M'Kinley Tariff is an 
entirely unprovoked act of unfriendliness, which 
must be recognised as such. • • .No reason can be 
assigned for it except a desire on the part of 
politicians in power to inflict injury on British 
interestso21 
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Not all British observers believed that the new tariff 
indicated that Americans were personally hostile toward the 
British, but it was nearly universally seen as a tactic in 
the American bid for world economic supremacy. Great Britain 
was the acknowledged great power of the economic world and 
it was necessarily at Great Britain that the American chal-
lenge had to be hurled. An English critic of "McKinleyism" 
wrote of the tariff that "there is no doubt but that it was 
specially directed at England--America's largest customer 
and her greatest competitor. 1122 Protectionists shared this 
view. One wrote to The·' Economist that the McKinley Tariff 
would clearly do more hRrm to Britain than to any other 
country. 23 Another insisted that "to damage our industrial 
interests" had been one o:f the objects of those who :framed 
the tarif:r. 24 The Fair Trade leader, W. Farrer Ecroyd, 
wrote to The Times that "the M'Kinley Tariff is a heavy blow 
21The Times, leading article, October 3, 1890, ?. 
22Robert Donald, "McKinleyism and the Presidential Elec-
tion," Contemporary, LXII (October, 1892), 492. 
23William J. Harris, letter to The Economist, March 28, 
1891, 409-10; additional letters from Harris appeared April 
11 and 18. · 
24Frederick Greenwood, "Free Trade, a Variable Experi-
ment," National, XX (November, 1892), 318. 
,, 
~' ~. 
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struck alike at our home industries and at the prosperity 
and independence of Canada--an unprovoked aggression, an 
attempt at conquest by fiscal warfare. 025 The Canadian pro-
tectionist, Sir Charles Tupper, complained that, while in 
1890 the British purchased .t97,000,000 worth of .American 
products, allowing them to enter free of any duty and in 
competition with British products, the United States pur-
chased in return a mere ;/;32,000,000 worth and took the balance 
in cash. But, he continued, they were not even satisfied 
with this immensely favorable trade balance. "They sat down 
and constructed the McKinley Tariff to see how much they could 
reduce the ~32,000,000, and by one stroke of the pen they 
knocked off, by that tariff, 10 per cent. of that ~32,000,000."26 
The grim forebodings for the future which the McKinley 
Tariff evoked in many quarters in England amounted to a sort 
of siege mentality. The silent weapon of protective duties, 
operating from afar, was going to wreak havoc in Great Bri-
tain. As The Times editorialized: 
The more the anticipations of its authors are realized 
the more will it restrict the demand for skilled la-
bour in the industries of this country. If it does 
not throw British artisans out of work and permanently 
cripple the manufactures on which they depend, no 
thanks will be2due to the majority of the Congress at Washington. 7 
25w. Farrer Ecroyd, letter to The Times, October 20, 
1890, 3. For Canada and "McKinleyism 11 see Part III. 
26charles Tupper, "The Question of Preferential Tar-
iffs," Fortnightly,LIII n.s. (August, 1892), 141. 
27The Times, leading article, October 3, 1890, ?. 
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"throws new and serious obstacles round the attempts of our 
manufacturers and traders to get their goods into the United 
states" by establishing troublesome and complex regulations 
for labeling, invoicing, and related matters and setting 
costly penalties for their violation. While Britain freely 
accepted all that America offered, "at the same time, all 
the ingenuity of the Americans is devoted to the work of 
keeping our goods out of their markets."32 
Above all, of course, it was the level of protection 
established in the various tariff schedules which was the 
greatest concern to British observers. "No such revolutionary 
fiscal law enacted by a great commercial power could have 
been without its effect on the trade of the world. It was 
an obstruction in the avenues of commerce which had to be 
overcome, or compensating outlets found."33 It was directed 
not only against England but "against any country which pro-
duces and desires to exchange for the products of the United 
States commodities which can possibly under the stimulus of 
legislative bounties be produced in the United States."34 
Some saw the McKinley Tariff as not really protective 
at all, but as "practically prohibitive."35 Its intent "un-
doubtedly was, and is, to exclude Europe as a producer and 
32Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 909-10. 
33nonald, "McKinleyism and the Presidential Election," 492. 
34Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of the United States," 2920 
35Cumming, "America and Protection," 377. 
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vendor from the American markets •••• It is a Non-Intercourse 
Bill."36 The McKinley Tariff "must inevitably have the effect 
of cutting off some classes of our exports altogether. 11 37 
There was fear that such English staple exports as jute, cot-
ton goods, and woolen goods could no longer be shipped to the 
United States just as so~n as the Americans could expand their 
own mills, for. the duties on such articles represented "com-
plete prohibitiono"38 
Even when the new tariff was considered to be less than 
prohibitive there was extensive concern that the decline of 
British exports to America would be substantial. "It is safe 
to anticipate as the result of the increased tariff under 
discussion that we shall for the future sell more British goods 
to Australia than to the United Stateso"39 There were those 
who believed that tariffs generally and very high tariffs 
particularly impaired a nation's purchasing power. These 
feared that "through the diminished consuming power of the 
American people every branch of industry in Great Britain 
will be affected, even those which produce articles uninflu-
enced directly by the McKinley Bill. 1140 The Economist pro-
fessed to care less whether the Americans had a higher tar-
iff or a lower one than that they should have a stable tariff. 
36Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of the United ·states," 285-86. 
37Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 903. 
3BA. Egmont Hake and O. E. Weslau, "The American Tariff 
Yar," Fortnightly, XLVIII n.s. (October, 1890), 5680 
39Moreton Frewen, "The National Policy of the United 
States," .!,ortnightly, XL VIII nos. (November, 1890), 677. 
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American correspondent provided ample evidence that the 
lengthy Congressional debates over the McKinley Bill had 
badly disrupted the import trade. While awaiting the legis-
lative outcome, merchants hesitated to make new commitments. 
Then, once it was clear that duties would be raised substan-
tially, there was a frantic rush to accumulate the largest 
possible stocks of goods before the tariff should take effect. 
Neither constant hesitancy nor violent fluctuations was good 
for healthy commercial relations and The Economist deplored 
the fact that in the United States the tariff was such a con-
stant public question. It interpreted the Democratic victo-
ries in the Congressional elections of 1890 as a repudiation 
of "McKinleyism," yet The Economist was not elated for it 
saw these elections as merely prolonging a state of suspended 
animation in the United States until fiscal policy lines 
become clearero The period 1890-1897 provided The Economist 
with one continuous opportunity to preach to the Americans 
the gospel of stability.41 
The new tariff was expected to have an especially severe 
effect on Britain's basic industries, textiles and metals. 
There were predictions that it would hurt the Belfast linen 
industry so severely that it would lead to the closing down 
of many firms. 42 Yorkshire anticipated a serious decline in 
41For illustrations of these points see particularly 
§he Economis·t, MTS, June, 1890, 759; MTS, October,l; November 
, 1407-08; and MTS, November, 4-5. Similar examples can be 
found appearing with great frequency between 1890 and 1897. 
42Th T. e imes, June 2, 1890, 11. 
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the export of its woolens to the United Stateso 43 The numer-
ous textile industries which centered around Bradford expec-
ted to be hard hit. One Bradford manufacturer estimated 
that the American trade in Bradford goods would decline by 
from 20 to 33%. 44 
The McKinley Tariff, predicted The Times, would reduce 
British exports of iron and steel and their manufactures 
generally and would "almost annihilate the tin-plate indus-
try of South Wales," since three-fourths of all the tin-plate 
that Britain produced was shipped to the United States, 
chiefly for the canning of foodso 45 Birmingham, perhaps Bri-
tain's premier manufacturing center, worried considerably 
over the new tariff "which threatens to inflict a heavy blow 
on more than one local industry. Its effect on the local gun 
trade will be serious and far-reaching.~' One manufacturer 
stated that the American trade in ~irmingham guns had repre-
sented ~2,000 a week but that, since the new tariff had come 
under consideration, the trade had "fallen off completely." 
Another gunmaker expected the McKinley Tariff would cost 
Birmingham i60,000 a year. The Birmingham trade in metal 
bedsteads with the United States had grown rapidly in the 
late 1880s despite a 35% tariff. Five or six firms had been 
sending nearly.i30,000 worth of iron and brass bedsteads a 
43The Times, leading article, September 29, 1890, 9. 
44Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 903-04. 
45The Times, June 2, 1890, 11. 
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year to America. It was expected that most of this would be 
lost. "In the pearl industry nearly half the orders will be 
lost by the virtual closing of the United States market. 1146 
No town, however, had more to fear than Sheffield. 4? 
The Sheffield cutlery trade with the United States amounted to 
~30,000 a month and nearly 2,500 people were employed solely 
in the American branch of the trade. Sheffield manufacturers 
were particularly irate because they knew that the American 
producers could not satisfy the very large American demand, 
especially in high quality goods. They accused the United 
States of seeking not protection but the complete exclusion 
of Sheffield goods and planned a town meeting to consider 
what action might be taken. 48 
From the very beginning, however, there were two schools 
of thought as to the eff ects--as opposed to the intentions--
of the McKinley tariff. While it was being debated, Andrew 
Carnegie gave a reassuring speech before the Liverpool Reform 
Club in which he asserted that Britain's economic position 
had never been stronger and predicted that the tariff would 
not reduce British exports to the United States.49 Joseph 
Chamberlain, James Bryce, and the president of the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce all stated that the significant effect 
46The Times, October 7, 1890, ?. 
4?see The Times, leading article, August 19, 1890, ?; and 
the brief comment in Jennings, "The Trade League against Eng-
land," 903. 
48The Times, June 23, 1890, 11; October 9, ?o 
49The Times, September 20, 1890, 9. 
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of the tariff would be to raise American prices to such an 
extent that American goods would no longer be competitive 
in world markets, an argument that frequently appeared also 
in periodical essays on the tariff .50 Even The Times, 
despite the pessimism and dismay which frequently appeared 
in its pages, insisted that the United States must sooner 
or later realize that trade is "bilateral" and that, if 
America were to shut out British products from its market, 
some equivalent of American trade must be shut out of Great 
Britain. It went so far as to predict that "if prices rise 
as they are now rising on the other side of the Atlantic • 
the competition even in the States lies open to us."5l In 
• • 
a rather ambiguous leading article on "The M'Kinley Tariff 
and its Effect on British Trade," The Times noted that of-16.8 
millions of the .t30o3 millions worth of British exports to 
the United States consisted of items that would be affected 
by higher duties. In 1889 Britain had sent to the United 
States .i6.2 millions worth of iron and ironware, .i5o8 millions 
50chamberlain quoted in Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of 
the United States," 273; Hurlbert himself amplified and restated 
this characteristic argument, 297, which continued to appear 
as late as 1892; see Henry George, Earl Grey, "Protection--
Free Trade--Fair Trade--Colonial Trade," Nineteenth Century, 
XXXI (January, 1892), 38-60 generally and especially 50; for 
Bryce and the Chamber of Commerce president, see The Times, 
October 8, 1890, 9; and October 28, llo 
5lThe Times, leading article, August 19, 1890,· 7;· and 
leading article, October 9, 9o See also the report of Lyon 
Playfair's speech on the tariff, which The Times called "the 
most complete exposure that has yet been made public on ei-
ther side of the Atlantic of the.futility and absurdity of 
the M'Kinley Tariff"; The Times, leading article, November 
14, 90 
·· ..... 
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worth of wool and woolens, ~209 millions worth of linen yarns 
and manufactures, .;f.1..5 millions worth of jute yarn and manu-
factures, and .f400,000 (or one-seventh of the total exported) 
worth of hardware and cutlery. All were to be affected by 
the increased rates. In addition, in mid-1891 the new rates 
would go into effect for tin-plate, of which the United States 
took in 1889~4.6 millions (or 80% of total British produc-
tion). Nevertheless, The Times concluded that the alarm over 
the effects of the tariff was "exaggerated. It will divert 
and disturb trade pro tanto, but it affects only a part of 
the United States foreign trade, and a still smaller part 
of the foreign trade of England after allo 11 52 
In addition to the numerous confident statements that 
the tariff would have little adverse effect for Britain, 
there were those in England who predicted that the new tar-
iff would prove so onerous, that prices would rise so dras-
tically for the benefit of the few, and that customs revenue 
would decline tremendously and thus require additional truces, 
that the passage of the McKinley Act was really a prelude to 
an era of Free Trade in the United States. In the words of 
the authors of "The American Tariff War," its evils would be 
so enormous that "it may prove to be the herald of Free Trade 
in the United States."53 The Democratic victories in 
52The Times, leading article, December 29, 1890, 10. 
53Hake and Weslau, "The American Tariff War," 567. They 
went beyond this not unusual assertion, however, to the fan~ 
tastic notion that McKinley intentionally had made the tariff 
so intolerable as to assure the adoption of Free Trade; they 
\ 
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November, 1890, and especially the victory of Grover Cleve-
land in 1892 raised the hope in many English hearts that the 
United States was on the verge of adopting Free Trade.54 
The.more overconfident statements in the press became 
easy targets for cri tic5.sm. Enough evidence appeared not 
long after the new tariff went into effect to support, at 
least tentatively, the position that Britain was indeed to 
suffer because of the McKinley Act. The first effect of the 
new duties was that greatly increased prices were charged in 
the United States for British woolens, linens, cottons, but-
tons, cutlery, guns, tools, and machinery; hence they found 
a more limited market.55 Only two weeks after enactment of 
the tariff "we hear rumours of 'short time,' of three days 
a week [in Sheffield], of reduction in hands, of reduction 
in wages." The American representative of one firm reported 
that orders were off by 80%.56 So general was the damage 
done to the Sheffield trade that even those firms with emi-
nent reputations for quality goods were hard hit.5? But no 
recommended, should their conjecture prove correct, that Mc 
Kinley be commemorated by "a statue of gold--or better, per-
haps, of the superfluous silver piled up in the Treasury 
vaults"; ibid. 
54The Economist found it necessary constantly to remind 
its readers that the Americans were committed to protection in 
one form or another, no matter which party was in power. See 
any of the issues during and immediately after these two elec-
tions and during the American debate of the Wilson Tariff Bill 
in 1894; some examples can be found in Chapter IV. 
55see the lengthy article in The Times, February 2, 1891, 3. 
56c.E. Howard Vincent, prominent protectionist, letter to 
The Times, October 22, 1890, 3. 
5?The Times, January 15, 1891, 80 
., 
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major industry escaped early damage at the hands of the Mc 
Kinley Tariff; iron, steel, tin-plates (after that duty took 
effect July 1, 1891), cutlery, hardware, textiles, all were 
~ affected.58 Two months after passage· of the tariff "ship-
i. 
,. 
ping agents all report a diminution in the quan.tity of goods 
sent to the United States. One agent has stated that 'the 
difference between this year and last is at least 50 per cent. 
The volume of the reduction is chiefly in cotton and woollen 
goods and upholstery materials.'"59 After eleven months of 
"McKinleyism," The Times reported that "the trade in lower-
class goods, both metal and textile, has very sensibly de-
clined, and in some cases been annihilatedo" In other bra~-
ches of industry "the normal course of trade has been wantonly 
and injuriously disturbed. 1160 
Under such circumstances Free Traders' claims that Bri-
tain would be unaffected left them open to scornful retorts. 
From their seats "on our only Olympus," wrote one critic, the 
Free Traders smiled at the alarm which the new tariff aroused, 
but there was scant reason for amusement: "Ravage set in 
almost immediately on some of the largest industries in the 
United Kingdom. First the tin and iron trades suffered; 
then it appeared that enormous damage had been inflicted on 
Sheffield:industries; and it is not long since the crash at 
58Donald, ''McKinleyism and the Presidential Election," 
492-93. . 
59Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 911. 
~- GOTh T' t d · G d "Fr T d 'ti'. • ;· e 1mes, quo e in reenwoo , ee ra e, a vari-
able Experiment," 318, n. 
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Saltaire [a major textile producer] illustrated the ruin that 
had been wrought in other trades. 1161 u'The dawn of Free 
Trade in America,'" wrote another, "was distinctly perceived 
by Sir Robert Peel over forty years ago. Since that time 
the tendency has always been in one direction, to increase 
the duties on foreign goods, and to adopt every measure that 
ingenuity can devise for the purposes of hampering English 
trade." As for the contention "that foreign tariffs cannot 
seriously interfere with our prosperity," it was "as great 
a fallacy as it is to contend that great industries cannot 
grow under a Protective system. 1162 
Doctrinaire Free Traders had a response even for this: 
capital and labor diverted from one field of endeavor simply 
moved into another. However, came the rebuttal, there is 
nowhere in England any evidence of such compensation but 
rather "a deeper gloom is settling.over most factory busi-
ness"; there was no such diversion but only the reduction of 
wages and profits which reduced the spending power of men 
and masters and prolonged the depression. 63 
The only American contribution to this controversy in 
the British press was Andrew Carnegie's essay on "The McKin-
ley Billo" Though it was intended, in part, to placate Bri-
tish readers and though it went even beyond his speech to 
tbe Liverpool Reform Club by predicting that British exports 
61Greenwocd, "Free Trade, a Variable Experiment," 318. 
62Jennings, "The Trade Lea~e against England," 904-05, 907. 
63Greenwood, -"Free Trade, a Variable Experiment," 318-19. 
l 
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to the United States would increase, Carnegie nevertheless 
made it clear that nMcKinleyism" did in fact represent a 
challenge to Great Britain. He claimed that the new tariff 
had "a neutral tint, nei.ther Protective nor Free Tradish," 
for it enacted many reG.t1ctions as well as increases. Enough 
duties had been abolished "to give joy to every member of the 
Cobden Club; but whether this application of the doctrine 
which the club preaches will prove for Britain's interest I 
know some sagacious thinkers in Britain who will gravely 
doubt. 1164 
The reductions in the new tariff, Carnegie pointed out, 
had been made chiefly in duties on raw materials used for 
manufacturing. Furthermore, Section 25 of the McKinley Act 
provided that rebates, equal to the duty levied, should be 
paid to American manufacturers who exported goods of which 
the raw material had been dutiable. This clause, he claimed, 
would naff ect Europe more ln the future than any increase of 
duties under the Billo" With a protected home market, with 
cheaper raw materials as the result of tariff reductions or 
rebates, with the possibilities for increased trade arising 
from the reciprocity clauses, and with the development of an 
American merchant marine by means of the recently enacted 
shipping subsidies legislation, the new law not only did not 
place American manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage 
in world trade but placed them "in a highly favourable 
64Andrew Carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," Nineteenth Cen-
~. XXIX (June, 1891), 102?-28. 
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position both for the home market and for the foreign. 1165 
Carnegie reminded his English readers that the United 
states was still the most important consumer of British prod-
ucts in the world and he offered them the consoling statement 
that "the fear that the new Bill would reduce the foreign 
trade [of Great Britain] seems, so far, to be proved ground-
less." He even anticipated that British exports to the United 
states would "steadily increase." But it was clear that he 
believed that such increased trade in the future would be 
on American terms. And, while "the Briton will search in 
vain through all his colonies and possessions for such a 
great and constantly expanding markets for his products as 
that furnished by his children under the Stars and Stripes,'' 
the entire New World and even beyond would be the province 
of the almost unlimited economic development which became 
available ·to the United States by virtue of the McKinl.ey Act. 66 
So the controversy continued. The evidence came in slow-
ly and was not always clear. But there were few people in 
England in 1891 or 1892 who would have disputed Hurlbert's 
statement that the passage of the McKinley Tariff marked "the 
opening of a new chapter in American history--a chapter full 
of immediate commercial and financial interest to the manu-
facturing and commercial nations of Europe. 116? And, while 
65 ... b"d 
.l. 1 • ' in PartllI. 
1029-31 • Reciprocity and shipping are treated 
66Ibid., 1034-35. 
-67Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of the United States," 296. 
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r-·· the English continued to watch the export statistics in the 
hope of finding what the future held in store for their Amer-
ican trade, there was one significant trend that was quite 
beyond dispute. The Queen's subjects were leaving for Amer-
ica in large numbers and many took with them va.luable skills 
or large amounts of capital. 
Hands across the Sea 
Ea.ch year well over 100,000 people left Great Britain 
to emigrate to the United States. No longer did Ireland 
provide the major contribution to this exodus; in most years 
the majority of America-bound emigrants were from England, 
Scotland, and Wales. Few of them ever returned. "They look 
for higher wages and comfort, and presumably find them." 
Many of these emigrants, claimed t~ose who favored an imper-
ial customs union, would have emig1·ated to Canada if only 
the economic conditions there had been as favorable as they 
/ were in the United States under "McKinleyism. 1168 
It was not, however, the emigration of the population 
at large which most concerned most of the disputants in the 
press. It was the skilled hand and the industrial employer 
who left for the United States as a result of "McKinleyism" 
whose departure was interpreted as a great asset for the 
United States and a grave threat to the British economy. 
68cumming, "America and Protection," 375; Tupper, "The 
Question of Preferential 'rarif fs," 143. Cumming and Tupper 
gave widely different and eoualJ~ inaccurate emigration fig~res. 
The peak year of the 1880s (1888; saw 108,692 leave Great Bri-
tain and 73,513 leave Ireland for the United States. The fig-
ures for 1890 were 69,730 and 53,024 respectively. After 1892 
this emigration declined significantly and remained well below 
1890 figures (except for 1905) throughout the period 1893-1914. 
'1~· . 
. 
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The impact of the new tariff on the emigr~tion of highly 
skilled labor was immediate. Already, wrote Moreton Frewen, 
"while the ink of the Presidential signature is scarcely 
dry on the McKinley Bill, we are being told that the skilled 
labourer of Birmingham--the button-maker, the brass-worker, 
the gunmaker--is getting ready to transfer himself to the 
Great Republic of the West." If in the past an able-bodied 
slave had been worth.;f250, he remarked, "I ought to apolo-
gize for asking how much per head this coming exodus from 
Birmingham, from Bradford, from Manchester, and Middlesbor-
ough [the iron center] will be worth to the United States."69 
Only a few months after passage of the tariff Carnegie called 
attention to cables from Liverpool ~eportiug a large adult 
emigration bound for the United States. According to the 
cables, they were "of a superior class, accustomed to the 
comforts of life, many of them mechanics who had been induced 
to settle in America in connection with the establishment of 
British mills and factories" in the United St.ates. ?O Skilled 
laborers were also being lured from England by American em-
ployers: 
The shortest way of obtaining the best skilled labour 
in many processes of manufacture is to seek it in 
England; M'Kinley tariffs throw thousands of good 
artizans out of work altogether, lower the wages of 
thousands more, deepen whatever fear there may be 
that trade is leaving the country, and so make it 
69Frewen, "The National Policy of the United States," 
676-77. 
?Ocarnegie, "The McKinley Bill,;, 1034. 
easier to draw off to America first-rate men. It 
is the best who go, and those who are most capable 
of helping to found competitive factories in the 
shortest time.?l 
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The linen trade?2 and the tin-plate trade were infant 
industries in the United States which relied particularly 
on skilled British labor. When the delayed tariff increase 
on tin-plate took effect in mid-1891 and the Welsh producers 
thought it .Clight be necessary to go to half-time production, 
The Economist warned them that "it is quite possible that 
any serious stoppage of production in South Wales might tempt 
the men to of fer their services to producers on the other 
side of the Atlantico"?3 At the same time the British consul 
at Chicago reported that the Americans were already tinning 
imported sheets with the help of foreign skilled labor.74 
Enough English tin-platers had emie;rated to the United States 
that in 1894 the Welsh manufacturers launched a campaign to 
have them return.?5 The emigration of such workers to the 
United States, claimed Edwin Burgis, was one of the "perils 
to British trade." American competition, he wrote in 1895, 
had led to "the exportation of the flower of the working 
class. 11 76 This departure of skilled labor was still being 
lamented in 1897 when the American challenge intensified.?? 
71Greenwood, "Free Trade, a Variable Experiment," 319. 
72see "Ultonia," letter to The Economist, April 22, 1893, 48. 
?3The Economist, MTS, June, 1891, 4. 
74Ibid., 9. 
-
?5The Times, October 1, 1894, 9. 
?6.Ed.win Burgis, Perils to British Trade: How to Avert Them 
(London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Coo, 1895), 196-98. 
??see JoBoCo Kershaw, "The Future of British Trade," 
Fortnightly, LXII n.s. (Nove~ber, 1897), 740. 
..---, . 
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v £· The engineering strike of that year caused a great commotion 
in England and there were reports of widespread talk among 
British mechanics of going to America if the engineering 
trade went there.78 
Of even greater concern than the loss of skilled labor 
were the numerous mills and factories which British capital-
ists established in the United States after the McKinley 
Act was passed. British capital investment in the United 
States was nothing new, of course. What alarmed and angered 
many British observers was the large number of British firms, 
including some very prominent ones, which transferred their 
works or built branch plants in the United States in order 
to manufacture behind the McKinley Tariff walla?9 "It is 
said that the mere mooting of the :McKinley Act has sent many 
~··. of our capitalists and manufacturers across the Atlantic to 
make inquiries as to starting busir..ess there, .. Cumming de-
clared. Before the end of October the American correspondent 
of The Economist reported excitement over "the frequent an-
nouncements of late of manufacturers in England and elsewhere, 
78Acccrding to Angus Sinclair, editor of the American 
journal, Locomotive Engineering, quoted in The Times, Decem-
ber 4, 189?, 11. For more on the effects of the engineering 
strike, see Part III. 
79see, however, the discussion of the "American Invasion" 
in the Epilogue. This alleged invasion consisted not only of 
products and of sales offices but also of American manufactur-
ing establishments. Granting that the migrations of capital 
took place under rather different circumstances, British public 
opinion nevertheless seems to have been rather inconsistent 
in seeing both the P.stablish.n!ent of British factories in the 
United States and the later establishment of American factor-
ies in Great Britain as threats to British well-being. 
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who intend, or contemplate, transrerring their industries to 
the United States." As the Earl of Du.nraven noted: "If we 
cannot manufacture goods here and export them to the United 
States or some foreign country, capital invested in mills in 
the United Kingdom is withdrawn and devoted to manufacturing 
those goods in the United States or in that foreign coun-
t n80 ry. In the following months there continued to be wide-
spread talk of British capitalists attempting to save their 
American markets by moving their businesses to the United 
States. "Symptoms of such a movement have already appeared 
in some quarters of manufacturing England •1181 One English-
man even argued that British investors had contributed to 
the problem; Samuel Plimsoll claimed that the American trusts 
had been the chief architects of the new tariff and that 
British capital had been involved in the establishment of 
some of them. 82 
It was not long before specific and prominent examples 
were being widely noticed in the British press. Most cases 
occurred in the textile industry, whose woolens, plushes, and 
silks were especially hard hit by the new rates. Two months 
before the McKinley Act was passed, The Times, citing a recent 
80Cumming, "America and Protection," 375-76; The Econo-
mist, November 1, 1890, 1.387; Earl of Du.nraven, "Commercial 
Union within the Empire, 11 Nineteenth Century, XXIX (March, 
1891)' 518. 
81Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of the United States," 297. 
82samuel Pliruso11, "'Trusts': An Alarm," Nineteenth Cen-
tur~, XXIX (May, 1891), 944. 
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issue of Bradstreet's, reported that in anticipation of 
higher duties British thread manufacturers had established 
factories in the United States. A new town was to be built 
in Pennsylvania grouped around cotton mills financed by Bri-
tish capital from the textile center of Oldham. New Oldham 
was to be located in Ct.ester County on the main line of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad and the cotton mills were to be staffed 
by English operatives. 83 It was perhaps this same group to 
which Jennings referred when he wrote that unnamed English 
capitalists were planning to build "extensive cotton mills" 
in Pennsylvania. The manufacturers were quoted as saying 
that since they could not break down the wall of protection 
they would get inside and take advantage of it. They proposed 
"to take over their factories instead of their products. 1184 
Other branches of the British textile industry were simi-
larly motivated. A Scotch gingham manufacturer announced 
that he was negotiating for a factory site in Connecticut. 
"The gentleman in question explains that, owing to the new 
tariff, the removal of the business is necessary. 1185 Messrs. 
83 . The Times, August 1, 1890, 3. Its correspondent, per-
haps in something of a pique, commented that the English owners 
of Pennsylvania mills could not expect their operatives to 
remain satisfied for long with English-level wages; thus 
their goods could not be produced more cheaply than American 
goods and no one would be better off except "the people in 
old Oldham who will have more room to breathe"; ill£.• 
84Jennings, "The Trade League against England, 11 903. 
85The Globe, quoted in Earl of Dunraven, "Commercial 
Union within the Empire," 518. 
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Lister and Company of Yorks~ire, makers of velvets and plush-
es and apparently a bellwether of the industry, so widespread 
was the attention given their plans, announced that if the 
new duty levied on its products was to be 90%, as proposed, 
they would have to establish factories in the U~ited States. 
Other textile makers of the North would be similarly injured 
by the new rates and "many of our prominent dress-good manu-
facturers contemplate similar action. 1186 
Once the tariff had passed, Lister sent agents to Phila-
delphia to acquire a site for American operations. "The 
gentlemen, on being interviewed, said that under the M'Kin-
ley Tariff it was impossible for them to retain the American 
trade. America was once their chief market. Now, however, 
the increase of the duty on the lower grades of silks brought 
prices to the point at which English firms could not compete 
with American houses." Lister plaIJ.ned a major American esta-
blishment employing a thousand workers or mdre. American 
manufacturers were overjoyed; they saw the action as evidence 
that the new tariff would make them prosper, for their major 
competitors would no longer. be able to produce goods more 
cheaply because of lower European wages. 87 
By June, 1891, less than a year after passage of the 
tariff, Carr.egie could present English readers with a long 
86st. JE.Illes Gazette, quoted ~· 
87The Times, October 28, 1890, 5; October 29, 5; the same 
reports were noted in Jennings, "The Trade League against 
England," 904. 
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list of British firms which were already manufacturing in 
the United States or which had purchased land for the erec-
tion of plants. One of the largest makers of Bradford goods 
was establishing a factory in Rhode Island. Messrs. Smith 
& Kaufman, makers of plush, were operating in New York. The 
'belebrated" textile manufacturers, the Saltaire Company, 
were producing goods at a factory in Bridgeport, Connecticut. 
The Notthingham textile firms of Messrs. Wilkin3on had pur-
chased a large factory near Hartford, Connecticut, for the 
manufacture of plushes and shawls. The Reddish Spinning 
Company of Lancashire was ready to start production at its 
factory in New Jersey. Messrs. Ingram., a large calico manu-
facturer, and Messrs. Nairn, the principal linoleum producers 
of Scotland, were also about to establish works in the United 
States.88 
The same process of transferring British factories to 
the United States took place in the metals gnd related indus-
tires, though on a much smaller scale than in the textile 
trade. The British trade most seriously injured by the Mc 
Kinley tariff was without doubt the Welsh tin-plate indus-
try. 89 In mid-1890 The Times carried reports from Pittsburgh 
that a large Welsh-financed tin-plate factory would be esta-
blished there if the new tariff increased the tin-plate duty.90 
88
carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1033-34. 
89see Chapter V, 11 Coal, Iron, and Steel." 
90The Times, May 21, 1890, 5. 
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such reports continued to circulate and by 1892 they were 
f . d 91 con irme • 
Under the impact of the McKinley Tariff other British 
metal trades crossed the Atlantic. Within two weeks of its 
enactment, a leading Sheffield firm was making plans to move 
its plant and its skilled workers to the United States. A 
major Lake Michigan ship-building firm was purchased by Bri-
tish interests. An English syndicate purchased one of the 
principal type foundries of the United States with a view 
toward establishing a trust.92 
The industrial growth of the American South attracted 
considerable attention in the British press.93 The steel 
industry of the South had been started on the premise that 
low-cost competitive steel could be made by the basic-hearth 
process, together with the advantages of nearby ore and fuel 
in abundance. A number of English firms had est~blished plants 
using the basic-hearth process in Birmingham, Alabama, at 
Middlesborou~h, Kentucky (the names of both carried overtones 
of national industries for British readers), and elsewhere 
in the South. Glasgow, Virginia, an iron ore and coal cen-
ter, was operated by an Anglo-American company. Middlesbor-
ough, Kentucky, was "strictly an English enterprise. It is 
9lThe Economist, MTS, July, 1892, 3-4; November 19, 1445. 
92c.E. Howard Vincent, prominent protectionist, letter 
to The Times, October 22, 1890, 3; The Times, July 3, 1890, 
5; January 8, 1892, 3. 
93see Chapter V, "American Industrial Growth." 
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80 far an English town in the Southern States, built and run 
with English money." The Duke of Marlborough anticipated 
the success of these Southern steel ventures and their stimu-
lation of other manufacturing operations, particularly tex-
tiles. Before long, he predicted, Southern cotton, "instead 
of crossing the seas to Liverpool," would be consumed by an 
immense Tennessee cotton industry. The Duke solicited addi-
tional English capital to finance a Southern railway combi-
nation capable of preventing Jay Gould's rail interests from 
adversely affecting the substantial British investments in 
the industrial South.94 
94Duke of Marlborough, "Virginia Mines and American 
Rails," Fortnightl;y, XLIX n.s. (May, 1891), 780-97, especially 
785-86 and 794-96; similar information appeared in an article 
by the President of the British Iron and Steel Institute: 
James Kitson, "The Iron and Steel Industries of America," 
Contemporary, LIX (May, 1891), 635-38. There is no direct 
evidence in either of these articles that the establishment 
of such English-owned and -operated ventures was considered 
as anything other than an excellent investment opportunity. 
However, appearing as they did at a time when many in Eng-
land were seriously disturbed at the loss of British capital 
due to "McKinleyism," they could only intensify such fears. 
The whole question of the transfer of capital is complex and 
information is scanty and tentative. Many companies were 
formed to "boom" American land investment in England. Mid-
dlesborough, Kentucky, was one of the areas so developed. 
The Economist frequently found it necessary to warn its rea-
ders of the speculative nature of such ventures and the in-
flated prices of American industrial shares. See The Econo-
mist, May 31, 1890, 691-92; June ?, 725; June 21, 789; and 
June 28, 825-26. Moreover, the transfer of capital was a 
two-way proces~. A British company was formed to acquire the 
entire assets of "the well-known firm of Fraser and Chalmers, 
of Chicago, U.S.A •••• and to extend the business by the 
erection of wo~ks in England, where mining and other machin-
ery will be constructed."; The Economist, January 11, 1890, 
49. And there were occasional reports that, due to the highly 
favorable American balance of trade, American securities were 
returning to the United States from England and elsewhere in 
large quantities. See, for example, The Economist, January 
20, 1894, 81-82. 
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Carnegie had no doubt that these early transatlantic 
ventures were but the first of many to come. Others would 
follow, "led by the wise conclusion that it only requires a 
few years in the United States for them to earn most of 
their profits upon this side if they begin to manufacture 
here, for it has been the experience of several branch es-
tablishments on this side that they have soon outgrown the 
main business at home."95 
The Chicago Exhibition 
When the United States decided to commemorate the dis-
covery of the New World by displaying American achievements 
at a World's Columbian Exposition to be held in 1892, New 
York City confidently expected to be designated as the site. 
It was the heart of commercial and financial America, great 
entrepot for the world trade of the United States, and adja-
cent to the major American industrial centers. In the minds 
of Americans, and of the English as well, New York City was 
the capital of economic America. Yet, despite the efforts 
of New York politicians, the prize went to Chicago. In the 
eyes of many Englishmen (and of some irate New Yorkers as 
well), Chicago and still more so St. Louis, which also had 
made a serious bid to host the Exposition, were but one 
remove from Indian country. The selection of Chicago, a 
thousand miles from the Atlantic, dramatically called attention 
95carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1033-34. 
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to a significant tendency. 11 Westward the course of empire," 
f: commented The Times, was just as applicable in 1890 as when 
the dictum had been uttered in the eighteenth century. Indus-
trial America continued to expand at a tremendous rate; it 
could no longer be contained on the Eastern sea~orad. The 
competition which British manufacturers faced in the Ameri-
can and other markets no longer originated exclusively in 
the original colonies but across a great continent. As The 
-
Times recognized, the American Midwest was rapidly coming 
into its own as a manufacturing center. Chicago was the 
heart of this new industrial area as New York was of the 
.country at large.96 
The World's Columbian Exposition, more commonly known 
in the United States as the Chicago World's Fair and in Eng-
land as the Chicago Exhibition, was planned as a mighty dis-
play of American growth and achievement. It was designed to 
be a major international event, attracting visitors and ex-
hibitors from all over the globe. The Americans wished to 
impress them all, but they desired especially to bring to 
the attention of those nations with which they shared the 
New World that the United States was eager and more than able 
to supply their need for manufactured goods.97 
The Chicago Exhibition was being planned at the same time 
96The Times, leading article, February 27, 1890, 9. 
97see the letter of Henry Trueman Wood, Secretary to the 
British Royal Commission for the Chicago Exhibition, to The 
Times, September 4, 1890, 4. ~ 
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that the United States Congress was debating the McKinley 
Bill. It was held in 1892-1893. It took place, therefore, 
at a time when Anglo-American commercial relations had been 
exacerbated for more than two years by the effects, real and 
alleged, of the McKinley Act. In Great Britain there was 
considerable opposition to recognizing or participating in 
the Exhibition. However, neither the Exhibition itself nor 
the hostility toward it attracted much attention in the Bri-
tish periodical press. National newspapers such as The Times 
and The Economist, especially the former, published news 
reports during the planning and construction stages of the 
Exhibition and occasional articles on it once it had opened, 
but they seldom editorialized on the significance of the Ex-
hibition. 
Yet discussion of British participation was apparently 
extensive. It was carried on within organizat~ons such as 
the Society of Arts, which the British Gov~rnment had desig-
nated to serve as the British Royal Commission for the Chi-
cago Exhibition. It was carried on in the local press of 
Britain's great manufacturing cities and in the trade organs 
of Britain's great industries. It was at these levels that 
resistance to British participation was strongest. At the 
center of many of these discussions were two individuals, 
both of whom had the responsibility to encourage ~aximum 
British participation at the Chicago Exhibition. On~ was 
the Englishman, Henry Trueman Wood, Secretary to the British 
Royal Com.mission for the Chicago Exhibition. The other was 
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the American, Robert .McCormick, official United States repre-
sentative to Great Britain for the Exhibition. 
Wood and McCormick spent much of their time dealing 
personally with directly concerned individuals and organiza-
tions such as local chambers of commerce and trade associa-
tions. But both of them also managed to bring their arguments 
in favor of full scale British participation before a wider 
audience. Wood did this by means of an essay in The Nine-
teenth Century. McCormick delivered a vigorous address on 
the Exhibition and Anglo-American trade before the Society 
of Arts which was immediately published in pamphlet form. 
This address, and other similar speeches, elicited consider-
able response in the British press, extracts of which, pub-
lished as addenda to the McCormick pamphlet, amply testify 
to the fact that his arguments were well known and widely 
discussed throughout England. 
Even in their more public appeals, Wood and McCormick 
were addressing themselves particularly to that group in 
England which was most strongly concerned about the effects 
of "McKinleyism." They were attempting to persuade a some-
times indifferent but more often a hostile British industrial-
commercial community of the prudence of making a good showing 
at Chicago. To accomplish this Wood and McCormick had to 
deal with that community on its own terms and to provide 
effective counterarguments to its objections. Thus their 
appeals provide valuable insights into the state of British 
opinion regarding "McKinleyism" and the American challenge. 
' i\ t 
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The·re were a number of reasons for British reluctance 
to exhibit at Chicago. It was a great distance from England. 
Displays had to be shipped across the Atlantic and then trans-
ferred to railway cars for the final stage of the journey. 
Consequently the cost of exhibiting was higho9B Very little 
financial assistance was provided by the British Government, 
in contrast to the handsome subsidies provided German, French, 
and other exhibitors. Furthermore, during the early stages 
of construction and preparation, a number of :foreign workmen 
had been dismissed from the Ex:hibition grounds in Chicago. 
British exhibitors feared that American federal and state 
alien labor legislation might force them to rely on American 
workmen, who were not familiar with the equipment and the 
goods they would be required to handle.99 
But the real obstacle, as Wood recognized quite clearly, 
"is, of course, the McKinley Tariff."lOO As the British 
trade journal Engineering noted two days after McCormick's 
address: 
The tempest of anger and alarm which • • • the 
McKinley tariff excited in Europe about eighteen 
months ago has died away, but it has left behind it 
a feeling of resentment among manufacturers on this 
side of the Atlantic, which bids fair to be perma-
nent, and in this country, at least, to do far more 
damage to British trade on account of prejudice and 
misconception than from any actual restrictions it 
98Henry Trueman Wood, "Chicago and Its Exhibition," 
Nineteenth Century, XXXI (April, 1892), 561. 
99The Economist, March 21, 1891, 372. 
lOOWocd, "Chicago and Its Exhibition," 561. 
~··. 
l 
has set on our export business with America. The 
volume of our export trade has decreased, it is 
true; the Bill was intended to foster foreign 
rthat is, Americjn] industries ••• and this it is 
!oing •••• [Yet we have a vast, and what should 
be, an increasing export trade to America.101 
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Over and over again in his negotiations wi~h potential 
exhibitors, Wood was asked why English manufactui·ers should 
display their products before a people who were doing their 
utmost to exclude them. Wood's response to this persistent 
query was two-fold. He first tried to persuade his audience 
that the McKinley Tariff was not the formidable threat that 
many Englishmen believed it to be. He maintained that it was 
"by no means certain that the new tariff will have the effect 
expected of it" and, for confirmation, he cited Carnegie's 
article in The Nineteenth Centuri which had anticipated the 
maintenance of British exports to the United States. Wood 
commented on the tariff that "large classes of our goods are 
not touched by it; the duties on s~me others are reduced. 
Very many can stand the increased rate, which is paid by the 
American consumer in higher prices, while for others, again, 
no duty is protective, since they cannot be made in America 
at all." Furthermore, he reminded them that Britain was not 
a Free Trade nation because she loved other countries, but 
because most Englishmen believed that Free Trade was the 
policy best suited to serve their interests. "America is 
lOl"English and American Trade," Engineering, April 8, 
1892, reprinted in Robert McCormick, The ~uture Trade Rela-
tions betwEen Great Britain and the Unitea States and the 
';iorld' s Columbian Bxnosition to .J::.e Held at Cnica o in 18'713 
London: W. B. Trounce, 18 , 27-cB. 
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of the tariff in American politics, there always was the 
chance that it might be altered. However, he speculated, 
"wrether this will be to our advantage remains to be seen; 
those who are entitled to express their opinion on the ques-
tion do not hesitate to state their belief that the day when 
America becomes a free-trade country will be a disastrous 
one for British commerce." But even if the tari.ff were as 
potent in excluding British manufactures from the American 
market as some English critics insisted, Wood declared it 
to be "the interest of British manufacturers to fight it in 
every way, to destroy it if possible, to render it nugatory 
if it cannot be destroyed."l03 
If one part of Wood's calculated appeal to potential 
British exhibitors was to dismiss many of the allegations as 
to its harmful effects, he did not ignore or minimize the 
reality of the serious challenge which American industry and 
the Chicago Exhibition posed for the British. To see the 
Chicago Exhibition only in terms of the American market was 
to take too narrow a view of things, he claimed. The Exhi-
bition was not merely an American but an international event. 
It would attract visitors from every part of the world and 
all of them were present or prospective customers. In parti-
cular 
the Chicago people expect of have large numbers of 
visitors from South .America, and they regard the 
l03Ibid., 562-63. Much of Wood's 
that of ~Economist and, to a lesser 
Times. See the following chapter. 
argument paralleled 
extent, that of The 
-
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exhibition as offering a most favourable opportunity 
of getting our South American trade away from us. 
If they are correct, it is essential that our manu-
facturers who make for the South American market 
should be prepared to keep themselves in the minds 
of their customers from that continent who visit 
the exhibition.104 
wood's conclusion was a dramatic appeal to English pride and 
self-interest. "Are we to lie down supine before the barrier'' 
which our best customer by far "has erected to protect her 
own industries, wringing our hands in distress because it is 
difficult to pass?" British commercial greatness had not 
been created that way and it could only be maintained if the 
British strenuously exercised every legitimate means to sur-
mount such difficulties. 
We must show the Americans that, in spite of all the 
artificj.al obstacles they can place in the road, we 
can still make our way into their markets. We must 
prove that in certain classes of manufactures we can 
still beat them. We must seize every opportunity of 
showing them--where we can--how much better our wares 
are than theirs, and so long as-we can do this, we 
need not fear hostile tariffs. wnen we fail to do 
so, we may admit ourselves beaten, get rid of seven-
eighths of our population, and set the rest t8 grow 
cheese and butter for their own consumption.l 5 
The case which Robert McCormick made before the British 
public was similar: the United States was Britain's best cus-
tomer and could be expected to continue as such for some time 
at least; nevertheless, in the near future the United States 
would be a very serious competitor. For both reasons Great 
Britain should make every effort to mount an effective dis-
play at Chicago. But, whereas Wood particularly emphasized 
l04Ibid., 561. 
105~., 563. 
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that fears of "NcKinleyism" were exaggerated, McCormick laid 
heavy stress on the theme of American competition. His Soci-
ety of Arts address, published as The Future Trade Relations 
between Great Britain and the United States and the World's 
Columbian Exposition to B~ Held at Chicago in 1893, was per-
-
haps the strongest detailed statement of the American chal-
lenge offered to the British public between 1890 and 1897. 
To the present time, according to McCormick, Great Bri-
tain had experienced relatively little serious American com-
petition "and her manufacturers are inclined to smile at the 
United States, 80 per cent. of whose exports are food products 
and raw materials, entering the field ••• with their manu-
factured goods." But there were ample reasons, said McCor-
mick, for the British to expect that situation to change 
drastically and soon. 
The United States already surpassed Great Britain in 
the production o.f iron and steel. She was already active in 
the export .field. Notwithstanding the worldwide depression 
of trade which followed the Baring crisis of 1890 and which 
caused British exports to shrink, the United States had in-
creased its manufactured exports by 7.3% in 1891. Impressive 
gains had been made in glassware, hardware and tools, sewing 
machines, general machinery, and especially locomotives and 
railway cars. In addition, British manufacturers no longer 
held the competitive edge over their American rivals which 
once they had enjoyed in a crucial factor for industrial 
·production: the United States now produced coal more cheaply 
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than Britain could. Therefore, though it was true that pre-
sently food and raw materials constituted the preponderant 
portion of American exports, that would not continue to be the 
. d f. ·t 1 106 case in e 1n1 e y. 
The great American growth area for more than half a 
century had been the West. It continued to grow and to that 
growth the decision to locate the Columbian Exposition at 
Chicago was eloquent testimonyo But the United States now 
had still another area which was being rapidly developed. 
The discovery of coal and iron in the South had led to the 
opening of steel mills. The railroads, which long had 
shunned the South as unprofitable, were building thousands 
of miles of new track there. Such facilities encouraged the 
expansion of the already important Southern textile industry. 
Since no other sector of the British economy, not even 
woolens,and iron and steel combined, approached in value the 
product of the British cotton industry, which represented 
22.5% of total British manufactures, Great Britain had legi-
timate cause for concern. The United States presently exported 
~58,000,000 worth of raw cotton and only i2,700,000 worth of 
cotton manufactures, but in time those figures would come to-
gether and even reverse themselves, and then "you must divide 
with us, at least, the trade in cotton manufactures" in the 
neutral markets of the world. It was not the tariff, said 
McCormick, but natural economic causes which would first 
106McCormick, Future Trade Relations, unnumbered pages 
of the Preface and ~~-23. 
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eliminate British textile exports from the United States and 
then "bring the United States to the fore as a competitor in 
this line of manufacture in your other foreign markets, prom-
inently in South America, China, and Japan." 
It is no more in accordance with natural lawc for 
you to bring the cotton from the United States, and 
send the manufactured article to countries in closer 
proximity than you yourself to the cotton fields, 
than it was for you in the 16th century to send your 
wool to Flanders to be manufactured and distributed 
from there to the consumers. The place for the cotton 
mill is in or adjoining the cotton field, and there 
the next generation at the latest will find it in 
its most prosperous condi~ion.107 
Other factors than the McKinley Tariff were bringing 
closer the time when the United States would be a serious 
rival. American manufacturers were going to be materially 
assisted by the reciprocity treaties already signed or being 
negotiated under the McKinley Act. Even more important than 
these treaties was the projected Nicaraguan Canal. When com-
pleted, it would provide American East Coast ports with a 
2,700 mile advantage and Gulf Coast ports with a 3,700 mile 
advantage over British ports in reaching the markets along 
the western shores of North and South America. 108 It would 
also give New York an advantage of several thousand miles 
over Liverpool in reaching much of Asia, so that the United 
States would be a competitor for the lucrative textile markets 
of that area. This would in turn stimulate American shipping; 
though it was German shipping which currently concerned the 
l07Ibid., 20, 22. 
108~., unnumbered pages of the Preface. 
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British, "we will soon be in a position to take the field as 
. "t 11109 competi ors. 
Nevertheless, McCormick believed, a proper appreciation 
of the competitive potential of the United States should not 
make the British overly apprehensive for Anglo-American trade. 
Presently the United States was Britain's best foreign cus-
tomer by far, buyir.g half again as much as her second most 
important foreign outlet, Germany. Despite the McKinley Tar-
iff, despite the large stocks of British goods which the Ameri-
cans had accumulated in anticipation of that tariff, and des-
pite the slackening of trade ~orldwide, many classes of Bri-
tish exports to the United States had in fact been increasing, 
most notably iron and steel manufactures, woolen and worsted 
goods, and drugs and chemicalsollO McCormick saw the Ameri-
can market for British products expanding for some time into 
the future. "For while our resources are such as to point to 
our becoming in time such competitors, we have too much else 
to do in the way of what might be called 'opening up the coun-
try' to enter for the present vigorously upon that career which 
will be ours in due time." Therefore, he concluded, "the ex-
ports of Great Britain to the United States must continue to 
be large, increasing for a time at least from year to year. 
[but] as it reaches its maximum you must expect to find us 
running you close in markets of the world foreign to both, 
l09Ibid., 20-21, 23. 
llOibi,i., 18-200 
• • 
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for we will then be powerful competitors in other fields."111 
As for Anglo-American trade relations of the future, Mc-
Cormick suggested, much depended on such things as the readi-
ness of British producers to adopt new machinery, to change 
their business methods, and to respond to changing tastes and 
requirements. It was their failure in these areas, far more 
than the McKinley Tariff which the British were so prone to 
blame, which really accounted for the recent slowness of the 
British export trade. The Americans were far more aware of 
the importance of such things; they were constantly seeking 
to keep up to date in their line of business. They bought 
samples of new products manufactured anywhere in the world 
so that they could copy and produce them, a practice which many 
British manufacturers very strongly resented. But, if Bri-
tish manufacturers should stay away from Chicago so as to 
avoid having their products copied, as a member of the Liver-
pool Chamber of Commerce had suggested, they would soon find 
out that the Americans had not only already copied their 
newer products and begun to manufacture them, but they would 
in fact be exhibiting and selling them at the Chicago Exhibi-
tion. The present capabilities of the United States which 
McCormick had vividly described were, he said, merely the 
"thin edge of the wedge. 11 If that wedge were not to be dri-
ven farther and faster, .the British would need to make a good 
showing at Chicago. 112 
111~.' 24-25. 
112Ibid., 23-25. 
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In the wake of Wood's article in The Nineteenth Century 
and McCormick's address, the Society of Arts sponsored a 
meeting at the Mansion House to encourage maximum British 
participation in the Exhibition. The meeting was presided 
over by the Lord Mayor and attended by Wood, McCormick, repre-
sentatives of the London Chamber of Commerce, and other inter-
ested parties. In opening the meeting the Lord Mayor insisted 
that it was "of immense importance to England that she should 
be well represented •••• trade competition was never greater 
than at the present moment, and having regard to the keen 
rivalry of the Americans, Germans, and other nations," Great 
Britain could not afford to be overshadowed at Chicago. 113 
The notion of economic competition as a form of warfare 
which, as we have already seen, so permeated the initial Bri-
tish reaction to the McKinley Act, was equally apparent in the 
discussions of British participation in the Chicago Exhibition. 
"An Exhibitor" called the Exhibition "a great commercial bat-
tlefield, in which the hosts of the United States, of Germany, 
and of England, will be drawn up to struggle for supremacy in 
the markets of the world. 11114 The same theme pervaded the 
Mansion House meeting. Wood, after repeating the substance 
of his recent article, concluded with the admonition that 
English manufacturers must remember that the compe-
tition of other countries was becoming, day by day, 
ll3"l"Ieeting at the Mansion House," Journal of the Society 
of Arts, reprinted in McCormick, Future Trade Relations, 30. 
114 
"Correspondence," Engineerin,g, April 1, 1892, reprin-
ted ~·, 36. 
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more intense •••• The Americans themselves looked 
upon this exhibition as a magnificent opportunity for 
robbing us of our South American trade, and they were 
doing their best, quite legitimately from their point 
of view, to take it awa~ from us, and we must do our 
best to prevent them.11> 
McCormick referred to the Exhibition as a "war of friendly 
commercial rivalry." He insisted that the Americans were 
quite willing to enter into "a friendly contest" with England 
to obtain what they felt to be their fair share of the South 
American market. "They would try," he warned, "to undersell 
the old country and would be able to supply quite as good a 
quality of goods. 11116 Sir Owen Tudor Burne, a member of the 
Royal Commission, said that the Chicago Exhibition might be 
England's "last struggle to maintain her pre-eminence in the 
commerce of the world. 11117 Sir Philip Cunliffe-Owen claimed 
that "they would push us out of the market if we would allow 
it, but if we did it would be our own fault." He called the 
Exhibition "the final effort" where the British had "to show 
our relatives in America" that the British were still alive 
and "not going to be superseded by any other nation." Cun-
lif fe-Owen also hopefully predicted that the Americans would 
be aroused to abolish the .McKinley Tariff once they had seen 
the lower price tags on British goods at Chicago. 118 
ll5".Meeting at the .Mansion House," reprinted !lli•, 31. 
116Tbid., 32. 
117~.' 33. 
118Ibid. , 32. 
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At the same Mansion House meeting, Sir Douglas Galton 
recalled attending the Philadelphia Exhibition in 1876 and 
that even then "American manufacturers ran their English com-
petitors very close indeed, especially in machinery." Unless 
they wished to lose their trade to the Americans, he said, 
British machinery manufacturers needed to make a particularly 
good showing.ll9 That industry's trade journal, Engineering, 
was quite alert to the American challenge and strongly pro-
moted adequate British participation at Chicago on the grounds 
that "it is not perhaps so much the prospect of doing new busi-
ness, as of saving existing trades from pillage that should 
form the main motive." Britain's trade and wealth were envied 
on every side, according to Engineering, "and will be snatched 
from us by our foreign competitors whenever the opportunity 
occurs." Britain's chief weakness it pronounced to be "the 
national belief in our own superiority and our contempt of 
the competing foreigner. 11120 
Engineering described at great lengths the evils of "the 
wicked and foolish McKinley tariff that prevents so many mil-
lions of United States citizens from enjoying the benefits 
that could be showered upon them from this country." Never-
theless, it argued, whatever valid reasons there might be 
against British participation in the Exhibition, the tariff 
was not one of them. Ger~any's grievances against that tariff 
119Ibic_., 30. 
12011En.glish and American Trade," reprinted ibid., 29. 
143 
were as strong as Britain's, but Germany was planning a lavish 
exhibit at Chicagoo Such German activity at Chicago was, in 
~ fact, seen as still another major challenge to Great Britain. 121 
;., 
But Engineering's real concern for the futUI·e was Ameri-
can competition. "It has often been stated in th-~se columns 
that the United States Government is making a carefully orga-
nised attack upon our South American trade and • • • the cam-
paign is being pushed forward with energy." It expected Bri-
tish trade to remain preponderant in South America, but "it 
is very different in Central America" where railway systems 
were being established 
with incredible repidity, affording rapid and direct 
connection between the manufacturing centres of the 
States and purchasing districts of large commercial 
value. The completion of the ~icaraguan Canal--
which may be looked for in a few years--will also 
help to shift centres of trade, and to bring American 
and foreign ports, where the British merchant flag122 is now more or less supreme, much closer together. 
The greatest immediate threat, according to Engineering, 
was American competition with British cotton goods. In this 
trade, which was Britain's most valuable by far, "we are within 
measurable distance of a great revolution in our industrial 
relations with the United States." It was only a question of 
time, "and possibly of a comparatively short time," when the 
great surplus of American wealth would be invested in placing 
the cotton mill near the cotton fields of the South "and the 
same revolution we have seen in India [whose cottons were 
121Ibid., 28. 
-
122Ibido 
-
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seriously competing with those of Britain in Asia] will be 
repeated, only on an indefinitely larger scale." 
Already this movement is on foot, and an astounding 
impetus will be given to it when the Nicaraguan Canal 
will be opened, and America will possess a shorter 
route to India, to Australia, and to the extreme East 
than ourselves. Mr. McCormick does not doubt that 
what is probable fo~ one great industry may readily 
be possible for many others, and he evidently dreams 
of seeing the United States commercial mistress of 
the world in the future.123 
Despite such grave warnings of the dangers of non-parti-
cipation, resistance remained strong in England. In April, 
1892, just a few months prior to the opening of the Ex:hibi-
tion, so important a manufacturing center as Manchester had 
still not arranged to have a single representative at Chicago. 
McCormick and others who had been at the Mansion House meet-
ing travelled to Manchester to addrass a public meeting at the 
town hall. Manchester manufacturers voiced the common com-
plaint: it would be folly to pay the cost of shipping arti-
cles 4,000 miles only to have them copied by American compe-
titors.124 
Henry Trueman Wood professed not to be seriously con-
cerned about such public displays of reiuctance: 
There seems to be no reason to fear that the country 
will fail to keep the leading position it has always 
held since the first Exhibition was held in Hyde Park 
in 1851. It is to be remembered that we have a char-
acter to maintain. The British Section has always 
been the best at foreign exhibitions. 
123Ibid., 29 .. 
12411Public Meeting in Town Hall," Manchester Guardian, 
April 9 and 11, reprinted ~·, 38·-40. 
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British manufacturers, he maintained, "generally seem quite 
alive to the importance of the occasion and preparations are 
now being made in various parts of the country for a display 
of certain classes of British goods which promise to eclipse 
even the fine collections shown before on similar occasions." 
"Should it prove otherwise," he said, "it would be disastrous" 
and among Britain's rivals it "would justly be held a symptom 
of the decadence of our commercial powers. 11125 
Wood, however, had underestimated his countrymen's hos-
tility to the McKinley Tariff or their commercial apathy or 
both. When the Exhibition Catalogue was published in the 
spring of 1893, The Economist commented that, though the Bri-
tish section seemed to be strong in fine arts, electricity, 
mining, motive power, transportation, and women's work, it 
was weak in many respects, especially in manufacturing. "Too 
many of our firms," it said, "allowed an unreasonable fear of 
the McKinley Tariff to prejudice them against sending their 
products to Chicago. 11126 
The campaign to promote an adequate British display at 
Chicago seems to have generated considerably more discussion 
than did the Exhibition itself. When Chauncey Depew formally 
opened the Exhibition with a mighty speech celebrating Ameri-
can achievements, The Times took editorial notice of the event 
and its significance. It spoke of the "many services" which 
125wood, "Chicago and Its Exhibition," 564-65. 
126The Economist, May 6, 1893, 540. 
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the United States had rendered to Europe and to England. "Not 
least among them is the spectacle they have given of a mater-
ial prosperity greater than had been known before, and of an 
energy and resolve which have done much to make the powers of 
nature subservient to the benefit of man." 
The fact remains that the United States have done 
what has never yet been done elsewhere, and have 
given proof to the world of what wonders can be brought 
about by industrial enterprise and skill, animated by 
a patriotic spirit and by a resolve to take the lead 
in everything. It is a splendid spectacle.127 
Once the Exhibition had been inaugurated, however, it 
received for the most part only terse coverage in the form of 
news reports of day to day events. Perhaps this should not 
cause surprise. The British had little reason to take any 
great pleasure from the competition at Chicago. Many of the 
British exhibitors were unhappy with the inadequate space and 
inefficient administration provided for them by the Royal Com-
mission.128 The United States, on the other hand, took full-
est advantage of its role as host country to put on quite im-
pressive displays. Among foreign participants it was the Ger-
mans who took the lion's share of the awards and who could 
expect as a result a relative improvement of their position 
in the American market. 129 Though Great Britain won a respec-
table number of awards and was by no means humiliated, the 
127The Times, leading article, October 22, 1892, 9. 
128See 
io5 British 
i298 ee 
the letter to the British Home Secretary signed by 
exhibitors in The Ti.mes, August 27, 1894, 7. 
The Times, November 13, 1893, 5. 
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world's Columbian Exposition was certainly not the decisive 
display of British pre-eminence which so many Englishmen 
hoped to make it. 
CHAPTER IV 
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE PROTECTED AMERICAN MARKET 
Having seen several different forms which the British 
reaction to "McKinleyism" took, it is time to survey the 
record of British exports to the United States following the 
passage of the McKinley Tariff. As we noted at the beginning 
of the previous chapter, the British economy had recovered 
from the depressed conditions of 1885 and by 1890 there was 
hope in Great Britain that the Great Depression was over. 
The United States had contributed demonstrably to the British 
export expansion of the late 1880s, prompting both The Times 
and The Economist to acknowledge once again British economic 
dependence on the United States market. 
The British optimism of 1890, however, was premature. 
That year brought what The Economist called "exceptional 
obstacles to trade," the most significant of which were the 
political and financial troubles in Argentina which led to 
the collapse of the prestigious financial house of Baring 
Brothers and the McKinley Tariff and the Sherman Silver Pur-
chase Act in the United States which "combined to paralyse 
business for a time."1 The combined effects of these obsta-
cles to trade was to launch Great Britain into the last half-
1com. History 1890, 1-2. 
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decade of the Great Depression. British exports had reached 
~· a record high in 1890, "the United States again figuring con-
r,·, 
spicuously" in the improvement as it had in the preceding 
year. But "that growth took place entirely during the first 
nine months of the year, and was not continued after the new 
McKinley tariff regulations came into force at the beginning 
of October."2 The McKinley Tariff thus marked another turning 
point for British exporters. Just as it had figured conspic-
uously in the recovery of the late 1880s, so the United States 
was a major factor in the highly unsatisfactory and difficult 
conditions which faced British exporters during the first 
half of the 1890s. The extent of the decline can be seen in 
the following figures: 
British Exports (millions sterling) 
1888 1889 1890 1891 189.2 1893 1894 1895 1896 
Total 235 249 264 247 227 218 216 226 240 
To U.S. 28.9 30.3 32.1 27.5 26.5 24.0 18.8 28.0 20.4 
It was indisputable that the British were losing a consi-
derable portion of their American trade in the years following 
1897 
234 
21.01 
the passage of the McKinley Tariff. But the economic conditions 
between 1890 and 1897 were so complex and unstable as to allow 
for a multitude of explanations. That such a loss was antici-
pated by at least some British observers has been demonstrated 
2The Economist, MTS, February, 1891, 1. 
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in that section of the preceding chapter which examined the 
"grim expectations" of 1890-18920 These early analyses, 
however, were far from unbiased; they were, rather, contro-
versial elements of the British domestic debate over fiscal 
reform. Even the most objective of them was nece3sarily spec-
ulative and tentative, for the real effects of the McKinley 
Act could only be gauged after it had been in effect for a 
reasonable length of time. But, instea.d of clarifying the 
issue, the passage of time brought a bewildering sequence of 
events which kept British exporters and economic observers 
constantly off balance. 
The British periodical press, which offered such a spate 
of articles between passage of the McKinley Act and the presi-
dential election of 1892, displayed little interest in the 
relationship of British trade to the American tariff after 
18920 For analysis of the slowly a~cumulating evidence on 
the performance of British goods in the protected American 
market from the McKinley Tariff to the Dingley Tariff of 
1897 and after, one must turn to The Times and above all to 
The Economist, for which questions of American markets and 
tariffs were naturally staple items. Here there was no 
dearth of information and commentary. Both newspapers main-
tained constant surveillance of British exports. Both be-
lieved the American market to be a crucial factor for the 
progress or decline of British overseas trade. 
There was nothing really decisive in the detailed news-
paper coverage of the effects of American tariffs on British 
l~ 
tradeo The issue remained highly ambiguous between 1890 and 
1897· But the unceasing attention given to the question and 
the attitude of dogmatic hope combined with a frustration 
verging on despair which marked these press accounts suggest 
that it was the inability of the British to main~ain their 
American markets that made the American challenge a recog-
nized national problem rather than merely the warning of a 
few perceptive observers or the shibboleth of British fiscal 
reformers. As this chapter will attempt to show, the news-
papers attributed the losses in the American market princi-
pally to American fiscal policy. Only at the very end of the 
period 1890-1897 did they begin to recognize that American 
industrial growth, which will be examined in the following 
chapter, was making the United States less and less dependent 
on manufactured imports from Great Britain. 
The impact of the McKinley Ta~iff was felt immediately 
throughout the British economy. Portions of a series analys-
ing the first nine months of the operation of the tariff pre-
pared by the Associated Press (New York) appeared in The 
Times. They showed that many major industrial centers of 
Britain had felt its effects. Liverpool, Sheffield, Glasgow, 
Leeds and Bradford all reported significant losses. Of all 
the cities reporting, only Manchester maintained its Ameri-
can trade unimpaired; it continued to ship high quality tex-
tiles, the cheaper trade having been lost to the United 
States even before the enactment of the McKinley Tariff .3 
3The Times, September 9, 1891, 3-4. 
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perhaps the most disastrously affected industry was the woolen 
trade. 4 Throughout 1891 The Economist was filled with dismal 
accounts from the woolen centers. Bradford complained of 
"next to no demand being experienced for export to the United 
States." Halifax reported. "that the McKinley tariff has been 
the turning-point in many a fine business, and accounts for 
a large part of the depression now so painfully felt." From 
Leeds came the gloomy prediction that American demand would 
never fully recover, "for the lower grades of worsteds • • • 
are practically shut out of the American market by the tar-
iff." Similar reports were filed at the beginning of 1892. 
While the United States had imported only half as much wor-
steds in 1891 as it had in 1890, the British Consul-General 
in New York was reporting that the American worsted industry 
"has been marked by fresh life since the new tariff has to a 
great extent cut off the importation of the lowest grades of 
such goods." Long dormant factories were operating again 
"and new mills are being erected by European and British 
capitalists."5 
Neither The Times nor The Economist panicked at these 
early adverse results. In a number of leading articles which 
appeared during the tariff's first year, The Times insisted 
4 Even harder hit eventually was the tin-plate trade, but 
the higher tin-plate duty did not go into operation until 
July, 1891. The effet.:t of "McKinleyism" on this industry will 
be examined in detail in the next chapter. 
5The Fconomist, Com. History 1890, 28-29; Com. History 
1891, 29-30; MTS, January, 1892, 3; MTS, July, 1891, 8. 
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that "the attempt to levy blackmail upon the world's industry 
for the benefit of the United States leaves extensive classes 
of British trade wholly unaffected and will give back with 
one hand to the remainder nearly as much as with the other 
it takes." Though it coLceded that the very high rates 
established by the new tariff were a heavy burden to British 
exporters, it remained confident "that American manufacturers 
are unable to compete on anything like equal terms with Eng-
lishmen." As a "serious check to the great volume of British 
trade--an intention which some Republicans undoubtedly enter-
tained--i twill turn out eventually futile." Though it could 
not deny that certain branches of British industry had been 
severely hurt by the tariff, The Ti~ believed that "the 
chief permanent sufferer from it will be the country which 
has been so unwise as to establish it" and that "in the course 
of time things generally recover themselves." Nearly a year 
after the passage of the tariff, The Times still insisted 
that the "total volume of trade between the two countries 
exhibits no appreciable signs of diminution."6 The Economist 
asserted after six months of experience under the new tariff 
that it "does not appear to have had any remarkable effect in 
checking imports into the United States" and that "whilst 
placing a barrier against the imports of some classes of goods 
[it] had encouraged the import of others." While also grant-
ing that some major British industries had been harmed, 
6Th m. 1 - . t . 1 J 2 1891 7 A t . e .... imes, eaa.ing ar ic es, anuary , , ; ugus 
10, 9; Sepuember 11, 7. 
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especially woolens and iron, The Economist suggested that, as 
soon as the Americans had consumed the large stocks which 
they accumulated before the tariff went into effect, exports 
of these items would be resumed on approximately the old 
scale.? 
Nevertheless, certain facts could not be ignored. After 
the McKinley Tariff had been in effect for a full year, ~ 
Economist admitted that "almost all our articles of export to 
the United States have fallen off during the current year." 
Total exports to the United States were off by several mil-
lions sterling and only the very inflated shipments of tin-
plates, in anticipation of the deferred duty, kept them from 
being much lower still. "It must be remembered," claimed~ 
Economist, "that we are now bearing the brunt, not only of the 
actual and direct prohibitory power of the tariff, but also 
of the accumulation of large stocks which • o • has limited 
the need of further supplies." A short time later this over-
stocked explanation was called into question when it was noted 
that "if anything, our trade has become more contracted as 
compared with 1890, as the year has grown older. 118 
British trade prospects for 1892 were therefore anything 
but pleasant. The record exports of 1890 had been achieved 
before the McKinley Tariff and the Baring collapse checked 
?The Economist, MTS, April, 1891, 1-2; essentially the 
same message appeared in many issues of The Economist through-
out 1891. 
8The Economist, MTS, November, 1891, 2-5; MTS, December, 
1891, 3-4. 
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British trade, sending the export line on the graph curving 
downwa.rd once again. British exports fell off in 1891 by 
il?,000,000. More than one-fourth of that loss was experi-
enced in the American market alone; United States imports 
from Britain declined f~om.f32,000,000 to ~2?,500,000. The 
controversial question was, of course, how to explain the 
loss. Such statistics as these, together with the plaintive 
reports coming from British manufacturing towns, fostered the 
"grim expectations" which have already been examined. But 
even as late as 1892 those who sought to minimize the tariff 
as a direct factor could offer apparently reasonable alterna-
tive explanations. Not only were the Americans still working 
off the large pre-tariff stocks, but the business boom which 
many Americans anticipated would follow the passage of the 
tariff had not materialized; instead there had occurred a 
minor business collapse as customers proved resistant to 
higher prices. Early in 1892 The Economist expressed the 
opinion that these adverse conditions were gradually disappear-
ing and that the McKinley Tariff had already done most of the 
harm of which it was capable.9 In the latter part of 1892 
there appeared a number of signs that British exports to the 
United States were on the verge of recovery. In August ship-
ments of such prominent items of Anglo-American trade as woolen 
and worsted articles, tin-plate, alkali, linen goods, and 
cotton goods surpassed those of August, 1891; the exports of 
9com. History 1891, 3. 
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linen and cotton goods were, in fact, the greatest in many 
years. 10 Near the end of 1892 The Times reported that, 
"though English iron is virtually excluded from the United 
states by the M'Kinley Tariff," and the staple trade of the 
Leeds area, worsteds, "ha.s been shorn of very much of its 
original dimensions through the operation of the M'Kinley 
Tariff in America, 11 the manufacturing center of Birmingham 
had found the American demand for guns, cycles, metal bed-
steads, chemicals, anvils, and various kinds of hardware 
"quite up to averageo"ll 
These hopeful signs carried over into 1893, during the 
first half of which the British were quite optimistic about 
regaining their lucrative American trade. Its review of 1892 
moved The Economist to predict a better year ahead "because 
in the directions in which we have suffered most, as in our 
trade with the River Plate countries and the United States, 
there are some encouraging signs of revival. 1112 Other promi-
nent voices professed equally optimistic beliefs. Sir John 
Lubbock, Chairman of the London Chamber of Commerce, argued 
"against commercial pessimism and counsels of despair by ref-
erence to the ascertained effects of menaces to British indus-
try which were understood to be uttered by the M'Kinley Tariff."1 ~ 
lOThe Economist, ~ITS, September, 1892, 3. 
11The Times, December 27, 1892, 4-5. 
12Th.e Economist, MTS, January, 1893, 1-2. 
l3The Times, leading article, January 25, 1893, 9. 
157 
The Times unequivocally rejected "the gloomy prophecies often 
:ard as to the incurable decay of British trade."14 Even 
some British industrialists who pointed particularly to the 
McKinley Tariff as an important factor in the unsatisfactory 
condition of the woolen, the iron and steel, and the engin-
eering industries expressed their belief that the low-water 
mark had been reached. They anticipated improvement, though 
it was expected to be very gradualol5 
Such confident expressions were more than pious hopes. 
They were based on reports of increased sales in the United 
States. Bradford, whose trade had been seriously affected 
by the increased duties on woolens, was experiencing "a con-
siderable increase in our trade to the United States, not-
withstanding the existence of the M'Kinley Tariff. 1116 Gains 
were also being reported in several categories of iron and 
steel exports, especially tin-plates, and in cotton goods. 
The United States continued to be the best customer for Bri-
tish jute and linen manufactures. 17 In the first half of 1393 
Britain recovered nearly all the American trade which she 
had lost in the comparable period of 1892: 
British Exports to the United States, January-June (5) 
1893 
15,043,799 
14Ibid. 
-
1892 
12,642,140 
1891 
15,246,47? 
15"The Present Depression of Trade," Fortnightly, LIII n.s. 
(March, 1893), 297, 303, 306...;07. 
i6The Times, January 11, 1893, 13. 
i?The Economist, MTS, April, 1893, 2. 
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The Economist called it "a satisfactory improvement" and 
-
noted that the increases were distributed among textiles and 
manufactures of iron and stee1. 18 
Already, however, when these statistics were published, 
British hopes for the American revival had been struck a 
serious blow. The United States was in the throes of a ser-
ious depression. The United States correspondents of both 
The Tines and The Economist were filing grim reports from 
major American cities of the drastic curtailment of produc-
tion, of the reduction of wages, and of rapidly rising unem-
ployment.19 Such a depression w~.s bound to have a drastic 
effect on British trade, as the British were well aware. The 
realization that the British and American economies were 
interdependent was as vivid for the British in 1893 as it 
had been in 1890. The Times acknowledged that "British trade 
is always dependent upon external requirements; and its prin-
cipal customers for a couple of years past, whether willingly 
or unwillingly, have fallen off. The M'Kinley Tariff barred 
the profitable export of the cheaper classes of goods to the 
United States."20 According to The Economist in late 1893, 
18The Economist, MTS, August, 1893, 4. 
l9such reports appeared almost daily in The Times in 
August and September and in nearly every issue of The Econo-
mist throughout the second half of the year; see, for example, 
~de·t;ailed reports in the latter of July 29, 1893, 913-15; 
MTS, October, 7-8; and November 11, 1346-47. 
20The Times, leading article, January 4, 1893, 7. 
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The character of our foreign trade as a whole 
has been largely determined by our interchange of 
commodities with the United States, and this in turn 
has been influenced to a considerable extent by the 
effects of the commercial crisis which occurred in 
the States during the past summer •••• exports to 
the United States, in consequence of the diminished 
purchasing power of the people and the stagnation in 
trade, have rapidly declined.21 
Any hope for improvement in 1893 was totally shattered 
by the American depression. British exports to the United 
States declined for the third successive year in 1893, drop-
ping to 24 millions. Britain's total exports sagged as well, 
for numerous British strikes in 1893 had reduced output and 
the lengthy Australian depression had produced a banking cri-
sis which seriously checked British trade with that important 
colony. But the most important obstacle to British trade in 
1893, according to The Economist, had been the American finan-
cial crisis which caused a six-month stoppage of business and 
brought immense harm to British exporters. The American panic, 
it explained, "paralysed for months the business of one of 
our most important customers, and even when it did subside, 
uncertainty, first as to the repeal of the Sherman [Silver Pur-
chase] Act, and later on as to tariff legislation, effectually 
barred the way to improvement. 1122 This diminished business 
with America accounted for more than one-third of the total 
decline of British exports in 1893. "Jute, linen, and woollen 
piece goods have all declined, the falling off in each case 
21The Economist, MTS, November, 1893, 3-4. 
22 Com. History 1893, 1-2; see also The Times, January '~, 
1894, 13. 
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being mainly attributable to the lessened demand for the United 
states. The shrinkage of metal exports is also largely due 
to smaller shipments for America, more especially of tin-
plates. "23 If 1893 had been a disaster--The Times called it 
"the most trying year of the decade 1124--little iti the way of 
immediate recovery could be anticipated for 1894~ for "busi-
ness in and with the United States must continue for some time 
to be checked by uncertainty as to the form which the projec-
ted tariff legislation is likely to assume. 1125 
The new year, as anticipated, brought no relief from the 
dismal conditions of late 1893. 'While the United States cor-
respondent of The Economist was describing the business decline 
as the worst in America's history, 26 The Times lamented that 
"the crisis in the United States, where a surplus that seemed 
unassailable has been converted into a deficit, not only 
checked our trade with America, but further complicated mat-
ters by depreciating securities held largely in this country. 1127 
The Times' most fervent wish was for a rapid American recovery: 
The prospects of a revival of trade in this country 
are so intimately bound up with an improvement in the 
industrial and commercial position of the United States 
that there is a natural disposition to make the most 
of every favourable sign •••• we shall have to go 
shares with the Americans in the resulting inconveni-
ences 
23The Economist, MTS, February, 1894, 1-4; see also MTS, 
January, 1894, 1-3. 
24The Times, leading article, January 4, 1894, 13. 
25com. History 1893, 4. 
26The Economist, MTS, January, 1894, 8; for further de-
tails see the correspondent's report qf February 13, 1894, 144. 
27The Times, leading article, January 4, 1894, 9. 
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of the present depression. A lack of vitality in the "Ameri-
can economy means a dull market here, and our own trade revival 
is not likely to be very pronounced until they are beginning 
to weather the storm."28 
Ever since the passage of the McKinley Tariff, the Bri-
tish had taken a keen interest in the prospects of American 
tariff revision. The Democratic victory in the Congressional 
elections of 1890, a repudiation it seemed of the month-old 
tariff, had stirred a flutter of hope in British hearts. But 
it was the Democratic adoption of an anti-"McKinleyism" plat-
form in 1892 which earned the issue a prominent place in the 
British press. There were those in England who had no doubt 
that the evils inflicted by protection on the American workers, 
in the form of very high prices which served to enrich the 
vested interests, were so great that they would assure a deci-
sive anti-"McKinleyism 11 victory in the election. 29 When the 
Democratic victory came, it seemed to most British observers 
to guarantee a downward revision of the tariff which must 
ultimately benefit Great Britain. 
In an editorial comment on the election The Times said: 
"We cannot doubt that the most monstrous absurdities of M'Kin-
leyism will be swept away or cut down to something like endur-
able dimensions, to the great benefit, we believe, of trade 
in the United States and all over the world." The change 
28The Times, leading article, February 23, 1894, 7. 
29Don~.ld, "McKinleyism and the Presidential Election," 
489-504, especially 503-04. 
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be slow and gradual "but it is difficult to see how, after 
the national verdict on the present tariff, it can be long 
postponed or restricted within narrow bounds."30 When, in 
December, a national meeting of the Conservative Party passed 
Colonel Howard Vincent's protectionist resolution by a large 
majority, The Times disputed the assumption behind the resolu-
tion: "A few years ago the protectionist movement appeared to 
be gaining ground all over the world, and the advocates of a 
change in our own fiscal system still point to the M'Kinley 
Tariff as a proof that we must do something to check the influx 
of foreign imports. But the M'Kinley policy has broken down 
in the United States and has been rejected by the people. 11 31 
The Economist drew essentially the same conclusions from 
the Democratic success: that "a tariff reform in the United 
States will ultimately prove advantageous to international 
trade"; and that the election had confounded British protec-
tionists who argued that the world was moving closer and closer 
to a high tariff policy. The Economist concluded "that ulti-
mately the removal of restrictions upon trade must lead to its 
expansion, and one immediate advantage we will gain is, that 
there will no longer be an inducement for European capital to 
flow to the States in order to establish new industries which 
might gain a footing in the American markets if the people 
were taxed for their support •••• "32 
30The Times 2 leading article, November l?, 1892, 9. 
3lThe Times, leading article, December 14, 1892, 9. 
32The Economist, November 12, 1892, 1415. 
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J. Stephen Jeans, a close student of both the British 
and the American economies, expressed agreement with the 
major point made by The Times and The Economist. According 
to him, "the decision that Grover Cleveland shall be once 
~ore the President of the United States, and that the Demo-
cratic party shall once again control tha destinies of that 
nation, may be accepted as an earnest of the determination 
of the American people to fling aside the crutches of pro-
tection, and rely on their ovm unaided strength for the time 
to come."33 
With Eritish trade in the doldrums, it was to be expected 
that interested parties in Great Britain should adopt the most 
sanguine views as to the beneficent effects of American tariff 
revision. As Jeans said: 
It is natural that this decision on the part of 
so important a contributor to the manifold require-
ments of the United Kingdom should inspire feelings 
of hopefulness, almost akin to jubilation. A very 
large section of the manufacturing and commercial 
population of these islands appear to have been imbued 
with the conviction that if the United States were 
only to return the Democrats once more to power, the 
Tariff would be got rid of, and British products of 
manufacture would pour in upon the market of that 
country like a flood 34 
Such parties were, however, strongly warned that they should 
not expect too much. 
Jeans and The Economist both argued strongly that the 
McKinley Tariff had not harmed British trade as much as had 
33J. Stephen Jeans, "The American Tariff--Its Past and 
Future," Fortnightly, LIII n.s. (December, 1892), 746. 
34ibid. 
~
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been anticipated. Jeans claimed that experience proved "the 
futility of a tariff in regard to keeping out of a country 
commodities that the country needs or desires." A signifi-
cant portion of American foreign purchases was comprised of 
highly dutiable goods from Great Britain; "the tariff has 
been ineffectual to prevent the Americans from purchasing 
even protected goods in English markets."35 The Economist 
conceded that the McKinley Tariff had led "at first to a great 
curtailment of imports into the States." But it had quickly 
been discovered "that even under the protection of the tariff 
the~e were many classes of commodities in which the American 
manufacturer could not compete with his foreign rivals" and 
many American producers expected such a high rate of profit 
that the great price increases which followed enactment of 
the tariff left many openings for foreign goods. The point 
of such arguments was this: that "just as the American imports 
have not been curtailed to the extent that was expected from 
the enhancement of the tariff, so they are not likely to expand 
so much as some seem to expect from the reduction of the 
duties."36 
But minimizing the harmful effects of the McKinley Tariff 
was not the only reason, nor the most important, for warning 
the British against excessive optimism as to the implications 
of Grover Clevelandts election. Jeans pointed out that the 
35Ibid., 756. 
36The Economist, November 12, 1892, 1415. 
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American North was protectionist, cohesive, influential, and 
able to bring strong pressure on Cleveland, most of whose sup-
port had come from the South and some of the Central states. 
The Cleveland administration lacked the ability, even if it 
had the will,· to revise the tariff in a radical manner. This 
fact, wrote Jeans, may very well "disappoint the not unreason-
able hopes of the people of this country, that the greatest 
market in the world, and probably in the world's history, is 
once again to be found lying at the feet of British industry 
and commerce."37 The E~onomist reminded the English people 
that the Democrats had only a slim majority in the Senate; 
thus the tariff adjustment was likely to be piecemeal and 
lengthy and would seriously disturb trade until the matter had 
finally been settled. And it reminded its readers that "the 
more the States free themselves from the trammels of Protec-
tion, the better able will they be to compete with us in for-
eign markets, and part of what we gain in one direction we 
may lose in others."38 
In March, 1893, when Cleveland was inaugurated, The Times 
granted that he was no Free Trader in the British sense, but 
it warmly applauded his Inaugural Address as "a declaration 
of war against M'Kinleyism."39 However, as the United States 
correspondent of The Economist pointed out, "the country has 
37 Jeans, "The Jl_merican Tariff,;, 746-47. 
38The Economist, November 12, 1892, 1415. 
39The Times, leading article, March 6, 1893, 9. 
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practically adjusted itself to doing business on the basis of 
the McKinley Tariff, and it might be a dangerous (political) 
experiment for any party to insist within two years of the 
passage of the McKinley Bill that merchants, manufacturers, 
and importers should again revise their bases for doing busi-
ness." The most he expected was that there would be some 
slight reduction on certain manufactured articles and the 
inclusion of additional raw materials on the free list. 1140 
When the depression of 1893 afflicted the Unite~ States, the 
danger of talking about tariff revision received further atten-
tion. Chauncey M. Depew, American railroad magnate, assured 
British readers that it was unwise and hopeless ever to expect 
the United States to adopt Free Trade or even to revise signi-
ficantly the McKinley rates. He pointed out emphatically that 
the electicn of Grover Cleveland in 1892 on a platform of 
American-style Free Trade had been followed by the disastrous 
panic of 1893.41 
Despite strong opposition, despite fears and hesitation, 
and despite the depression (or perhaps further motivated by 
it), the Democrats were determined to make good their campaign 
pledge to revise the tariff and abolish the evils of "McKin-
leyism." British newspapers were full of information and 
editorial opinion on the revision campaign from the time it 
began in Congress in the fall of 1893 until the Wilson Tariff 
40The Economist, MTS, April, 1893, 6-?o 
41chauncey M. Depew, "Prospects of Free Trade in the 
United States," Nineteenth Century, XXXV (February, 1894), 
343-52. 
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passed and became effective in August, 1894. Nothing bet-
demonstrates British confusion regarding their relation-
ship to American tariff policy better than the frustrated, 
ambivalent, and sometimes contradictory comments which ap-
peared in The Times and The Economist during this hectic--
and for British trade disastrous--ten-month period. 
When The Times first editorialized on ~he new American 
tariff bill, it reiterated the dependence or Britain and of 
the whole world on the United States for the revival of pros-
perity and stated that "we may rejoice on general grounds 
that the Democratic party appears bent upon making a serious 
and vigorous effort to bring existing uncertainties to an 
end. 1142 How very little reason there was for rejoicing, 
however, quickly became evident. Yb.at The Economist called 
"a· scandalously protracted party conflict"43 over tariff re"'Ti-
sion occurred, preventing any possible recovery from the ser-
ious depression which had begun in 1893. And not only did the 
lengthy tariff controversy keep American imports to a minimum 
but these British newspapers began to have second thoughts 
about whether tariff revision would really be in Britain's 
best interest. The Economist repeated its by now customary 
warning that, since the McKinley Tariff had been only par-
tially responsible for the decline of British exports to the 
United States, too much improvement should not be expected 
42The Times, leading article, November 27, 1893, 9. 
43The Economist, August 18, 1894, 1013. 
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to result from the revision of that tariff. Though reduced 
tariff schedules would no doubt benefit certain British indus-
tries, they would not "enable them to make good all the ground 
that has been lost since 18900 11 Moreover, 11 the removal o:f 
the duties on their raw naterials would render the American 
manufacturers, whose competition we already feel in certain 
markets, much more serious rivals than they are now. 1144 The 
Times also began to see the proposed revisions as more advan-
tageous to the Americans than to the British. It would 
give the American worker cheaper clothes and housing. Above 
all, "it will give American manufacturers the advantage of 
raw materials at a price that will place them on something 
like a level with their :foreign competitors. Whether or not 
these changes would, in the long run, be for the benefit of 
British industry and trade is doubtful. 1145 
By the end of 1893 it was beginning to sound as if the 
British wi3hed that "McKinleyism" had remained unquestioned 
and undisturbed. The setback to British exports in 1893, of 
which the tariff controversy in America was a prominent factor, 
might well have evoked in Britain nostalgia for the more pros-
perous days which immediately followed the enactment of the 
McKinley Tariff. The prospects for 1894 were even worse than 
the results of 1893. Before 1893 was over, the American cor-
respondent of The Economist was calling attention to the fact 
44The Economist, December 2, 1893, 1429-30. 
45The Times, leading article, December 5, 1893, 9. 
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that "the unrest and uncertainty due to threatened changes in 
the tariff, following the practical prostration of business 
by the financial panic of last summer, is producing some ser-
ious effects." American merchants, caught with large stocks 
cf foreign goods imported at McKinley rates and moving slowly 
due to the depression, were petitioning Congress to postpone 
the effective date of any new tariff until they could reduce 
h . . t 46 t eir inven ory. 
evident by mid-1894. 
What this meant for British exporters was 
British exports for the first half of 
1894 were considerably lower than for the comparable period 
of 1893; iron and steel and jute, linen, and woolen manufac-
tures made particularly bad showings. The export figures 
showed, said The Economist, "how seriously our trade has suf-
fered during the past half-year, owing to the financial and 
other troubles of our transatlantic kin. And there is con-
sequently good reason to hope that a recovery in the States 
will be promptly followed by an expansion of trade here."47 
Such a recovery, however, was dependent on settlement of 
the tariff question. And, amid the ever-worsening business 
conditions of the first eight months of 1894, while American 
importers remained reluctant to place new orders and while 
the British increasingly doubted whether a downward revision 
of the tariff would be of any value to them, the American 
solons debated endlessly. The American correspondent of 
46The Economist, December 23, 1893, 1537-38; December 30, 
1893, 1565. 
47The Economist, MTS, July, 1894, 2-3. 
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The Economist filed report after report telling of the strug-
-gle between supporters of the House bill (average ad valorem 
duties of 35.51%, as compared with the 49.58% of the McKin-
ley Tariff) and supporters of the Senate bill (38.68%); of 
the numerous and troubl&some riders and amendments that were 
proposed; and of the strong reaction of the business community 
against Congress for its inability to resolve the matter and 
allow normal trade conditions to return. 48 The Times' disgust 
with the tariff revision debacle was nearly boundless. It 
even ceased to consider the implications of the tariff for 
Britain during the first half of 1894 and devoted its leading 
articles to exposing the scandalous incapacity of the American 
politicians to liberalize their tariff and set their house 
in order. It acidly commented that the Americans had showed 
the world the quickest way to turn a government surplus into 
a deficit. It noted that the United States was experiencing 
"one of the deepest trade depressions which the world has 
ever known," but it offered no sympathy; "they have no one 
but themselves to thank for it," for they proved incapable of 
agreement on the tariff. From the point of view of The Times, 
the haggling was not even over anything substantial; it called 
one of the latter versions of the bill nothing more than "the 
Democratic variation of the M'Kinley tariff."49 
48see The Economist, August 11, 1894, 988; and the weekly 
reports of the correspondent; particularly informative are 
those of February 17, 1894, 211; March 3, 1894, 274; March 17, 
1894, 355; May 19, 1894, 613; and May 26, 1894, 642. 
49see The Times, leading articles, January 10, 1894, 9-10; 
February 5, 9; April 19, 9; July 5, 9; July 23, 9; and August · 
13, ?. 
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After nearly a year of debate, the Senate version of the 
tariff prevailed and went into effect in late August. Though 
the general level of duties was reduced, the Wilson Tariff 
out-McKinleyed McKinley by raising the duty on certain arti-
cles, as The Economist was quick to point out. Particularly 
important from the British point of view were the higher 
duties imposed on certain iron and steel manufactures.50 
Despite this feature and despite their quibbling about the 
illiberality of the bill as it worked its way through Congress, 
The Economist conceded that the reductions made by the Wilson 
Tariff were "still very considerable" and The Times noted 
that the new tariff "generally reduces the amount charged, 
sometimes to one-half of what it was." Yet The Economist was 
not prone to exaggerate the prospects for any quick recovery 
of British exports. "The lower duties will unquestionably 
work to our advantage," it said, "but that they will lead to 
any very large expansion of our exports to the States is very 
doubtful. t,5l There was substantial agreement that the best 
that could be hoped for was that the termination of American 
tariff uncertainty would gradually restore some semblance of 
normal trading conditions, providing British exporters an 
opportunity to recover at least some of the lost ground. How 
50The Economist, September 1, 1894, 1077-?8. The com-
plete text of the Wilson Tariff appeared, side by side with 
the McKinley rates for comparison, in the MTS, September, 
1894, 1-16. . 
5lThe Economist, August 18, 1894, 1013-14; The Times, 
leading.article, August 18, 1894, 9. 
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much had been lost could be seen in the stark fact that Bri-
tish exports to the United States had shrunk more in the first 
six months of 1894 than in the entire period 1889-1893 and 
The Economist recognized that "a considerable margin has 
still to be filled up before our export trade to the United 
States reaches the level even of 1892," which year itself had 
been a very disappointing one.52 
After the bad year which 1893 proved to be, The Economist 
had looked forward to 1894 with only the most limited expecta-
tions. But, as it said in reviewing 1894, even such a very 
cautious forecast had proved considerably wide of the mark 
since 
we did not reckon sufficiently with the perversity of 
the United States Legislature. For nearly eight 
months, the two Houses deliberately dallied with the 
tariff question, and, deaf to all the appeals made 
to them, persisted in prolonging a state of suspense 
under which the trade of the country shrunk and shri-
velled in all directions. 
With "equal disregard of the public interest," Congress refused 
to do anything to stop the gold drain from the Treasury, giving 
rise to serious misgivings about its ability to maintain gold 
payments. 
To the tariff unsettlement, therefore, was added a 
monetary distrust, which not only arrested the invest-
ment of foreign money in the States, but caused with-
drawal of foreign capital that had been previously 
placed there. This, of course, tended still further 
to cripple trade, and how seriously we were affected 
by the business prostration of so important a customer 
is shown by the fact that the value of our exports to 
52The Economist, August 18, 1894, 1013-14; The Times, 
leading.article, September 14, 1894, ?; The Economist, MTS, 
October, 1894, 1. 
the Statas in the first nine months of 1894 fell 
short of the total for the corresponding period 
of 1893 by fully~7,ooo,ooo, or more than 33 per 
cent. 
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British exporters had actually increased their sales in other 
markets in 1894, but so great was their loss in America that 
Britain's total exports for 1894 declined by two millions 
sterling in 1894, to .;¢216,000,000, the lowest figure since 
1885. British exports to the United States in 1894 were 
nearly 22% below those for 1893 and 37% below those for 18900 
They amounted to a mere .fl8,800,000; no figure since 1865 had 
been lower. As The Economist somberly put it at the end of 
1894, there was some reason to expect that in 1895 things 
could only get better. 
For once at least, The Economist was not disappointed. 
The United States experienced a strong economic recovery in 
early 1895 and, for the British, it could not have come at a 
better time. Britain was suffering from numerous domestic 
obstacles to economic recovery and her exports to most of the 
world were suffering accordingly. The horrible year 1894 
might well have been followed by an equally bad 1895 had it 
not been for the enormous increase of American demand. Bri-
tain's total exports increased from.;i-216,000,000 in 1894 to 
~226,000,000 in 1895. The United States was responsible for 
nearly the entire increment, her imports from Great Britain 
increasing from ~18,800,000 to .i28,000,000o America, a major 
factor in the British distress of 1894, proved equally 
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prominent in the expansion of British foreign trade in 1895.53 
The Economist, however, was once again cautious as it 
surveyed trade prospects for 18960 It recognized that a sub-
stantial portion of the increased American imports simply 
represented purchases de.f erred during 1894 while the Wilson 
Tariff was being debatedo54 Moreover, there was renewed con-
cern that the United States was contemplating tariff changes 
again. Passage of the Wilson Tariff had convinced many in 
Britain that the United States was giving up "McKinleyism." 
While that tariff was still being debated, The Economist 
claimed that the United States had tried protection and found 
it wanting and that the world was moving in the direction of 
Free Trade. Throughout the first half of 1895 it remained 
confident that the United States was abandoning its fiscal 
foolishness. 'When Lord Salisbury complained that protection 
was in fact increasing throughout the world, diminishing Bri-
tish commerce and industry in the process, The Economist re-
sponded that the tendency was in fact away from ultra-protec-
tionism, that nations were learning that high tariffs were 
harmful: 
In the United States McKinleyism had a career as 
short as it was eventful, and the results were of 
such a character as to suggest that the experiment 
is not likely to be repeated. 
The Economist clung to this mirage throughout the summer of 
53see Com. History 1895, 1-2. 
54Ibid., 2. 
l. 
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1896. It professed to see that "in the United States there 
are signs of the disappearance of the delusion that Free-
trade means a decrease in the productive industries." It 
applauded Lord Farrer for a Cobden Club speech in which he 
caid of the Americans: 
Yith that period of prosperity it would be found that 
the modifications which were made in the McKinley 
Tariff had not ruined them, and there would probably 
be an inclination to proceed in the direction of 
making further alterations.55 
The Times knew better. As early as 1894 it had pointed 
out that the Americans refused to put any faith in Free Trade, 
that any tendencies toward it were checked and reversed every 
time there was the "slightest decline in general prosperity." 
In 1895 it carried a graver warning: 
The repeal of the M'Kinley tariff and the pass-
ing of the freer Wilson tariff are probably to be 
followed • • • by new changes in the direction of more 
protection. This means that such part of our manufac-
turers' fixed capital as has been employed for produc-
ing articles for export to the United States will 
become valueless in whole or in part, and that the 
workmen who have been engaged in the business will be 
thrown out of employment. It is useless to argue that 
these trade dislocations inflict most injury on the 
country which causes them. All that we need care to 
know is that they inflict very grave injury on our-
selves and that it would be worth our while to get 
rid of them at some loss to the mere volume of our 
trade.56 
By the end of 1895 The Economist's knerican correspondent 
was warning the journal how dangerously incorrect it was to 
55The Economist, July 28, 1894, 917-18; May 25, 1895, 685-
86; August 24, 1895, 1106. 
·56The Times, leading article, November 27, 1894, 9; 
leading article, July 29, 1895, 11. 
176 
expect any further downward revision. The American business 
community was likely to punish any party which so much as 
raised the issue and if any revision did occur it would be in 
the direction of still further protection.57 From that point 
on, The Economist was considerably more sensitive about the 
danger of a higher American tariff. It noted that, though 
American governmental revenue was less than expenses, Cleve-
land did not dare ask for new taxes for fear that he would 
invite a new struggle with the protectionists. When Cleve-
land took an inflexible position on the Anglo-Venezuelan 
controversy late in 1895, prompting a brief stock market and 
business panic, The Economist claimed that he had at one 
stroke done much to arouse a great clamor for upward revision 
of the tariff .58 
To the relief of the British, the tariff did not become 
an important issue in the United States in 1896. There were, 
nevertheless, a number of things which disturbed Britain's 
export trade to America. The American position on Venezuela 
produced not only a short-term panic but a much longer period 
of commercial uncertainty. Furthermore, there existed through-
out 1896 the possibility of American intervention in Cuba 
which also had "a very unsettling eff"ect" on Anglo-American 
trade. More important than any other single factor, however, 
57The Economist, November 23, 1895, 1532-33; December 21, 
1895, 1655-56; December 28, 1895, 1684-86. 
58The Economist, November 30, 1895, 1555; December 21, 
1895, 1947--48; Dacember 28, 1895, 1681-82. 
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was the money issue in the United States around which the 
McKinley-Bryan presidential· campaign revolved. The currency 
question, as The Economist pointed out, was far more than an 
American electoral issue. Its outcome, its very existence, 
produced worldwide effects and unsettled trade.59 
The Economist treated Silver Democracy as irresponsible 
nonsense and conveyed the impression that any nation which 
allowed such a program to come within the realm of possible 
national policy was a reckless people indeed. Silver agita-. 
tion in the United States had led to "an almost unprecedented 
depression of business," for as long as the gold standard was 
in doubt businessmen entered future contracts only in cases 
of extreme necessity. Naturally, British exports suffered and 
The Economist believed that American trade could never revive 
so long as the threat of a Democratic victory remained. 
On the other hand, it also believed that the United States 
would never really prosper until the evils of protection and 
its direct offspring, trusts and pools, were eliminated. If 
the silver issue had disturbed American commercial circles, 
the depression had also been "in no small measure due to Pro-
tection" and The Economist found the anti-trust and the tariff-
for-revenue-only planks of the Democratic platform praisewor-
thy. Caught in this dilemma, most of England including ~ 
F.conomist opted for McKinley and sound money .on the grounds 
that "nothing would please the people of England better than 
59com. History 1896, 1-2. 
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to see America sound and prosperous, economically and poli-
60 tically." 
The Economist rejoiced a.t the Bryan defeat but it had to 
record that, though an industrial and financial crisis of the 
eravest character "was happily avoided by the victory of the 
sound money party • • • deep business depression reigned for 
months, and only a partial rec0very" had occurred by the end 
of 1896. This, of course, had major repercussions for British 
trade. "It was inevitable that with one of our chief customers 
reduced to such straits our trade should suffer." British 
exports to the United States fell drastically, from ;f.28,000,000 
in 1895 to a mere t20,400,000 in 1896. 61 
The Economist, however, was optimistic regarding the 
prospects for 1897 •. While the McKinley administration was 
"not showing itself so alive to the immediate necessity of 
currency reform as it ought to be" and was "subordinating the 
sound money issue • • • to measures for increasing the already 
high protective tariff," no doubt the country's monetary ar-
rangements would be put on a sounder basis. "And while any 
increase of the Customs duties is to be deprecated, trade 
will suffer much less from an actual raising of the tariff 
than from the uncertainty that now prevailso 1162 
There was no reason for the British to be surprised that 
60~. and The Economist, July 11, 1896, 890-910 
61 com •. History 1896, 1-2; The Economist, MTS, January, 
1897, 2. 
62com. History 1896, 3-4. 
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President-elect McKinley was giving tariff reform higher pri-
ority than currency reform. It was clear to any reader of 
The Times that the father of "McKinleyism" had made higher 
tariff rates a major campaign issue. He had insisted that 
"the most urgent of reforms is a return to the tariff laws 
known by his name. • • .He declares the underlying principle 
of his projected legislation to be the obtaining of new markets 
for American agricultural produce and manufactures without the 
loss of a single day's work by an American labourer."63 McKin-
ley's victory gladdened the hearts of American and British 
businessmen alike, but it also gave a great impetus to tariff 
revision. By the time of the election the House had already 
passed the Dingley Bill and as soon as Bryan was defeated 
tariff debates came to the fore again. The Dingley Bill called 
for substantial increases in most of the tariff schedules.64 
Yhile McKinley himself kept rather quiet about what he 
would propose once in office, others in and out of Congress 
talked excitedly of strong new doses of protection. When 
Mark Hanna made allegedly "conservative remarks on tariff 
legislation," one of The Times' American correspondents retorted: 
The most conservative remark I have seen attributed 
to Mr. Hanna is the following:--"M'Kinley is in favor 
of just so much protection as will enable us to compete 
with foreigners and protect our labourers, and no more." 
Preciselyo That is the foundation of every protection-
ist argument from Carey onward, and of every protec-
tionist tariff from that of 1826 down to the M'Kinley 
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Bill of 1890 •••• If the British manufacturer expects 
any modification of the tariff in the direction of 
free trade or in deference to free trade theories, 
he is deceiving himself completely. Mr. Hanna's 
conservatism is the conservatism of protection for 
protection's sake.65 
As usual, such tariff speculation disturbed American trade. 
The great recovery anticipated after the election of McKinley 
failed to materialize and British exports to the United 
States remained in the doldrums. 66 
Speculation about McKinley's tariff intentions was 
quelled by his unambiguous Inaugural Address in which, accord-
ing to The Times, McKinley stressed protection "in its most 
uncompromising form." The Economist was sceptical whether 
McKinley's avowed objectives--a substantial increase of govern-
mental revenue and the protection of home industries--were 
compatible. It also questioned whether American public opin-
ion would permit McKinley to carry revision to the lengths 
he proposed in his Inaugural: "When, for instance, we have 
American makers of steel rails boasting that they can now 
undersell foreign competitors in their own markets, it should 
be difficult to persuade the Legislature that they stand in 
need of protection at home. 1167 But the British newspapers did 
not control any votes in Congress and the American legislators, 
called into special session by McKinley for the specific 
65The Times, November 9, 1896, 5. 
66The Times, January 5, 189?, 3; see also the comments 
of the American correspondent of The Economist throughout 
the first half of 189?. 
67The Economist, March 6, 189?, 340-41. 
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purpose of revising the tariff, passed the Dingley Tariff in 
the sununer of 1897. 
There was some concern in Britain, though it was minimal 
by comparison with the furor which the McKinley Tariff pro-
voked, over the effects of the tariff on British trade. The 
Dingley Tariff provided for average rates about 8% higher than 
the average rates of the McKinley Tariff. It was clearly 
recognized in Britain that the tariff was designed to bar 
foreign goods and would thus be "injurious and detrimental to 
British interests.tt68 
For The Economist, however, there were some compensatory 
factors in the situation. It expressed not only the long 
cherished British belief that "it is the people of the States 
that will suffer most from its enactment'' but it also saw the 
Dingley Tariff as a remedy for the American competition which 
had suddenly emerged with a new intensity in foreign markets 
and in Britain itself in 1897. 69 "We have heard much of late," 
said The Economist, of the ability of the iron and other manu-
facturers of the States to compete with their foreign rivals 
on their own ground, and the increase in the exports of manu-
factured articles from the States has been the theme of much 
self-congratulation there." Under the pressure of the depres-
sion of the mid-1890s, .American manufacturers had struggled 
68The Economist, March 27, 1897, 443; September 4, 1897, 
1263-64; Tfie Times, September 1, 1897, 3; "The Month in Amer-
ica," NatIOnal, XXIX (June, 1897), 558. 
-69 See below, pp. 
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successfully to reduce production costs and had thus become 
competitive in world markets. Now the new tariff would in-
crease the American cost of production and "cripple the export 
trade." Therefore, "whilst we cannot but regret that our 
trade with the States should be hampered by a restrictive 
tariff, there is some consolation in the knowledge that this 
will give us better opportunities of pushing trade in other 
directions." The final redeeming feature of the Dingley 
Tariff was that old perennial: though the tariff raised fur-
ther obstacles to British exports, the conclusion of the 
tariff debate at least removed uncertainties and permitted 
the resumption of normal trade patterns. If the United 
States, which by mid-1897 was enjoying a revival of prosperity, 
remained affluent, such normal trade conditions should bring 
an improve~ent in British exports to the United States despite 
the Dingley Tariff.70 
At the end of the year The Economist reported that the 
United States had indeed waxed prosperous since the inaugura-
tion of McKinley. In addition to the general revival of 
trade, there was the special prosperity which accrued to 
America when bad harvests in Europe and excellent ones in 
the United States led to an enormous increase of American 
agricultural exports. American purchasing power had never 
been higher than it was in 1897. It proved, however, to be 
70The Economist, March 27, 1897, 443; August 7, 1897, 1144; 
August 14, 1897, 1176-77; Com. History 189?, 1-2. 
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of little benefit to the British economy. British total ex-
ports were on the decline· once again and the British "did 
not obtain in [the American market] an appreciable compensa-
tion for the contraction in other quarters." British exports 
to the United States exhibited only the slightest increase, 
from.f20,400,000 in the disappointing year 1896 to t21,ooo,ooo 
in 1897. 71 
That the American market failed to provide a compensatory 
outlet for British exports The Economist blamed on the "pro-
hibitive effect of the new Dingley tariff." Inexplicably, it 
consistently failed in its year-end analyses of B~itish trade 
to attribute failure to regain the American market to the 
growth of American industrial capacity and self-sufficiency, 
even though it was well aware of this development.72 However, 
The Economist did note in 1897, for the first time, that Amer-
ican competition had provided a check to British exports to 
other parts of the world.?3 The journal was impatient with 
those who were morbidly sensitive to foreign competitionG In 
1896, when British excitement over German competition reached 
a peak with the publication of E. E. Williams' Made in Germany, 
which vividly described the German "invasion" of England, ~ 
Economist denied that German competition was really formidable. 
In this context, the following remarks from its 1897 summation 
are especially interesting: 
71com. History 1897, 1-2. 
?2see Chapter V. 
?3see Part III for details of American competition. 
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It would be idle, of course, to ignore the fact that 
our export trade did suffer to some extent, especially 
in the iron and steel trades, from the competition of 
the United States, where the cost of production has 
been very greatly reduced of late years. In the opin-
ion of many, also, German competition is a factor to 
be taken into account, but that can hardly have affec-
ted us specially last year. 
The Economist did not exaggerate American competition, though 
it was intense in 18970 It presented that competition as a 
feature of the disappointing year but not as a real cause. 
It specifically denied the claim of some Englishmen that Bri-
tain "had failed to keep pace with our commercial rivals."74 
Nevertheless, these comments marked a turning point in the 
British recognition of the American challenge. 
As Part II attempts to show, British concern about the 
American challenge between 1890 and 189? revolved aro~.ind tt-e 
American market itself. By 189?, however, British attention 
had shifted to the challenge of American competition in exter-
nal markets including Britain itself, as Part III will show. 
After 189? the American market absorbed a substantially smal-
ler portion of Britain's total exports. In 1890 Britain still 
sent 12.2% of her total exports to the United States and this 
figure was exceeded in the atypical year 1895. But in 1897 
only 9% of the total was sent to America and during the four 
year period 1898-1901 less than ?% of all British exports 
went there. Though the percentage increased somewhat in 1902 
and 1903, the United States was by then a considerably less 
lucrative market for the British than it had been a decade 
74 com. History 1897,· 2. 
earlier, as the following figures show:75 
1890 1897 
Total 264 234 
To U.S. 32.1 21.0 
British Exports 
1898 
233 
14.? 
1899 
264 
1801 
1900 
291 
19.8 
1901 
280 
18o4 
1902 
283 
23.e 
1903 
291 
2206 
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As the National Review put it in 1903: "During the last few 
years we have seen a determined effort on the part of the 
United States to kill our export trade to America, and if it 
is not actually dead, it has been reduced to beggarly propor-
tions.1176 The Economist did not give up its close scrutiny 
of the American market and of the American economy generally 
after 18970 But it had recognized by 1898 "that manufacturers 
in the United States will be able in the future more fully to 
meet the requirements for the various descriptions of goods 
that were formerly imported from this countryo"77 
75These percentages are approxi~ate, since they are cal-
culated from rounded trade figures. 
76"Eplsodes of the Month," Navional, IlI (June, 1903), 526. 
??The Economist, November-12, 1898, 16240 
CHAPTER V 
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1890-1897 
American Industrial Growth 
As The Economist suggested at the end of 189?, there 
was more to the American economic challenge than a fiscal 
policy which checked the importation of British goods and 
accentuated, if it did not entirely cause, violent fluctua-
tions in the course of American trade. There was also the 
unavoidable fact that American industry was growing with 
amazing rapidity, that it was reducing its production costs, 
and that with ever-increasing frequency it was offering its 
products, in competition with British goods, in markets 
around the world. This obviously indicated that American 
manufacturers could also increasingly supply the American 
demand for goods which Britain had previously exported. 
This chapter will examine the industrial aspects of the Amer-
ican challenge between 1890 and 1897 as the previous chapter 
dealt with what were, for the most part, the fiscal aspects. 
It bears repeating that the various aspects of the American 
challenge overlapped and intersected at numerous points. 
The material in this and in the preceding chapter, divided 
for convenience of analysis and presentation, should be 
considered as a unit. 
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The economic growth of the United States following the 
Civil.War never ceased to amaze the British. It seemed no 
less marvelous to them between 1890 and 1897 than it had 
during the years from 1873 to 1889. In 1893 an American, 
inspired by the nationa~ celebration being held at Chicago, 
wrote a compendium of AI!lerican accomplishments for the edifi-
cation of British readers. After but a single century of 
national existence, he argued, the United State-s had taken 
its place among the great nations of the world. It had be-
come 
not only superior in population, wealth, influence 
and intelligence to many, but the peer of any existing 
nations •••• This surprising development is not by 
any means confined to commerce, trade, and the indus-
trial arts, but it is as striking and gratifying in 
the advancement made in scientific research, in inven-
tions, in the fine arts, in educational and religious 
facilities, and in all those ~onditions which are 
manifest in advanced civilizationo 
He supported his assertions with an array of statistics on 
American manufacturing, commerce, banking, agriculture, and 
national income designed to overwhelm the reader by their 
magnitude and rapid increase. 1 
Few Englishmen would have challenged such claims of 
material accomplishment. Mulhall's statistical compilations 
led him to the conclusion that by the end of the 1880s the 
United States had become "by far the wealthiest nation in 
the world."2 During the debates over "McKinleyism," stateru.ent 
1n. Brock, "Advance of the United States during One Hun-
dred Years," Fortnightly, LIV n.s. (July, 1893), 116-41; the 
quoted statement appears on the first page. 
2see Mulhall's table, "The Wealth of Nations," which 
gives the figures for 1888, in Williamson, British Industries 
.e_nd Foreign Competition, 238. 
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after statement appeared in the British press repeating and 
confirming that conciusion. One British writer noted of 
.America that "in the course of the last twenty years her 
prosperity has become positively embarrassing. 113 Another 
praised the "National sy8tem" of internal Free Trade and ex-
ternal protection for f6stering the growth of a prosperity 
such as had never before been seen, to which nothing testi-
fied better than the immense numbers of Europeans who were 
being attracted to the United States. 4 When The Times criti-
cized "McKinleyism" and wondered when the Americans would 
come to recognize the "waste of national energy" involved in 
"battling against economic laws," a Fair Trader responded: 
"'Waste of national energy!' How very comic." Since it had 
adopted protection during the Civil War the United States 
had demonstrated a rate of growth and accumulation of wealth 
which were unparalleledo5 Even a Free Trader could maintain 
that "it requires unusual temerity to allege that the tariff 
system of the United States has been a failure--for that 
country."6 British readers were reminded once more, as they 
had been so often during the previous decade, that their 
national debt still stood at Qf 700,000,000 while the debt of 
the United States, once nearly as large, had been paid off; 
3cumming, "America and Protection," 373. 
4 Frewen, "The National Policy of the United States," 
675-78. 
5Williamson, British Industry and Foreign Competition, 
237 and 239, n. 
6Jeans,"The American Tariff,"746-47 and 749-55. 
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that beyond this the American government had amassed a surplus 
so large that politicians had established a pension fund for 
Civil War veterans the annual payments from which exceeded 
the entire cost of maintaining the British army. At a loss 
for words to describe suc.h growth, the author had recourse 
to the eighteenth-century eloquence of Edmund Burke who him-
self had found the increase of American prosperity defying 
the powers of description: "generalities, which in all other 
cases are apt to heighten and raise the subject, have here a 
tendency to sink it •••• Fiction lags after truth, invention 
is unfruitful, and imagination cold and barren."? 
Westward expansion and the consequent development of 
agriculture no doubt played a major role in this rapid increase 
of American wealth. But the development of industry and of 
related natural resources was becoming increasingly apparent 
to British observers. As Jeans wrote shortly after the pas-
sage of the McKinley Act: "Ten years ago, indeed, the United 
States were very backward, as compared with most European 
countries, from a manufacturing point of view. In the inter-
val there appears to have been a process of revolution going 
on."8 The Canadian admirer of the United States, Erastus 
Wiman, attempted to provide British readers with more graphic 
illustrations of the magnitude of American economic activity. 
The tonnage on the Detroit River, he wrote, ho.d reached in 
?Ibid., ?4?. 
8Ibid., 751. 
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1890 an amount equal to the combined tonnage of London and 
Liverpool. More tonnage passed through the Sault Ste. Marie 
[ 
b canal connecting Lakes Michigan and Superior in seven months 
,,, 
than passed through the Suez Canal in an entire year. The 
value of the American cotton crop in 1890, the product of 
but a single section of the United States, exceeded in value 
all the gold mined in the world during the preceding five 
years.9 The magnitude of American industrial growth in the 
1880s was seen in the census figures which became available 
in the early 1890s: 10 
The Growth of Manufacturing in the United States 
Factories 
Invested Capital 
Employees 
Value of Product 
1880 
253,852 
$3,000,000,000(approximate) 
2,700,732 
$5,000,000,000(approximate) 
1890 
355,401 
$6,524,475,305 
4,476,094 
$9,054,435,337 
By 1890 the value of American manufactures exceeded those cf 
Great Britain by $1500 million, those of France by $2000 mil-
lion, and those of Germany by $2500 million. 11 That the 
growth of certain American industries had been even further 
stimulated by protective duties even that arch-critic of 
"McKinleyism," The Times, had to concede. "Though the M'Kin-
ley Tariff has not been long in force," it commented during 
9Erastus Wiman, "Canada and the States--A Barbed Wire 
Fence," Contemporar;z;, irx (April, 1891), 620-21. 
lOThe Times, April 17, 1894, 10. 
11wiman, "Canada and the United States," 620-21. 
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the Congressional debate on the Wilson Bill, "it has already 
served to give a start to the productions which it was de-
12 
signed to foster." 
During the debate over "McKinleyism," the British press 
-
was full of interesting information on American industrial 
growth. One of the more frequently noted factors was that 
American industrial growth was taking place now on a continen-
tal scale. The importance of the Midwest as a manufacturing 
center was clearly recognized at the time of the Chicago Ex-
hibition. The growth of Southern industry was also a frequent 
theme in the British press during the 1890so13 The Duke of 
Marlborough predicted that, if the basic-hearth process of 
steel-making proved a success, "before vecy long we are going 
to see the whole of this Tennessee valley a veritable Black 
Country [the heart of the English manufacturing area] in Amer-
ica." Occasional shipments of Birmingham (Alabama) iron and 
steel to England served as constant reminders of what was 
happening in the American South, while the Cotton States and 
International Exhibition of 1895 served as a more dramatic 
demonstration of the industrialization of the region. 14 
This continental manufacturing network was bound together 
by a transportation system which long before 1890 had won 
12The Times, leading article, February 5, 1894, 9. 
l3see, for example, The Times, leading article, June 16, 
1891, 9; cf. the rema~ks of Robert McCormick above. 
14Duke of Marlborough, "Virginia Mines and American Rails," 
794-95; _cf. Kitson, "The Iro~ and Bteel Industries of Americao" 
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British admiration and which had been continually expanded and 
1mproved since Atkinson had called British attention to its 
importance in the early days of the Great Depression. As 
Mulhall's statistics showed, the United States was interlaced 
with 51,820 miles of na·.~igable inland waterways (compared 
with 3,810 in the United Kingdom) on which operated a fleet 
of vessels equal to one-third of the carrying-power of the 
entire British merchant fleet. Equally important, the United 
States had an incomparable railway system comprising 171,800 
miles of track (compared with 20,320 in the United Kingdom)o 
In 1892 every hundred miles of American track represented 
845,000,000 tons of merchandise traffic, while every hundred 
miles of British track represented only 94,000,000 tons. In 
fact, two-thirds of all the railway merchandise traffic of 
the world was carried by American railways. Finally, and 
this was a very sensitive point in England where manufacturers 
complained bitterly about rail rates, the American railway 
system carried goods much more cheaply than they were carried 
anywhere else in the world. The world average railway freight 
charge (calculated in pence per 100 miles) was 97. In the 
United States the figure was 40; in Great Britain it was 140. 15 
If the United States benefitted from cheap internal trans-
portation, critics of "McKinleyism" insisted that the United 
States suffered from artificially increased costs of the other 
factors of industrial production. Nothing was more frequent 
l5Michael G. Mulhall, "The Carrying-Trade of the World," 
Contemporar~, LXVI (December, 1894), 818-200 
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in the British press during the early 1890s than predictions 
that America's high-tariff policy would so raise prices as 
to render the United States non-competitive in the neutral 
markets of the world. Such assertions, however, did not go 
nnchallenged. American wages had been increasing for a long 
time and the advance between 1880 and 1890 had been greater 
than that which had taken place during the previous thirty 
years. They rose still higher in the wake of the McKinley 
Tariff. Despite such considerable increases, there was ample 
testimony that in many lines of manufacturing the United 
States could in fact produce at competitive prices. In 1891 
Carnegie noted 
that prices in Europe and the United States, for 
everything, draw closer and closer together. In 
recent times, steel rails, for instance, have some-
times been quite as cheap in New York as in London • 
• • • Indeed some articles have been cheaper here than 
abroad within the past three years.16 
The following year Jeans wrote that, despite rising wages 
and the McKinley Tariff, "the general course of prices has 
been downwards for a comparatively long series of years, and 
neither the McKinley Tariff nor any other legislative measure 
or proposal has been able to arrest this movement." The ex-
planation was that, since they had no choice but to pay high 
wages, 
the American manufacturers work with might and main 
to make that labour as efficient as it can possibly 
be made. This has been secured in a remarkable 
degree by the introduction of labour-saving appliances 
16
carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1029. 
of every kind. 
wages • • • has 
increase in the 
per employee.17 
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As a consequence, the increase of 
been accompanied by a considerable 
annual value of the product obtained 
American efficiency and inventiveness had been bywords 
in England for a long time. This was no less thG case in the 
1890s. During the debate over "McKinleyism," it was frequently 
pointed out that American manufacturers had reduced working 
hours while maintaining or even increasing productivity. 18 
The American worker, it was claimed, could produce all that 
the country required in the course of a six-hour working day 
while enjoying a higher standard of living through better 
wages and more constant employment, given the modern machinery 
and the available capital of the United States. 19 The opera-
tion of the McKinley Tariff and the onset of severe depression 
in 1893 did nothing to dispel such notions. The Americans had 
proved beyond doubt, many Englishmen believed, that high wages 
and short hours could stimulate increased production. English 
nail-makers earned twelve shillings a week. Their American 
counterparts earned twenty shillings a day "and yet American 
nails are but half the price of English. Here again we find 
the explanation in the fact that the American turns out two 
and a half tons whilst his English rival is making two 
l?Jeans, "The American Tariff," 752-54. 
18 . See, for example, John Rae, "The Balance Sheet of 
Short Hours," Contemporary, LX (October, 1891), 499-520. 
l9Freuen, "The National Policy of the United States," 
680; Cumming, "4merica and Protection," 373-740 
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cwt."20 Or, as Jeans put it: 
The increasing and almost unhealthy energy of the 
American people has already placed them in a position 
to reconcile their economic system with cheap produc-
tion in many products that have hitherto been sup-
posed to be almost of purely British growth.21 
In a leading article on alleged American competition in 189?, 
especially in the engineering trades, The Times remarked how 
much more receptive were .American than British workers to 
new techniques and new machinery, a charge that had been 
made many times in the past. At the same time, the system 
of production of interchangeable parts gave the Americans a 
decided edge over the British, much of whose production was 
done on a custom-built basis. 22 
All these things were, of course, of more than merely 
academic or technical interest for the British. What such 
conditions across the Atlantic signified was stated quite 
clearly as early as 1890. "In many departments," wrote A. N. 
Cumming, the Americans "are already ahead of us. The Presi-
dent of the [British] Iron and Steel Congress has admitted 
the fact of American supremacy in those industries. It is 
probable that in many others the same may shortly be the facto" 
This remark by the President of the Iron and Steel Institute 
was also echoed by L. J. Jennings, who claimed that the 
20L. R. Phelps, "The Economy of High Wages," Edinburgh, 
CLXAIX (January, 1894), 33-61; the quoted statement is from 
P.! 4?. , 
21J. Stephen Jeans, "The Labour War in the United States," 
Nineteenth Century, XXXVI_(August, 1894), 26?. 
22The Times, leading article, December 4, 1897, 11. 
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the American. people's 
main object is to build up the biggest trade in the 
world, and they will do it, and do it moreover by that 
very Protection which, as our philosophers tell us, 
saps the foundations of every industry to which it 
is applied •••• the Americans have beaten us at the 
iron and steel trades, in which thirty yea.rs ago they 
did next to nothing, and eventually they wi:l pass 
us in the cotton trade. They are now turning their 
attention to shipping, in which we are at present 
supreme.23 · 
Though such ancillary industries as coal and shipping 
received some attention in the British press, 24 the greatest 
coverage was devoted to those manufacturing industries which 
were absolutely essential to British prosperity: textiles and 
iron and steel. And it was precisely in these areas, as 
Jeans pointed out in 1892, that the growth of American manu-
facturing capacity was most pronounced. Invested capital in 
the American textile industry had risen from $386.5 million 
in 1880 to $701.5 million in 1890, an increase of 8lo5%o Dur-
ing the same interval the value of American textile manufac-
tures had increased from $500 million to $693 million; the 
increase in quantity was greater still for the output was 
being sold at lower prices in 1890 than in 1880. The iron 
and steel industry was growing so fast that in 1892 it was 
capable of producing nearly double the amount of pig iron and 
of steel rails produced in 1891. 25 Little wonder, then, that 
23cumming, "America and Protection," 374; Jennings, "The 
Trade L~ague against England," 910. 
24 . For these, see below, 203-04, 250-59, 316-1?. 
25· Jeans, "The American Tariff," 750-51. 
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British exporters sometimes found it difficult to find buyers 
in the United States or even in neutral and home markets for 
a number of the traditional British export goods. 
Textiles 
Passage of the McKinley Tariff and publication of United 
States census data in the early 1890s elicited numerous Bri-
tish statements on the growth of this industry in America. 
The topic received much less attention later in the 1890s, 
but enough appeared in the early part of the decade to make 
it clear that Britain could not realistically expect to expand 
or even to maintain her total textile exports to the United 
States. Among the different branches of the textile industry, 
however, there were considerable differences. 
Two branches of the trade fared relatively well in the 
1890s. The manufacture of cotton textiles was Britain's 
, 
major industry in terms of both the value of domestic manufac-
turing and the value of exports. As was noted in Part I, how-
ever, the United States had for sone time been supplying much 
of its own requirements, particularly in the medium and coar-
ser grades. Nevertheless, what American trade was left to 
the British, that in the expensive, high quality articles--
though it represented only about one per cent of the total 
volume of British cotton exports--remained lucrative through-
out the 1890s and occasionally experienced substantial in-
creases. 26 
26For details see Com. History, annually. 
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It was to the producers of lower quality grades of cotton 
goods that American growth presented a problem. In 1871 Bri-
tain had consumed 2,410,000 bales (of 500 lbs. each) of cotton 
and the United States only 893,000 bales. By 1891 Britain 
consumed 4,230,000 bales (of 400 lbs. each) and the United 
states 3,071,000. In 1897 British consumption was 3,224,000 
bales (of 500 lbs. each) and American consumption was 2,738,000 
bales. 27 Thus, between 1871 and 1897 British consumption 
increased by about 33%, while American consumption increased 
by about 200%. 
In certain branches of the trade the United States had 
become increasingly self-sufficient. In 1891 the United 
States imported less than one million lbs. of British thread, 
less than half the quantity imported in 1871, and The Econo-
mist concluded that the decline was "no doubt the result of 
the continued growth of the manufacture in that country. 11 
As for cotton piece g9ods: 
Every year finds the Americans doing more and more 
for themselves, whether or not they find it to their 
profit; and evidently the only hope for British goods 
is from superiority of design, material and finish. 
Even in these we are not altogether safe, as our 
rivals think nothing of appropriating wholesale the 28 styles our people have been at such pains to develop. 
However, since the export of quality goods was well maintained, 
and since the British had by 1890 grown accustomed to American 
27 . Com. History 1893, 27-28; The Economist, October 26, 
1895, 1402; October 23, 1897, 1502. 
28T!le Economist, June 13, 1891, 760-61; MTS, June, 1892, 
8; Com. History 1891, 27. Cf. the complaints made to Wood 
and McCormick by those approached to exhibit at Chicago. 
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self-sufficiency in lower quality goods, the American chal-
lenge to the British cotton goods industry was experienced 
not so much in the American as in the neutral markets of the 
world and will be considered in the subsequent chapters which 
deal with such competit10n. 
The British linen industry was much more alarmed when the 
McKinley Tariff took effect than was the cotton goods indus-
try. Linen manufacturing was concentrated in Ulster. More 
than£15,000,000 of capital was invested in the Ulster indus-
try, "hundreds of thousands of her inhabitants are entirely 
dependent on the employment thus provided," and the United 
States had for a very long time been Ulster's "largest and 
most important foreign customer. 11 The McKinley Tariff imposed 
very high rates on imported linens, with the anticipation that 
an American industry would thus be created and the rates could 
be reduced January 1, 1894. 29 However, by 1893 a correspon-
dent of The Times could claim that "the great American linen 
industry that was to spring up under the M'Kinley law has 
proved a myth."30 Though Congress extended the linen duty 
and Americ.ans built new factories and brought over trained 
workers from Ireland, an apparently well-informed correspon-
dent wrote to The Economist in 1893 that "the Irish linen 
trade with the United States is in a healthier and better con-
dition than it was previous to the introduction of the 
29 11 Ultonia," letter to The Economist, April 22, 1893, 480. 
30The Times, January 2, 1893, 11. 
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If British cotton and linen producers were satisfied 
with the state of the American market in the 1890s, compaints 
came with great frequency from woolen and silk manufacturers. 
The rapidly changing relationship between the British and 
American woolen industries can be seen in the following 
figures: 32 
Consumption of Wool (thousands of lbs.) 
1866 
United Kingdom 313,000 
United States 229,707 
1876 
369,000 
235,020 
1884 381,ooo 
376,036 
Proportionately farther behind Britain in 1876 than in 1866, 
by 1884 the United States had nearly reached parity with Bri-
tain. The American industry continued to grow rapidly during 
the 1880s:33 
Growth of the Woolen Industry in the United States 
Invested capital 
Employees 
Value of product 
1880 
$159,091,869 
161,557 
$267,252,293 
1890 
$296,983,164 
221,087 
$338,231,109 
The value of the product of the American woolen industry grew 
during the decade by 26.56%, but this was an average which 
masked considerable variations among the branches of the 
3111Ultonia," letter to The Economist, April 22, 1893, 480. 
32Ed.win Burgis, Perils to British Trade: How to Avert Them 
(London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1895), 184; no figures beyond 
1884 are provided. 
33The Times, June 11, 1892, 8. 
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industry. Some of the British complaints about declining 
sales in the United States are explained by noting that the 
.American production of carpets increased by more than 50% 
during the decade, hosiery by more than 131%, and worsted 
goods by more than 136%034 
Faced with such growth across the Atlantic, as well as 
with tariffs and depressions, British woolen exporters found 
the American market very disappointing in the 1890s. Such 
exports had fallen from their peak in 1872 of 6.3 millions 
sterling to only 1.6 millions in 1877. By 1890 they had 
recovered well but were checked once again as the following 
figures show: 35 
Total 
To U. s. 
The 
British Exports of Woolen Manufactures 
and Yarns (millions sterling) 
1890 1891 1892 189? 1894 1892 
25o7 23.5 23.2 220!5 20o0 27.0 
4.8 3o0 3o5 2.6 1.6 605 
1896 
25o5 
3.5 
British silk industry was equally affected by 
1892 
22.6 
3.4 
what 
one observer called "the simultaneous progress of the silk 
manufacture in the United States, and decay in this country 
for twenty years." His figures justified the remark:36 
34The Economist, MTS, April, 1892, lOo 
35see Com. History, annually, for the figures and also 
for the anguished coillplaints reported ~early every year from 
the various woolen centers. Still another significant decline 
of exports to the United States was experienced in 1898 and 
1899. 
36Burgis, Perils to British T.:-ade, 184; Burgis used as 
the sterling equivalent of the dollar, 4s. 2d., rather than 
the 4s. Od. which was more customary at the time. 
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Value of Raw Material Used in the Silk Industry (~) 
1860 1870 1880 
United Kingdom 
United States 
6,482,066 
812,870 
5,774,510 
1,628,658 
3,383,373 
3,864,409 
When The Economist surveyed the industry in i890, it found 
that while the United States continued to purchase increasing 
amounts of British yarn for its own manufacturing use, Amer-
ican purchases of silk cloth were declining. The McKinley 
Tariff provided a further obstacle to British silk exports, 
but Americ1n production was the mont serious limitation.37 
The Times reported that in 1891 there were nearly six hundred 
silk factories in the United States. "It is said that Ameri-
can manufacturers have now taken the entire home market for 
certain styles of silk fabrics. 11 38 The growth of American 
silk manufacturing had, it was claimed, both reduced the mar-
ket for British silks and led to a 40% decline in silk prices 
since 1885.39 
Coal, Iron and Steel 
The quantity and the cost of coal production were impor-
tant factors in the growth of an industrial economy, for they 
affected, directly or indirectly, the cost of production of 
nearly the whole gamut of manufactured goods. For no other 
37com. History, 1889, 27; Com. History, 1891, 19. 
38The Times, May 7, 1892, 8. 
39Williamson, British Trade and Foreign Competition, 209. 
k. 
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industry were these more crucial than for iron and steel. 
And, since the British were so vitally and constantly con-
cerned in the 1890s with the enormous growth and occasional 
competition of the American iron and steel industry, they 
could not help but take a keen interest in American coal 
production also. 
In 1890 the United States was already producing more 
lt-0 than one-fourth of all the world's coal. Production con-
tinued to rise and in 1893 the United States produced a 
record 164,000,000 tons and entered the coa.l export trade. 41 
Not only was American coal being mined in record quantities, 
but the cost of production was decreasing. Carnegie claimed 
that generally coal was "much cheaper in the United States 
than in Britain. If we compare New York and London, New 
York receives anthracite coal as cheaply as London receives 
bituminous coal. The former will, at least, give double 
service, and it is said to yield three times as much."42 
And a knowledgeable British observer claimed that 
So far as the United States are concerned, we have 
to face the prospect of being permanently dislodged 
from our former supremacy of rank as a coal-producing 
country •• o .the United States have for some years 
past been producing their coal at a cost not much 
40Brock, "Advance of the United States during One Hun-
dred Years," 127. 
41The Economist, March 24, 1894, 365. 
42Andrew Carnegie, "Britain and the United States: 
Cost of Li Ying Compared," Contempo1•ary, LXVI (September, 
1894)' 323. 
exceeding one-half of that of many coal-fields that 
are being worked at home.43 
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By 1897 the British, who formerly had found a good mar-
ket for coal on the Pacific Coast of the United States where 
the only competition they faced was from British Columbia, 
were being exposed to the increasing competition of coal 
mined in the eastern United States. 44 Simultaneously Britain 
was being affected by a great engineering strike at home and 
American competition in numerous products and in a variety of 
markets. This led to a number of in-depth analyses of the 
basic factors underlying Britain's economic position. Per-
haps no other single factor received as much attention as 
British coal production. Three decades earlier Stanley Jevons 
had initiated a great controversy when he asserted that Bri-
tain might some day exhaust her coal supply and that such a 
situation would threaten Britain's rank as the leading indus-
trial nation of the world. In 1897 the President of the Royal 
Statistical Society gave an address recalling Jevon's thesiso 
He pointed out that American coal production had increased 
by more than 1000% in thirty-eight years and placed great 
emphasis "upon the danger to our commercial supremacy from 
the competition of the United States. 1145 
If in 1897 there were doubts expressed about the contin-
uation of English commercial supremacy, there was no question 
43J. Stephen Jeans, "The Coal Crisis and the Paralysis 
of British Industry," Nineteenth Century, XXXIV (November, 
1893), 801. 
44The Economist, December 11, 1897, 1739. 
4 5The Times, leading article, December 16, 1897, 9. 
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as to supremacy in the manufacture of iron and steel. In 
this industry the United States had surpassed Britain in 
1890 and held, with only occasional exceptions, a commanding 
lead thereafter. And if there was rejoicing in Belfast be-
cause the Ulster linen trade sustained itself against the 
challenge of "McKinleyism," there was little but gloom and 
despair in Wales. Tin-plate was to Wales what linen was to 
Ulster, its only important industrial resource and its major 
employer of capital and labor. Most British tin-plate was 
produced in Wales and about three-fourths of Britain's tin-
plate exports were sent to the United States; tin-plate ex-
ports normally made up the bulk of Britain's total iron and 
steel exports to America. When, under the protection affor-
ded by the McKinley Tariff, the United States established a 
tin-plate industry capable of furnishing more than half of 
the nation's requirements, Wales faced disaster. Beyond 
Wales serious effects were also felt. The greatly reduced 
demand for Welsh tin-plate led to reduced demand also for the 
steel plate from which it was made, thus reducing demand for 
British steel and pig-iron. Similarly, it reduced the demand 
for Cornish tin and thus nearly destroyed still another 
regional industry. Finally, the tremendous decline of tin-
plate exports to the United States, coupled with the reduc-
tion of American demand for British iron and steel products 
generally, had serious effects on British shipping. The 
growth of the American iron and steel industry, and parti-
cularly the successful establishment of American tin-plate 
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production, was of the utmost significance for key industries 
which represented gigantic investments of British capital. 
At the beginning of 1890 tin-plate was not being pro-
duced in the United States and as late as September of that 
year The Economist asserted that no American tin-plate works 
were in operation. 46 A Pennsylvania Congressman, however, 
assured the American canning interests, who were concerned 
about the adverse effects to their business of raising the 
tin-plate duty from one to 2.2 cents per pound, that within 
eighteen months American tin-plate producers would be making 
all that was required for domestic consumption at a price 
competitive with imported plates. McKinley himself pointed 
to the tin-plate duty as one of the outstanding benefits of 
the new tariff. McKinley and the Congressman from Pennsyl-
vania both insisted that the tariff would create a new indus-
try, provide employment for between 30,000 and 50,000 men, 
and eliminate the payment of $20,000,000 annually for British 
plate.47 
The importance of the American market to British pro-
ducers can be seen in the following figures: 48 
British Exports of Tin-Plates (tons) 
Total 
To U. S. 
1887 
354,773 
268,364 
1888 
391,361 
292,626 
1889 
430,650 
336,689 
46The Economist, MTS, September, 1890, 4. 
1890 
418,725 
318,108 
47The Times, August 15, 1890, 3; September 29, 1890, 5. 
48
com. History 1890, 24. According to the Com. History 
1891, exports to the United States in 1890 were 321,109. 
207 
The British press, therefore, watched the tin-plate duty 
debate in America with great interest and concern. The Times, 
noting that nearly three-fourths of all the tin-plate produced 
in Britain was sold to canning interests in the United States, 
predicted that the proposed duty would "almost ar.nihilate the 
tin-plate industry of South Wales." The Economist was more 
reserved in its comment, believing that it would be some time 
before the Americans could establish their own works and that, 
therefore, there would be an interval of time before any 
serious decline would occur. 49 There were reports, however, 
that "some of the largest manufacturers in America are increas-
ing their capital very considerably with a view to the produc-
tion of tin-plates." Even before the tariff passed, I"TcKinley 
claimed that plates were being tinned in St. Louis and as 
soon as the duty was finally agreed upon it was announced 
that major works were being established at Pittsburgh and 
Baltimore. As early as May it had been predicted that, if 
the duty were increased, "parties from Wales" would establish 
a large tin-plate mill at Pittsburgh.50 
Congress, anticipating that it would take some time to 
get the new industry established, arranged that the tin-plate 
duty should not take effect until July 1, 1891. In the 
interval between passage .o.:f the tarif'i' and that date, the 
49The Times, June 2, 1890, 11; The Economist, MTS, Sep-
tember, 1890, 4a 
50The Economist, October 18, 1890, 1337-38; The Times, 
September 29, 1890, 5; October 4, 1890, 5; May 21, 1890, 5. 
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British regained a certain amount of confidence. Despite 
reports to the contrary, The Economist maintained that "there 
is little evidence of any new tin-plate works being erected 
in America," and "the Welsh tin-plate makers who have just 
~eturned from the American excursion of the Iron and Steel 
Institute do not seem much alarmed at the prospect of compe-
tition in the States." Reinforcing this confidence were the 
Democratic victories of 1890 which called the maintenance of 
protection into doubt and made it unlikely that large amounts 
of capital would be invested in American mills. The Econo-
~ was still hopeful that the Welsh industry could be 
saved, along with the 500,000 tons of pig-iron which that 
industry annually consumedo5l 
The Americans remained convinced that a new industry had 
been born. In 1891 a celebration was held in Madison Square 
Garden to celebrate that birth. All the table service was 
of American-manufactured tin-plate, including the tin menu 
cards.52 Evidence was beginning to accumulate in support of 
.American optimism. The British Consul at Chicago reported 
that "one of the largest manufacturers of cans and importers 
of tin-plate had nearly completed tin-plate facilities out-
side Chicago and it was expected "that the substitution of 
machinery for hand labour • • • will materially reduce the 
cost, and within three or four years plates will be made 
5lThe Economist, MTS, November, 1890, 4-5; Com. History 
1890, 23. 
52The Times, May 1, 1891, 5o 
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greatly cheaper than those now imported from En.gland, and 
entirely of American material, and with American labour." 
A Chicago steel firm was planning another tin-plate mill to 
supply local packers, an already operative factory in St. 
:iouis was being expanded, and other factories were being 
built or planned throughout the Yddweat. "It is confidently 
believed," he reported, that the use of labor-saving equipment 
"will lower the cost of production to a point which will in 
a few years remove any fear of competition, and entirely 
exclude imported plate. 11 53 
Anticipation-of the new tariff kept American demand at 
a very high level during the first half of 1891, so high iL 
fact that the total figures for the year looked quite good; 
British exports of tin-plate in 1891 exceeded 325,000 tons, 
surpassing the figures for 1890. However, only 62,000 of 
those tons were sent after the tariff took effect July 1. 
Nevertheless The Economist continued to hope that "the Ameri-
can demand will continue to expand still further" once the 
large stocks of early 1891 were worked off, for "so far there 
is little satisfactory evidence of any great development of 
the power of production on the other side of the Atlantico" 
James Kitson, President of the British Iron and Steel Insti-
tute, whose statement of 1890 that the Americans were and 
would remain supreme in iron and steel was so widely quoted, 
also expressed a cautious optimism. He conceded that, 1'should 
53The Economist, MTS, June, 1891, 9. 
the duty on tin plates be maintained, the Americans will 
doubtless in course of time make their own tin plates." 
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But he believed further that "it will take many years to 
displace what we are now sending from this country, and 
•••• it is therefore wise not to be alarmed fvr the future 
of the tin-plate trade, but rather to anticipate with con-
fidence that the United States trade will be replaced by 
demands from other markets."54 
Such guarded optimism was supported by statistics; in 
the first half of 1892 Britain shipped a greater quantity of 
tin-plates to America than she had in the first half of 1890, 
indicating to some that American surplus stocks were nearly 
gone and that the trade was being resumed on a pre-McKinley 
, scale.55 Yet there was no denying that the McKinley Tariff 
had already had adverse effects on the Welsh industry. The 
pre-tariff overstocking of the American market had led to 
the danger of an "exceptional depression" for British produc-
ers. The Economist pointed out that they might be forced to 
go to half-production for a number of months to accomodate 
themselves to the reduced demand. In fact, many of the Welsh 
mills closed for weeks in the summer of 1891. The workers, 
angry at the loss of wages, threatened that they would only 
return after the layoff if their wages were increased and 
there was fear that many of them might be lured away to the 
54James Kitson, "The Iron and Steel Industries of America," 
Contemporary, LIX (May, 1891), 634-35. 
55The Economist, MTS, July, 1892, 3. 
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mills. in America. Even the increased shipments of 1892 
little to alleviate the depression of the Welsh industry 
for these sales were being made at prices which The Economist 
described as "quite unremunerative. 11 56 So far the Welsh 
industry had escaped the annihilation which The ~imes had 
predicted, but it had not avoided depression and the disap-
pearance of profits. Such was the cost of dependency on the 
American market. 
Late in 1892 there were those in England and America who 
claimed that the tariff had failed to foster an American tin-
plate industry. A British critic argued that as of March, 
1892 the A.merican,s were producing only enough to satisfy tHo 
days' requirements of the United States. He noted that many 
American tin-plate factories, including the symbolically 
important Pittsburgh McKinley Tinplate Company Limited, had 
already failed and been abandoned.· He concluded that in the 
attempt "to create an industry at the expense of Wales, the 
Americans have had the worst of it. 11 57 As late as December, 
1892 the American Tin-plate Consumers Association complained 
that, even if American producers made as much as they clained 
they could in 1893, this would represent only 5% of what the 
United States consumed; the remainder had to be imported at 
tremendous cost to the American consumer because of the 
56The Economist, MTS, June,1891, 4; MTS, July, 1891, 
3-4; MTS, April, lD;2, 5. . 
57nonald, "McKinleyism and the Presidential Election, 11 
499-500. 
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tariff. 58 
For many in England the future of the Welsh industry 
s~emed closely tied to the outcome of the American presiden-
tial election of 18920 The Economist noted in July that 
So far the Mc;Cinley Tariff has had but little 
effect on the tinplate trade •••• No doubt some 
small quantity of sheets are [sic] being tinned in 
America, but any extensive development on the other 
side of the Atlantic is improbable until the issue 
of the present elections is decided. Should the 
Republicans be again returned to power there will be 
more confidence in the maintenance of the present 
high duties, and capital may flow more freely into 
the trade, whilst it is not iillpossible that some 
South Wales makers may decide to transfer their 
trade to the United States, as has been the case with 
other large manufacturers, such as the Coates and 
Clarks of Paisley. 59 -
The victory of Grover Cleveland generally pleased the British 
and kindled new hopes for tariff revision. But sober British 
observers realized that it did not guarantee the security of 
the Welsh tin-plate industry. During the first year of oper-
ation of the new duty, the United States produced 20,000,000 
pounds of tin-plate, enough, the American correspondent of 
The Economist reported, to convince American protectionists 
that the tariff could foster home industries. By mid-1892, 
according to the American Iron & Steel Association, twenty 
tin-plate factories were operating or ready to operate and 
ten more were being built. Tin-plate imports were expected 
to decline considerably in the near future. 60 According to 
58The Economist, MTS, December, 1892, 8. 
59The Economist, MTS, July, 1892, 4; see also "Terne,'' 
letter to The Economist, October 22, 1892, 1333-34. 
60The Economist, August 20, 1892, 1071; MTS, June, 1892, 4. 
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a United States Treasury report thirty-two works were produc-
ing tin-plate in September and fourteen others were being 
built; ten of the producing firms were enlarging their facil-
ities. The United States was at that time producing at an 
annual rate of 50,000,000 pounds or one-sixteenth of total 
American consumption. Under such conditions The Economist 
warned that "it would be dangerous ••• to assume that the 
change of Presidency will at once put a stop to tin-plate 
production" in America. Given the current level of activity, 
"the more important question is whether any reduction of duty 
will entirely stop the production in America." Many author-
ities believed that once the industry was established in the 
United States no policy was likely to check it, 
especially as the American mind is quick to devise 
new methods and improvements upon the production of 
old countries. When any revision of the tariff comes 
to be considered, there is no doubt that the new 
industry will have to be heard in its defence •••• 
it is just possible that such a measure of protection 
will be accorded in the future as may enable the 
American producers of tin-plates to compete success-
fully with South Wales •••• The fact that several 
South Wales tin-plate makers are opening works in 
America would seem to indicate an expectation on their 
part that the production is likely to be still further 
developed.61 
Yet British exports increased once more in the first 
quarter of 1893 and British opinion remained, tentatively 
at least, optimistic. Export figures indicated to The Econ-
omist that "in spite of the excessive duty and the efforts 
made to manufacture tin-plates in the United States, we are 
still able to command an extensive market there." In March, 
61The Economist, November 19, 1892, 1445. 
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1893 the Foreign Office released a report on the American 
tin-plate industry drawn up by the British Legation at Washing-
ton, a report which The Economist described as "exhaustive." 
Its principal findings were that little American-made tin-
plate had as yet become commercially available and that im-
ports of British plate had not declined but had in fact shown 
signs of increasing. According to the official who prepared 
the report, "a new industry in the manufacture of tin-plates 
may be said to have started in the United States" and "there 
appears to be no reason why the present difficulties as to 
price and quality • • • should not be overcome in course of 
time, provided the duty be maintained." But, he continued, 
whether the industry prove to be a success or merely 
an experiment, it will, I ven"ljure to predict, be long 
before more tin-plate is produced than will be ab-
sorbed by the constantly increasing consumption in 
this country, and it will probably be years before the 
English product will be seriously affected by the 
McKinley Act or b~ the new industry under the best 
of circumstances.62 
The American depression of 1893-1894 resolved these am-
biguities and destroyed British hopes that the tin-plate in-
dustry could maintain its American market. The American de-
pression caused a drastic drop of British exports to the 
United States during the second half of 1893 and "tin-plates 
experienced even greater depression than any other branch of 
the iron and steel trade." American imports of British tin-
62The Economist, MTS, April, 1893, 2; March 18, 1893, 323; 
The Times carried an account of this report May 19, 1893, 2. 
Por further manifestations of British confidence, see The 
Times, leading article, January 25, 1893, 9; and The EC'Oiio-
~' MTS, January, 1893, 9. 
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plates, which had fallen from more than 325,000 tons in 1891 
to about 278,000 tons in 1892, fell still further in 1893 to 
less than 256,000 tons. 63 This substantially reduced demand 
for British steel plate and for pig-iron. Furthermore, it 
nea~ly destroyed the tin-mining industry of Cornwall, for the 
demand for Cornish tin was almost totally dependent on the 
American demand for tin-plate. By mid-1894 many Cornish 
mines were on the verge of bankruptcy and tin-mine shares 
had fallen from 40% to 97% below their post-McKinley Tariff 
highs of 1892. 64 
The depression in the United States lowered prices and 
production costs to such an extent that The Econo~ believed 
that America would be able to maintain her tin-plate industry 
and supply much of her own requirements. By early 1895 the 
price of steel billets, the raw material of the industry, was 
"actually less in the United States than in South Wales" and 
American production continued to rise. There was little hope 
for any immediate revival of the Welsh tin-plate industry, 
but only the watchful waiting to determine the effects on the 
American industry of the new Wilson Tariff, which reduced the 
tin-plate duty from 10 to 5 10s. a ton. 65 
American production figures provided no basis whatsoever 
63The Economist, July 1, 1893, 785; MTS, September, 1893, 
2; December 30, 1893, 1560; Com. History 1893, 25. 
64The F.conomist, August 4, 1894, 954-550 
65The Economist, October 6, 1894, 1224; MTS, January, 
1895, 5; April 13, 1895, 4820 
\ 
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for British optimism. According to the American Iron & Steel 
Association, there had been no American tin-plate industry 
when the McKinley duty took effect in mid-1891. Within four 
years, it boasted, "we had built up a tin-plate industry that 
had excited the wonder of our Welsh rivals, compelled them to 
greatly reduce the price of the tin-plates they sent us, and 
given ample assurance that in less than four years more--
perhaps in less than two years--we will be able, with favour-
able legislation, to supply all our own wants for tin-plates, 
including exports, thus saving an annual payment of about 
$20,000,000 to foreign manufacturers. 11 There could be no 
doubt that the American industry had grown impressively: 
American Tin-Plate Production (lb&) 
1892 1893 1894 1895 
13,646,719 99,819,202 139,223,467 193,801,073 
"This pyramid of tin-plate production," contended the Asso-
ciation, "forms as complete a justification of the Protective 
policy as has ever been printedo 1166 
The prospects of the British industry could hardly have 
been gloomier than they were as the tin-plate manufacturers 
looked toward 18960 Though the American economic recovery 
of 1895 had driven up the American cost of production, caus-
ing tin-plate producers to agitate for increased tariff pro-
tection, 67 both The Times and The Economist by now conceded 
66The Economist, November 16, 1895, 1498-99. 
67The Economist, July 20, 1895, 942-43; September 28, 
1895, 1275-76; November 16, 1895, 1498-99. 
t. 
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that the United States had become practically self-sufficient 
in the manufacture of tin-plates. 68 The United States was 
now capable of producing at least 200,000 tons a year, a 
figure sufficient to cut the average British shipments of 
1889-1893 by half. And, as if this were not bad enough, 
there was the possibility that the tin-plate tariff might be 
increased once again. As The Economist sadly pointed out in 
its review of the first quarter of 1896, only a few years 
earlier Britain had been producing 550,000 tons of tin-plate 
annually and sending more than 60% of it to the United States. 
"Now we have lost fully one-half of the American trade, and 
the remainder might be lost altogether by any change in the 
American tariff. 1169 
Whereas every other branch of the British iron and steel 
industry experienced a renewal of prosperity in 1896, the 
tin-plate trade remained severely depressed. Even increasing 
production costs proved incapable of checking the amazing 
growth of the American tin-plate industry. American produc-
tion increased from 193,801,073 lbs. of tin-plates in fiscal 
1895 to 307,228,621 lbs. in fiscal 1896, an increase of 58% 
in a single year. Correspondingly, British tin-plate exports 
declined significantly and by mid-1896 half the tin-plate 
works of South Wales were reported closed. Whereas only five 
years earlier Wales had shipped an average of more than 
68The Times, leading article, January 14, 1896, 9; Col11. 
History-rd95, 23-24. 
G9The Economist, January 4, 1896, 4-5; April 11, 1896, 455. 
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25,000 tons a month to the United States, the monthly average 
in 1896 was only 10,000 tons, a decline of 60% in the trade 
of Wales' principal customer. Throughout most of 1896 nearly 
half of the 530 tin-plate mills in Britain were closed and 
the remainder operated only irregularly.70 
The prices which Welsh makers got for their product had 
been low for years. The American tendency toward self-suffi-
ciency kept them low and the depressed condition of the Ameri-
can iron and steel industry which led to the intense Anglo-· 
American competition of 1897 drove them lower still. As mill 
after mill closed down or reduced hours and wages, labor 
troubles became serious in the Welsh tin-plate industry. 
The Economist was highly critical of the workers for refusing 
"to meet the serious competition now experienced by English 
manufacturers, and if this condition of matters continues, 
the results may be very disastrous to the trade of the coun-
try. "7l Any British reader who had followed the vicissitudes 
of the British tin-plate trade in the pages of the British 
press since the passage of the McKinley Tariff might have been 
excused for thinking that the disaster had already occurred. 
Though other branches of the British iron and steel 
industry were not as drastic~lly affected as the tin-plate 
trade, the industry generally nevertheless faced a formidable 
challenge from its American counterpart in the 1890s. In 
70The Economist, July 11, 1896, 892-93; November 21, 
1896, 153~; January 16, 1897, 76-77• 
7libid •. 
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~ 1890 the United States had surpassed Britain for the first time 
in the production of iron (9.2 million tons to 7.9 million) 
and of steel (4.3 million tons to 3.7 million). At the meet-
ing which the British Iron and Steel Institute held at Phila-
delphia in 1890, Sir James Kitson, Institute President, asser-
ted that 
the United States are the first producers of iron in 
the world, and this is the first year of their exceed-
ing the production of Great Britain, in which industry 
Great Britain will never be able to regain the lead. 
It is undeniable that America also leads the world 
in the production of steel.72 
Kitson's prediction was not quite accurate. Britain regained 
the lead in pig-iron production by a wide margin in 1894 and 
by aslight margin in 1896. The statement, however, remained 
essentially true. Whatever the actual production figures, 
American productive capacity grew much more rapidly during 
the 1890s than that of Britain so that, whenever demand war-
ranted it, the United States could out-produce Britain by a 
very wide margin. 
The British iron and steel industry was reviving in the 
latter 1880s from the serious depression which the industry 
had suffered a few years earlier:?3 
72Brock,"The Advance of the United States during One 
Hundred Years," 127; Jennings, "The Trade League against 
England," 902. There were numerous other references to 
Kitson's.statement in the Britinh press in the early 1890s. 
73com. History, annually. These total export figures 
include tin-plates. 
!·~ 
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British Exports of Iron, Steel, and Their Products (tons) 
1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 
Total 3,128,401 3,319,167 4, 1'+6, 907 3,966,984 4,188,388 4,001, 57 
To U.S. 397,613 804,570 1,212,445 639,760 573,666 . 522,94 
In regard to these figures it should be noted that: (1) Bri-
tain, which had long been without a serious rival, had been 
displaced as the world's leading producer in 1890; (2) the 
United States was a major purchaser of British iron and steel, 
taking no less than 12% and upon occasion as much as 30% of 
Britain's total exports; (3) American purchases fluctuated 
violently, 1886 witnessing an increase of more than 100% and 
1888 experiencing a decrease of nearly 50%; and (4) there was 
no inverse correlation between American production and British 
exports to the United States, for the same tendencies--espe-
cially the periodic "booms" in railroad construction--which 
stimulated American production simultaneously enhanced the 
opportunities for British exporters. 
At the beginning of 1890 all seemed well with the British 
iron and steel industry. British total production and exports 
were both up in 1889, despite declining American purchases. 
According to The Economist, "the prospect of any immediate 
increase in our trade with America is not very good," for "the 
iron and steel trade of America has expanded at a very rapid 
rate, and the production of pig-iron has been more than dou-
bled wi thi:i.1 ten years." Nevertheless, it continued, "it is 
probable that the shipments to the United States have now 
about reached a minimum, as they consist mainly of tinplates 
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with a small quantity of pig-iron, unmanufactured steel, and 
old iron."?4 With the important American market apparently 
stabilized and home and foreign demand on the rise, the indus-
try anticipated great prosperity. The revival in iron and 
steel had led to a great wave of activity in the engineering 
trades as well. When The Times compared the engineering 
trades of Britain with those of the United States and the 
Continent it smugly concluded that freedom of import and 
governmental non-interference tended in thelong run to pro-
duce the greatest prosperity.75 The Economist also took note 
of this engineering activity and commented that 
while on previous occasions export to the United 
States has been the main factor in determining the 
prices of iron and steel, such a measure of trade no 
longer applies. The increased demand for the ser-
vices of British engineers~ and for the products of 
engineering factories, comes now from all parts of 
the world.r6 
The British iron and steel industry looked to the future 
with confidence. Activity and prosperity had returned. The 
industry was less dependent on American demand, for home con-
sumption and foreign sales in other markets were increasing. 
Exports to the United States were believed to have hit bottom. 
Though the American correspondent of The Economist reported 
that Americans were predicting that within five years the 
United States would have replaced Britain as the iron-supplier 
or the world,77 the British could easily pass this off as the 
74com. History 1889, 22-24. 
?5The Times, January 24, 1890, 13. 
?6· Com. History, 1889, 21. 
??The Economist, February 8, 1890, 175-?6. 
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idle talk of a traditionally boastful people. They knew, for 
example, that the United States Commissioner of Labor had 
determined that the labor cost for producing a ton of steel 
rails in the United States was $11.59 whereas in England it 
was only $7.88.78 Yith such a competitive edge, the British 
felt they had little to fear. 
As previous chapters have shown, however, economic con-
ditions could change rapidly and drastically and this proved 
no less true for the British iron and steel industry between 
1890 and 1897. During the period it experienced both pros-
perity and depression, often alternating with great rapidity. 
It learned that, contrary to the opinions of 1890, not only 
did the American market still mean a great deal, that it was 
as important as any other single factor facing the British 
industry, but it also experienced occasionally severe Ameri-
can competition in iron and steel and in the engineering trades. 
It faced this American challenge in the American market, in 
neutral markets of the world, and even in England itself. 
Not even Middlesborough, capital of the British iron and steel 
industry, escaped being directly confronted by the American 
challenge. 
The prosperity and confidence of 1890 gave way with great 
suddenness. First came the Argentine political and financial 
crisis and the subsequent Baring collapse. Then the McKinley 
Tariff was passed. Finally, in 1890 American iron and steel 
Production outstripped that of Britain. 
78The Times, August 15, 1890, 3. 
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By mid-1890 January's optimism had begun to evaporate. 
:Exports, The Economist reported, no longer represented a 
bright spot in the picture and this was particularly true of 
the American market. "Owing to the great expansion of produc-
tion in the United States during the last twelve months ••• 
our export trade with America is a diminishing quantity, and 
even some of this is threatened by the Tariff Bill." The 
McKinley Tariff reduced certain duties, as Carnegie and others 
pointed out to the British. But the duty was increased on 
the finer qualities of steel such as cutlery and screws and 
the duties under the new tariff on such important items as 
steel rails, beams, and wire rods remained sufficiently high 
to compensate for the greater American production costs and 
still leave an ample margin of protection. We have already 
seen what effect the McKinley Tariff had on tin-plates, which 
represented 60% of Britain's total iron and steel exports to 
the United States in 1889 and 1890. The next most important 
item among these exports was cotton tie hoops, which the 
United States used in large quantities to bundle raw cotton 
for shipment. The Times and The Economist agreed that the 
framers of the McKinley Tariff increased the duty on cotton 
ties "so as to secure their being made in America, and • • • 
we will likely lose this trade (about 20,000 tons) for next 
season," for the duty was high enough "to secure the whole of 
that trade to the American manufacturer." As The Economist 
wrote: "The intention of this tariff is to secure to American 
Producers all the trade in iron and steel, and it would appear 
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as if in time this might happen, but, as it will not happen 
suddenly, we shall have time to adapt ourselves to this 
changed condition of affairs." With the tariff affording 
ample protection to American makers, with the tin-plate trade 
1~ jeopardy, and with the cotton tie trade likely to disappear, 
British iron and steel producers would lose the demand for 
a half-million tons of pig iron a year and the iron export 
trade "has now but a comparatively small interest in American 
business. 11 79 
In sober contrast to the sanguine outlook at the begin-
ning of 1890, The Economist declared the outlook for 1891 to 
be dismalo "Our trade with the United States," it said, "has 
received a great shock by the passing of the McKinley Tariff 
Bill • • • [and] it is beyond doubt that for some considerable 
time our trade with that country must experience a check. 1180 
While the British producers grew increasingly anxious about 
their depressed trade, two illustrious British visitors to 
the United States were writing glowing reports on the growth 
of the American industry, especially that of the South. The 
Duke of Marlborough, after presenting the usual array of 
statistics and an invidious comparison of British and American 
rates of growth, hazarded the prediction that the center of 
American production would shift from Pennsylvania to Virginia 
?9The Economist, MTS, September, 1890, 4; Donald, "McKin-
leyism and the Election," 497-98; The Times, January 30, 1891, 
3; The Economist, Octobe~ 18, 1890, 1337-38; Com. History 1890, 
23 •. 
80
com. History 1890, 23; The :Economist, January 3, 1891, 
5-6. 
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and Tennesseeo He looked forward to the day when its ample 
coal and ore supplies and the cheaper transportation and labor 
costs which it enjoyed, would enable the South to outproduce 
the North and to become "a veritable Black Country in America." 
Sir James Kitson, Presiden~ of the British Iron a~d Steel 
Institute who had in 1890 declared the supremacy of the Amer-
ican industry, called attention to the great American talent 
for adaptation. Though the important inventions of the modern 
iron and steel industry were all of British origin, according 
to Kitson, the Americans profited from English experience. 
"The Americans have not invented, they have improved" and, 
"supplemented by their own ingenuity for mechanical devices 
and appliances, they were able to lay down plant of the best 
models •••• Their blast fm:-naces are more capacious than 
ours, their engines are more powerful, their rolling mills 
are of new and improved construction." These, together with 
the high standard of education, particularly technical educa-
tion, among the workers and the managers' promptness to dis-
card the old and immediately adapt whatever improvements be-
came available, made American facilities the best in the world. 
This was particularly true of the Southern facilities. Kitson 
noted the rapid expansion of iron foundries, nail factories, 
and pipe and engine works in Alabama. The production cf pig-
iron in that state had increased from a mere 62,000 tons in 
1880 to l,?80,000 tons in 1890. The Birmingham district alone 
produced 2,200 tons of pig-iron a day and at the lowest 
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production cost in the United States.81 
Despite such impressive growth, Kitson insisted that 
"there need be no ground for apprehension as to the competi-
tion o:f the United States," for "the English iron and steel 
makers will continue to h~ld their position with their keen-
est competitors." Not only were the British beginning also 
to erect modern fac·ili ties on a large scale, but the vast 
productive capacity of the United States would be kept fully 
occupied satisfying the enormous domestic demand. Even were 
this not the case, the British policy of Free Trade, "our 
insular position, our abundant supply of labour, our accessi-
bility to mineral products, make it certain that England, as 
a producer of iron and steel, will continue to hold the lead-
ing place in the neutral markets of the world. 1182 Such con-
fident predictions, however, could not hide the fact that the 
British industry was in serious trouble in 1891 and 1892. 
British pig-iron production in 1890 declined by nearly 400,000 
tons, while American production increased by 21% (on top o:f a 
17% increase in 1889). Longer-term statistics were even more 
alarming. Between 1880 and 1890 American steel production 
had increased by 290%. Between 1880 and 1892 British produ·c-
tion o:f pig-iron had decreased by the enormous amount of 
1,132,343 tons, while American production increased by 5,321,809 
tons. Under the circumstances The Economist felt obliged to 
echo Kitson's remark of 1890 and to grant to the United States 
81Duke .of Marlborough, "Virginia Mines and American Rails," 
?91-92, ?95; Kitson, "The Iron and Steel Industries of America," 
635-36, 6400 -
82Kitson, "The Iron and Steel Industries of America," 640-41. 11 
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"the title of premier pig-iron producers of the world."83 
The dismal pattern continued. British pig-iron produc-
tion, which in 1891 had fallen to a post-1886 low, fell still 
further in 1892 to 6,616,890 tons. British total exports of 
iron and steel, which between 1887 and 1890 had averaged 
more than 4,000,000 tons annually, fell in 1892 to only 
2,740,2170 British exports to the United States also contin-
ued to decline; in 1892 they reached the lowest point in nearly 
a decade: 
British Iron and Steel Exports to the United States (tons) 
188? 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 
1,212,445 639,760 573,666 522,943 43?,884 348,788 
Reasons for this export decline were not hard to find. Tin-
plate exports were checked if not yet destroyed. The trade 
in cotton ties had been destroyed; in 1891 Britain exported 
less than 5,000 tons of this article to America, far under 
the nearly 30,000 tons of 1889. Another badly depressed 
branch of the British industry was that of steel rails. The 
Economist pointed out in dismay that not only had most of 
Britain's former customers ceased to build railroads at the 
same time but that some countries, the United States among 
them, could now make all the steel rails they required.84 
83The Economist, MTS, November, 1890, 5-6; The Times, 
April 24, 1891, 5; Williamson, British Industry and Foreign 
Competition, 236-37;_ The Economist, February 7, 1891, 170-71. 
84The Economist, MTS, April, 1892, 5; December 31, 1892, 
16360 See also'""'t1ie .. Com. Histories for 1891 and 1892. 
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Hindrances to British exports to America were not limi-
ted to expanding American production and the protective tariff, 
however. The American industry had overproduced in 1890; in 
1891 it faced depressed conditions and cut back production. 
But, far from bringing any satisfaction to the BI·i tish indus-
try, this reaction led to price-cutting and an American search 
for foreign markets. 85 In 1891 Andrew Carnegie predicted that 
the already low American prices would decline still further 
before the depression was corrected. This meant that there 
was little hope for any British revival for, as Carnegie 
pointed out, the industrial economies were interdependent. 
"The world is so closely interwoven, one part with another," 
he said, "that nothing can happen in Europe which cannot affect 
us here, and vice versa."86 This interdependence of the 
British and American economies, lost sight of when British 
trade prospered in 1889 and 1890 despite the fact that exports 
to America were falling to less than half the 188? level, was 
brought once again to the attention of the British during the 
depressed conditions of 1891; they seldom forgot it thereafter. 
American prices did continue to drop, as Carnegie had predic-
ted. "The present prices ruling in America for pig-iron and 
steel rails," The Economist commented in 1892, "does not seem 
to hold out any :imlediate hope for any increase of trade 
85This competition will be examined in Part III. 
86The Economist, MTS, April, 1891, 4, quoting an interview 
With Carnegie which appeared in the American journal, Iron Age. 
For additional comments on this interdependence, see The Econ-
omist, August 8, 1891, 1015-16; and MTS, September, 1891, 4.-
229 
these articles."8? 
In the light of all these factors The Economist doubted 
validity of the British optimism which the election of 
Grover Cleveland brought about. It pointed out that British 
iron and steel exports to the United States had been falling 
consistently since 1887, even before the passage of the McKin-
ley Tariff. Furthermore, American production was on the rise 
again after a slack 1891. In 1892 the United States produced 
9~157,000 tons of pig-iron to Britain's 6,617,000 and with 
already existing facilities the United States could produce 
more than 12,000,000 tons if demand warranted it. "Of one 
thing," The Economist concluded, "the British iron-master 
may remain perfectly satisfied, and that is, that the Ameri-
cans, having now got the control of their own market, mean 
to keep it by hook or by crook." Finally it pointed out that, 
if a tariff reduction resulted from the Cleveland victory, 
wages and other costs cf production would also decline and the 
United States would become still more competitive in neutral 
marketso 88 
By early 1893 the unsatisfactory conditions in the Bri-
tish iron and steel industry were becoming more widely noticed. 
The Times called attention to the increasing disparity of 
production between the rivals: "The :production of pig-iron 
[in the United States] increased from 2,546,713 tons in 1872 
87The Economist, November 19, 1892, 1445. 
88The Economist, February 4, 1893, 133-34; November 19, 
1892, 1445-46; Decembe.!' 31, 1892, 1637-38. 
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to 9,157,000 tons last year. Twenty years ago it was a little 
more than a third of that of Great Britain; but it has grown 
so steadily and rapidly that now the United States is the 
largest producer in the world."89 A very much stronger state-
ment appeared in The For·~nightly Review: 
From all we can learn it seems certain that the 
extraordinary depression of the British iron and 
steel trade must be attributed chiefly to the effects 
of competition. In the United States, iron and steel 
are produced as cheaply as, if not more cheaply than, 
in Great Britain, although the wages of labour are 
from fifty to seventy per cent. higher in America, 
and capital can only be obtained there at a higher 
rate of interest. It is a severe reflection upon 
the intelligence of the British manufacturers of iron 
and steel that they are losing their s~premacy in 
this branch of trade, because they will not introduce 
labour-saving appliances until they are compelled to 
do so by the pressure of successful competition.90 
The worst, however, was still to come. The American de-
pression which began in the summer of 1893 had an immediate 
and tremendous impact on British trade and iron and steel 
suffered along with the other British industries. The extent 
of the British adversity can be judged from the following 
mournful mid-year comment: 
Bad as the present condition of the [iron and 
steel~ trade is, we regret that beyond the statement 
that 'things can scarcely be worse," we see little 
to encourage any great expectations as to the future. 
• • • Our best foreign customers are now suffering 
very severely from financial disturbance, and we can-
not expect but that they will do a hand-to-mouth trade 
for a very long time to come. 
If anything, continued The Economist, the .American situation 
89The Times, February 27, 1893, 11. 
90 . 
"The Present Depression of Trade," Fortnightly, LIII 
(March, 1893), 308-09. 
231 
"is perhaps more unsatisfactory than our own." British pig-
iron production increased slightly. In the United States pig-
iron production declined by 22% (though it remained larger 
than British production) and Bessemer steel production dropped 
off even more sharply. with the American market in such a 
depressed state, British iron and steel exports to the United 
States declined for the sixth consecutive yearo9l 
The gravest problem for the British industry remained 
the decline of American prices. This decline, which had 
begun in 1891, was accelerated by the depression of 1893-1894. 
The American correspondent of The Economist pointed out in 
1893 that the price of American steel rails had recently been 
slashed from $29 to $21 a ton, "so that we have the spectacle 
of leading rail manufacturers offering their wares at practi-
cally the same price they would cost f .o.bo at London, without 
takers. 1192 
Not even the substantial reduction of certain duties 
enacted by the Wilson Tariff was sufficient to restore Bri-
tish sales in the American market. Though the new tariff 
out-McKinleyed McKinley by raising the duty on such metal 
manufactures as wire, iron and steel rivets, and umbrella and 
parasol ribs, tips, and frames, the general direction of the 
revision was downward in iron and steel as well as in other 
products. The duty on tin-plate, as we have already seen, was 
9lThe Economist, July 1, 1893, ?85; MTS, February, 189L'., 
4; Com. History 1893, 25. 
~ 92Th Ee . t e onomis , December 2, 1893, 143?0 
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nearly halved. Cotton ties were placed on the free list. 
The duty on pig-iron was cut from $60?2 to $4.00 a ton and 
other reductions were also made. But, since America was now 
producing iron and steel at virtually the same price as the 
British (or at least at v~ices equivalent to British cost plus 
transportation charges), the Wilson Tariff availed the British 
iron and steel industry next to nothing. The Americans were 
manufacturing cotton ties at a cost sufficiently low to ex-
clude British imports. The same was true in the case of rail-
road and bar iron, which "are now sent [to America] in such 
exceptionally small quantities that the trade may be said to 
be practically nil" and no tariff revision could alter the 
fact. As for pig-iron and steel, the reduced protection affor-
ded by the Wilson Tariff was still more than sufficient to 
give the Americans the competitive edge in their home marketo93 
When, toward the end of 1894, the American industry began 
to revive and it became apparent that low American prices were 
not merely the result of depression and therefore only tempor-
ary, the British became alarmed. Andrew Carnegie pointed out 
to British readers that the price of Bessemer pig-iron and of 
steel billets at Pittsburgh had dropped below the prices at 
Middlesborough, center of the British industry.94 The Economist 
analysed at great length the fall of iron and steel prices 
93The Economist, September 1, 1894, 1077-78; August 25, 
1894, 1042; October 6, _1894, 12240 
94carnegie, "Britain and the United States," 323; for a 
similar rep~rt see The Economist, MTS, January, 1895, 5. 
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throughout the world and concluded that the tendency was 
strongest in the United States, where manufacturers had sub-
stantially reduced prices, in some cases cutting them by half. 
They had been able to do so because of the reduction of the 
price of ore (now as cheap as that which Britain used); the 
reduction of the price of coke (now much cheaper than British 
coke); the reduction of transportation costs (also much cheaper 
than Britain's); and the reduction of wages (by as much as 
20%)o Though American wages remained higher than British wages, 
American labor was considerably more efficient. The only fac-
tor which saved the British iron and steel industry from the 
gravest danger was, according to The Economist, distance and. 
the necessity of transporting the American product by rail or 
by river and then across the Atlantic. "But for this fact 
the iron-masters of Alabama would now be flooding English mar-
kets with their common forge and foundry pig-iron, which they 
are selling at furnaces for four or five shillings per ton 
less than the same quality or iron is sold for in this country." 
There were reports that a manufacturer in the American South 
had taken a large order for pig-iron at less than $6 a ton; 
a decade earlier most iron experts had been certain that pig-
iron could never be sold profitably at less than $10 a ton. 
The Economist warned further that, if these conditions did 
not change, not only would the British have to reconcile them-
selves to the loss of all their American business "but we 
should be prepared for possible competition in some of our 
foreign markets; already it is experienced in Canada." In 
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fact, in both 1893 and 1894 American exports of iron and steel 
exceeded the import of those goods. There were reports that 
high quality American iron and steel products were underselling 
British goods in England itselfo95 
Although in 1894 British production of pig-iron exceeded 
American production for the first time in five years, the 
American industry revived rapidly at the end of the year, 
leading The Economist to predict that there would be no increase 
of British iron and steel exports to the United States. Hap-
pily for the British, in the short run at least, the prediction 
proved erroneous. By mid-1895 the American revival was in 
full stride; there was a general recovery throughout the Amer-
ican economy in which the iron and steel industry participated 
fully. Renewed prosperity meant renewed demand. Together they 
led quickly to rather considerable price increases which in 
turn presented long-awaited opportunities for British iron 
and steel producers. Even cotton ties, which Britain had not 
exported to the United States for y~ars, were once again in 
demand and The Economist happily predicted that most of Amer-
ica's requirements for cotton ties in 1896 would be imported 
from Britain. For the first time in years the "Commercial His-
tory & Review" was able to report a distinct improvement in 
the British iron and steel industry, an improvement based 
95The Economist, November 3, 1894, 1343-44; February 2, 
1895, 153-55; Com. History 1894, 23; May 25, 1895, 686; Wil-
liamson, British Industries and Forei n Com etition, 236-37~ 
For detai s on erican compe 1 ion outsi e e nited States 
see Part IIIo · 
' 
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chiefly on the reappearance of American demand for British 
iron and steel goods.96 
American economic recovery stimulated British exports 
and British hopes, but they were to be short-lived. As prices 
soared, so did American production. The American industry 
had been producing at only two-thirds capacity or less for 
several years, but as soon as prices became remunerative the 
additional capacity was brought into operation. During the 
interval between the decision to go to full production and 
the actual expanded functioning of the American facilities, 
British producers eagerly received a flood of American orders. 
But the brief duration of such, a prosperous interlude was 
apparent to The Economist even at the beginning of 1896. Bri-
tish optimism, it warned, 
was in large measure doomed to disappointment, owing 
to the rapidity with which the American manufacturers 
set to work to bring their large reserve force of pro-
duction into operation •••• Unless there is a very 
large demand from the railway companies of America 
in 1896 it will be found difficult to absorb the pre-
sent tremendous output, and competition will likel~ 
keep prices down to about the cost of production.9r 
Just how rapidly the Americans responded to the new situa-
tion can be seen in the fact that pig-iron production in 1895 
increased by 4,2% over 1894, reaching a record 9,446,000 tons, 
well above the previous high of 1890. By November of 1895 
American production had risen to an annual rate of 12,000,000 
96The Economist, October 12, 1895, 1334; Com. History 
1895, 23. 
9?com. History 1895, 23-24. 
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tons and the experts insisted that this could be increased to 
i5,ooo,ooo if necessary. But, as The Economist predicted, 
only highly unusual requirements could create a demand suffi-
cient to absorb this large output; American demand in 1896 
proved inadequate to the enormous production. By early 1896 
the rate of production had dropped 10% from its November peak 
and prices had fallen by $4 a ton.98 
The growth of the American iron and steel industry had 
won admiring commendations from British protectionists. As 
one' wrote: 
The great object of American statesmanship has been 
the creation of manufacturing industries; and this 
object has been realised by the aid of protective 
duties. The rapid growth of the iron and steel trades 
in the United States proves the wisdom of American 
fiscal policy. Home production for home consumption 
has been the corner-stone of America's industrial 
systemo99 
In 1896, however, American home consumption proved unequal to 
production and prices once again began to fall. We have al-
ready seen that this reaction proved to be the final disaster 
for the British tin-plate industry. What it meant generally 
to the British iron and steel industry was active competition 
in Latin America, in Asia, and even in England. British inter-
est in the American market tended to fade in the face of thi.s 
American competition, to which we must now turn. 
98The Economist, February 1, 1896, 137-38. 
99Burgis, Perils to British Trade, 1800 
PART IIIo THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE 
AND COMPETITION AROUND THE GLOBE, 1890-1897 
l. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE APPEARANCE OF AMERICAN COMPETITION 
The Growth of American Export~ 
As Part II attempted to show, the major thrust of the 
American challenge between 1890 and 1897, as seen from the 
British point of view, had to do with British losses in the 
American market. Nevertheless, even at the height of the 
debate in the British press over the effects of the McKinley 
Tariff, a few observers foresaw that Britain might have to 
confront that challenge on a much broader scale in the future. 
The "main object 11 of the Americans, wrote L. J. Jennings, 
is to build up the biggest trade in the world, and 
they will do it, and do it moreover by that very 
Protection which, as our philosophers tell us, saps 
the foundations of every industry to which it is 
applied •••• the Americans ha·.re beaten us at the 
iron and steel trades, in which thirty years ago 
they did next to nothing, and ~ventually they will 
pass us in the cotton trade. They are now turning 
their attention to shipping, in which we are at 
present supreme •••• the shrewd Americans believe 
that their chance has come of stepping into the 1 first place, and putting England into the second. 
Jennings was a Fair Trader and therefore perhaps not an un-
biased witness. There was no taint of the Fair Trader about 
J. Stephen Jeans, however. Jeans favored Free Trade for 
England and he was a sober analyst not given to exaggerating 
1 Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 910-11. 
For the earlier contributions of Jennings,_Jeans, ~nd Atkin-
son, see Part Io 
23? 
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the American threat. He too attempted to alert British rea-
ders to the possibility of American competition. His argu-
ment had nothing to do with American protection but was, 
rather, an amplification of certain points which the American 
Atkinson had first brougat to the attention of the British 
public. Like Atkinson, Jeans believed that the growth of the 
American railroads, by cheapening commodities throughout the 
world and revolutionizing the source of Europe's food supply, 
had established a new world economic situation. He noted that 
the United States already benefited from low ocean transport 
rates and he anticipated still further reductions of American 
internal transportation costs. "It seems, then," he wrote, 
"to be the 'manifest destiny' of the United States to continue 
for many years to come to be the dominant factor in the agri-
cultural, and perhaps, also, in the industrial situation of 
Europe, and more especially of the United Kingdom." Though 
Jeans' more immediate concern was Britain's overwhelming depen-
touched but slightly, though indulgently, on the anti-
quated and decaying institutions of Europe, in order 
to expatiate on the present grandeur and prospective 
I 
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pre-eminence of that glorious American republic, in 
which Europe enviously seeks its model and trembling 
foresees its doom.2 
More typical of British opinion in 1890, however, was 
The Economist when, without any mention of the United States, 
it listed Britain, Germany, and France as the "chief rivals 
in the world market."3 American exports had demonstrated an 
awe-inspiring growth since 1870, when they had amounted to 
less than f80,000,000o In 1889 American exports were valued. 
at d'l65,450,000 (compared with Britain's ci248,049,000), an 
increase of nea~ly 20% over 1888. But "it is noticeable, as 
usual," The Economist said, "that the manufacturing industry 
of the country has but an insignificant share in the improve-
ment." Two-thirds of the total was made up of food and raw 
cotton and three-fourths of the increase over 1888 was in 
these same commodities. According to The Economist, 
Manufactured goods constitute only a small fraction 
of the total and show but a trifling advance, the 
main reason, of course, being that the manufacturing 
industry of the country is hampered by the protective 
tariff ••• o However much the protective tariff may 
enable manufacturers in the United States to dominate 
the home markets, it certainly renders it impossible 
for the country to compete in her export trade with 
one which labours under no fiscal restrictions. 
Passage of the McKinley Tariff further· strengthened this widely-
held British belief. Though total American exports rose again 
in 1890 and iron, steel, and cotton goods exports showed 
2J. Stephen Jeans, "American Railways and British Far-
mers," Nineteenth Centur~, XX:VIII (September, 1890), 407, 392, 
409. _The Coming nace (1 71) was a utopian fantasy of a lost 
subterranean people, by Edward Bulwer, Lord Lytton. 
3The Economist, MTS, October, 1890, 15-16. 
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impressive gains, The Economist continued to insist that 
it is difficult to see how any impetus can be given 
to foreign trade in manufacturing articles so long 
as the cost of production is enhanced by protection. 
If the people of the United States care to relinquish 
their power of competing in the markets of the world 
in order that a few nanufacturers a~ongst them may 
enjoy the monopoly of the home trade ••• it is 
scarcely the place of outsiders to complain.4 
As we have seen in Chapter IV, however, by 1897 The Econo-
mist was forced to acknowledge that American manufactured 
-
exports were serving to check the expansion of similar British 
goods. America's competitive ability came as something of a 
revelation to the British in 1897 for, despite the numerous 
indicators that appeared in the British press between 1890 and 
1897 which comprise Part III of this study, few people in 
Great Britain really believed that a nation which adhered to 
"McKinleyism" in one form or another could be a truly formid-
able competitor in world markets. This chapter will examine 
what may be called the pre-conditions to the emergence of 
serious American competition: the growth of American manufac-
tured exports, plans for strengthening the American merchant 
marine, and the expansion of America's global influence. Sub-
sequent chapters in Pa~t III will examine reciprocity and 
American competition in the New World and American competition 
around the globe between 1890 and 18970 
It quickly became apparent that the American policy of 
"McKinleyism" was not going to halt the growth of total 
4 The Economist, MTS, March, 1890, 5-6; MTS, March, 1891, 
5-6. Similar statements often appeared in The Times; see, 
for example, February 15, 1890, 13. 
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American exports or the expansion of American industrial capa-
bility. Yet both The Economist and The Times continued to 
emphasize the preponderance of agricultural exports and "the 
continued poorness of the part played by American manufacturers 
in her total foreign tra~e."5 At the same time, however, 
these newspapers published information which demonstrated 
that at least certain American manufactured exports were in-
creasing at an impressive rate. A comparison of American 
exports for fiscal 1890 and fiscal 1891 showed that cotton 
goods exports increased by ~21,000 and reached a total of 
£2,721,000. Manufactured petroleum products increased by 
i298,000, totalingot9,230,000. Iron and steel increased by 
.f6?4,000, reaching £2,655,000. Leather and copper manufactures 
also showed sizeable increases. 6 This growth continued in 
fiscal 1892. The total value of American manufactured exports 
was seldom ascertainable, but The Economist was able to gauge 
the approximate rate of increase by comparing the "all other 
articles" category (that is, total exports minus the exports 
of natural products) of official United States figures. From 
fiscal 1887 to fiscal 1892 this category of American exports 
grew as follows:? 
1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 
36.3 36o3 39.5 43.9 46.3 47.5 
5see, among many examples, The Economist, MTS, August, 
1892, 4-5; The Times, March 13, 1891, 13; October 1, 1892, 9. 
6The Economist, MTS, September, 1891, 5o 
7The Economist, MTS, August, 1892, 4-5. 
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The question of the character of American exports was 
chiefly one of emphasis. Robert McCormick, in England to 
promote the Chicago Exhibition, conceded that more than 80% 
of American exports consisted of foodstuffs and raw materials, 
but he considered it mor~ appropriate to call attention to 
the relative growth of manufactured exports rather than to 
the preponderance of natural products. He informed the Bri-
tish public that among American exports in 1891 important 
increases had been made in many manufacturing categories. 
These included hardware, sewing machines, tools, engines and 
boilers, glassware, and miscellaneous machines. Most impres-
sive of all, the export of American locomotives increased by 
;£447,524 and reached a total value of i65Lt,965; the export 
8 
of railway cars increased by ;f251,437 to a total of ~1,055,382. 
The Englishman, J. Stephen Jeans, concurred with McCormick. 
He denied the British assertions, which appeared frequently 
during the presidential campaign of 1892, that the Americans 
had seen the folly of "McKinleyism" and were repudiating it. 
Furthermore, he denied that the American policy of protection 
had proved a failure. Jeans pointed out that the growth of 
American exports between 1880 and 1890 represented "a larger 
increase than has occurred within the same interval on the 
part of any other country in the worldo" Agriculture was and 
would likely remain the staple industry of the United States, 
he said. But there had occurred "a sensible increase of late 
8McCor~ick, Future Trade Relations, 21-22. 
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years" in manufactured exports. Only 9.6% of America's total 
exports in 1880 had been of manufactured goods. Of the much 
larger total exports of 1891 19.3% were manufactures. Despite 
constantly increasing wages and the passage of the McKinley 
Tariff, the value of American manufactured exports rose from 
545,500,000 in 1860 to $79,000,000 in 1880 and to $169,000,000 
in 1891. American industry was clearly something which British 
manufacturers would have to reckon with.9 
The .American depression of 1893-1894 caused many Ameri-
can manufacturers to seek foreign outlets for their products 
and in these years manufactures contributed to the continuing 
expansion of total American exports. This increase of Ameri-
can manufactured exports, coinciding as it did with the sharp 
decline of British exports to the United States, elicited a 
number of statements in the British press. The author of a 
study of foreign competition compiled a list of manufactured 
items which the United States exported in large quantities: 
rifles and ammunition, clocks and watches, pianos and organs, 
locks and safes, joinery work and furniture, agricultural 
implements, and tools and machinery of all kinds. 10 In a 
more detailed statement, the values of leading American manu-
factured exports were pointed out to British readers by Andrew 
Carnegie. In 1893 the United States exported i6,000,000 
worth of iron and steel; for the first time these exports 
9Jeans, "The American Tariff, 11 755, 757. 
lOYilliamson, British Industry and Foreign Competition, 
237. 
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exceeded imports of the same items. Cotton goods exports 
reached.f2,400,000. Exports of agricultural implements were 
valued at nearly Dfl,000,000 and Carnegie boasted that "America 
has now the command of the world for agricultural machinery." 
Other prominent exports were copper manufactures Gf900,000); 
carriages and cars (.;£500,000); glassware (il,600,000); leather 
and its manufactures (..(2,000,000); musical instruments (;;(360,000); 
paper G;E300,000)--"some English journals are now printed upon 
American paper," according to Carnegie; clocks and watches 
(.£200,000); and scientific instruments (J=260,000). 11 
Reflecting on this growth of American manufactured exports, 
Jeans wrote in 1894 that 
American agriculture had displaced English agricul-
tural produce many years ago, and threatens to do so 
more and more. But the British manufactu~er has 
recen~ly been threatened with the same fate. In 
the iron, cotton, and other leading industries, Amer-
ican inventiveness and enterprise have brought Ameri-
can prices almost down to a European level. The 
cultivation of foreign markets, hitherto disregarded 
except for agricultural produce, has now become for 
American manufacturers a matter of the most pressing 
concern. Having filled to overflowing their own 
previously redundant order-books, they are now ad-
justing their costs so as to meet Britain in the 
principal markets of the world. 
If the depression led to labor strife in the United States, 
such as Britain had experienced in 1893, then, according to 
Jeans, "the competition which we dread may still be some way 
off, but if Britain were to have a monopoly of labour trou-
bl es 
• • • this undesirable and ominous end could not be long 
11
carnegie, "Britain and the United States," 324; for 
similar information on some of these exports, see The Economist, 
April 28, 1894, 517-18; MTS, August, 1894, 4-5. 
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delayed."12 
This theme continued to receive attention in the British 
press during 1895. "Great Britain is not, and never now can 
be, the workshop of the world," wrote Edwin Burgis. This 
title was passing to Britain's rivals. "The success of the 
protectionist policy of our foreign competitors ••• in 
building up their manufacturing industries in the face of 
our competition, to an equality with ourselves, has now de-
prived us of even the last advantage," that of keeping costs 
low and finding ready sales in neutral markets. The protec-
tionist nations have also lowered the cost of production, he 
claimed, and Germany, France and the United States "are in a 
position to dispute the possession of every market in the 
world with us, notwithstanding all that has been said in 
favour of o:ir Free Trade policy." Captain Lugard insisted 
that the search for new markets for· British goods was impera-
tive because of the "commercial rivalry" and the "commercial 
hostility" among the Great Powers, "more especially on the 
part of America, Germany, and France, by means of hostile 
tariffs, State bounties, and protectiono" An anonymous author, 
whose long-term fear was of Chinese competition, noted that 
in his own day Germany, the United States, Belgium, and even 
Italy "are all beginning to compete with us more or less seri-
ously in some of our own pet markets, and there is every 
prospect of a growing competition in the future. 111 3 
12Jeans, "The Labour War in the United States," 267. 
13Burgis, Perils to British Trade, 74, 143-44; Captain F. D. 
Lugard, "New British Markets (3) Tropical Africa," Nineteenth 
~ntur~, XXXVIII (September, 1895), 442. 
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Still, the notion that the tariff prevented the United 
states from being competitive in world markets did not die. 
"The competition of America is weakened, if not destroyed, 
by a protective tariff," one Englishman wrote, though he did 
predict "that if that tariff be modified or suppressed, and 
Free-trade be adopted on the other side of the Atlantic, we 
shall be embarked upon a struggle far more severe than any 
in the past. 1114 More prestigious voices drew even more nega-
tive conclusions. Though The Times claimed that "Germany 
seems to be hopelessly outdistanced and our serious competitor 
would seem to be the United States," it reiterated American 
exports consisted chiefly of foodstuffs and raw cotton, which 
did not compete with British p~oducts. And, though the United 
States was obtaining an increasing share of the European mar-
ket, that "share is still only 9 per cent. of the total, and 
they have lost some ground in the various American countries 
which, a prior~, they ought to have kept, and in British pos-
sessions.1115 Sir Robert Giffen, Board of Trade official and 
influential economist, denied, as he had long done and would 
continue to do, the existence of any real challenge to British 
industry. He recognized that cotton manufacturing had grown 
rapidly on the Continent and in the United States so that Lan-
cashire had become "primus inter pares" rather than the com-
manding leader of the world industry. He recognized further 
14L. R. Phelps, "The Economy of High Wages," Edinburgh" 
CLXXIX (January, 1894), 59. 
15The Times, leading article, May 4, 1894, 9; for details 
Of AmerICaii exports to these markets, see Chapters VII and 
VIII. 
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that the United States had surpassed Britain in iron and steel 
production and was on the verge of surpassing her in the pro-
duction of coal. But, he insisted, 
there is nothing in these facts to explain the spe-
cial apprehensions of the present depression. As 
yet there has been nothing in foreign competition 
to prevent great growth and great prosperity at home • 
• • • On grounds of theory, we believe, there is 
nothing in the extension of that competition to gi6e 
us any real cause for apprehension in the future. 
American exports had sagged in 1895, but by the end of 
the year prices were reviving and exports were climbing once 
again. In 1896 American exports reached£20l,175,000, an 
increase of ~36,300,000 over 1895. This was the first of a 
series of export increases and set the stage for the British 
excitement over American competition in 1897· 
In 1896, however, it was tne fear of German competition 
which alarmed many in Britain. E. E. Williams' Made in Ger·~ 
manz was only the most flamboyant of the many publications of 
1896 which called attention to the German threat and which 
provoked Salisbury's scornful comment that his contemporaries 
were "a degraded generation compared with what our fathers 
were." Lord Rosebery, on the other hand, attempted to make 
the issue his own and gave a number of speeches on German 
competition. The Times and The Economist sided with Salis-
bury, denying that German competition was a serious threat 
to Britain. 17 Nevertheless, public opinion was sufficiently 
16sir Robert Giffen, "Depression Corrected," Edinburgh, 
CLXXXII (July, 1895), 1-11; the quoted passage is from ll. 
17The l'irnes, leading article, September 16, 1896, ?; a.IJ.ong 
the many such statements in The Economist, see especially June 
20, 1896, 794; August 1, 1896, 996-97; and October 24, 1896, 
1385-86 •. 
v 
~,i I 
248 
aroused that Parliament called for an official investigation. 
This resulted in the publication in January of 1897 of a report 
compiled by Sir Robert Giff en and Sir Courtenay Boyle under 
the auspices of the Board of Trade entitled "Memorandum on the 
Comparative Statistics of Population, Industry, and Commerce 
in the United Kingdom and Some Leading Foreign Countries." 
This report, popularly known as the "Boyle Memorandum," ana-
lysed the commerce and industry of Germany, France, and the 
United States. Its primary focus was on German competition 
since it was this which led initially to the demand for an 
investigation, but it contained interesting and significant 
information about American com.:petition alsoo 18 
The "Boyle Memorandum" acknowledged that Great Britain 
was facing increasing competition on the part of rival expor-
ting nations. It took the position that changes in relative 
population must significantly affect trade patterns. Of the 
foreign nations under consideration, the United States demon-
strated the highest rate of growth both in total and in urban 
population. As for the growth of foreign trade, France occu-
pied the same relative position as an exporting nation in 
1891-95 that she had held in 1880-84; Germany had advanced; 
and the United States had advanced even more rapidly than 
Germany. However, the "Boyle Memorandum" concluded, "we are 
still greatly ahead of either country in our power of manu-
18The following section is based on press reports of the 
content of the "Boyle Memorandum." The most important of these 
were the detailed summary which appeared in The Times, January 
29, 1897, 12; and January 30, 1897, 120 A summary and selected 
excerpts appeared in J.B.C. Kershaw, "The Future of British 
Trade," Fortnightly, LXII n.s. (November, 1897), 732-43. 
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facture for export, so much so that up to the present the 
gains of either in this respect have had no very serious 
effect upon our trade, but beginning from a lower level, each 
country is for the moment travelling upwards more rapidly 
than we are who occupy a lD.uch higher eminence." In addition, 
it pointed out, "neither of our rivals exports manufactures 
to the same extent [as Britain], although Germany has undoubt-
edly made some gains, and both Germany and the United States 
have developed the capacity to manufacture not only for their 
home markets, but to some extent for export also." If Eng-
land had suffered, and the "Boyle .Memorandum" believed that 
to be a moot point, it was from the consistent price decline 
of the preceding years, a tendency which affected other na-
tions as well and which had diminished their total export 
values. The sole exception to this tendency was the United 
States, whose exports had increased in value by about 10% 
during the previous sixteen years. But, it was pointed out, 
this had scarcely affected Britain in a serious way for the 
increase occurred more in agricultural exports than in arti-
cles which were competitive with those produced in England. 
In summation, the "Boyle Memorandum" maintained that Britain 
was neither losing ground in her own home market nor being 
displaced significantly in neutral markets. 
It was, generally, a very confident report which the 
Board of Trade issued at the beginning of 189?. Yet the 
situation across the Atlantic was changing rapidly and by the 
end of the year the "Boyle Memorandum" was very much out of 
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date. American exports were growing at a rate which the Amer-
~, ican correspondent of The Economist described as "astonishing." 
American exports for fiscal 1897 exceeded by nearly s22,ooo,ooo 
the previous annual high, which had been registered in fiscal 
1892. 19 The exports of 1897 were 50% above those of 1887 and 
manufactures were increa8ingly to be found among these Ameri-
can exports. As we have seen, by the end of 1897 The Economist 
was pointing out that American competition in various markets 
was checking the export of British goods. 
The year 1897 was a turning point. After that date the 
British nervousness about foreign competition was transferred 
from Germany to the United States, reaching a peak in the 
alleged "American invasion" shortly after the turn of the 
century. The principal pre-conditions for this formidable 
competition were the growth of American industrial capability 
and the expansion of American exports, which we have already 
examined, and the prospects of the revival of American ship-
ping and the expansion of the global influence of the United 
States to which we now turn. 
American Shipping 
Their greatest protection against American competition, 
many English.men believed, was the woeful condition of the 
American merchant marine. Free Traders in particular consis-
tently called attention to the disintegration of American 
l9The .~conomist, July 31, 1897, 1103-04. 
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shipping since the adoption of protection during the Civil 
War. 20 This American weakness was pinpointed by The Times 
when it commented on the great expansion of American foreign 
commerce in 1889: 
The only drawback from the American point of view is 
that the exports and imports were mostly carried in 
foreign ships. Of the total imports of 149 millions 
sterling, upwards of 117 millions were imported in 
foreign ships, and of the total exports of 146 mil-
lions sterling upwards of 126 millions were shipped 
in foreign vessels. Of the total commerce of the 
country, less than 14 per cent. was carried under 
the American flag; whereas 30 years ago nearly 75 
per cent. of the commerce of the United States was 
transported in national vessels.21 
Even J. Stephen Jeans, who had proved himself willing to 
acknowledge American achievements, believed that the utter 
inadequacy of the American navy was one of the chief reasons 
why Britain had no reason to despair over the American chal-
lenge. "Great Britain," he wrote during the debate over the 
McKinley Tariff, "does not much care what artificial restric-
tion may be placed on our commerce, so long as we have the 
command of the ocean-carrying trade." He recited, as~ 
Times often did also, the sorry story of the decline of Amer-
ican shipping. In 1860 American ships had carried not only 
a large proportion of their own trade, but they had carried 
12% of Britain's foreign trade as well; in 1892 American 
ships carried a mere 0.4% of Britain's trade. Jeans blamed 
this, as others did, on the tariff and he predicted that so 
20cr. Part I. 
21The Times, February 5, 1890, 13. 
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long as protection remained the American policy, Britain had 
no reason to fear the shipping rivalry of the United States. 22 
The numerous books and articles of Michael Mulhall invariably 
referred to the supremacy of the British mercantile marine 
and frequently offered comparative statistics on .t\.merican 
shipping, as in the following example: 23 
Maritime Carrying-Power of National Merchant Fleets 
Tonnage 
1882 1892 
Great Britain 19,020,000 27,720,000 
United States 1,760,000 1,680,000 
Percentage of 
World Total 
1882 1892 
This progressive decay of an indispensable industry continued, 
so that by 1896 only 8% of America's enormous foreign trade 
was carried in national ships. 24 
Despite this obvious decrepitude of American shipping, 
there were Englishmen who feared tqe realization of the much-
discussed schemes for the revitalization of this American 
industry. The Times occasionally carried reports of plans 
"to revive American shipping by means of enormous bounties. 1125 
The British were aware that the United States Secretary of 
the Treasury had made a public issue of the large fortune 
22Jeans, "The American Tariff," 756-57; see also The Times, 
May 13, 1892, 5. 
23Michael G. Mulhall, "The Carrying-Trade of the World," 
Contemporary, LXVI (December, 1894), 812. 
24Alexander Maclure, "America as a Power," Nineteenth 
Centurx, XXXIX (June, 1896), 907. 
25see, for example, The Times, May 13, 1892, 5; and Novem-
ber 16, 1892, 14. 
r 
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which American passengers and freight paid to foreign ship-
ping interests and that he had recommended governmental sub-
sidies to encourage American shipping. 26 They knew also that 
several measures had been sent to Congress which would provide 
subsidies to American shipbuilders and lucrative mail con-
tracts for American ship operators. From Philadelphia came 
word that America was "filled with the idea of placing the 
American flag upon all parts of the ocean, and sending its 
ships throughout the world. 1127 
Could the Americans possibly challenge England, which 
possessed such an overwhelming marine superiority? Some 
Englishmen feared that they could. The British had once 
enjoyed a comparable superiority in iron and steel, commented 
A. N. Cumming, and only recently the President of the British 
Iron and Steel Institute had conceded American supremacy. 
What was to prevent this supremacy £rom being extended to 
shipping as well? "It is notorious," he wrote, "that a slight 
modification of the existing Protection would enable America 
to become most formidable in that branch of competition." 
The Americans had already demonstrated their technical compe-
tence; "the vessels recently built in the States for her Navy 
possess an average speed higher than anything to be found in 
the English navy."28 
26The Economist, February 14, 1891, 210. 
27The Economist, March 14, 1891, 338-39; Jennings, "The 
Trade League against England," 911. 
28
cumming, "America and Protection," 374. 
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\.lb.at many in Britain feared was that "McKinleyism" would 
be used to foster American shipping competition as well as to 
c~eate new home industries. There were reasonable grounds 
for such fears. Andrew Carnegie, for example, considered 
shipping subsidies as integral components of "McKinleyism." 
In his interpretation of the McKinley Act for British readers, 
he laid great stress on the encouragement it offered to Amer-
ican shipping. The success of the reciprocity clause, he 
believed, demanded the encouragement of regular steamship 
service between the United States and other nations, espe-
cially those of South America. The Subsidy Act promoted this 
by providing handsome payments for carriage of the mail in 
American-built ships, the rate of payment increasing in pro-
portion to the size and speed of the vessel. Thus the 
greatest incentives were offered to vessels of the first 
class. Carnegie admitted that it would be some time before 
the full effect of this measure could be fairly judged. But 
he noted that the Inman Steamship Company was preparing to 
build on the Delaware "two of the largest and swiftest ves-
sels, fit mates to the 'City of Paris' and the 'City of New 
York,'" which were among the premier ships afloat. These 
latter vessels, though of foreign registry, were owned prin-
cipally by Americans and they "may be naturalised and fly 
the flag of the Republic." 
This would create a weekly American line upon the 
Atlantic, superior to any now existing. Such ships 
would receive for carrying the mails each round trip 
nearly five thousand pounds. Making ten trips per 
annum, this would equal five per cent. upon a million 
r 
sterling, a sum much greater than the cost of each 
ship. It is evident that all parties in this coun-
try have determined that an earnest effort shall be 
made to give the flag its former prominence upon 
the sea.29 
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As the .figures for 1896, which were noted above, indi-
cated, the various shipping subsidy schemes bore little fruit 
between 1890 and 1897. During this period, however, there 
was just enough which was happening or being proposed to keep 
the British constantly aware of the possibility of American 
competition on the seas. The chief importance of these 
years was that the British became sensitive to the issue of 
an American maritime threat and were thus prone to panic 
when J. P. Morgan began his "raids" on British shipping in 
the first years of the new century. 
The British were shocked in 1893 when, as Carnegie had 
predicted, the superior and prestigious 'City of Paris' and 
'City of New York' were transferred to American registry as 
part of the complete takeover o.f the Inman Line by Americans. 
The normally confident and sober Economist was moved by the 
transfer to publish a lengthy analysis entitled "The 'Stars 
and Stripes' v. the 'Union Jack.'" The transfer was described 
as 
a new departure in the history of transatlantic 
navigation, which is calculated to induce more 
satisfactory reflections on the past than confident 
anticipation for the future. It is not satisfactory 
to find that a rival Power has become possessed of 
one of our principal li~es of transatlantic steamships, 
and it is all the less so when that transfer is 
29carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1033. 
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accompanied by circumstances that appear likely to 
induce rivalry that may in the long run tend to the 
serious disadvantage of the one country or the other. 
The Economist was by no means ready to concede. It pro-
vided once more the by now almost ritualistic account of the 
decline of American shipping since the Civil War. It pointed 
out that it cost about 50% more to build ships in the United 
States and nearly 100% more to pay the wages of American sea-
men. It maintained that it was "difficult to see how England 
can be much injured by the fact that the Americans are once 
again about to compete with us in the Atlantic trade." Never-
theless, it concluded, "the experiment will be watched with 
interest all the same." The danger was twofold. First, since 
the governmental subsidies favored the swifter vessels, the 
American lines, by offering very speedy service, could hope 
to attract a greater portion of the first-class trade and thus 
to secure the higher income necessary to offset their higher 
costs. Furthermore, the American cost disadvantage was to 
be reduced, for the Inman Line planned to use the newly 
opened port facilities at Southhampton. Southampton was 
closer to London than was Liverpool and its facilities guar-
anteed fewer port delays. Its use would give American ships 
an economic advantage. Secondly, whether or not the Americans 
were ultimately successful, the competition thus established 
could not but render British shipping somewhat less profit-
able. The British, therefore, had to take this challenge 
seriously.30 
30The Economist, February 18, 1893, 190-92. 
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British awareness of American maritime ambition was kept 
alive in 1894 by the attention devoted to the visit of Captain 
Alfred Thayer Mahan. When The Influence of Sea Power upon 
Histori was published in 1890, reviewers had noted how ironic 
it was that such a perceptive analysis should come from a 
naval officer whose country had allowed its maritime strength 
to deteriorate so badly. But by the time of Mahan's visit to 
:England in 1894, the British were readier to believe that this 
American weakness would be remedied. A testimonial dinner for 
Mahan elicited an editorial statement by The Times that Mahan 
had made the English realize that their sea power, which was 
based on national fortitude and the predestination of nature, 
had made them a great nation. "If Captain Mahan is to be 
trusted,'' The Times continued, "it is hardly less certain • 
that these conditions must make hereafter for the sea power 
of the United States." It concluded that, "for good or for 
evil we have to face the prospect of the growth on the other 
side of the Atlantic of a seapower not unequal to our own," 
and that such a change must "vitally affect" the whole civi-
lized world.3l 
• • 
The intervention of the United States in the dispute be-
tween Great Britain and Venezuela was the occasion for an out-
pouring of commentary in the British press in late 1895 and 
1896. The major issue was the diplomatic one but it had im-
plications for the maritime challenge which did not escape 
3lThe Times, leading article, May 25, 1894, 9. 
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British notice. It was widely recognized in the British press 
that Secretary of State Olney's extension of the Monroe Doc-
trine marked the beginning of a new era in international rela-
tions. The United States was now taking responsibility for 
a substantial part of th~ globe and this new responsibility 
implied the creation of a navy adequate to such a task.32 The 
issues of 1896 had to do chiefly with the United States Navy, 
but any stimulus to the American Navy caused concern in Eng-
land for it stimulated American shipbuilders and expanded 
their facilities for producing merchant vessels. That the 
Americans had not given up hope of a shipping revival was 
evident in 1897 when the Dingley Tariff was passed. It con-
tained a clause which imposed an additional duty of 10% on 
all goods imported into the United States in vessels not 
flying the American flag unless such vessels were registered 
in a country whose ships had by prior treaty obtained the 
right to enter American ports on the same basis as American 
vessels. Since British ships carried such a large proportion 
of America's foreign trade, there was a brief flurry of excite-
ment in England until the United States Attorney-General 
ruled that British ships qualified by treaty for exemption 
from this extra chargeo33 
32These implications of American policy were clearly set 
forth in Sydney Low, "The Olney Doctrine and America's New 
Foreign Policy," Nineteenth Centurz, XL (December, 1896), 850-60. 
British press reaction is examined in detail in A. E. Campbell, 
Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903 (London: Long-
mans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1960), Chapter 2. 
33The Times, September 1, 189?, 3. 
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The American maritime challenge did not really become 
formidable until 1901, but the possibility of an American 
revival was kept constantly before the British public from 
1890 onward. This was so not only because American exports 
continued to increase and American politicians continued to 
seek additional governmental assistance for American shipping 
but also because the United States had begun to establish 
its influence in distant parts of the world. This expansion 
of American influence could only enhance the possibility of 
American economic competition. 
The Exoansion of American Influence 
One direction of the American outward thrust of the 
1890s was into the Pacific. Americans had long had substan-
tial interests in Hawaii and The Times recognized that because 
of these the United States might find involvement in the poli~ 
tical upheavals of 1893 unavoidable.34 According to the Ameri-
can correspondent of The Economist, "there is no disguising 
the fact that public sentiment is distinctly in favour of 
'taking in' the mid-Pacific Ocean Kingdom." "We want no Ber-
muda off our Pacific Coast," is the way he summed.up the pre-
dominant American opinion.35 This caused no alarm in Britain. 
The Times spoke for most Englishmen when it stated that 
it is easy to understand the advantages which will 
accrue to the United States Navy, the development 
34 The ~imes, leading. article, January 30, 1893, 9. 
35The Economist, February 18, 1893, 199-200. 
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of which is now the object of so much care and expen-
diture, from the possession of a naval station so 
advantageously placed. The civilized world, too, 
has every reason to be contented that the United 
States should "protect" these beautiful islands.36 
' ~.. The extension of American influence in Hawaii and its ul ti-, 
' 
mate annexation by the United States did not provoke any sig-
nificant British complaints. 
Though the British had important commercial interests 
in Hawaii, American competition there did not become a major 
issue. Ironically, what competition there was resulted from 
the extension of the Canadian transportation system, which 
many Englishmen hoped would relieve Canada from the American 
challenge.37 The Canadian Pacific Railway and the Canadian-
Australian Steamship Line made American products including 
manufactures so accessible that many Hawaiian purchasers 
shunned British goods which were cheaper but which took con-
siderably longer to arrive. In this way sugar machinery was 
imported from St. Louis and American steam engines began to 
replace those of British origino38 
Hawaii's real significance was as a stepping stone to 
Asia. The establishment of American maritime facilities in 
Hawaii and in Samoa was often linked in the British press to 
36The Times, leading article, March 26, 1894, ?. 
37see the following chapter. 
38The Economist, November 30, 1895, 1561. English inter-
ests in Hawaii also complained about strong competition from 
American soap manufacturers but this soap, which bore imita-
tions of the labels and brand names of prominent American 
manufacturers, was really made in Japan; ~· 
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the prospective completion of a canal across the Central 
American Isthmus. Though work on the canal was for the most 
part suspended between 1890 and 189?, it was the subject of 
occasional articles in the British press and no one doubted 
that such a waterway would some day be completed.39 
The advantages which the canal would provide for Ameri-
can commerce was an important part of Robert McCormick's 
appeal for British participation in the Chicago Exhibition. 
In words which echoed the statements of earlier British com-
mentators, he noted that the discovery of the passage by way 
of the Cape of Good Hope had destroyed the commercial supre-
macy of the Mediterranean cities; similarly, the Suez Canal 
had superseded the Cape of Good Hope and had made Great Bri-
tain commercially supreme. "How," McCormick asked, "will the 
opening of the Nicaraguan Canal affect the present channels 
of trade and the present trade relations, especially the trade 
relations between Great Britain and the United States?" The 
implied answer was obvious; McCormick had only to supply the 
figures. First, the canal would give New York a 2,700 mile 
advantage over Liverpool in reaching the Pacific ports of 
the New World, three-fourths of whose trade was controlled by 
Europeans in 1892. Secondly, the vast populations of Asia 
and the other Pacific markets, all of which were dominated 
by Britain, would be brought nearer to New York by distanceo 
39see, for example, E. H. Seymour, "The Present State of 
the Panama Canal," Nineteenth Century, XXXI (February, 1892), 
293-311. For pre-1890 British comments on the canal, see 
Part Io 
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varying from 2,000 to 10,000 miles. The British journal, 
Engineering, confirmed McCormick's thesis. Completion of the 
canal, it stated, would "help to shift centres of trade, and 
to bring American and foreign ports, where the British mer-
~hant flag is now more or less supreme, much closer together. 1140 
By the mid-1890s the markets of China had become a cause 
of diplomatic friction among the European Powers and British 
observers were aware that, with her growing foreign trade and 
Pacific influence, the United States had to be taken into 
consideration. But, until the emergence of the ''open door" 
policy in 1898, there was no unanimity of British opinion as 
to the significance for Britain of America's expanding role 
in the Pacific. Some anticipated the "open door" solution, 
suggesting that nations whose interests in Eastern markets 
were identi~al with Britain's should be brought into a coali-
tion. "For this purpose we need look no further than the 
41 United States, Japan, and possibly Germany." Others had a 
greater fear of American than of Russian expansion and encour-
aged Anglo-Russian cooperation: 
The fact that a civilised and organised Power [that 
is, Russia] confronted the United States upon the 
Pacific would not, in itself, be a matter of regret; 
and if, as is not inconceivable, the trade of the 
United States sought outlets in China, affairs would 
have to be arranged between the two great Powers con-
cernedo 42 
40ttcCormick, Future Trade Relations, 20-22; En.gineerins, 
quoted ibid., 28. 
41Robert K. Douglas, "The Greater Eastern Question," 
National, XXVI (December, 1895), 493. 
42H. O. Arnold-Forster, "Our True Foreign Policy," 
Pineteenth Century, XXXIX (February, 1896), 211. 
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Still others spoke of "the precarious and uncertain condi.tion 
of our prosperity at present" and insisted that prosperity 
was dependent on maritime supremacy and the retention and 
consolidation of the Empire. Unless Britain proved herself 
capable of forging a strong policy against rival European 
nations, it was argued, the British Colonies would feel that 
the imperial connection made them vulnerable in war time and 
that Britain could no longer protect them. They would detach 
themselves and "the hegemony of the scattered fractions of 
our race will then fall naturally and almost inevitably to 
the United States, and Great Britain proper will be reduced 
to the level of a third-rate power. 1143 However. they assessed 
its role, the British were fully conscious of America's pre-
sence in the Pacific by 18970 
Closer to her own borders, America's expansionist ten-
dencies seemed still more pronounced and intensive. As seen 
by the British, growing American influence in Latin America 
and in Canada was closely linked to the reciprocity clause 
of the McKinley Tariff. For this we must turn to an examina-
tion of actual American competition. 
43"1920," Contemporary, LXVIII (December, 1895), 770-71. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CANADA 
Canadians were angered by the passage of the McKinley 
Tariff for they believed that it was aimed directly at them-
selves,. American politicians nad given them ample reason for 
so believing. The debates of the McKinley Bill in both hou-
ses of Congress were full of expressions indicating the belief 
that passage of the Bill would lead to a closer union with 
and possibly even the absorption of Canada. These were duly 
t d . B "t . l no e in ri ain. Even where differences of opinion emerged 
over the proper use of reciprocity, there was often substan-
tial agreement as to the desired objective. Chauncey Depew, 
for example, believed that it was by giving the largest pos-
sible scope to reciprocity that "t~e closest commercial rela-
tions with Canada" would be achieved. On the other hand, 
Senator Evarts, though he supported reciprocity generally, 
wished to see Canada excluded. It was offering reciprocity 
to others and refusing it to Canada, he thought, which would 
hasten the day "when the American flag would wave over Canada 
in the place of the British standard" and Canadian commerce 
would become American. 2 
1
see, for example, the speeches of Representatives But-
terworth and Richie reported in The Times, January 25, 1890, 5. 
See also Moreton Frewen, "The National Policy of the United 
States," 6810 
2The Times, November 20, 1890, 3; September 10, 1890, 5. 
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No one was more incensed than Sir John MacDonald, head 
of the Canadian government. He charged that Canada's marvel-
lous growth since Confederation had made the United States 
covetous. At the same time he strenuously denied that the 
alleged aim of the McKinley Act, to force a merger of the two 
countries by means of trade policy, would ever be accomplished.3 
Many people in England shared MacDonald's view of the McKin-
ley Tariff. If, wrote Lyon Playfair, the object of the McKin-
ley Act was "to force the United States lion and the Canadian 
lamb to lie down together," as he believed to be the case, 
"this can only be accomplished by the lamb being inside the 
lion. 114 With the McKinley Tariff in operation, wrote Moreton 
Frewen, the United States had "a very great prize • • • in 
sight; that prize is Canada. 0 5 The Earl of Dunraven claimed 
that 0 we are seeing Canada exposed to a gigantic bribe in the 
shape of reciprocity with the United States, and Newfoundland 
boiling" because the British Government refused to allow her 
to come to what she considered favorable terms with the United 
States. 6 L. J. Jennings accused Secretary of State Blaine 
of trying to force Canada and the South American republics 
into an arrangement under which American products would be 
3see his angry speech which was quoted at length in The 
Times, October 6, 1890, 13; and further, The Economist, October 
11, 1890, 1290. 
4The Times, November 14, 1890, 3. 
5Frewen, "The National Policy of the United States," 681. 
6Earl of Dunraven, "Commercial Union within the Empire," 
Nineteenth Century, XXIX (March, 1891), 511. 
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imported on exceptionally favorable terms and· England "further 
handicapped in the race for markets."? 
Such views, however, were far from unanimous. The Econ-
omist chided the Canadians for feeling aggrieved by the McKin-
ley Tariff when their own national policy was one of high pro-
t . 8 tee ion. Lyon Playfair predicted that "the natural effect 
of the Act will be to draw together Canada and England." 
His explanation was the widely accepted notion that trade was 
essentially barter; that the McKinley Tariff would force Can-
ada to sell more of her goois in England, so that England 
would naturally sell more to Canada in return. A Free Trade 
Canada, Playfair claimed, would have no need to fear her 
mighty neighbor.9 Such was also the view of The Economist 
which said that "it is idle to talk of the McKir..ley tariff 
forcing Canada into the arms of the Republic •••• the proba-
bility is that Canadian intercourse with the mother country 
will be substantially increased by this new Bill, and if it 
be, then the main action of the new United States Tariff 
. 
will be to draw the Dominion nearer to us in the future." 
Given fast ships and the expansion of the Canadian railway 
system, Britain could in fact expect her Canadian trade to 
. 10 increase. 
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The Economist found nothing surprising in the fact that 
Canadian trade with the United States had reached very large 
proportions: 
From 
-United Kingdom 
United States 
Canadian Imports (;£) 
1888 
?,859;744 
9,696,369 
1889 
8,463,478 
10,107,488 
The common border and easy communication by rail and water 
meant that this was to be expected. The Economist was content 
that Great Britain, though thousands of miles away, should 
remain "a very good second to the United States. 1111 It was 
more concerned with the adverse effect of the Canadian than 
of the American tariff, so far as Canada's future was concerned. 
As the Canadian tariff was framed, the smaller amount of imports 
from Britain paid duties of il,890,100 while the larger amount 
fr•om the United States paid only .;fl ,474,200. The Economist 
believed that the United States needed no such advantage and 
that such a policy was decidedly not in the Canadian interest. 12 
The discussion of the impact of the McKinley Tariff oc-
curred at the height of an election campaign in Canada. The 
major issue of the campaign was tariff policy and the best 
response of Canada to the new conditions imposed by the McKin-
ley Act. Wilfrid Laurier, leader of the Liberal opposition, 
asserted that the "only salvation of Canada was in unrestricted 
11Ibid. 
12The Economist, February 14, 1891, 199-200. A partial 
explanation of this discrepancy was that Britain shipped a 
greater proportion of finished manufactures to Canada than 
did the United States. 
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reciprocity with the United States in natural products and 
manufactured goods. 1113 The Liberal Party demanded the appoint-
ment of a commission to negotiate a reciprocity treaty with 
the United States under the terms of the McKinley Act. 14 Ano-
ther Liberal declared that with a neighbor such as the United 
States at her doorstep it was ridiculous to seek markets three 
thousand miles away. 1 5 Erastus Wiman, prominent Canadian 
industrialist and Liberal, was an ardent crusader for the 
views that Goldwin Smith had been voicing for years, that 
Canada's natural economic relations were with the United 
States. "If material progress is the essential standard of 
success and happiness," he wrote, "then Canada would be enor-
mously benefited by a free relation with the United States. 1116 
In a speech before the British Iron and Steel Institute at 
Niagara Falls, Wiman declared that the Canadians required 
"only the magic touc~ of freedom and appreciation of the Amer-
ican people to enormously enrich them." 
If the Congress of the United States should express 
a willingness to extend to the north an invitation to 
reciprocal arrangements similar to that which, in 
their new tariff, they have extended to southern 
nationalities, the people of Great Britain must not 
blame Canada if she accepts this first omen of better 
relations hereafter to exist between the English-
speaking nations that hold this vast continent in 
common.I? 
13Quoted in Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 
907-080 
14The Times, December 20, 1890, 5o 
15Quoted in Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 
907-08. 
lGiJiman, "Canada and the States," 623. 
l 7Quoted in Jennings, ''The Trade League against England," 
907-08. 
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The stick and carrot approach of the McKinley Tariff was ob-
viously receiving serious consideration on the.part of Canada. 
One of the Canadians wrote a letter to The Economist in 
which he insisted that the Canadian people were wavering on 
the question and that, if MacDonald ''desires to remain in 
power mu.ch longer, he is bound to accept terms from the 
United States which will be detrimental to ourselves. 1118 
Even a Quebec newspaper which on most issues be.eked MacDon-
ald's government favored closer trade relations with the 
United States: "Trade is what we want," it remarked, "not 
twaddle about loyalty to the Crown. 1119 
Across the Atlantic, however, things were seen in a dif-
ferent light. When, during the campaign, the Liberals pro-
posed a new Canadian tariff that would establish free trade 
between Canada and the United States while retaining the 
duties on British and foreign goods, 20 there were those in 
England who saw this merely as evidence that the Canadians 
were not sufficiently self-confident to resist Blaine's crude 
attempts at bribery. An Englishman ridiculed the notion 
held by Wiman and many other Canadian Liberals, that the reci-
procity possibilities of the McKinley Act should be construed 
as a sign of proffered American cooperation and friendship. 
18William J. Harris, letter to The Economist, March 28, 
1891; for further letters from Hanis, see the issues of April 
11 and 18, 1891. 
l9Quoted in Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 
907-08. 
20The F.conomist, February 14, 1891, 199-200. 
He reminded Canadians of the verse 
It was all very well to dissemble your love, 
But why did you kick me down stairs? 
2?0 
and insisted that the McKinley Act had been passed by Ameri-
cans for American benefit. It seemed likely at one stroke to 
cut off one-sixth of Canada's total exports. He advised the 
Canadians that no tariff adjustments would ever provide them 
with the markets they required to develop their potential. 
Instead, they should adopt Free Trade and develop commercial 
relations with the rest of the world, and especially with the 
other portions of the British Empire. Complementary trade 
between the rich and rapidly developing British possessions 
would more than compensate Canada for the loss of her Ameri-
can trade. 21 The position of The Times was essentially the 
same. Canada should not attempt to fight a tariff war with 
the United States, it maintained, but should adopt Free 
Trade. She was more likely to prosper by looking to the east 
than to the south, and in the future she could even hope to 
supplant the United States in the markets of China and Japan. 22 
Alarmed by certain views expressed during the election cam-
paign, Earl Grey, a former Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
wrote a book which he dedicated to the people of Canada in the 
hope that they would adopt Free Trade. This brief work con-
tained no novel arguments but simply contended that the Empire 
had prospered under Free Trade and that the wisest Canadian 
21
cumming, "America and Protection," 371-72, 382. 
22The Times, leading article, October 9, 1890, 9; see also 
the leading articles of August 13, 1890, 7; and October 18, 
1890, 9. 
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reaction to the McKinley Tariff was neither higher Canadian 
protection nor Canadian-American reciprocity but the estab-
lishment of free commercial relations with the rest of the 
world. 23 
The Economist dismiBsed the campaign argument of the 
Liberals, that only through reciprocity could Canada avoid a 
drastic curtailment of trade, and also that of the Conserva-
tives, that reciprocity would lead to political absorption. 
The real point, according to The Economist, was that recipro-
city would mean that "the American manufacturers would be pro-
tected against the only effective competition they have to 
fear; the competition, that is, of British manufacturers." 
The people of Canada would be doubly burdened for the benefit 
of the United States. They would not only have to pay in-
creased internal truces to replace lost customs revenue, but 
they would also have to pay the higher prices the Americans 
could charge in a non-competitive market. 24 
MacDonald's Conservatives won a fairly close election 
in 1891. However, according to both The Times and The Econo-
~' an analysis of the returns demonstrated clearly that a 
large majority of Canadians had refused to swallow the Ameri-
can bait. 25 The Economist held out the pleasing prospect that 
23Henry George Grey, The Commercial Policy of the British 
Colonies and the McKinley Tariff (London; New ~ork: Macmillan 
and Co. , 1892). 
24The Economist, February 14, 1891, 200-01; virtually the 
same argument appeared in the issue of February 13, 1892. 
25The Times, leading article, February 5, 1891, 9; The 
Economist, March 14, 1891, 334-35. 
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Blaine would have to sweeten his proposals if he wished Canada 
to discuss reciprocity and that, should Cleveland win the 
election in 1892, the Canadians could look forward to benefit-
ing from the large tariff reductions which the Democrats 
. . 26 
were promising. 
For many both in Canada and England, however, the dilemma 
was by no means resolved nor were the prospects so hopeful as 
The Economist suggested. Not only were there those who asser-
ted that the McKinley Tariff was doing far more harm to Canada 
than to Britain herself , 27 but there was the nagging question 
for Canadians and British alike: why was Canada growing and 
prospering so little in comparison with the United States? 
No one framed the question more strongly than Erastus Wiman, 
the Canadian industrialisto 28 He pointed out that Canada 
was larger than the United States exclusive of Alaska and 
that the variety and richness of the Dominion's natural re-
sources equalled or even exceeded those of the United States. 
What then, he asked rhetorically, were Canada's possibilities? 
"The measure of development which is possible for the whole 
continent is that which has actually taken place in the sou-
thern portion of it, and which is found in the creation of a 
commerce, and the development of wealth-giving forces for the 
good of man, which in the United States have actually taken 
26The Economist, March 14, 1891, 334-35· 
27nonald, "McKinleyism and the Presidential Election," 
493-94. -
28The Times, leading article, February 5, 1891, 9. 
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placeo 1129 
Canada, said Wiman, despite possessing the greater part 
of the continent, British support, stable institutions, large 
supplies of money, and everything else to make her great, 
has had no progress at all comparable with the pro-
gress of the United States •••• Measured by every 
standard of comparison, the experiment in Canada of 
self-reliance and self-development is a failure. 
Beyond all question, the cause of this has been that 
the freedom of trade, which among the [United States] 
has built them up, has been denied to Canada. If the 
Declaration of Independence had taken in the whole 
continent, the same relative progress would have taken 
place north of the 45th parallel, the Lakes, and the 
St. Lawrence that has taken place south of them, and 
the wo::-ld would have been enriched to double the ex-
tent of the contributions of the United States. 
Would Great Britain have suffered had such an event oc-
curred? Fa~ from it. 
Great Britain would have been infinitely better off, 
because while she is receiving twenty-five millions 
of dollars in interest every year from her possessions 
in North America, she is receiving two hundred mil-
lions of dollars in interest from the revolted colo-
nies that declared their independence of her fiscal 
interference ••• the United States are, today, one 
hundred times more important to the commerce of Great 
Britain than is Canada. 
Britain worried that closer commercial relations with the 
United States would weaken imperial loyalties. They must 
come to learn that "if the penalty of adherence to British 
connection be poverty, loss of population, increase of in-
debtedness, and decline of values, then British connection 
is imperilled by consequences far more serious than those 
that would follow the most intimate commercial relation with 
29wiman, "Canada and the States," 620-21 • 
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the United States. 1130 
Obviously Canada could not grow and prosper in economic 
isolation. Yet the injunction to adopt free trade and to 
hope for an increase of inter-imperial trade seemed to be 
wishful thinking, while the policy of even closer commercial 
ties with the United States was favored only by a minority in 
Canada and virtually no one in the mother country. In England, 
however, numerous proposals appeared for realizing Canada's 
great potential by means of an imperial customs union. 
One of those came from Moreton Frewen. He took excep-
tion to those in Britain who denied that the McKinley Tariff 
was a constructive policy. It was, he wrote, only the latest 
phase of a "national policy," an American system of Free Trade 
which the United States had adopted long ago. It consisted 
of "Free Trade within, Protection without." This American 
system of Free Trade, in combination with the British system 
of Free Trade which operated to provide America with markets 
and with population to fill her empty spaces, had made the 
United States the most prosperous nation in the world. "It 
has attracted, and still must attract, the greater portion 
of all the immigration from foreign lands, and having once 
attracted the settler, it serves no less to keep himo 11 3l 
This latter was a barbed remark addressed to the problem of 
migration or re-emigration from Canada to the United States, 
30ibid., 621-23. 
3lFrewen, "The National Policy of the United States," 
674-76. 
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which was of serious concern to Canadians and British alike 
at this timeo32 
It was, according to Frewen, from the "political labora-
tory" of the United States that answers for the political 
problems of the future were coming. It was this "National 
policy" of the United States--"Solidarity through Federation, 
State Rights through Home Rule, and Social Progress through 
the restriction of competition--which will force upon England 
• • • that National policy which all portions of the British 
Empire can combine to carry out." Frewen recalled for his 
readers the statement which John Sherman had made in the United 
States Senate in 1888: "Within ten years from this time the 
~ominion of Canada will, in my judgement, be represented either 
in the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain or in the Congress 
of the United States." The choice, concluded Frewen, was 
Britain's but it had to be made soon. "The McKinley Bill 
may indeed lose us Canada" to the attractions of the American 
economy. But, if Britain will act quickly and wisely, it 
will more likely "win over to a wiser and greater Britain, 
not Canada alone, but also Australasia and South Africa."33 
L. J. Jennings was another admirer of what the Americans had 
accomplished through their system of a large internal area of 
commercial freedom protected by tariffs. He was convinced 
that the "day will come when the English people decide that 
32see, for example, The Economist, August 29, 1891, 1106-07. 
33Frewen, "The National Policy of the United States, 11 
681,6830 
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they were right," but by then it might be too.late. It was 
already the eleventh hour, he said. Canada might still re-
spond to a British offer of a common tariff. A few years 
later no such offer would be possiblea34 
The British Government had no intention of offering 
Canada fiscal change cf any kind. Left to her.own devices, 
Canada opened negotiations with the United States with a view 
toward establishing reciprocity under the provisions of the 
McKinley Act. The discussions did not go well,35 but never-
theless the British were deeply concerned. "It is not plea-
sant," The Times editorialized, "to contemplate the possi-
bility that, under protective tariffs of increasing stringency, 
our colonial trade may slip from us and the political alle-
giance of our colonial fellow-subjects may be gradually bro-
ken down. 11 36 
In June, 1892, the Congress of Chambers of Commerce of 
the Empire met in London. The first question raised for dis-
cussion was: "Commercial relations of the mother country with 
her colonies and possessions, with special regard to the renewal 
of European treaties, and recent commercial legislation in the 
United States." During the discussion of this question, Sir 
Charles Tupper, spokesman for the Canadians, proposed that a 
preferential duty not to exceed 5% be levied by the Imperial 
34Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 911-13. 
35The Times, February 17, 1892! 5. 
36The Times, leading article, April 27, 1892, 9. 
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and Colonial governments against certain foreign articles "in 
order to extend the exchange and consumption of the home 
staple products in every part of the Empireo"3? Tupper re-
minded the delegates "that France and the United States had 
made marvellous progress under a protective policy." He at-
tempted to win them over to his proposal for imperial prefer-
ence by damning the McKinley Act, not as a protective measure, 
but as an enormous "wrong to this country [Great Britain] as 
well as to Canada." It was part of an American effort, he said, 
to expand the Monroe Doctrine, "to undermine our national 
position, and establish one Government from the Equator to 
the Pole." Tupper further noted the many thousands of Bri-
tish subjects who annually emigrated to the United States, 
where, in order to become citizens, they had to "renounce for-
ever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, poten-
tate, state or sovereignty whatever_, and particularly to the 
Queen of England." Had there been in existence such a system 
of preferential tariffs as he was advocating, Tupper claimed, 
the largest number of these emigrants would have gone to Can-
ada, to the benefit not only of Canada but of the empire gen-
erally. 38 
Tupper's attempt to arouse feelings of loyalty to the 
empire against the aggressive designs of the United States 
was received unsympathetically by a majority of the chambers 
3?charles Tupper, "The Question of Preferential Tariffs," 
Fortnightli, LII n.s. (August, 1892), 139-40. 
3Sibid., i41-43. 
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represented at the Congress. 39 Canada was nearly alone in 
being vitally concerned with increasing inter-colonial trade. 
Whereas the largest portion of the trade of the other parts 
of the Empire was already imperial, only forty-seven percent 
of Canadian trade was imperial; most of the remainder was with 
the United States. To many delegates at the Congress, Tup-
per's proposal seemed to be a request for them to tax them-
selves .for the benefit of Canada. For this reason The Econo-
~ predicted the failure of the Tupper proposa1. 40 When the 
vote came, it was defeated fifty-five chambers against thirty-
three. 41 Even The Times, though it too was concerned that 
the McKinley Tariff had been designed to alienate Canadian 
trade and loyalty from Britain, and though it hailed the 
Canadian proposal as "a most encouraging sign of loyalty and 
good will," had to warn the Canadians that "we could not for 
a moment think of establishing a differential tariff for the 
advantage of the Canadians alone. 1142 
Thus rebuffed, the Canadia.ns had to learn to :ii ve with 
the situation brought about by the McKinley Tariff. She con-
tinued, as The Times and others had encouraged her to do, to 
work on a program of economic expansion which would lead to 
39Though Englishmen such as Frewen and Jennings, and the 
Fair Traders generally, were enthusiastic supporters of a pol-
icy such as the one proposed by Tupper, the Chambers of Com-
merce, and especially those in Britain, tended to be strong-
holds of Free Trade. , 
40The Eco1iomist, July 2, 1892, 852-53. 
41Tupper, "The Question of Preferential Tariffs," 143. 
42 -The Times, leading article, April 27, 1892, 9. 
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increased imperial and other global trade relations. Canada 
spanned the continent with a railroad to connect her with 
Australia and Asiaq She established steamship service in the 
Atlantic and Pacific and planned for a large mercantile mar-
ine, the object of which could only be non-American trade. 
Furthermore, the Canadian Parliament took up the discussion 
of a system of tariff reductions which would be more favorable 
to British than to American trade. 43 
In the meantime, however, the Ca:aadian aspect of the 
American challenge continued. Despite all the talk, all the 
proposals, and the various attempts of the Canadian government, 
the facts remained: the United States had grown considerably 
faster in population, j_n wealth, in industry and commerce than 
Britain's North American Dominion; and, while Britain was 
anxious about the growth of her foreign trade, the Americans 
were increasingly outstripping them in the Canadian market. 
As 1h_e Economist had predicted, the effect of the McKin-
ley Tariff was to increase Anglo-Canadian trade. But the 
increase occurred almost exclusively in Canadian exports to 
England. British exports to Canada remained virtually sta-
tionary, while those of the United States continued to rise: 44 
Canadian Imports, Fiscal Year Ending June 30 
1890 1§2..1 1896 From 
-Great Britain 8,678,000 
10,448,000 
8,630,000 
11,644,000 
6,595,948 
11,714,804 United States 
43The Times, leading article, March 28, 1894, 7. 
44The Economist, April ?, 1894, 422-23. 
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Total Canadian Imports Supplied45 
·1868-72 1878-82 1888-92 1895-96 
Great Britain 
United States 
55046 44.03 37.51 27.94 
35.08 46.18 46046 49.63 
No doubt the British exports continued to include a larger 
proportion of manufactured goods, but there was no doubt 
either that American competition in the Canadian market was 
real. The depression of 1893 had caught American textile 
manufacturers at full capacity operation. Despite drastic 
price cuts, there still were no buyers to be found in the 
American market. Subsequently there were widespread Canadian 
and British complaints "of the invasion of the Canadian market 
by American cottons at cut prices. 1146 
In 1887 Sir Charles Tupper had begun an ambitious program 
to foster the Canadian iron and steel industry by enacting 
heavy duties on imports and paying bounties to Canadian pro-
ducers. 47 In 1890 the Canadian demand for foreign iron and 
steel was still great and The Economist predicted that, as a 
result of the McKinley Tariff, Britain could expect to replace 
the United States as Canada's major source of supply. 48 But 
neither the Canadian dream of self-sufficiency nor the British 
45The Economist, September 1, 1894, 1072; for the last 
set of figures November 28, 1896, 1571. Such figures appeared 
in many other places as well; see, for example, Michael G • 
.Mulhall, "The Trade of the British Colonies," Contemporarz, 
LXXII (Noyember, 1897), 702-03. 
46The Economist, June 16, 1894, 737-38. 
47The Economist, July 24, 189?, 1058. 
48
see Part I. 
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hope of ousting the American supply was realized. In 1896 
British exports of iron and steel to Canada amounted to 
$3,150,000 and those of the United States $6,450,000. The 
Canadian system of protecting and subsidizing the domestic 
iron industry had actually served to give foreign manufac-
turers an advantage. The Canadian industry, located in Nova 
Scotia, could not economically ship its product to manufac-
turing centers in Toronto and elsewhere, Thus, Canadian 
agricultural implement makers, for example, had to pay more 
for thej.r ra.w material either through very high transport 
costs for Canadian iron or through the duty imposed on impor-
ted iron. Neither the Canadian iron industry nor Canadian 
manufacturers who required iron or steel as raw material 
were in a position to withstand American competitiono 49 
In addition to subsidizing her iron and steel industry, 
Canada had also subsidized the petroleum industry for many 
years and at great cost, on the grounds that it "would succU1llb 
at once if exposed to free American competition." In 1897 
Standard Oil was preparing to disrupt the Canadian industry 
just as it had for many years prior to this been disrupting 
the Scotch oil industry. Standard Oil was planning to estab-
lish a refinery in Canada and, according to the Canadian 
correspondent of The Economist, it'~ill make short work of 
the Canadian refineries, which," he complained, "might as 
well have been killed by free-trade in oil as by the competition 
49The Economist, July 24, 1897, 1058. 
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within Canada of that vast monopoly."50 
By 1897 there was widespread discontent with Canada's 
economic system among all parties and on both sides of the 
Atlantic. American goods continued to pour into Canada to 
the detriment of Canadian and British manufacturers. The 
invasion of Canada by Standard Oil dramatically symbolized 
the increasing hold on Canadian industries by Americans. 
The population of the United States continued to increase at 
an amazing rate which made the growth of Canadian population 
seem meager by comparison. The Canadian census of 1891 showed 
an increase of less than 12% whereas in the previous decade 
(1871-1881) the population had doubled. The Economist thought 
it very evident that there had been a consistent and serious 
leakage of Canadians into the United States.51 This trend 
continued throughout the 1890s. "To the counterattractions 
of the United States cheap living is the great advantage 
Canada could offer," The Economist believed, but since her 
unwise protective policies denied that to her people "she 
need not be surprised that, owing to a constant leakage over 
the United States border, her population grows with such slow-
ness.1152 
The Economist _maintained a critical attitude toward the 
Canadian tariff throughout the 1890s. In a lengthy assessment 
50ibid. For the competition between Standard Oil and the 
Scotch oil industry, see Chapter IX. 
5lThe Economist, August 29, 1891, 1106-07. 
52The Economist, September 1, 1894, 1072. 
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offered by its local correspondent in 1895, The Economist 
pointed out that the Canadian tariff had been adopted in 1879 
to force the United States to open its markets to Canadian 
products, to improve the balance of trade, to stimulate manu-
facturing, and to stop the exodus of British subjects to the 
United States. It had accomplished not a single one of these 
objectives, the correspondent concluded. The United States 
was even more the nemesis in 1895 than it had been in 1879. 
The tariff had raised the cost of living in Canada, had led 
to inefficiency and the formation of trusts, and had produced 
no solid growth.53 Moreover, the Canadian tariff actually 
discriminated against Britain, The Economist charged. It 
allowed many .American semi-manufactures to enter free of duty 
as raw materials for Canadian industry. British manufacturers 
had to pay heavy duties to get their goods into Canada and, 
once there, these goods had to comp8te with articles which 
were half the product of Canadian and half the product of 
American industry.54 British prospects in Canada were grim 
in 1897· "It is evident," The Times admitted, "that Canada 
purchases most of her manufactured goods .from the United 
States."55 And Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who only recently had 
been elected Canadian premier, said in a speech at Montreal 
that the United States had virtually captured Canadian trade.56 
702. 
53The Economist, July 20, 1895, 943-45. 
54The Economist, December 12, 1896, 1642. 
55The Times, May 15, 1897, 5. 
56Reported in Mulhall, "The Trade of' the British Colonies," 
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Laurier's Liberal Party had consistently favored closer com-
mercial relations with the United States. Once ele~ted, his 
first act was to send representatives to Washington to nego-
tiate for the free exchange of a long list of items. But, 
"owing in part to a belief, which Mr. Blaine did something 
to create, that Canada can be starved into annexation, Con-
gress refused to let down the bars." According to The Econo-
mist, the Republican response to this Laurier initiative was 
the Dingley Tariff .57 Faced with such new and strong evidence 
of American commercial hostility, the Liberal Government 
decided to offer tariff reciprocity to all well-disposed 
nations. In a further about-face, the Liberals granted imme-
diate trade preference to Britain. British imports were given 
a 12.5% reduction of duties to June 30, 1898 and thereafter 
a 25% reduction.58 
In most quarters there was a sensible respect for the 
limitations of such a policy insofar as any major change in 
the relativ8 positions of Britain and the United States was 
concerned. Mulhall, for example, warned that any hope for 
large increases of British exports were "doomed to disappoint-
ment." America's manufacturing ability, added to its geo-
graphic proximity, meant that the trade between these neigh-
bors "must go on increasing in strength and volume year after 
year. 11 59 The Canadian correspondent of The Economist believed 
57The Economist, July 24, 1897, 1059. 
58The Economist, May 1, 1897, 635-36. 
59Mulhall, "The Trade of the British Colonies," 703. 
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that the new system would prove to be of little advantage to 
Britain's basic industries. He chose not even to mention the 
possibility of increased British textile shipments but rather 
the necessity for the Americans and Germans to cut their 
prices if they wished to keep the trade. As for iron and 
steel he offered no hope at all: 
It is not likely that the reduction of one-fourth 
of the duties in favour of iron and steel from the 
United Kingdom will have the effect of transferring much 
trade from American to British manufacturers. The for-
mer are selling as cheap as any of their ccmpetitors. 
This spring the Canadian Pacific bought from the Car-
negie Company 65,000 tons of steel rails for its new 
road through the Crow's Neet Pass at a price lower 
than the lowest ever paid to British makers. The 
United State3, indeed, has been cutting out England 
in this market in almost the entire range of iron 
and steel goods.60 
Yet, as l"Iulhall pointed out, many British manufacturers 
and merchants did in fact expect a sizeable increase of Bri-
. 61 
tish exports to Canada. The Canadian correspondent of The 
Economist anticipated considerable growth in Canadian demand 
for a wide range of British products. 62 "The immediate point" 
of the new tariff policy claimed The Times, "is that Canada 
has decided to shift her main market from the United States 
to the United Kingdom. 1163 
There was, then, in 189?, some hope expressed both in 
Great Britain and in Canada that the American takeover of the 
60The Economist, July 24, 1897, 1059. 
61Mulhall, "The Trade of the British Colonies," ?03. 
62The Economist, July 24, 1897, 1059 • 
. 
63The Times, leadipg article, April 26, 1897, 9. 
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Canadian market might be at least halted if it could not be 
checked altogether. Time was to prove even these limited 
hopes false. 
r 
CHAPTER VIII 
RECIPROCITY AND AMERICAN COMPETITION IN LATIN AMERICA 
The Americans were looking to the south as well as to 
the north in 1890. If growing American influence in Canada 
--the virtual'~mericanization" of the Dominion some would have 
said--attracted attention in the British press, so did Ameri-
can attempts to gain footholds in the markets of Central and 
South America and of the Caribbean. The two movements were 
in fact related. Both Canada and Latin America were affected, 
though in different ways, by the American reciprocity policy. 
Both were, therefore, elements of that "McKinleyism" which 
the British saw as driving them out of certain sectors of the 
American market, disrupting key British industries, and per-
haps posing a threat to British mar.itime supremacy. Particu-
larly in the two years following the passage of the McKinley 
Act, Amer·ican commercial forays into Latin America competed 
for British attention with the other elements of "McKinleyism." 
By 1893 British fears of the effects of American reciprocity 
had diminished considerably--though the case of the British 
West Indies was an important exception. Yet what reciprocity 
could not accomplish American industrial growth often could. 
In a number of their traditional Latin American markets the 
British faced increasing American competition between 1890 
and 189?. 
287 
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In their 1892 campaign in England, both Henry Trueman 
Wood and Robert McCormick emphasized that the cultivation of 
Latin American markets for American manufacturers was one of 
the principal objectives of the Chicago Exhibition. Though 
McCormick also stressed that the completion of an Isthmian 
canal would encourage American trade with Central America and 
give New York a great advantage O'rer Liverpool in reaching 
the Pacific ports of Latin America, he could point to present 
as well as prospective competition. American manufacturers, 
he noted, "encouraged and aided by the opportunities afforded 
them by the Treaties of Reciprocity," were already entering 
South America in significant quantities and English and Ger-
man importers in Brazil were sending to the United States 
for their merchandise since a reciprocity treaty had been 
signed between the United States and Brazilo 1 It was this 
reminder of the reciprocity clause of the McKinley Act which 
had prompted the British journal, Engineering, to repeat its 
assertion that "the United States Government is making a care-
.fully organized attack upon our South American trade. 112 But 
the strongest statement in the British press on American 
reciprocity came from another visitor to England in 1892. 
Sir Charles Tupper, who presented the Canadian proposal for 
preferential tariffs within the Empire, which itself was 
chiefly a reaction to "McKinleyism," gave British readers 
1McCormic~, Future Trade Relations, 22. 
2Quoted ~., 28. 
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this picture of the Americans: 
Like a great octupus they threw their tentacles over 
South America, the Antilles, and the West Indian 
Islands, with the intention of driving out British 
trade. And they are going to do it. Read the lan-
guage of the British Consul in Brazil. What does 
he say? He tells the people of Great Britain, "You 
must make up your mind to lose the British t~ade in 
Brazil, because the United States has absorbed it 
under the reciprocity clause of the McKinley Bill."3 
Though it was the reciprocity feature of the McKinley 
Act which motivated much of the British interest in the fate 
of their Latin American markets in the early 189Cs, readers 
of the British press were well aware that the American search 
for Latin American markets had begun well before that Act 
had been passed. The Southern hemisphere of the New World 
was a focal point of the policies of Secretary of State 
James G. Blaine. "It becomes us," The Times quoted Blaine as 
saying in 1390, "to use every opportunity to extend our market 
on both American Continents. Our f·ield for commercial develop-
ment lies in the South. 114 Long before the McKinley Bill was 
passed, the Pan-American Congress, held in the United States 
in 1890, was dramatizing Blaine's and America's interest in 
the southern continent. The Pan-American Congress proposed 
a number of policies whose effect would be closer economic 
relations among the nations of the Americas. The Congress 
recommended, and according to The Times the United States 
would support, a plan calling for the coinage of a common 
3Tupper, "The Question of Preferential Tariffs," 141. 
4The Times, July 15, 1890, 5. 
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silver dollar to be used as legal tender among all the Ameri-
can nations. A related plan would have the United States 
issue certificates of deposit on bullion sent to the United 
States by the peoples of Central and South America.5 Presi-
dent Harrison sent to Congress Blaine's request for funds to 
pay the United States' share of the engineering survey for an 
international railway system to link together all parts of 
North and South America. The Senate Commerce Committee re-
ported favorably on a bill providing more than $6,000,000 for 
t~e construction of a deep-water port at Galveston, Texas, 
to facilitate trade with the southern hemisphereo 6 Such ac-
tivities as these, when coupled with the reciprocity policy, 
were sufficient to arouse considerable anxiety in England. 
Blaine had authorized the United States delegates to 
introduce a discussion of reciprocity at the Pan-American 
Congress. The Congress responded by adopting a report which 
favored such treaties among all the American Republics.7 
During the acrimonious debates in Congress over the McKinley 
Bill, the American correspondent of The Economist had reported 
that the strong protectionists, who disliked reciprocity, 
might eventually include a reciprocity clause in the Bill as 
5The Times, March 4, 1890, 5. 
6The Times, May 21, 1890, 5; February 19, 1890, 5. 
7The Times, March 29, 1890, 5; April 12, 1890, 7. Not 
all the Latin American nations were enthusiastic supporters 
of the work of the Congress; there was substantial anti-
Blaine feeling in Latin America. Argentina, Chile, and Para-
guay cast r,egative votes on the reciprocity report; ibid.; 
see also July 15, 1890, 8. 
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a sop to Blaine and other moderates but that it would be a 
sop which the protectionist majority had no intentions of 
implementing. 8 Once the McKinley Act was law, however, it 
soon became clear that the reciprocity clause was not going 
to be a dead letter. In February, 1891, the United States 
signed a reciprocity treaty with Brazil, one of Britain's 
more important Latin American customers. Similar negotia-
tions were soon under way with Spain (on behalf of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico), the British West Indies, and several of the 
Latin American nations. 
By the terms of the United States-Brazilian treaty, the 
Americans could send into Brazil, duty-free, not only a vari-
ety of foodstuffs and other natural products but also arti-
cles competitive with British exports: coal, farm implements, 
tools, machinery, and railway equipment. Many other items 
entered Brazil at a 25% reduction of duty.9 No sooner had 
the treaty been signed than three American steamers left for 
Brazil with exhibits of American goods. By 1892 the Brazil-
ian Steamship Company, which formerly had scheduled only 
three ships a month between Brazil and the United States, was 
sending fourteen and McCormick was claiming that English and 
German importers now received their merchandise from the 
United States. 10 A letter to The Times complained about 
8 The Economist, October 4, 1890, 1264. 
9The text of the treaty appeared in The Times, February 
?, 1891, 5; see also the issue of February 12, 1891, 5. 
lOThe Times, February 18, 1891, 5; McCormick, Future 
Trade Relations, 22. 
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"the exceptional favour shown to the United States in this 
matter to the detriment of England, the principal creditor 
of Brazil," and expressed surprise and dismay that there 
had not been a great outburst of public indignation in 
11 England. 
The letter was premature. Soon the British press was 
full of commentary on the treaty and speculations regarding 
the negotiations currently taking pla~e. Andrew Carnegie 
warned British readers that all Europe would become concerned 
over the reciprocity provision of the McKinley Act and with 
good reason. "Hereafter," he wrote, :rthe American farmer 
has a better market in Brazil for hi.s grain, and the Ameri-
can manufacturer has a new market for his products, his for-
eign competitor being subject to duties upon similar articles 
twenty-five per cent. higher than he." The treaty with Bra-
zil, Carnegie continued, was only the beginning. The Presi-
dent had publicly stated "that othe1·s are to follow, and • • • 
the products of the United States • • • are to find free or 
favored access to the ports of many of these South and Cen-
tral American States." Carnegie offered British readers the 
example of Cuba. No sooner had the McKinley Act been passed 
than she was clamoring for reciprocity with the United States. 
"Cuba," he insisted, "will hereafter be of as little good to 
Spain as Canada is to Britain. 1112 
1111Amigo.De Brazil," letter to The Times, February 25, 
1891, 4. 
12carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1030-31. 
293 
The Spectator, which denied also that the Canadians 
would show any interest in reciprocity, had been so bold as 
to claim that "Mr. Blaine's South American policy, which 
aimed at securing the whole trade of the Southern Continent 
by the differential duties authorised in the Tariff Act, has 
gone to the winds." It thus set itself up for attack by 
L. J. Jennings, who made a career of contesting those who 
minimized the American threat. As Jennings pointed out, no 
sooner had the Spectator forecast the failure of reciprocity 
than there came the announcement that Brazil had signed a 
treaty with the United States. The truth, according to Jen-
nings, was that 
The United States are making persistent efforts to 
form a new commercial federation in their own favour, 
to embrace the Nhole of the continent on which their 
destinies have been cast •••• They have it within 
their power to offer very great advantages to the 
South American Republics and to Canada to induce them 
to enter into an arrangement by which the productions 
of the United States shall be taken upon exceptional 
terms, and England, among other powers, be further 
handicapped in the race. The South American Republics 
will in due season enter into this arrangement, and 
we shall find our trade with Brazil, Peru, Honduras, 
the Argentine Republic, and other countries greatly 
reduced. 
There was more involved even than the loss of American trade, 
Jennings warned; there was the danger that British colonies 
would "drift off into commercial unions with other nations. 1113 
The Economist described the treaty as "important not 
only in itself, but also as an example of the methods by 
which Secretary Blaine is endeavouring to secure to the United 
13Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 904, 
907, 901. 
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States a predominant trade position in Mexico and the South 
American Republics." First, it pointed out, the tariff reduc-
tions which the United States received helped to offset the 
American disadvantage of high-cost production under a protec-
tive system. Secondly, Blaine was challenging Britain's 
chief advantages, financial and shipping supremacy, by cre-
ating a.n international bank of the American Republics and by 
subsidizing steamship service. Though The Economist was 
rather sceptical of the success of the reciprocity scheme, it 
conceded that it should "be watched with much interest, not 
only as affecting our trade with Brazil, but also as an ex-
periment" which Blaine intended to extend to the other Ameri-
can states at the earliest opportunity. 14 In a pair of let-
ters to The Economist, a protectionist pointed out still 
another danger. "We are about the see the custom of one of 
our most important colonial possessions [Canada] transferred" 
to the United States unless Britain takes special steps to 
prevent it and the West Indies and the South American Republics 
will be offered proposals such as the one which Brazil already 
accepted. But the most serious disadvantage for Britain is 
that the American policy of reciprocity "means that we are to 
be deprived for the future of all chance of obtaining 'most 
favoured nation treatment' in the markets of the world. 111 5 
This last statement was not quite correct. One of the 
14The Economist, MTS, March, 1891, 4. 
l5William J. Harris, letters to The Economist, March 28, 
1891, 409-10; April 18, 1891, 503-0LJ.. . 
r 
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factors which kept the British from panicking.in the face of 
American reciprocity was the fact that Britain already had a 
most favored nation treaty with every state of the South 
American continent except Brazil. Every concession which 
Blaine obtained for American products in these countries 
would be shared by the British. Thus when Spain signed a 
reciprocity treaty with the United States under which certain 
American goods entered Cuba and Puerto Rico at preferential 
rates, British goods were automatically granted identical 
reductions. 16 Two factors, however, marred this otherwise 
favorable situation for Britain. The first was that Britain's 
commercial treaty with Spain was due to expire in mid-1892. 
There was concern that Spanish efforts to retain favorable 
trade relations between her Caribbean possessions and the 
United States might be an obstacle to Britain's retention 
of most-favored-nation-treatment in the Spanish West Indies. 
In 1891 The Economist began urging interested British mer-
chants and Manufacturers to let the British Government know 
that they were keenly interested in renewing the existing 
treaty with Spain intact. 17 
The second factor was that American reciprocal trade 
relations with such producers of tropical products as Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and Brazil put the British West Indies at a 
disastrous disadvantage, for the United States had been by 
16The Economist, MTS, March, 1891, 4; The Times, April 
18, 1891, 7; September 9, 1891, 7; The Economist, September 
19, 1891, 1202-03. 
17The Economist, September 19, 1891, 1202-03. 
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far their most important customer. As The Times pointed out, 
once the United States gave preference to sugar from other 
areas, "the West Indian planters are manifestly given a 
strong reason for the acceptance of close trading relations 
with the States. 1118 There was considerable agitation in the 
British West Indies for reciprocity with the United States, 
even though Canada also was considering a reciprocal arrange-
ment with the Indies. The Economist advised the West Indians 
to come to terms with Canada, for "it will serve no good pur-
pose to encourage expectations of reciprocal trade arrange-
ments of an exclusive character between the British West 
India Colonies and the United States." Such an arrangement 
was most undesirable from the British point of view since it 
"would make the economic and fiscal systems of these colonies 
dependent upon that of the United States • • • a condition of 
dependence of this nature would not be for the general and 
ultimate welfare of the colonies. 1119 West Indian planters 
spurned this advice and put considerable pressure on the 
British Government to negotiate with Washington. A treaty 
was worked out in 1892 but it never received the final appro-
val of the British Government and was not implementedo 20 The 
plight of the British West Indies grew continually worse. By 
1897, as we will see later, this British possession was in 
very dire straits. 
18The Times, leading article, January 2, 1891, 7. 
l9The Economist, MTS, July, 1891, 4o 
20The Times, February 2, 1892, 6. 
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Like the McKinley Act of which it was a part, the reci-
procity clause provoked considerable discussion during the 
months after it became operative. By 1892, however, there 
was evidence that it was not the boon to American trade it 
was expected to be. Early in the year Sir Michael Hicks-Beach 
told the Association of Chambers of Commerce that, though 
some success had attended the American reciprocity treaty 
with Brazil, Britain shared in the gains obtained by the 
United States elsewhere. Furthermore, the value of the con-
cessions which the United States could make diminished with 
each treaty that was signed. "It is hardly likely, therefore," 
he said, "that the new tariff policy of the States will have 
any marked effect upon our trade, and, indeed, any beating 
down of tariff barriers to which it may lead is more likely 
to be a gain than a loss to us. 1121 Reciprocity policy com-
prised the bulk of the annual report for 1892 of the United 
States Secretary of the Treasury, which The Economist analysed 
for its readers. American exports to countries which had 
signed reciprocity treaties did increase, from.fl8,367,000 in 
1891 to i"22,521,000 in 1892. But it was the increase of 
American imports from these same nations (fromj'-52,929,000 
to i69,788,000) which The Economist considered most signifi-
cant. The increases were largely in commodities which the 
Unitad States did not produce and which would have been im-
ported under any circumstances, it maintained. "In effect, 
21~Economist, MTS, March, 1892, 5. 
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then, [Secretary] Fester maintains that Brazil and Cuba have 
gained nothing by the treaties, and have been beguiled into 
making tariff concessions to the States, for which they 
obtain no return. 1122 
A number of Latin American governments apparently sha~ed 
The Economist's view of reciprocity. The British Consul 
reported that the Ecuadorian Government, after consultation 
with the Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce, was "decidedly adverse" 
to reciprocity with the United States on the grounds that 
benefits would be slight while concessions to the United 
States would too greatly reduce governmental customs revenue. 
Venezuela rejected reciprocity for the same reasons. Even 
Brazil quickly became dissatisfied. The American-Spanish 
treaty had ~ade Spanish colonial sugar competitive with Bra-
zilian sugar in the United States. Industrialists and impor-
ters were also unhappy and Brazil sought to renegotiate its 
treaty in 1893. 23 From 1893 onward, the British press ignored 
American re~iprocity for the most part. The relations of the 
United States with Latin America received editorial attention 
only when an international crisis occurred, as was the case 
when the Anglo-Venezuelan controversy provoked American 
intervention and the Olney Doctrine. On such occasions the 
British press did not make much of the economic issues 
involved, though the observation of a Chilean newspaper is 
22The Economist, December 24, 1892, 1607-080 
23The Economist, MTS, April, 1892, 10; The Times, July 
2'1:, 1891;'5: The Economist, MTS;, January, 1893, 9. 
r ;, 
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pertinent here. During the Venezuelan crisis it warned Latin 
American nations that they would gain nothing by throwing 
themselves into the arms of the United States, for they would 
simply become "new centres of exploitation for the great 
country whose diplomacy is merely an auxiliary or its mercan-
tile enterprises. 1124 
Whatever the success of the American reciprocity policy, 
it was clear to those who followed the consular and other 
trade reports which appeared in the British press, particu-
larly in The Economist, that the Americans were in fact in-
creasing their manufactured exports to Latin America during 
the 1890s. 25 In the Brazilian market much of this new compe-
tition was rightfully attributed to reciprocity. The treaty 
of 1891 admitted into Brazil, free of duty, a long list of 
manufactures, the most important of which were: agricultural 
tools, implements, and machinery; m~ning and mechanical tools, 
implements, machinery, and engines; all machinery for manufac-
turing and industrial purposes except sewing machines; and 
railway equipment and construction material. Other manufac-
tures were admitted with a 25% reduction of duty including: 
cotton goods; iron and steel products not on the free list; 
24The Valparaiso Chileno, quoted in The Times, January 
28, 1896, 10. 
25statements to the contrary, though rare, occasionally 
appeared. During the Venezuelan crisis one writer insisted 
that the United States was losing Latin American trade because 
of shortsig~-ited business methods--a critic ism more frequently 
applied to the British--and lack of shipping; H. Somers Somer-
set, "Great Britain, Venezuela, and the United States,"~­
teenth Century, XX.XVIII (December, 1895), 768. 
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leather manufactures except boots and shoes; and all wood and 
rubber manufactures. 26 The Rio News confidently remarked 
that a 25% reduction of duty just about equalised the cost 
of British and American goods in Brazil. "Mr. Blaine," it 
said, "will have to conjure up something beside a reduction 
of 25 per cent. on dutie3 before he can turn the tide of 
importation in South America from England to the United 
States. 1127 The response in England was much less optimistic. 
The danger to British trade with Brazil was discussed in the 
House of Commons. The Manchester Chamber of Coffimerce be-
lieved the treaty would be particularly detrimental to Man-
chester industries and requested that the Prime Minister, 
Lord Salisbury, receive a deputation to discuss the matter. 28 
This British concern was understandable. Between 1888 
and 1890 the United States supplied only about 9% of Brazil's 
imports. Britain supplied more than 50%. In 1889 British 
exports to Brazil were valued at cf6,232,000 and it was esti-
mated that two-thirds of that would face American competition 
as a result of the reciprocity treaty. In 1889 fritain sent 
cil,182,500 worth of coal, machinery, tools, and implements to 
Brazil, where they then paid a duty ranging from 5% to 48%0 
The United States obtained in 1891 the right to send competing 
goods duty~free. In 1889 Britain sentof3,514,900 worth of 
26The Economist, February 21, 1891, 243. 
27Quoted in The Economist, March 7, 1891, 307. 
Rio newspaper bore an English title, it is possible 
represented the interests of the English mercantile 
that cityo 
28Ibido 
Since the 
that it 
class in 
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cotton goods, iron and steel manufactures, and rubber and 
leather products (except boots and shoes); these paid duties 
ranging from 15% to 50%. The United States could export com-
peting goods at a 25% reduction of duty. 29 At least a few 
AMerican industries quickly reaped the benefits of the treaty. 
In 1891 Brazil was one of the major purchasers of American 
locomotives, buying£367,557 worth. 30 In 1894 a British 
· consul in Brazil pointed out that one of the most significant 
results of the treaty was that "American shirtings, sheetings, 
and plain cotton goods are gradually supplanting, to some 
extent, similar articles of British manufacture, owing to the 
difference :.n duty." In finer quaiity goods, though, the 
British were holding their own.31 
Argentina was another major British marketo In 1890, 
the last year of the Argentine "boom," the United Kingdom wo.s 
Argentina's leading source of imports, sending $ (Gold) 
61,217,504 worth. The United States ranked fifth, sending 
$ (Gold) 9,307,315 worth. In the latter part of 1890 occurred 
the financial crisis which led to the Baring collapse and 
drastically curtailed Argentine imports for a number of years. 
This, however, did not prevent the United States from gaining 
29The Economist, MTS, March, 1891, 4. 
30McCo~mick, Future Trade Relations, 22. 
3lThe Economist, MTS, August, 1894, 7. Surprisingly, 
after 1891 The Economist failed to publish comparative figures 
for Brazilian imports as it did for those of many other coun-
tries. Brazilian imports of American hardware increased also, 
but not as rapidly as those from England and Germany; The 
Economist, MTS, January, 1893, 9. ~ 
r 
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on Britain as an Argentine supplier. In 1890 American ship-
ments were between one-sixth and one-seventh of the value of 
British shipments; in 1891 the proportion slipped to less 
than one-eighth. By 1896 the American position had been 
considerably improved. In that year Argentine imports from the 
United Kingdom were valued at $ (Gold) 44,730,000 and those 
from the United States at $ (Gold) 11,210,000.32 
The only other reported American competition in South 
America occurred in Colombia. Between 1888 and 1890 British 
exports to Colombia exceeded American by a margin of about 
four to one. The British were far ahead of the United States 
in supplying many of the items in which the United States 
could compete, but the figures for 1891 showed that the Amer-
icans had a commanding lead in shipments of coal (978o2 tons 
to Britain's 6.5) and of glassware (53.8 tons to Britain's 
3.3).33 
In the Caribbean the British also faced increasingly 
serious American competition. The reciprocity treaty between 
Santo Domingo and the United States conferred such advantages 
on American products, according to the British Vice-Consul 
in 1892, "that a serious prejudice is expected to be derived 
by British and other foreign trade, which is deprived of the 
same advantages." Though Britain had the right to most-favored-
nation treatment, the Dominican Government had not made any 
32The Economist, MTS, March, 1891, ?; May 13, 1893, 569-
70; April 3, 1897, 487-89. 
33The Economist, MTS, January, 1892, 9-10; MTS, March, 
1893, 7. 
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of the new concessions available to Britain. As a result, 
the British official said, British trade was suffering and 
the introduction of several articles which were 
solely imported from British markets, such as 
galvanised iron and hardware, hav(e] come to a 
standstill. It would be too extensive to mention 
all the articles of British manufacture which cannot 
compete with American merchandise on account of the 
privileges which are enjoyed by the lattero34 
In 1893 the British Consul-General of Hayti reported 
that during the preceding few years the United States had "to 
an important degree" replaced Britain as the supplier of 
certain classes of dry goods. The American articles, he 
said, were preferred for their softer finish and more lasting 
colors. Despite the fact that British merchants granted more 
lenient credit terms than their American rivals, the importa-
tion of American goods had been increasing greatly for several 
years.35 
Between 1886 and 1892 Britain had enjoyed most-favored-
nation status in all the Spanish colonies and had success-
fully competed with the United States in Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
But then, not long after Spain had accepted reciprocity with 
the United States for her West Indian possessions, she had 
denounced her commercial treaty with Britain and proposed a 
new one. Under its terms, The Economist complained, England 
would''have to abandon all hope of being placed on the same 
footing as the United States in Cuba and Puerto Rico. II By 
34The Economist, MTS, May, 1892, 9. 
35The Economist, MTS, July, 1893, 7o 
r 
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1893 The Times could declare that "the effect of the [recipro-
city] treaty has been to throw the entire Cuban trade into 
the hands of the United States merchants, with whom the impor-
ters of goods from less-favoured nations cannot competeo" 
It was universally believed "that the treaty gives the United 
States the command of the ~achinery and metal imports of 
Cuba" and stimulated the American export of all items enumer-
ated in the treaty. The European trade with Cuba in these 
items, it said, "is fast disappearing. 11 36 
As in the case of South America and the Caribbean, infor-
mation in the British press regardir.g American competition 
in Central America was scattered and fragmentary and most 
apparent in the early 1890s. In 1892 the British Government 
issued a series of Consular Reports on the decline of British 
trade with Central America. In Guatemala British sales re-
mained level while imports from America, Germany, and France 
were increasing. This "successful competition" was ascribed 
in part to the saleability of inferior goods at lower prices; 
but it was also noted that the American and German merchants 
had close connections with their home firms, better advertis-
ing and more efficient salesmen. In Guatemala the competition 
was chiefly in hardware, tools, drugs and pharmaceuticals.37 
In El Salvador, which in 1889 had purchased nearly twice as 
much from Britain as from the United States (~141,831 v • .;(80,033) 
36The Economist, June 17, 1893, 723-24; The Times, August 
5, 1893-;--5. 
37The Economist, MTS, February, 1892, 9. 
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imports of British cottons, silks, earthenware, glassware, and 
hardware were declining. Imports from America, Germany and 
France were on the increase.38 In Costa Rica the United States 
and Germany were taking from Britain some of the trade in hard-
ware and in cotton goods. The sale of large quantities of 
American railway materials to Costa Rica elevated the United 
States to the position of Costa Rica's chief supplier. Bri-
tain, however, regained first place in 1893.39 The Consular 
Reports also showed that Honduras was importing fewer British 
goods while the United States and Germany competed for the 
trade in dry goods, cutlery, prints, and boots and shoes. By 
1894 the United States had made great inroads on the British 
trade with Honduras in iron products; American edge tools and 
. . h. . 11 f 1 40 mining mac inery were espec1a y success u • 
Not surprisingly, American competition with Britain in 
Mexico received more frequent and consistent attention than 
American competition in other Latin American markets. In 
this market the United States had not only the advantage of 
proximity and suffered less from the lack of an adequate mer-
chant marine, but the number of British commercial houses 
there had dwindled after diplomatic relations between the two 
nations were severed in 1867 and the British had been slow in 
re-establishing them. British exports to Mexico had remained 
38The Economist, 
9. 
MTS, July, 1890, 8· 
' 
MTS, February, 1892, 
39The Economist, MTS, February, 1892, 9; June 10, 1893, 694. 
40The Economist, MTS, February, 1892, 9; MTS, June, 1894, 8. 
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virtually stationary since then, reported a British Consul, 
"while those of American goods have increased so notably." 
He noted that the sale of English agricultural and industrial 
machinery was increasing, "but mining machinery is almost in-
variably bought from the United States, partly because it is 
cheap, and, as a general rule, well suited to the requirements 
of the country, and partly because orders can be filled there 
quicker than if sent to Europe." There was still another fac-
tor, one worth quoting for it exemplified a very widespread 
criticism of English commercial practices: 
the American manufacturers take more pains than the 
British to push the sale of their goods by sending 
elaborate price lists and estimates when required, 
and several of them have agents in the country who 
will, when called upon, visit mines free of charge, 
and report upon the class of machinery best adapted 
to the special local conditions.41 
In 1893 Britain's proportion of Mexican trade was~ill 
low, but the British Consul in Mexico thought he saw a number 
of openings for British goods; his recommendations illustrate 
the competition which prospective British exporters would 
have to face. He suggested that Britain might send more 
carriages and carts, which currently were being suppli°ed al-
most exclusively by the United States and France. English 
saddles, boots, and shoes he thought would do well for, though 
they were much more expensive than the prevailing American and 
French articles, they were also far superior. He saw no rea-
son why England could not compete in lamps, hardware, cutlery, 
tools, arms, and ammunition, which were being supplied by the 
41The Economist, MTS, November, 1891, 9o 
307 
42 United States and Germany. The Consul's hopes were by and 
large disappointed. During the mid-1890s the American pre-
ponderance in Mexico increased as the following figures show: 43 
Mexican Imports (.;{") 
_Fr~om~~~~~~~-1_8~9_4~~~~-1_8~9~5~~~F~i_;scal 1896 
Great Britain 1,226,096 1,378,215 1,581,003 
United States 2,693,751 3,243,502 4,029,152 
Of the various markets of the New World in 1897 only 
the Canadian was dominated by imports from the United States. 
Great Britain remained generally the preeminent supplier of 
the Latin American nations and in some of them she was over-
whelmingly predominant. But she was facing increasing rivalry 
from other industrial nations and by 1897 her fastest growing 
rival in some of the Latin American markets was the United 
States. 
42The Economist, MTS, March, 1893, 7; MTS, October, 1893, 
8-9. 
43The Economist, November 28, 1896, 1571; April 24, 1897, 
602. 
CHAPTER IX 
COMPETITION AROUND THE GLOBE 
Europe, Africa, and Asia 
Serious competition for industrial sales on the Conti-
nent was largely a matter between Great Britain and Germany. 
American exports to European countries, though, were by no 
means negligible. The United States, for example, was not 
far behind Britain as a supplier of German imports: 1 
German Imports (thousands of marks) 
From~--------~--1_8~9_2~--~-1_8_9~3~--~--18_9_4_ 
Great Britain 620,971 656,443 608,640 
United States 611,966 458,094 532,939 
During this period the United States improved its position, 
relative to that of Britain, as a supplier to France: 2 
From 
Great Britain 
United States 
French Imports (t) 
1890 
25,080,000 
12,680,000 
' 1896 
20,217,720 
12,430,160 
Even Spain, which had long-standing commercial ties with 
England, purchased substantial amounts of American goods. 
In 1889 her imports from Britain were valued at t;G,440,024; 
1The Economist, October 12, 1895, 1340-41. 
2The Economist, MTS, October, 1891, 7; February 20, 
189?, 275-76. 
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those from the United States were valued at ~4,081,876.3 
However, the silence of the British press on the significance 
of these figures would seem to indicate that a very substan-
tial portion of these American exports was comprised of non-
competitive natural products, particularly breadstuff$; the 
presumption is further supported by the frequent British 
statements to this effect which were discussed in Chapter VI. 
The only consistent American threat to British manufac-
tures in Eul·ope between 1890 and 1897 was that of agricul-
tural machinery. British Vice-Consuls at LaRochelle and at 
Nantes both reported concern over such competition in the 
early 1890s. Recent British strikes had driven up prices 
and, according to the former, 
the Americans have taken the opportunity to make a 
considerable reduction in their machines, which 
are equally good. The result can only be disas-
trous to our manufacturers, as the American price 
is now so much lower than the English that if it 
continues so all competition between the two will 
be at an end. 
The latter reported that the American machines were 
equal to English, but cost less, and it seems odd 
that the United States, where the protective duties 
are higher than in any other manufacturing country 
(a state of things which we are told should make the 
cost of production greater), is able to turn out 
these machines as good as English, send them 3,000 
miles, and sell them cheaper than we can. 
Both noted with dissatisfaction that British makers refrained 
from exhibiting at agricultural shows in France. The Ameri-
cans did participate. They won the prizes and they sold the 
3The Economist, February 21, 1891, 241. 
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In Russia the British faced similar competition. The 
British Consul at Rostov-on-Don, a major Russian emporium 
for agricultural machinery, reported that all the steam 
threshers sold there in 1889 were of British make~ The Ameri-
cans, however, supplied all the reapers, mowers, and hay-
rakes. Abundant harvests in 1894 greatly increased the Rus-
sian demand for agricultural machinery. The sale of English 
engines and steam threshers increased, but it was the Ameri-
cans who sold most of the reapers and binders and about half 
the drills. More than 2,000 American reapers were sold in 
the Kiev district alone. Some of the reasons for the increase 
of American sales are made clear in the following report: 
The long monopoly enjoyed by Britain in supplling 
the steam-thrashing machinery used in [Russiaj is 
threatened with serious competition fron Hungary and 
America •••• The American thrashers are being intro-
duced by the Minister of Agriculture. It appears 
the class of thrashing machinery used in America 
was favourably noted by the Commissioner of Agricul-
ture during his visit to the Chicago Exhibition of 
1893, and several sets have been imported by the 
Government. 
The Russi~n Government, the report continued, was staging 
official trials of the machinery on the estate of Count Tol-
stoi. The competition was "well worth the attention of Bri-
tish manufacturers," for their exports of agricultural equip-
ment to Russia were being jeopardized. The American thrashing 
. 
4The Economist, MTS, July, 1890, ?-8; MTS, June, 1891, 
10; MTS, June, 1892, 9. The Americans completely monopolized 
the market for reaping and binding machines; the English 
retained a share of the market for other agricultural 
machinery. 
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machine, though equal to the British in performance, was con-
siderably lighter and this gave the American equipment a very 
great price advantage since the import duty was calculated 
by weight. A ten-horsepower portable engine of American 
make paid between ii40 a:iri £50 less than a British-made engine 
when it passed through Russian Customs.5 Finally, though it 
was not typical, the contract obtained by Bethlehem Iron and 
Steel in 1894 to furnish 1,200 tons of steel armor-plate for 
Russian cruisers deserves mention for the attention it re-
ceived in the British press. 6 
As American competition in Europe was confined largely 
to agricultural machinery, what American competition in Africa 
was reported in the British press was limited to textiles. 
A British Consular Report or 1891 stated that nthe competition 
for the Madagascar trade in cotton goods lies entirely between 
Great Britain and the United States." Though Britain had the 
lead in most articles, the favorite calico in Madagascar came 
from the United States, "the New England cotton lords having 
been the first to meet the Malagasy requirements in such goods." 
Lancashire had found it prudent to begin producing a comparable 
product. The Americans had also been first in establishing 
a trade outlet in Mozambique and the British Consular Service 
recommended that the ~ritish should follow suit.? The Foreign 
5The Economist, MTS, May, 1890, 10; MTS, Ju.ne, 1894, 9; 
MTS, January, 1895, 9. 
0The Economist, January 5, 1895, 15-16. 
?~he Economist, MTS, June, 1891, 11; MTS, May, 1891, 10. 
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0£fice received a report in 1892 that the most significant 
feature of the trade of the Zanzibar-Somali area was "the 
large amount of American shirtings and drills, compared to 
that imported from Europe and India, the respective figures 
being $225,000 and $?5,0JO." The natives said they preferred 
the American articles because they lasted through more wash-
ings. ln 1895 Britain held first place in supplying Zanzioar's 
imports, but her shipments were declining while those from the 
United States were increasing. 8 
American competition in Pacific markets was somewhat more 
diversified. The British press displayed some interest in 
Samoa's American trade, perhaps because of the relative new-
ness of American activity there, though ~ritish dominance or 
tiamvan imports actually increased after 1890. In the year 
British and American exports were .£25,799 and i9,661 respec-
tively. Britain widened the gap in 1891 and by 1895 was 
sending .f53,196 worth of goods to Samoa to America's£12,124.9 
Nor was Hawaii, an area of more substantial American interest, 
any cause for British concern, despite the fact that certain 
American manufactured goods were replacing those of British 
8The Economist, MTS, March, 1892, 9; July 25, 1895, 965. 
The Americans were also apparently capable of selling sub-
stantial quantities of dynamite in South Africa, though not 
necessarily in competition with British suppliers. It was 
reported that the Transvaal mining industry ~as irate in 
189? over an agreement between the Nobel Trust and American 
manufacturers by which the Americans agreed not to sell dyna-
mite in South Africa, thus enabling the Trust to raise its 
prices. _TI?.e Economist, October 9, 189?, 1429. 
9The Times, June 2, 1891, 10; July 6, 1892, 10; November, 
1896, 7. 
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origin.10 British anxiety about American competition in Asia 
was focused on the much more important markets of China and 
Japan. 
China was an important market for certain American pro-
ducts. Especially in 18~2 and again in 1896 the United 
States sent very large quantities of cotton goods to China. 
American petroleum was another major item of Chinese trade 
though it faced increasing Russian competition after 1894. 
But, though they took note of American activity in China in 
the mid-1890s, the British expressed little concern over it. 
They were far too anxious about German, French, and Russian 
competition there to be alarmed by the Americana. 11 Further-
more, if 1893 was representative, ~~erican exports to China 
were miniscule if they are compared, not with Britain's alone, 
but with the exports to China from Britain and her possessions: 12 
Chineseimports, 1893 (Hong Kong Taels) 
From 
-Hong Kong 
Great Britain 
India 
United States 
10see Chapter VI. 
80,891,000 
28,156,100 
16,739,000 
5,443,600 
11The Economist, MTS, July, 1894, 4-5; June 27, 1896, 
825-26; May 15, 1897, 710; December 25, 1897, 1820. There is 
the possibility that American competition was minimized, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, because in the international mael-
strom which was China in the 1890s, the United States was 
looked on as a commercial ally. This was certainly the case 
after 1898. 
12The Economist, April 27, 1895, 545-46. The figures ~e­
quire qualification. All imports into China which were sent 
through Hong Kong were officially listed as being of Hong Kong 
origin, whatever their original source may have been. In any 
case', the Eritish enjoyed a considerable margin over the United 
States whether Britain alone or the British Enpire is the basis 
of the comparison. 
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American competition with Britain in Japan was more for-
midable. In this market British possessions played a much 
smaller role and Great Britain herself, though she led the 
world in sending exports to Japan, did not enjoy so wide a 
margin of preponderance over the United States: 13 
From 
Great .tSritain 
United States 
Japanese Imports (#.) 
1890 
4,635,602 
1,117,115 
1891 
3,332,675 
1,140,008 
Though total American exports to Japan declined in 18~2 and 
1893, the British noticed that they were losing ground in the 
sale of steam engines and boilers because of the successful 
competition of the Americans and the French. ln the mid-
1890s the exports to Japan of both Britain and the United 
States grew considerably, though the ratio or the former to 
the latter remained much the same: 14 
From 
Great Britain 
United States 
Japanese Imports 
1893(£) 1894(&:~) 
3,767,590 
821,567 
4,614,517 
1,201,218 
1896 (Yen) 
59,251,780 
16,373,420 
In 1895 The Economist pointed to the United States as 
Britain's leading competitor. And though it maintained in 
1896 that Germany and France offered "more direct competition," 
it remained concerned about the Americans. "Until quite 
recently," it stated, "Japan's principal purchases .from the 
l3The Economist, MTS, October, 1892, 5-?. 
14The Economist, September 21, 1895, 1239; June 19, 
189?, 8~ 
# 
;15 
States were kerosene oil, raw cotton and flour, none of which 
possess any direct interest for British manufacturers; but 
America is now sending machinery and metals to Japan. 1115 As 
events would prove, these American industrial exports of the 
mid-1890s were the prelude to even stronger competition in 
the future. 
British Colonial Markets 
In the British Colonies other than Canada, the domination 
of which by the United States has already been examined, Amer-
ican competition was confined to a very limited range of 
products and was experience4 chiefly in Australia. A substan-
tial number of American locomotives were sold to Australia 
in 1891. Though this American competition did not completely 
displace Hritish locomotives there, arguments over the respec-
tive merits of each continued for quite a long time. 16 Other 
British possessions, notably Egypt and India, also experimen-
ted with American locomotives. The climax of this competition 
came after the period under review here and will be examined 
later. The British also faced competition from American 
hardware in many of the Colonies. Australia imported cutlery 
and axes "of superior quality to the English and at no greater 
cost" from both the United States and Germany. 17 Increasing 
15The Economist, September 21, 1895, 1239; May 16, 1896, 
615. 
16carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1029; Com. History 1891, 
23-24; Com. History 1892, 24. 
l?Lord Augustus Loftus, "Commercial Unity with the Colo-
nies," Nineteenth Century, ll.AIII (February, 1893), 342. 
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foreign competition in colonial markets, including competi-
tion from American hardware, tools, and machinery, prompted 
the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, to request reports 
from the colonial governors as to the extent to which foreign 
goods had ousted British products. 18 The final report on 
competition in the colonies will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Great Britain 
Not even England itself escaped the sporadic competition 
the United States was offering in markets around the world in 
the 1890s. Not only were the Americans sending manufactures 
to England, but these American exports were in competition 
with key ~ritish industries. The English had grown extremely 
sensitive about the question of the duraoility and the cost 
of production of the ~ritish coal industry. In 1893 United 
States coal production reached a record lb3,770,000 tons and 
American coal exports increased by 3b%. ~hough ~he :Economist 
was not alarmed, pointing out that the American coal export 
~rade "is still of very diminutive proportions," not exceed-
ing 3,600,000 tons, some of those American shipments were 
actually sold in England. This prompted Jeans to remark that 
If the same rate of freight could be got for Ameri-
can coal destined for British ports (as now prevails 
for pig-iron and steel], our coal markets may soon 
be flooded with supplies from the coal fields of 
Virginia, Alabama, and Pennsylvania. • • • it will 
18For announcement of the investigation and comments, 
see The Economist, December ?, 1895, 1584-86. 
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be an evil case ror England should the day ever arrive 
when coal can be mined upwards of 3,000 miles from 
our shores, and landed at our very doors in successful 
competition with our own.19 
"Carrying coals to Newcastle" became the statement of a threat 
rather than an expression of the redundant or the absurd. 
Basic English manuf~cturing industries also raced at 
least occasional American competition in their home market. 
At the end of 1893 the textile center of Kidderminster repor-
ted that "the introduction of low-grade American Axminsters 
into the English market in the autumn produced some a:Brm lest 
permanent competition from the United States was to be looked 
for." English rug-manufacturers, however, countered the 
threat by putting a new and competitive grade or carpet on 
the market. 20 In 1894 there were claims that a variety of 
American iron and steel manufactures were "being sold in our 
markets, often of a better quality, and at lower prices than 
we can produce them." Carnegie, too, pointed out to British 
readers the effects of recent American price reductions. 
They had enabled American shipbuilders to tender bids for 
new British war-ships; the Clyde Trustees had purchased their 
new dredgers in the United States; American quarrymen sent 
granite from Maine to Aberdeen; and American manufacturers of 
agricultural equipment were enabled to sell in the British 
l9The Economist, I1arch 24, 1894, 365; J. Stephen Jeans, 
"The Coal Crisis and the Paralysis of British Industry," 
Nineteenth Centurl, XXXIV (November, 1893), 800-01. 
20com. History 1893, 31; see also Carnegie, "Britain 
and the United States," 323. 
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market. 21 
The introduction into England of American coal and manu-
factures alarmed the British by the very novelty of the threat. 
Two other British industries were contending, not always suc-
c~ssfully, with long-established American competition. A 
British observer commented in 1890 that a hundful of American 
companies were coming to monopolize the life insurance busi-
ness in England and the author of a letter to The Economist 
in 1892 remarked that English life insurance companies "have 
seen their business so seriously trenched upon for so long 
by the American offices." The extent of American domination 
was made clear in 1895 when The Economist published a summary 
revenue table of all eighty-one "ordinary" life assurance 
companies doing business in Great Britain. Ranked in order 
of annual premium income, the four leading firms were all 
American: Equitable (i?,814,656); Mutual New York (~,849,585); 
New York ~5,776,953); and Prudential (£-2,077,956). These 
enjoyed a tremendous lead over their British competitors, only 
three of which had an annual premium income exceedingi500,000, 
the largest being~895,653. 22 
These American insurance firms were the subject of a 
number of disputes in the early 1890s. The first centered 
21
wiiliamson, British Industries and Forei63 Com~etition, 
237; Carnegie, "Britain and the United States," 22-2 • 
22P. M. Tait, "Life Assurance," Edinburth' CLulJ. (Octo-
oer, 1890), 514-19; The Economist, February3, 1892, 222; 
May ~~, 1895, btl2. l have not been able to establish cer-
tainly that Prudential was an American company. 
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around ~r~tish income tax law. British insurance firms be-
lieved they were subjected to an unfair disadvantage, since 
their American competitors were exempt from the British 
income tax on interest derived from investments. On the 
other hand, The Economist pronounced as "most unj 1 st" a 
recent Queen's Bench ruling that life insurance premiums were 
deductible from taxable income only when paid to British 
firms. "The disability thus imposed upon foreign insurance 
companies doing business here is a serious one," it said; and, 
though "our home offices don't like the competition of the 
American institutions," they should not seek protection 
against by means of discriminatory tax legislation. 23 
More serious were the very frequent charges that the 
American firms, and particularly the Equitable Life Associa-
tion of the United States, operated at excessively high cost, 
bad insufficient assets, and attrac~ed considerable business 
on the basis of exaggerated advertising and highly-misleading 
annual statements. The Economist published considerable cor-
respondence and numerous articles under headings such as "Hand 
to I1outh Life Assurance" and "The Promise and Performance of 
American Life Offices" exposing such practices. Editorially 
it stated that American firms such as Equitable Life "have for 
many years been getting an unfair advantage over their English 
competitors."24 
23The Economist, 
169. 
February 15, 1890, 211; February 8, 1890, 
24 The Economist, May 6, 1893, 536; December 2, 1893, 1431; 
December 9, 1893, 1464-65; December 16, 1893, 1507-09; January 
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Far more sinister and dangerous than the allegedly un-
ethical practices of American life insurance companies, how-
ever, were the machinations of that epitome of the American 
trust, the Standard Oil Gompany. 25 The Scotch oil trade was 
not a major British indu&try. Nevertheless it was of consi-
derable importance in Scotland, for much local capital had 
been invested in the business and it provided one of the more 
important cargoes for the Scotch railroads. The business con-
sisted of the extraction of paraffin oil (scale) from shale 
rock and its processing for use chiefly as illuminating oil 
and as a base for candles. In the past the industry had re-
turned "an exceedingly handsome profit," but then Standard 
Oil had entered the British market and nearly ruined the Scotch 
producers. The result was an agreement, which in 1890 had 
been in force for some time, by which the Scotch producers 
limited their productions and Standard Oil, which set the 
price for the product, reduced its imports into the United 
Kingdom. 
At the beginning of 1890 the Scotch producers, faced 
with rising production costs, sought a price increase. Stan-
dard Oil countered with a plan to increase its shipments to 
the United Kingdom by 25% on the grounds that the maintenance 
6, 1894, 18-19; April 6, 1895, 450-51. Such criticism was 
presumably not motivated by any anti-American bias. Under 
the title "Where Not to Insure," The Economist published a 
scathing criticism of a Canadian insurance company; December 
23, 1893, 1531-32. 
25The British press had much to say about trusts, which 
were generally considered to be a natural, though very unde-
sireable, outcome of the American protective system. This 
important topic must be excluded due to lack of space. 
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of moderate prices would lead to increased consumption. As 
~he Economist viewed the situation, 
the outlook for the Scotch oil trade is not pleasant 
to contemplate. Acquiescence in a continuance of 
current prices means ruin to certain undertakings; 
a break with the Standard, and the introduction of 
unbridled competitio~ with America will amount, 
sooner or later, to the same thing. 
There was no doubt that American oil ruled the British 
market. Of the 1,826,297 barrels of petroleum which Britain 
imported in 1890, 1,232,957 crune from the United States. 
The remainder came from Russia. 26 
By 1892 the Scotch oil trade was in still more serious 
trouble. Standard's Lima oil fields, which yielded petroleum 
richer in scale and lubricants than the Pennsylvania fields, 
were by this time in full production "and the American pro-
ducers are resolved that Europe must take what they have to 
send." Standard Oil, which in 1889 had exported 16,000 tons 
to the United Kingdom, sent 27,000 tons in 1891--total Scotch 
production was only 25,000 tons annually--and was expected 
to send 30,000 tons in 1892. Consequently, early in 1892 the 
Scotch producers were forced to agree to an additional 10% 
reduction of their output, to the maintenance of their domes-
tic prices, and to the reduction of their prices to contin-
ental consumers. Surplus stocks of Scotch oil nevertheless 
accumulated rapidly. What could not be converted into candles 
was frequently pawned, for operating capital was required 
even thougb the product could not be sold. Many of the 
26The Economist, MTS, January, 1890, 6-7; MTS, July, 
ia90, 5-6; Com. History 1890, 18. 
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Scotch firms were liquidated, prompting The Economist to remark: 
The agreement with the American producers has been 
a disastrous event for the Scotch producers, and 
has been altogether one-sided, and wholly in the 
interest of the Yankees •••• All along the Ameri-
cans have pursued that policy of selfishness which 
characterizes most of their dealings with competi-
tors in the mother country. 
The mid-1890s brought no relief. The Economist bsgan an 
1895 article by announcing that "the Scotch oil trade--or 
such part of it as still exists--had renewed friendly rela-
tions with the all-absorbing Standard Oil Company of America." 
Friends of the industry, it continued, "believe that the 
Scotch oil ~rade would have fared best by having naught to do 
with the oil octopus of America. 1127 
The British antagonism against Standard Oil was due to 
more than the latter's ability to establish prices and produc-
tion quotas to suit its own interests, disastrous as that was 
for the Scotch industry. A heated public controversy, the 
origins of which went back several decades, was renewed in 
1894. Much of the oil which the United States and Russia 
shipped to Britain was of inferior quality. Its flash-point 
(ignition temperature) was so low as to be a very serious 
safety haz~d. The flash-point of American and Russian oils 
was frequently as low as ?0-88 degrees F. The flash-point of 
Scotch oil was considerably higher and the Scotch producers 
sought to have the Hritish government raise the minimum legal 
27The Economist, January lb, lt\92, 69-70; October 1, 
1892, 1237-38; January 14, 1893, 39; April 29, 1893, 507; 
February lb, 1895, 224. 
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flash-point to at least 100 degrees F. The chief target of 
such legislation was, of course, Standard Oil, which supplied 
the bulk of British imported oil and which, it was reported, 
had just come to an agreement with the Russians by which the 
world was to be divided into monopolistic spheres of influ-
ence, Standard Oil obtaining control of America, Britain, and 
Western ~urope. 28 
The Americans, however, had surmounted such legal obsta-
cles before. The British government had passed an Act in 
18b2 establishing a flash-point of 100 degreos F., but it had 
not suited American producers and they brazenly ignored it, 
according to The Economist. 'When new legislation was passed 
in 1868, The American producers (operating through their 
Petroleum Association) had suborned governmental consulting 
experts, persuading them to adopt a testing device which 
registered a very inflated flash-po~nt. When another commis-
sio11 was established by the British Government in 1897 to 
28The Economist, February 10, 1894, 175; The Times, May 
8, 1894, 5. An interesting sidelight on Anglo-American com-
petition is provided by the case of the entrepreneurs, includ-
ing a number of British investors, who devised a scheme to 
capture the American oil trade with the East. They planned 
to build large reservoirs in Eastern port cities and to fill 
them from newly-designed tankers of huge capacity which would 
carry the oil from Black Sea Ports to the East via Suez, thus 
putting the more expensive American case oil trade (oil shipped 
in tin cans packed in wooden crates) out of business. Bri-
tish tin-plate, shipping, and financiai interests which pro-
fited from the American trade, lobbied to have the Government 
prohibit the passage of such tankers through Suez on the 
grounds that they were a safety hazard. They failed and by 
1893 four such tankers had used Suez. The Economist, January 
9, 1892, 36-37; MTS, March, 1893, 3-4. 
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consider the question anew, The Economist published official 
Iowa reports which described Standard Oil's fraudulent and 
criminal attempts to sabotage that state's flash-point require-
ments. No decision was reached in 1897, but The Economist 
mounted a campaign of reporting deaths and injuries caused 
by lamp explosions, simultaneously urging the commission to 
have more regard for the safety of British citizens than for 
the profits of American oil producers. 29 
1892: A Turning Point 
British concern over foreign competition was growing in 
the mid-1890s in both official circles and in the press. 
Late in 1895 Chamberlain requested from Colonial governors 
information of the displacement by foreigners of British-
made goods in the Colonies. The German threat of 1896 led 
to an official investigation of foreign competition and the 
publication of the ".t:Soyle Memorandum" at the beginning of 
1897. Later in that year the replies of the Colonial gover-
nors to Chamberlain appeared in the form of a lengthy Blue 
Book. The year 1897 marked a turning point in two respects. 
American competition intensified considerably in 1897, and for 
a number of years after that date .t:Sritish attention was pro-
bably focused more on American than on German competition. 
A recapitulation is in order here. We have already 
seen that by 1897 the British were coming to accept the fact 
·
29The r:Conomist, February 16, 1895, 224; July 10, 189?, 
984-86; August 28, 1897, 1235-36. 
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that the United States was becoming less open as a market for 
British goods, an opinion which the next few years confirmed, 
and that American exports were in some cases checking the 
expansion of ~ritish exports in various markets around the 
world. We have seen that by 1897 America was a ~ominant 
force in the economic life of Canada, far surpassing the 
British there. The Canadians recognized this and,their bid 
tor reciprocity with the United States rejected, opted for 
preferential trade with Britain in the hope of checking still 
further American penetration. During the 1890s American 
goods of several kinds were competing with British articles 
in a number of Latin American markets. American cotton goods 
were competitive in China and in portions of Africa. Metal 
products, particularly agricultural implements and locomotives 
were supplanting similar British products in E'.irope and Japan. 
By 1897 the British were also feeling the American challenge 
right at home. The Welsh tin-plate and the Cornish tin-mining 
industries had been very adversely affected by American com-
petition and the British iron and steel industry had felt the 
effects of this. British insurance companies and Scotch oil 
producers, particularly the latter, had been injured by Amer-
ican competition and resented the sharp practices of their 
rivals. Occasional shipments of American coal, iron, and 
manufactures had reached Britain during the 1890s, opening 
eyes in a way that American competition elsewhere could not. 
Many of these tendencies reached a new peak of inten-
sity in 1897. Early in that year the renewal of revolution 
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in Cuba re-established British awareness of the world role of 
the United States. The British press generally supported or 
at least tolerated the thought of American intervention, even 
though it was widely recognized that such intervention would 
mean an increase of American influence in and possibly control 
of Cuba.30 
The annexation of Hawaii by the United States became all 
but formalized in 1897. As the National Review recognized: 
The expansion of America into the Pacific is an 
event of capital importance. Henceforth the United 
States must be regarded as a great colonizing and 
naval Power, for no one can imagine that she will 
rest her oars in Honolulu •••• Captain Mahan ••• 
regards this new departure with unqualified approval, 
for in his eyes the Sandwich Islands constitute the 
Key to the Pacific.31 
According to A. Maurice Low, the National Review's regular 
columnist for United States affairs, "the annexation of Hawaii 
is the logical forerunner of the annexation of Cuba. And 
after Cuba, with the building of the Nicaragua Canal, it is 
easy to see that the lust on conquest, the passion for terri-
tory, will not be appeased until the United States command 
its approaches both in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific. 11 32 
30The National Review, though it was highly sensitive to 
Britain's world position, virtually mounted a campaign of 
appeal for American intervention. See, for example, w. Hal-
lett Philips, "The United States and Cuba--A New Armenia," 
National, XXVIII (January, 1897), 598-604; and the regular fea-
ture, "Episodes of the Month," throughout 1897 and 1898. For 
a thorough examination of British press opinion of the several 
manifestations of American expansion discussed here, see A. E. 
Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903. 
3lnA Greater America," NationaJ., XX.1.X. (July, 1897), 658. 
32A. I111urice Low, "The :Month in America," National, x.x.1.x.· 
{July, 1897), 744. 
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Such a situation disturbed few in Britain. Typical was 
the British ooserver who rhetorically raised the question, 
"Do Foreign Annexations Injure British Trade?" and answered, 
emphatically not. i~ough by such annexations he oelieved the 
linited States had reached the status of a "world state" as 
Britain and perhaps Russia also were, he concluded that it 
was in Britain's interest that the United States annex such 
areas; it was better that an area come under regular govern-
ment--even if a tariff wall were erected--than for free trade 
with anarchy to prevail.33 
Yet it was significant that Lew's vision of "Hawaii under 
the American flag, Cuba destined to be an American colony, 
and the Stars and Stripes flying at both ends of the Nicaragua 
Canal" was juxtaposed with an account of lagging American 
prosperity. It had been supposed by many that the election 
of McKinley would be followed by palmier days. That these 
had not yet appeared many Americans were blaming on the "free-
trade" Wilson Tariff. The American Protective Tariff League, 
one of whose directors was McKinley's Secretary of the Interior, 
complained that the United States was suffering from an inva-
sion of foreign products. Others joined the chorus of com-
plaints. If na score of articles 'made in Germany' are caus-
ing irritation in .England," Carnegie asked British readers, 
"what can a thousand articles 'made in England' be expected 
to do in the United States? 11 34 That such conditions and such 
33Henry Birchenough, "Do Foreign Annexations Injure Bri-
tish Trade?" Nineteenth Century, XLI (June, 1897), 1004. 
34Low, "The Month in Jl..merica," ?44; Andrew Carnegie, "Does 
America Hate England?" Contemporary, LXXII (November, 189?), 660. 
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opinions led to the ultra-protectionist Dingley Tariff which 
further impeded British exports to the United States we have 
already seen. But these same economic conditions, insuffi-
cient home demand and declining prices, led to increased 
efforts to find foreign markets for the surplus production 
of America's rapidly growing industrial capability. An exam-
ple of such efforts, more public than most and reminiscent of 
Blaine's 1890 campaign, was the formal opening by President 
McKinley of the International Commercial Congress at Philadel-
phia in mid-1897. According to an American correspondent of 
The Times, it was a revival and an extension of the Pan-Ameri-
can idea; not only governments but also commercial organiza-
tions were taking part in it. He described the Congress as 
"an attempt to extend trade relations between the United 
States and South America, where England is thought to mono-
polize too large a share of business and influence •• • • 
There are large exhibits of American goods for which South 
America is expected to become a cus"tomer."35 Less ostenta-
tiously and in other directions the scope of American activity 
was widening. An event of the greatest consequence was the 
opening by Andrew Carnegie of sales offices in European cities 
including London and Liverpool. The American correspondent 
of The Economist called this action "a gauntlet in the face 
of the steel world; for that it is the intention of American 
rail makers, or at least of this particular rail maker, to 
35The Times, June 3, 189?, ?. 
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bid on all contracts open for the world's competition which 
may come up, seems unquestioned. 11 36 The export of iron and 
steel and of products manufactured from them constituted the 
principal but not the only form of American competition 
recognized in the ~ri tislJ. press in late 1896 and in 189?. 
1~e first indications of serious American competition 
in iron and steel occurred in April, 1896. One week The Econo-
~ announced that American rail manufacturers "have cap-
tured an order for rails for Japan against the competition of 
our English makers." Furthermore, vigorous efforts were being 
made to export Southern pig-iron; "already shipments on a 
small scale are being made to this country." The following 
week it reported that a thousand tons of Southern pig-iron 
had been sold for export to Glasgow, 16,000 tons of steel 
rails had baen sold to Japan, and "a large quantity" of rails 
had been purchased in the United States by the Grand Trunk 
Railroad of Canada.3? Since it attributed this competition 
to "the exceptional depression in the United States" and to 
temporary situations such as the favorable fluctuations of 
ocean freight rates, The Economist was not overly alarmed in 
1896. When, in the fall of that year, it again carried ac-
counts of "order for rails for Japan and Canada having been 
taken [by Americans] in competition with English makers" and 
it reported that "about 250,000 tons of iron and steel in 
36The Economist, February 2?, 189?, 313. 
3?The Economist, April 11, 1896, 455; April 18, 1896, ~89. 
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different forms (including pig-iron) have been shipped from 
America to Europe," The Economist remained confident. Bri-
tish producers, it believed, could "hol.d their own, foreign 
competition notwithstandi.ng. 11 38 
At the beginning of 189? both The Times and The Economist 
were still complacent. Both noted in their reviews of 1896 
that the British iron and steel industry was prosperous. 
Though The Times reported that Alabama pig-iron was being 
offered at Middlesborough at competitive prices and The Econo-
mist once again recounted that Americans had taken Japanese 
and Canadian rail orders away from English rivals, these lead-
ing newspapers used identical words to describe the situation: 
"the United States have not yet commenced to seriously com-
pete with Great Britain in foreign markets." The extensive 
sale abroad of American locomotives was dismissed as the result 
of British makers being too busy to accept the enormous world 
demand. The entry of American iron and steel into Britain 
was characterized by The Economist Ets "quite exceptional"; 
such shipments had been possible only because there was no 
market in depressed America for the great surplus production. 
The Economist anticipated an economic revival across the At-
lantic which would, it believed, raise American prices to the 
point where American iron and steel would no longer be compe-
titive. 39 
38The Economist, October 10, 189b, 1323; October 24, 1896, 
138?; November 7, 1S96, 1451. 
39 . 
.... The Times, January 5, 189?, 3-4; Com. History 1896, 
21-22; The Economist, January 16, 189?, 77. 
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By early 1897 the cost of Alabama pig-iron had increased 
by $1 a ton beyond the prices of 189b, yet the British found 
that American competition not only did not slacken but actu-
ally increased. The American correspondent of The Economist 
reported in February that Alabama producers were exporting 
pig-iron to England, Holland, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Austria, 
India, and Japan; and they were negotiating orders with Rus-
sia, Australia, and South Africa. l!'oreign buyers had found 
Alabama pig-iron equal to that produced in Scotland and 
superior to that made in Middlesborough. Alabama producers, 
he went on, "regard it reasonable to suppose that after a 
i'u.11 familiarity with American iron, European consumers will 
be willing to pay full market prices for it, and that this 
export business is therefore likely to continue. 1140 At about 
the same time Carnegie was reported to be introducing new 
equipment which would reduce the production cost of steel 
rails by 20%. According to The Times, Carnegie and other 
major American steel makers "are said to be making a special 
effort to conquer the European and especially the South Ameri-
can markets, which latter has been heretofore monopolized by 
England. 1141 In March came the sensational report from The 
. -
:Economist's correspondent that "orders for 100,000 tons [of 
steel rails] have been received from London by the Carnegie 
interests. One-half of this order is credited to English 
40The 3?.conomist, February 20, 1897, 280. 
41The Times, March 1, 1897, 7. 
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railway companies, and a large block is said to be destined 
for Japan." The remainder of his report was more startling 
still: 
The statement that [AmericanJ tinplate bars 
have been exported to the Welsh tinplate mills for 
several months, and that some of the tinned plates 
imported recently were made of American steel, rests 
upon good newspaper authority, but has not been 
officially confirmed, as has been the announcement 
that Bessemer steel billets have been going abroad 
for some time past, and that one Pittsburgh concern 
is "shipping on an order for 20,000 tons of billets, 
to be landed on the west coast of England, at a price 
said to be l2s. below the local quotations.n42 
By April The Economist admitted that American competi-
tion was having "a depressing influence" on the British iron 
and steel industry and it predicted that "we may have to 
count upon this condition of things continuing for some time 
to come." Accounts of British and Canadian purchases of 
American iron and steel continued to appear and the United 
States still found Japan a very profitable market. According 
to the British Vice-Consul at Tokyo, the United States had 
emerged 
as a serious competitor with Europe in supplying 
Japan with machinery, rails, nails, and pig-iron. 
In rails alone American producers sold 30,000 tons 
at lower prices than British makers were willing to 
accept, and there appears to be a probability that 
American locomotive builders will secure a greater 
number of Japanese orders during the current year. 
The Economist hoped that the United States had secured so many 
foreign orders for steel that the flooding of the British mar-
ket by that product might diminish, but it expected the British 
importation of Southern pig-iron to continue. British cotton 
42The Economist, March 6, 1897, 348. 
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steamers offered the Americans low freight rates for pig-iron 
for they found it to be excellent ballast. 43 
Throughout the first half of 1897 The Economist continued 
to insist that such competition was primarily the result of 
the depressed condition of the American market. ~ut by July 
it was repudiating its former conviction that the competition 
would disappear when an improvement occurred in the United 
States. lt had come to believe "that a considerable portion 
of the present competition will continue, 11 despite any Ameri-
can revival. Large quantities of American iron were being 
imported by Britain and others had 
found its way to lndia, China, Japan, and the Conti-
nent of Europe, and other m~rkets are daily being 
found by American manuracturers. The main reason why 
this conpetition must now oe viewed in a more serious 
light is the fact that most successful erfo~ts have 
been made towards cheapening the cost of producing 
steel, and it is affirmed on the best authority that 
the cost of making pig-iron and steel billets is less 
in America than in this country. 
At Chicago Carnegie was producing pig-iron and steel billets 
at costs which "so far, have not been possible in this coun-
try, even under the most favourable conditions." If any 
further proof of American competitiveness were required, said 
The Economi~, there were abundant examples. In addition to 
the large quantity of steel billets and the nearly ?0,000 
tons of pig-iron which Britain had imported from the United 
States in the preceding twelve months, the Americans had 
just won a large order for rails for the Indian railways, 
their price being about 20s. per ton under British quotations; 
43The Economist, April l?, 189?, 56?; June 26, 1897, 914. 
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they had also won an order for water pipes for Coolgardie; 
"and steel hoops are being offered at considerably less than 
English prices laid down both in English and foreign ports." 
The Economist warned that the now "more serious competition 
of America," coupled with existing Continental competition, 
might check the expansion and jeopardize the prosperity 
which the British iron and steel industry had been enjoying 
for several years.44 
By the latter part of 1897 it was quite clear to the 
British that American iron and steel competition was not a 
temporary phenomenon resulting from depression. The Americans 
continued to take Japanese orders out of the hands of English 
producers. In England itself agents "are still pushing the 
sale of American pig-iron, steel hoops, wire rods, gas, water, 
and boiler tubes, and other productions of the American steel 
works." The United States was no longer depressed. Its suc-
cessful competition was clearly attributable to "enterprise" 
and to the adoption of the newest equipment and techniques. 
In fiscal 1897 the United States exported 168,890 tons of 
pig-iron, 107,740 tons of steel rails, 53,865 tons of wire, 
and 46,248 tons of steel billets, in addition to smaller 
quantities of other iron and steel products. "If exports 
on this scale are to continue," The Economist warned, "it 
will be a serious matter for the iron and steel trade of 
this country, and it behoves our manufacturers to do all in 
44The Economist, July 10, 1897, 986. 
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their power by cheapening the cost of production to meet this 
new competitor."45 
This competition was not restricted to the primary pro-
ducts of the iron and steel industry. In the sale of the 
various kinds of machinery and equipment which tL~ British 
styled collectively as engineering products, there was also 
formidable American competition. We have already noted ear-
lier examples of the extensive foreign sales of American loco-
motives and agricultural machinery. In a leading article of 
1897, The Times cited the statement of an American engineer 
that hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of American machi-
nery was being sent to Asia, to Bu.rope, and to England itself. 
According to The Economist, the process "which is subject to 
serious and growing competition from American manufacturers" 
was the application of electric motors to machine tools and 
other technical innovations. Both Journals saw this as a 
demonstration that the United States was successful because 
of its ability constantly to reduce industrial costs. The 
Times added the observation that the highly-paid American 
worker labored harder and more efficiently than his ~ritish 
' 
counterpart. 40 
The "American cycle invasion" was still another element 
of American competition which attracted attention in 1896 and 
1897. !n 189b cycling became a mania in England and almost 
45The Economist, October 16, 189?, 1458. 
46The Times, leading article, September 23, 189?, 6-7; 
Com. History IS96, 21. The Times' comparison of the American 
with the British worker was occasioned by the existence of a 
serious strike in the British engineering trades, a strike which 
"has given a great advantage to our American and Continental 
competitors"; The Times, leading article, October 9, 1897, 11. 
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overnight the cycle industry experienced a fantastic boom. 
British makers were not prepared for this sudden and tremen-
dous increase in demand. But in America, wrote a British com-
mentator, "f'or some reason or other, the rise was foreseen, 
and manufacturers there • • • placed large contracts for cycle 
tubing, which practically swallowed up the output of that 
indispensable material ••• and so made it impossible for 
the English manufacturers to cope with the subsequent rush of 
orders." While English investors were sinking large sums in 
the establishment of tube works, English cycle prices were 
necessarily quite high "and the market has been flooded with 
cheap American ones. 1147 
The American rush to take advantage of English cycle 
market conditions led to the export of large numbers of infer-
ior machines. Even cycles that were well made by American 
standards proved too light and fragile for the rugged country 
lanes of England. Soon there were widespread complaints that 
the American product was shoddy and there were those in Eng-
land in 1896 who were prepared to write off American cycle 
competition as a failure. But at least some American manu-
facturers adapted their product for the English market and 
this competition did not disappear. "With characteristic 
push," The Economist reported in mid-1897, American cycle 
manufacturers 
47A. Shadwell, "The Economic Aspects of the Bicycle," 
National, XXVIII (November, 1896), 345-46. 
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have not hesitated to attack the .British maker on 
his own ground, and this country has been flooded with 
American machines, many, no doubt, of inferior class, 
but others practically as good as can be manufactured 
on this side. As a matter of fact, the American cycle 
has established for itself, more especially among 
ladies, quite a market in England, of course to the 
detriment of the home trade. 
J.n this industry, too, keener competition was a result of 
American cost-cutting. At the height of the influx of Ameri-
can cycles, a major American producer announced a 25% price 
reduction. The Economist concluded that, however damaging 
to the .British industry it might be, "there appears to be no 
doubt that the competition will have to be met by a general 
lowering of prices" by English makers.48 
The 1897 invasion of England by American manufactures 
was largely confined to products of the iron and steel and 
the engineering industries, though there were also complaints 
that the Americans were "dumping" quantities of Axminster 
carpets in the English market at iow prices. 49 American com-
petition in other world markets, however, was somewhat more 
diversified. ~ritish concern over American competition in 
external markets in 1897 was particularly focused on the .Bri-
tish possessions. ~he trend of American domination of the 
Canadian market, which prompted the adoption of preferential 
tarif!'s oy Uanada in ltb?, has already been examined. There 
were those in England who feared that a similar situation 
48Ibid.; The Economist, July 3, 1897, 952-53; August 21, 
1897, l~ 
49com. History, 189?, 31. 
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had arisen in the British West Indies. 
The one-product economy of these islands had been nearly 
ruined since 1890, first by the refusal of the British Govern-
ment to permit the West Indies to conclude a reciprocity 
treaty with the United States and secondly by th& competition 
of European, government-subsidized beet sugar. In the interim 
the islanders had developed a profitable trade in tropical 
fruits with the United States and there were those who thought 
the West Indian trade pattern was becoming ominously similar 
to that of Canada: 
West Indian Trade, Annual Average (millions if) 
With 
Great Britain 
United States 
1881-1885 1891-1892 
5.9 
5.1 ' 
The expanded marketing of tropical fruit, however, had not 
completely compensated for the immense losses being sustained 
in the sugar trade. The planters had been refused reciprocity 
with the United States in part at least because of English 
fears that this would establish too close a relationship 
between America and a British possession. By 1897 the plan-
ters were requesting assistance from the British Government 
in the form of subsidies, similar to those paid by the sugar-
beet producing countries of Europe. Again the Government 
proved reluctant to aid the west Indies. But there were 
English critics who believed that such a refusal would be a 
far greater inducement for the West Indians to turn to the 
United States than any mere reciprocity treaty. The United 
States had once admitted West Indian sugar duty-free; it 
might do so again. 
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Geographically much nearer to America than to Great 
Britain, [the West Indians] might seek, and would 
certainly receive, from the United States, not alone 
the commercial facilities which we deny them, but 
other inducements o1 far greater importance. Trade 
would follow the flag. That flag would no longer 
be ours, and we might have to deplore not only the 50 ruin, but the loss, of our West Indian possessions. 
In Australia, too, the American rivalry was keenly felt. 
Earlier examples of American competition in locomotives and 
hardware have been noted already. According to a British 
Commercial Attache, by the mid-1890s the Americans dominated 
the Australian market for wooden manufactures and their mono-
poly of the sale of tools and implements was such that "the 
British do not attempt to assail that position." The Ameri-
can strength in this trade was "the well-known talent of the 
United States manufacturers in producing the best shapes for 
utility [which] gives them a strong position in a market the 
requirements of which are somewhat similar to those of Amer-
ica." This British official attributed American success in 
certain other trades to superior packaging, more detailed and 
attractive catalogues, and better advertising. In the case 
of items on which the Australian duty was levied by the size 
50Williamson, British Industries and 
214; Michael G. Mul a , ·'f e Traa.e o t e Hri.tis11 o onies, 
ContemEorary, L.X.Xll (November, 1897), 703-04 (note that the 
rigures are for total trade, not for imports alone); Mayson 
M. Beeton, 111l1he Wrecking of the W'est Indies," Nineteenth Cen-
thry, XLII (July, 18(j?), 151-bO; Lord Pirbright, 11 'l'he Ruin ()f 
t e West Indies," National, XX.X (December, 189?), ~34. 
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of the package, the Americans "had proved themselves able to 
place a greater quantity in a cubic foot than the ~ritish" 
and in a manner which reduced breakage. ~y attention to such 
minor details as these, the AmeJ.icans had been successful in 
selling lamp-glasses, bo~tles, and other items for which 
proper packing was important. Moreover the Americans shipped 
trade packages, units which could be bought and sold in the 
cases in which they were imported. Whereas British or Con-
tinental exporters sent goods in unwieldy and irregularly 
sized cases, the Americans shipped clocks, lamps, and many 
other articles in cases of unvarying size, each containing a 
suitable number of articles for sale to retail shopkeepers, 
and attractive enough to be put on display on the merchants' 
shelves.51 
According to this same official, "the Americans also are 
doing excellent work in promoting commerce" in South Africa. 
The United States was far behind Britain as a supplier to 
Cape Colony but, as in other markets, American sales were 
increasing at a faster rate: 
From 
Great Britain 
United States 
Cape Colony Imports (Qf) 
1890 
7,825,000 
274,000 
1895 
10,427,000 
867,000 
Yankee enterprise was evident in South Africa. A large Chicago 
5lWilliam s. H. Gastrell, Our Trade in the World in Rela-
tion to Forei n Comoetition: 18 _ on on: apman & a 1, 
Ltd., 189?), , ·-ts?. The Economist also recognized the 
superiority of American packaging; September 18, 1897, 1322. 
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machinery manufacturer had established a permanent agency in 
the Transvaal with a warehouse for goods, a repair shop, and 
a technical staff. Whenever new mining projects were begun, 
its engineers were on the spot offering plans and estimates. 
If their offer was accepted, they could immediately supply 
and erect the necessary equipment, a factor which gave them 
a very great sales advantage.52 
Such a heavy incidence of American competition in 1897, 
and the fact that so much of it was taking place in England 
itself or in the British colonies, brought with it a new 
notoriety. The year 1897 was a turning point in that, for 
the first time in a number of years, many in Britain oegan 
to express the opinion that American competition was a graver 
peril than that of Germany. As early as 1897 the climate of 
opinion in Britain was being prepared for the alarmist reac-
tion to the "American invasion" a few years hence. There 
were still those who, in 189'/, oelieved that American com-
petition was inconsequential compared with that of Germany.53 
There were others who saw little point in discriminating, who 
saw dangerous competition on many sides. "America, Belgium, 
and Germany," went one example of this attitude, "are running 
us very close in our own specialties of engines, printing 
machines, agricultural machinery and implements, cycles, 
52Gastrell, Our Trade in the World, ?5, 172, Annex No. ?. 
53see, for example, Henry Birchenough, "England's Oppor-
tunity--Germany or Canada?" Nineteenth Century, XLII (July, 
1897), 1-8. 
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firearms, &c., &c."54 But there began to appear also identi-
fications of America as Britain's chief rival: "In the 
future," wrote Professor Armstrong, "we have to fear not 
German competition, but that of our colonists beyond the 
seas, and perhaps that of our American cousins mos·t of all. n55 
The United States had been identified in the official 
reports which appeared in 189?--the "Boyle Memorandum" and 
the colonial replies to Chamberlain's questionnaire--as one 
among a number of competitors; these reports had had their 
origins in 1895 and 1896. Publication of the responses to 
' Chamberlain's inquiry elicited this statement from The Times: 
The keenest of our competitors in the colonial 
trade are the United States, Germany, and Belgium, 
with Japan emerging as a rival in the Far East •••• 
The general result of the inquiry appears to be that 
British trade is still easily ahead in goods of the 
best class, except machinery and tools, in which the 
United States, on the whole, takes the lead, but that 
the colonial market very largely demands goods of a 
second-rate kind, which our foreign competitors fur-
nish at lower prices and in a more finished style 
than British manufacturers •••• As yet [British 
manufacturers] commercial supremacy remains unshaken, 
but competition has challenged it boldly and has made 
rapid advances.56 
This was a somewhat stronger statement of American competition 
than those which had appeared in The Times when the "Boyle 
Memorandum" had been published at the beginning of 1897, but 
the strongest statements were still to come. 
54Pirbright, "The Ruin of the West Indies," 532. 
55Quoted in J.B.C. Kershaw, "The Future of British Trade," 
Fortnightly, LXII n.s. (November, 1897), ?38, n.l. 
56The Times, leading article, September 15, 1897, 7. 
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In the wake of all the news and commentary of 189? con-
cerning American competition, a Fair Trader examined for the 
British public "The Future of British Trade." According to 
him, "our difficulties are an increasingly keen competition 
trom Germany and the United States." Though he denied the 
journalistic allegations of a German deluge of England, he 
quoted with approval the statement of the "Boyle Memorandum" 
that German and American "competition with us in neutral 
markets, and even in our home markets, will probably, unless 
we ourselves are active, become increasingly serious." He 
denied that report's contention that British activity could 
reduce the :3eriousness of foreign competition, which he 
believed "must inevitably slowly increase." But the most 
important conclusion which he drew from the evidence of 
189? and the most pregnant comment on Britain's commercial 
future was that "the United States is a rival in our trade 
to be feared even more than Germany. 11 57 By themselves, of 
course, such statements are inconclusive, for they represen-
ted no more than a single individual's point of view. But 
this particular view was shared by The Economist and The Times 
and was, therefore, presumably representative of a consider-
able body of British opinion. Though it was not the style of 
The Economist to offer an explicit editorial statement on the 
comparative gravity of the American and the German threats, 
it consistently took American competition more seriously, 
5?Kershaw, "The Future of British Trade," 733-3?. 
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as a reading of its issues throughout the 1890s shows. At 
no time was this more evident than in 1896 when it simul-
taneously minimized the currently fashionable alarm over 
German competition while maintaining the closest scrutiny of 
American activity in nearly every issue. The TifuPS had 
adopted this view more explicitly by the end of 189?. In a 
leading article it agreed with the President of the Royal 
Statistical Society that "the competition we may expect from 
Germany [isJ insignificant in comparison with that of the 
United States."58 
The year 1897, then, did mark a turning point for Bri-
tish opinion. While there can be no doubt that, as the pio-
neer student of the subject has shown,59 a still more exten-
sive British concern emerged after 1898 when the United States 
expressed commercial ambitions and demonstrated commercial 
energy commensurate with its new r~le as a world power, it is 
important to realize that the fund~nental features of the 
American danger were apparent to many in Britain in 1897. 
58The Times, leading article, December 16, 1897, 9. It 
must be noted, however, that both The Times and The Economist 
remained relatively confident throughout the period covered 
in this study that neither American nor German competition 
would overwhelm Britain. 
59Heindel, The American Impact on Great Britain: 1898-
1914, Chs. VII-IX. According to iieindel (171, n.1), Clapham's 
s:tu:<!y of British economic history was the first "to give pro-
per attention to the Atirica:EJ impact" but er:-ed by dating its 
emergence in 1903 rather than in 1898. It would be pedantic 
to take issue with Heindel over this date, especially since 
his study includes evidence of pre-1898 British awareness of 
the American challenge. Nevertheless, the pre-1898 origin of 
worldwide American competition and of serious British concern 
deserves emphasis. 
345 
British alarm over the "American invasion" of 1901-1902 had 
its roots in the pre-Spanish-American War years however much 
the spectacular events of 1898 established a new and differ-
ent context for American economic activity • 
. • :<;.-( ' 
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EPILOGUE 
THE CLIMAX OF THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE, 1898-1903 
"America has invaded Europe not with armed m0n but with 
manufactured products," began Frederick Mackenzie's The Amer-
ican Invaders (1902), the most detailed and the most discussed 
examination of the many facets of the American invasion of 
Britain. 
No nation has felt the results of this invasion 
more than England •••• Men have sometimes spoken as 
though the dramatic coup of a Horgan, when he took 
our Atlantic supremacy-away from us; of a Schwab, who 
outbids our steel makers; of Philadelphia bridge buil-
ders, who capture the orders of our biggest viaducts, 
comprise this invasion. They form but a very small 
part o1 it. 3uch items &re merely the sensational 
incidents in a vast campaign. The real invasion goes 
on unceasingly and with little noise or fuss in five 
hundred industries at once. From shavin~ soap to 
electric motors, and from tools to telephones, the 
American is clearing the field·.l 
In support of this thesis, I1ackenzie drew a portrait--
exaggerated yet not utterly beyond the bounds of belief, 
according to the author--of the Englishman as a consumer. 
Despite its length, the anecdote deserves quotation in full 
not only because of its content but also because it was 
probably more often alluded to than any other passage in the 
literature of the American invasion. 
The average citizen wakes in the morning at the sound 
of an American alarum clock; rises from his New England 
1Frederick Arthur Mackenzie, The American Invaders (Lon-
don: Grant Richard, 1902), 1-2. 
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sheets, and shaves with his New York soap, and a 
Yankee safety razor. He pulls on a_Pair of Boston 
boots over his socks from West [sicj Carolina, 
fastens his Connecticut braces, slips his Waterbury 
watch into his pocket, and sits down to breakfast. 
Then he congratulates his wife on the way her Illi-
nois straight-front corset sets off her Massachusetts 
blouse, and begins to tackle his breakfast, at which 
he eats bread made from prairie flour (possibly doc-
tored in the special establishment on the Lakes), 
tinned oysters from Baltimore, and a little Kansas 
City bacon, while his wife plays with a slice of 
Chicago ox tongue. The children are given Quaker 
Oats. 
Concurrently he reads his morning paper, set 
up by American machines, printed with .AI:lerican ink, 
by American presses, on American paper, edited possi-
bly by a smart journalist from New York City, and 
sub-edited with as close an approach to American 
brevity and verve as English pressmen can achieve, 
advertising its American edition of some classical 
novels or gigantic encyclopedia, which is distributed 
among the subscribers on the American installment 
system. 
Rising from his breakfast table the citizen rushes 
out, catches an electric tram I:1ade in 1Iew York, to 
Shepherds Bush, where he gets into a Yankee elevator, 
which takes him on to the American-fitted railway 
to the city. At his office of course everything is 
American. He sits on a Nebraska swivel chair, before 
a Michigan roll-top desk, writes his letters on a 
Syracuse typewriter, signing them with a New York 
fountain pen, and drying them with a blotting sheet 
from New England. The letter copies are put away in 
files nanufactured in Grand Rapids. 
At lunch time he hastily swallows some cold 
roast beef that comes from a Mid-West cow, and fla-
vours it with Pittsburgh pickles, followed by a few 
Delaware tinned peaches, and then soothes his mind 
with a couple of Virginia cigarettes. 
When evening comes he seeks relaxation at the 
latest Adelphi melodrama or Drury Lane startler, 
both made in America, or goes to a more frivolous 
theater, controlled by the great American Trust, 
where he bears the latest American musical conedy, 
acted by young ladies and thin men with pronounced 
nasal accents. For relief he drinks a cocktail or 
some California wine, and finishes up with a couple 
of "little liver pills" made in America.2 
2Ibid. ,142-43. 
-
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Caricature, however, was not a characteristic of this 
classical study of the American challenge. For the most part 
its pages were full of detailed information and specific 
examples of the invasion of American products, sarvices, 
operations, and capital investments. Mackenzie rearly suc-
ceeded in demonstrating that the invasion was affecting "five 
hundred industries at once." But, though it is the most com-
plete contemporary account and attracted considerable atten-
tion when it was published, first in 1901 as a series in 
Northcliffe's Daily Mail and then as a book in 1902, it would 
be misleading to allow the work's breadth of scope and vivid-
ness of example to obscure the very significant fact that The 
American Invaders was only the most substantial among a great 
outpouring of British writings on the American challenge 
between 1898 and 1903. This literature is much too vast for 
analysis or even for adequate ident~fication in these con-
cluding pages. However, having brought the account to the 
brink of the great "American invasion," some indication of 
the enormous impact on British opinion of the events of the 
post-1897 era is in order.3 
In a number of ways the post-1897 American challenge was 
3Tl1ese comments apply even if consideration is limited, 
as it is here, exclusively to articles, books, and pamphlets 
which deal directly with the theme of the American invasion 
or the American challenge. Writings in the newspapers and 
in the periodicals which deal specifically with other themes 
which have been treated in this study--Canada, tariffs and 
reciprocity, American competition in neutral markets, etc.--
are so numerous in the period 1898-1903 that discussion of 
them would l"equire 'book-length treatment. 
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but an intensification of already established patterns. The 
competition of American iron, steel, and engineering products 
more than ever dominated the pages of The Economist. The 
British continued to buy American pig-iron and steel and to 
face stiff competition in machine tools, enginest mechanical 
and electrical engineering products, and locomotives. Ameri-
can iron and steel exports rose from 150,000 tons in fiscal 
1896 to 998,000 tons in fiscal 1899. There could be no doubt, 
according to The Economist, that it was the American producers 
who "will for the future be the principal factors in inter-
national rivalry. ,.4 
Though it was not until 1901 that the "American invasion" 
became a prominent theme in the periodical press, as early as 
1900 readers of The Economist and The Times were aware that 
it had reached very serious proportions. "The Commercial 
History & Review of 1897" was the first to recognize American 
competition in neutral markets. "The Commercial History & 
Review of 1900" was the first to begin its analysis of the 
year's trade with the recognition that "the Americans were 
able not only to cut us out to some extent in foreign markets, 
but also to wrest from our manufacturers some of our own home 
trade." It was also the first to include a special section 
section under the heading "American competition." American 
4com. History 1898, 19-22; Com. History 1899, 22-23; for 
the last phase of the American "cycle invasion" see "Duncans," 
"The Cycle Industry," Contemporary, LXXIII (April, 1898), 
500-11; after 1898 the British regained the home market in 
this trade. 
350 
manufactured exports, it noted, had risen from f'76,160,000 
in 1898 to.£88,280,000 in 1900, an increase of more than 15%: 
Over this development of their trade there has been 
much jubilation in the States. Industrial supremacy, 
they say, is passing from the Old World to the New, 
and the ability of American manufacturers, through 
their greater energy and adaptability, and the super-
iority of their machinery, to out-distance their 
European competitors, is loudly vaunted. And there 
can be no question as to the growing industrial capa-
city of the United States. 
The value of American iron and steel exports had risen from 
c£16,500,000 in 1898 to aboutaf26,000,000 in 1900, an increase 
of nearly 60%. England had faced competition in iron and 
steel before, The Economist observed, first from Belgium and 
then from Germany, "but now we are face to face with the most 
powerful and determined competition of all."5 
American competition in engineering was growing so intense 
that in 1899 The Times dispatched ~ British engineer to tour 
and report on American production facilities. His findings 
appeared as a series in The Times in the spring of 1900; they 
attracted such interest that they were published in book form 
as American Engineering Competition. 6 These reports described 
in detail the superiority of American equipment and produc-
tion techniques and presented a wide array of examples of 
successful American competition in British and other markets 
in iron and steel, in structural steel work, in engines, 
machine tools, and agricultural equipment. The Americans 
5com. History 1900, 1, 4, 22-23. 
6The Times, American En~ineering Comnetition (London and 
New York: harper & Brothers Publishers, l~Ol). 
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had an even greater edge in the newer electrical engineering 
industry; in England these products faced virtually no Bri-
tish competition at all but only that of German manufacturers.? 
The British periodical press had been rather silent 
regarding the American challenge since 1892. As l:e saw in 
Part III, the intensification of American competition was 
broadcast for the most part in the newspapers. The events 
of 1898 ch,1nged this. The new world role which the United 
States adopted, coupled with the continuing expansion of 
American manufactured exports, re-established the American 
challenge as a staple item in the journals of opinion and 
occasioned the publication of a number of books and pamphlets. 8 
?For one of the earliest accounts, see A. A. Campbell 
Swinton, "Electrical Engineering and the 11unicipalities,u 
Nineteenth Centur~, XLVII (February, 1900), 297-303. 
8or the six journals of opinion used in this study, The 
ContemEorary Review, The Fortniu.;btly Review, The National-
Review, and ·rhe i~ineteenth Century, might '6e saiO: to have 
oeen preoccupied with tbe American challenge. For virtually 
issue-by-issue coverage the regular features of The National 
Review-- 11 Episodes of the I1onth" and A. Maurice Low*s column, 
'11'Tfie Month in America"--deserve special mention. The Edin-
burgh Review and The Ouarterly Review gave it less prominence 
out by no means did they ignore it. 
Of the literally hundreds of articles which dealt with 
or alluded to the American challenge in these six journals 
between 1898 and 1903, the following represent only a sampling 
of the more important contributions: 
The Contemporary Review: nRitortus," "The Imperialism 
of British Trade: Parts I and II," LXXVI (July, August, 1899), 
132-52, 282-304; "The Author of 'Drifting, '" "The Economic 
Decay of' Great Britain," LXXIX, LXXX (May, July, August, 1901), 
609-38, 24-33, 264-83; Henry W. Macrosty and s. G. Hobson, 
"The Billion Dollar Trust: I and II," LXXX (August, September, 
1901), 177-94, 333-54; Walter F. Ford, "American Investments 
in England,'' LXXXI (March, 1902), 401-08; Dr. E. J. Dillon, 
"The Commercial Needs of the Empire," LXXXI (April, 1902), 
457-81; Wal"ter F. Ford, "The Limits of the American Invasion," 
LXXXI (June, 1902), ?80-8?; o. Elzbacher, "The American Shipping 
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The influx of American manufactured products and of Amer-
ican coal; the invasion of England by the Steel, the Match, 
the Tobacco, and other American Trusts; the frightened out-
cry over Morgan's attempt to monopolize Atlantic shipping; 
the construction by Americans of much of London's transit 
system; the repatriation of American securities and a wave 
of American investments in British enterprises--these and 
Trust," LXXXII (July, 1902), 69-79; J. A. Hobson, "The Econo-
mic Taproot of Imperialism," LXXXII (August, 1902), 219-32; 
and Major c. C. Townsend, "The American Industrial Peril," 
LXXXII (October, 1902), 562-67. 
The Edinburgh Review: "American and English Working Peo-
ple," CXCIII (April, 1901), 489-510. 
The Fortnightly Review: "The Commercial Future," Brooks 
Adams, "The New Struggle for Life among Nations," and Benjamin 
Taylor, "The Commercial Sovereignty of the Seas;" LXV n.s. 
(February, 1899), 274-99; Benjamin Taylor, 11 The Struggle for 
Industrial Supremacy," LXYIII n.s. (October, 1900), 639-52; 
"Calchas," "Will England Last the Century?" LXIX n.s. (January, 
1901), 20-34; "Commercial Rivalry with America": Benjamin Tay-
lor, "The I•Iari time Expansion of America," and H. W. Wilson, 
"Face to Face with the Trusts," LXX n.s. (July, 1901), 61-8'7; 
"Two Presidents and the Limits of American Supremacy," L:XX 
n.s. (October, 1901), 555-70; and J. A. Hobson, "The A:pproach-
ing Abandonment of Free Trade," LXXI n.s. (I1arch, 1902), L~34-44. 
The National Review: W. R. Lawson, "Morganeering," XXXVII 
(June, 1901), 538-47; brnest E. Williams [author of Made in 
German , "Made in Germany--Five Years After," XXXVIII (Septem-
er, 1 01), 130-44; and "The Economies of Empire," a 106-page 
supplement which appeared with the regular issue of September, 
1903. 
The Nineteenth Centurt: Andrew Carnegie, "The Manchester 
School and To-Day, 11 XLIII February, 1898), 277-83; Frederick 
Greenwood, "The Anglo-American Future," XLIV (July, 1898), 1-
11; J. W. Cross, "British Trade in 1898: A Warning Note," XLV 
(May, 1899)t 850-56; Andrew Carnegie, "British Pessimism," XLIX 
(June, 1901;, 901-12; Edmund Robertson, "The Shippi.Llg 'Combine' 
and the British Flag,'' LI (June, 1902), 873-82; George T. Deni-
son, "Canada and the Imperial Conference," LI (June, 1902), 
900-07; John Foster Fraser "The Success of American Manufac-
turers," LIII (.March, 1903), 390-402; Sir Robert Giffen, Edward 
Dicey, and Benjamin Kidd, "Imperial Policy and Free Trade: Parts 
I-III," LIV (July, 1903), 1-54. 
The Quarterly Review: "A Council of Trade," CXCVI (July, 
1902), 221-38; "Mr. Chamberlain's Fiscal Policy," CXCVIII (July, 
1903), 246-78; and "Retaliation and Reciprocity," CXCVIII 
(October, 1903), 613-48. 
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many other manifestations of the American challenge filled 
the pages of the British press between 1898 and 1903. Those 
British readers not sated in this manner could turn to books 
such as Harold Cox, American Progress and British Co~erce;9 
B. H. Thwaite, The American Invasion; Or, England's Commercial 
Danger; 10 or Beckles Willson, The New America: A Study of the 
Imperial Republic. 11 
None of these, however, came close to matching Mackenzie's 
American invaders in demonstrating to the British the many 
ways in which their lives were being affected by American 
economic developments. The only work which could rival Mac-· 
kenzie's was the less intensive but wider-ranging book by 
William Thomas Stead, The Americanization of the World; Or, 
The Trend of the Twentieth Century. 12 Stead devoted two 
chapters of his work to the economic "Americanization" of the 
world but he maintained that politically, socially, and cul-
turally, the same process was evident in England, in the Bri-
9(London and New York: Cassell & Company, 1902). I was 
not able to obtain a copy of this work; an article by Cox 
bearing the same title appeared in The North American Review 
(July, 1901), 91-101. The thesis of the article was that the 
expansion of American industry and prosperity was good for 
Britain and that, though British "yellow journals" made much 
of the American peril, "sober Englishmen only read such papers 
for the sake of amusement." 
10originally published in London in 1902, the only copy 
I was able to obtain was that of (Wilmington, North Carolina 
and Washington, D.C.: Hugh MacRae & Co., Bankers, 1902). 
11 (London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1903). 
12(London and New York: Horace Markley, 1901, 1902). 
I have used the latter edition. 
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tish Colonies, and in other portions o.f the globe. "That the 
United States of America," Stead maintained, "have now arrived 
at such a pitch of power and prosperity as to have a right to 
claim the leading place among the English-speaking nations 
cannot be disputed." Though many in England would indeed 
have disputed it, there were many who were in sympathy with 
Stead's chief objective, the unification of the two branches 
of the Anglo-Saxon race. Many might have disputed th3 way 
he phrased his argument, but his conclusion, since it was 
used by many in England to rationalize their acceptance of 
the American invasion, will serve as an appropriate conclusion 
to this study. "It is possible," wrote Stead, 
that the American may stand to the Briton as Chris-
tianity stands to Judaism •••• [and] so it may be 
through the Americans that the English ideals ex-
pressed in the English language may make the tour of 
the planet •••• the philosophical historian may 
record that the mission of the English fulfilled 
itself through the American. The Americanization 
of the world is but the Anglicizing of the world at 
one remove.13 
l3Ibid., 3-4. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRINCIPAL PRIMARY SOURCES 
NewsEal'ers 
l'he Economist 
~·he Times 
Periodical Articles 
Alcock, Rutherford. "China and Its Foreign Relations,n 
Contemporary Review, XXXVIII (December·, 1880), 1000-24. 
Anderson, George. "The Future of the Canadian Dominion," 
Contemporary Review, XXXVIII (September, 1880), 396-411. 
Arnold-Forster, H. O. "Our True Foreign Policy," Nineteenth 
Century, XXXIX (February, 1896), 204-17. 
Atkinson, Edward. "An American Vj.ew of American Competition," 
Fortnip;htly Review, XXV n. s. (March, 1879), 383-96. 
• "The Railroads of the United States: Their Effec'\is 
----on Farming and Production in That Country and in Great 
·Britain," Fortnigh·cly Review, XXVIII n.s. (July, 1880) 1 83-104. 
Baden-Powell, George. "New Markets for British Produce," 
Nineteenth Century, X (July, 1881), 43-55. 
----· "Our National Future," National Review, IV (Febru-
ary, 1885), 766-?5. 
Beeton, Mayson M. "The Wrecking of the west Indies," Nine-
teenth Century, XLII (July, 189?), 151-60. ----
Bell, Lowthian. "The Iron and Steel Trade," Fortnightly 
Review, XLI n.s. (January, 1887), 88-104. 
Bettany, George Thomas. "Europe versus the United States: A 
Darwinian Forecast," Contemporary Review, LIII (r-1arch, 
1888), 395-405. • 
Birchenough, Henry. "Do Foreign Annexations Injure British 
Trade?" Nineteenth Centur;z, XLI (June, 1897), 993-1004. 
• "England's Opportunity--German;y or Canada?" 
---N!"'l"i-neteenth Century, XLII (July, 1897), 1-8. 
355 
356 
II 
Brassey, Thomas. "The Depression of Trade, Nineteenth Cen-
tury, V (May, 1879), 788-811. 
Brock, D. "Advance of the United States during One Hundred 
Years," Fortnightly Review, LIV n.s. (July, 1893), 116-41. 
Buxton, Sidney C. "Fair Trade and Free Trade: A Dialogue," 
Contemporary Review, XL (December, 1881), 959-84. 
Carnegie, Andrew. "As Others See Us, 11 Fortnightly Review, 
XX:XI n.s. (February, 1882), 156-65. 
----· "Britain and the United States: Cost of Living 
Compared," Contemporary Review, LXVI (September, 1894), 
318-26. 
___ ..,,.,,,.. "Does America Hate England?" Contemporary Review, 
LXXII (November, 1897), 660-68. 
• "The McKinley Bill," Nineteenth Centur;y, XXIX 
__ _,,( .... J~une, 1891), 1027-36. 
Colquhoun, Archibald R. "An Anglo-Chinese Commercial Alliance," 
National Review, VI (October, 1885), 162-73. 
Cooke, C. Kinloch. "Europe in the Pacific," Nineteenth Cen-
tury, XX (November, 1886), 742-64. 
Courtney, Leonard H. ".Migration of Industrial Centres," 
Fortnightly Review, XXIV n.s. (December, 1878), 801-20. 
Cripps, C. A. "Competition and Free Trade," National Review, 
X (November, 1887), 341-54. 
Cumming, A. N. "America and Protection," National Review, 
XVI (October, 1890), 370-82. 
Depew, Chauncey M. "Prospects of Free Trade in the United 
States," Nineteenth Centur:t;, XX.XV (February, 1894), 343-52. 
Donald, Robert. "McKinleyism and the Presidential Election," 
Contemporar:t; Review, LXII (October, 1892), 489-504. 
Douglas, Robert K. "The Greater Eastern Question," National 
Review, XXVI (December, 1895), 484-93. 
"Duncans." "The C;rcle Industry," Contemporary Review, LXXIII 
(April, 1898), 500-11. 
Dunraven, E3.rl of Dunraven. "Commercial Union within the 
Empire," Nineteenth Century, XXIX (March, 1891), 507-22. 
Ecroyd, W. Farrer. "Fair Trade," Nineteenth Century, X (Octo-
ber, 1881), 588-605. 
35? 
"England and Her Second Colonial .Empire," Quarterly Review, 
CLVIII (July, 1884), 134-61. 
"Episodes of the Month," National Review, XLI (June, 1903), 
521-;o. 
Finlayson, Archibald W. "Falling Trade and Factory Legisla-
tion," Nineteenth Century, XIII (June, 1883), 971-7?. 
Frewen, Moreton. "The N;.;itional Policy of the United States," 
Fortnightly Review, XLVIII n.s. (November, 1890), 674-83. 
Giffen, Robert .. "Depression Corrected," Edinburgh Review, 
CLXXXII (July, 1895), 1-26. 
• "The Dream of a British Zollverein," Nineteenth 
------c-e-ntury, LI (May, 1902), 693-705. 
• "The Liquidations of 1873-6," Fortnightly Review, 
-----~:xx=--tr n.s. (October, 1877), 510-25. 
• "Trade Depression and Low Prices," Contemporary 
---~!'-e-vi ew, XL VII (June , 188 5), 800-22. 
Giles, Herbert. "The Present State of' China," Fortnightly 
Reviel>·, XXVI n.s. (September, 18?9), 362-84. 
Gladstone, William E. "Free Trade, Railways, and the Growth 
of Commerce," Nineteenth Centur;y, VII (February, 1880), 
36?-88. 
Greenwood, Frederick. "Free Trade a Variable Eicperiment," 
National Review, XX (November, 1892), 310-26. 
Greg, Percy. "Financial Prospects, 11 Quarterl;y Review, CLVII 
(January, 1884), 58-91. 
Grey, Henry George, Earl Grey. "Protection--Free Trade--
Fair Trade--Colonial Trade," Nineteenth Centur;y, XXXI (Janua.ry, 1892), 38-60. - . 
Griffiths, Robert J. "New Markets for British Industry," 
Quarterly Review, CLXIII (July, 1886), 151-79. 
Hake, A. Egmont and O. E. Wesslau. "The American Tariff War," 
Fortnightly Review, XLVIII n.s. (October, 1890), 559-69. 
Henderson, James. "England and America as Manufacturing Com-
petitors," Contemnorarv Review, XXXIII (October, 1878), 
458-69. 
Hincks, F. "Commercial Union from a Canadian Point of View," 
Fortnightly Review, XXIX n.s. (May, 1881), 61'8-33. 
Horner, Joseph G. "The Age of Steel," Quarterly Review, 
CLXIX (July, 1889), 132-61. 
358 
• "Technical Education and Foreign Competition," 
-------Q-u-arterly Review, CLXVII (October, 1888), 448-77• 
Howell, George. "The State of Our Trade," Fortnightly Review, 
XLI n.s. (February, 1887), 196-210. 
Hurlbert, W. H. "The Fiscal System of the United States," 
Edinburgh Review, CLXXIII (January, 1891), 268-98. 
Jeans, J. Stephen. "American Railways and British Farmers, 11 
Nineteenth Century, XXVIII (September, 1890), 392-411. 
• "The American Tariff--Its Past and Future," 
-----F..-or-tnightly Review, LII n.s. (December, 1892), 746-60. 
• "The Coal Crisis and the Paralysis of British 
---In-d ...ustry," Nineteenth Century, XXXIV (November, 1893), 
?91-801. 
• "The Labour War in the United States,n Nineteenth 
--~-c-e-ntu~~' XXXVI (August, 1894), 259-67. 
Jennings, Ii. J. "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 
Quarterly Review, CLII (July, 1881), 271-306. 
• "Fair Trade and British Labour," Quarterly Review, 
~----c-t-!r (October, 1881), 552-94. 
• "The Trade League against England," Nineteenth 
---c.,.-en-tury, XXVIII (December, 1890), 901-13. 
Johnson, F. Bulkeley. "English Supremacy in the East," Nine-
teenth Century, XVI (September, 1884), 490-504. ----
Keith, James. "Our Great Competitor," Nineteenth Century, 
XXI (June, 188?), 792-99. 
Kershaw, J.B.C. "The Future of British Trade," Fortnightly 
Review, LXII n.s. (November, 189?), 732-49. 
Kitson, James. "The Iron and Steel Industries of America," 
Contemporary Review, LIX (May, 1891), 625-41. 
Kropotlcin, Prince Peter. "The Brealcdown of Our Industrial 
System," Nineteenth Century, XXIII (April, 1888), 497-516. 
"The Lancashire Cotton-Strike," Quarterly Review, CXLVI (July, 
18?8)' 485-519. 
359 
Leffingwell, Albert J. "Free-Trade from an American Stand-
point," Contemporary Review, XXXVIII (July, 1880), 55-68. 
Leslie, T. E. Cli.ffe. "The History and Future of Interest 
and Profit," Fortnightly Review, XXX n.s. (November, 
1881), 640-59. 
Lethbridge, Roper. "Is an Imperial Fiscal Policy Possible?" 
National Review, V (March, 1885), 29-42. 
Levi, Leone. "The Material Growth of the United Kingdom from 
1836 to 1886," Fortnightly Review, XLI n.s. (June, 1887), 
913-27. 
Loftus, Lord Augustus. "Commercial Unity with the Colonies," 
Nineteenth Century, XXXIII (February, 1893), 339-46. 
Low, A. Maurice. "The Month in America," National Review, 
XXIX (June, July, 1897), 583-93, ?44-55. 
Low, Sydney. "The Olney Doctrine and America's New Foreign 
Policy," Nineteenth Centurv, XL (December, 1896), 849-60. 
Lugard, F. D. "New British Markets (3): Tropical A.frica," 
Nineteenth Century, XXXVIII (September, 1895), 442-54. 
Marlborough, Duke of Marlborough. "Virginia Mines and Ameri-
can Rails, 11 Fortnightly Review, XLIX n. s. (!1ay, 1891), 
?80-9?. 
Maclure, Alexander. "America as a Fower," Nineteenth Century, 
XXXIX (June, 1896), 906-13. ----
McCulloch, D. "Canadian Protection Vindicated," Fortnightly 
Review, XXV n. s • (May, 1879) , 748-62. 
Medley, George W. "The Lion's Share of the World's Trade," 
Nineteenth Century, XIX (June, 1886), 807-26. 
Mulhall, Michael G. "The Carrying-Trade of the World," 
Contemporary Review, XL (October, 1881), 608-15. 
----· "The Carrying-Trade of the World," Contemporary 
Review, LXVI (December, 1894), 811-20. 
----· "The Trade of the British Colonies," Contemporarz 
Review, LXXII (November, 1897), 697-708. 
----· "Two Decades of Industry," Contemporary Review, XL (November, 1881), 818-24. 
"1920," Contemporary Review, LXVIII (December, 1895), 761-72. 
360 
Pattison, Mark. "Industrial Shortcomings," Fortnightly Review, 
XXVIII n.s. (December, 1880), 737-51. 
Penzance, Lord Penzance. "Collapse of the Free Trade Argument," 
Nineteenth Century, XX (September, 1886), 322-39. 
---~· "The Free-Trade Idolatry," Nineteenth Century;, XIX (March, 1886), 380-95. 
Phelps, L. R. "The Economy of High Wages," Edinburgh Review, 
CLXXIX (January, 1894), 33-61. -
Philips, W. Hallett. "The United States and Cuba--A New 
Armenia," National Review, XXVIII (January, 1897), 598-
604. 
Pirbright, Lord Pirbright. "The Ruin of the West Indies," 
National Review, XXX (December, 1897), 519-34. 
Playfair, Lyon. "On Patents and the New Patent Bill," 
Nineteenth Century, I (April, 1877), 315-26. 
---...-· "The Progress of Applied Science in Its Effect upon 
Trade," .Qontemporar;z Review, LIII (March, 1888), 358-71. 
Plimsoll, Samuel. "'Trusts': An Alarm," Nineteenth Century;~ 
XXIX (May, 1891), 832-44. 
"The Present Depression of Trade," Fortnightly Review, LIII 
n.s. (March, 1893), 297-315. 
"Principles at Stake," Quarterly; Review, CXLVIII (October, 
1879), 568-606. 
Rae, John. "The Balance Sheet of Short Hours," Contem:porar;z 
Review, LX (October, 1891), 499-520. 
"Ritortus." "The Imperialism of British Trade: Parts I and 
II, 11 Contemporary Review, LXXVI (July, August, 1899), 
132-52, 282-304. 
Seymour, E. H. "The Present State of the Panama Canal," 
Nineteenth Century;, XXXI (February, 1892), 293-311. 
Shadwell, A. "The Economic Aspects of the Bicycle," National 
Review, XXVIII (:November, 1896), 345-53· 
Smith, Goldwin. "The Canadian Tariff," Contemporary Review, 
XL (September, 1881), 378-98. 
• "The Expansion o.f England," Contem:porary Review, 
---n;-v (April, 1884), 524-40. 
361 
• "The Greatness of England," Contemporary Review, 
---~-xx--xIV (December, 1878), 1-18. 
• "The Political Destiny of Canada," FortnightlL_ 
---R,_e-view, XXI n.s. (April, 1877), 431-59. 
Somerset, H. Somers. "Great Britain, Venezuela, and the 
United States," Nineteenth Centur;y, XXXVIII (December, 
1895). 
Stout, Robert. "A Colonial View of Imperial Federation," 
Nineteenth Century, XXI (March, 1887), 351-61. 
Sullivan, Edward. "Isolated Free Trade: Part I," Nineteenth 
Centurz, X (August, 1881), 161-83. 
Swinton, A. A. Campbell. "Electrical Engineering and the 
Municipalities," Nineteenth Century, XLVII (:F'ebruary, 
1900)' 297-303. . 
Syme, David. "Restrictions on Trade from a Colonial Point 
of View," Fortnightly Review, XIII n.s. (April, 1873), 
447-64. 
Tait, P. M. "Life Assurance," Edinburgh Review, CLXXII 
(October, 1890), 491-520. 
Taylor, Benjamin. "The Coming Struggle in the Pacific," 
fil;.neteenth Centur;y, XLIV (October, 1898), 656-72. 
Tupper, Charles. "The Question of Preferential Tariffs," 
Fortnightly Review, LII n.s. (August, 1892), 137-45. 
Vogel, Julius, "Greater or Lesser Britain," Nineteenth 
Century, I (July, 18??), 809-31. 
Whitaker, Thomas P. "The Proposals of the Fair Trade League," 
Nineteenth Century, X (October, 1881), 606-28. 
White, Horace. "The Financial Crisis in Anerica," Fortnight!z 
Review, XIX n.s. (June, 1876), 810-29. 
'Whymper, Edward. "The Panama Canal," Contemporary Review, 
LV (March, 1889), 323-40. 
Williamson, Stephen. "Bad Trade and Its Causes," Contemporary 
Review, X"XXV (April, 1879), 121-30. 
Wiman, Erastus. "Canada and the States: A Barbed Wire Fence," 
Contemporary Review, LIX (April, 1891), 620-24. 
Wood, Henry Trueman. "Chicago and Its Exhibition," Nineteenth 
Centurz, .XXXI (April, 1892), 553-65. 
362 
Books 
Burgis, Edwin. Perils to British Trade: How to Avert Them. 
London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1895. 
Cox, Harold. American Progress and British Commerce. London 
and New York: Cassell & Company, 1902. 
Ellison, Thomas, The Cotton 
Effingham 1Jilson, 1886. 
Trade of Great Britain. London: 
Gastrell, William S. H. Our Trade in the World in Relation 
,,,.,,t,_o.._.,,.F_o._r-=e..,.i~g._n_C...,,o'""m.-'!Op,,..,e,....t_i_t_i_· -o:n_-_:-:_..,,.1_...,.8~"'"8:'.._2 .. -_ ..... _1-:_s:9:_2,,....., .-'""'L"""o_n_a. .. .. o-·ii-: -c=h.-a_p_m-an-.... &-
Hal l, Ltd., 1897. 
Giffen, Robert. Essays in Finance. Second Series; New York: 
G. P. Putnam'Sf3ons, 1886. 
Grey, Henry George, Earl Grey. The Commercial Policy of the 
British Colonies and the McKinle~ Tariff. London ancr-
New York: Macmillan and Co., 189 • 
Jeans, James Stephen. England's Supremacy: Its Sources, 
Economics, and Dangers. London: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., 1885. 
Mackenzie, Frederick Arthur. The American Invaders. London: 
Grant Richards, 1902. 
McCormick, Robert. The Future Trade Relations between Great 
Britain and the United States and the Horld 1 s Columbian 
Ex osition to e Hel at 0 icar;o in 8 • London: VJ. S. 
Trounce, 1 
Mulhall, Michael G. 
1887. London: 
Stead, William Thomas. The Americanization of the World; Or, 
The Trend of the ~Nentieth Cen~ury. London and New York: 
Horace l'larkley, 1961, 1962. 
Thwaite, B. H. The American Invasion: Or, England's Commer-
cial Danger. Wilmington, North Carolina and Washington, 
D. C.: Hugh MacRae & Co., Bankers, 1902. 
The Times. ~merican Engineering Competition. London: Harper & Row Brothers PUblishers, 1961. 
Williamson, A. British Industries and Foreign ComEetition. 
London: Simpkin, Harshall, liam:~lton, Kent & Co., Ltd., 1894. 
Willson, Beckles. The New America: A Stud~ of the Imperial 
Republic. London: Chapman & Hall, Lt ., 1903. . 
A:PPROVAL SHEET 
The dissertation submitted by Richard Gruber has been read 
and approved by members of the Department of History. 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the 
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies 
the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated 
and that the dissertation is now given final approval with 
reference to content and form. 
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
~''ii Date 
